Russell, G. (2020). Logic isn't normative. Inquiry,63(3-4), 371-388. United Kingdom: Routledge. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1372305
Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and how we ought to reason, so that pluralism about the consequence relation would result in an incoherent or unattractive pluralism about those things. In this paper I argue that logic isn’t normative. I distinguish three different ways in which a theory – such as a logical theory – can be entangled with the normative and argue that logic is only entangled in the weakest of these ways, one which requires it to have no normativity of its own. I use this view to show what is wrong with three different arguments for the conclusion that logic is normative.
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Access may be restricted.