Publication Date

2018

Abstract

This chapter argues that the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God is a straightforwardly legitimate argument. The fine-tuning argument takes certain features of fundamental physics to confirm the existence of God because these features of fundamental physics are more likely given the existence of God than they are given the non-existence of God. And any such argument is straightforwardly legitimate, as such arguments follow a canonically legitimate form of empirical argumentation. The chapter explores various objections to the fine-tuning argument: that it requires an ill-defined notion of small changes in the laws of physics, that it over-generalizes, that it requires implausible presuppositions about divine intentions, and that it is debunked by anthropic reasoning. In each case it finds either that the putatively objectionable feature of the fine-tuning argument is inessential to it or that the putatively objectionable feature of the fine-tuning argument is not actually objectionable.

School/Institute

Dianoia Institute of Philosophy

Document Type

Book Chapter

Access Rights

ERA Access

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