Blake-Turner, C. & Russell, G. (2018). Logical pluralism without the normativity. Synthese, 1-19. Netherlands: Springer Netherlands. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals.
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
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