Fritz, P. & Goodman, J. (2017). Counterfactuals and propositional contingentism. Review of Symbolic Logic,10(3), 509-529. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020317000144
This article explores the connection between two theses: the principle of conditional excluded middle for the counterfactual conditional, and the claim that it is a contingent matter which (coarse grained) propositions there are. Both theses enjoy wide support, and have been defended at length by Robert Stalnaker. We will argue that, given plausible background assumptions, these two principles are incompatible, provided that conditional excluded middle is understood in a certain modalized way. We then show that some (although not all) arguments for conditional excluded middle can in fact be extended to motivate this modalized version of the principle.
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
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