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This paper points out a tension between Agustín Rayo’s criteria for singulartermhood and his explicit views on the status of Hybrid Identities, that is, identity statements that use singular terms from two different Systems of Representation, such as ‘7=Julius Caesar’ or more suggestively ‘I am b’ where ‘b’ is a singular term referring to my brain. It argues that non-trivial Hybrid Identities are common and important in philosophy and elsewhere, and it suggests a friendly alternative that involves treating Hybrid Identities on the model of Rayo’s ‘Just Is’ statements. The last section of the paper points out that even this friendly alternative has counterintuitive consequences when combined with the metaphysical conventionalism that Rayo finds attractive, when it comes to questions of personal identity over time.


Dianoia Institute of Philosophy

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Journal Article

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