Baron, S. (2019). How to endure presentism. Inquiry,62(6), 659-673. United Kingdom: Routledge. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1487883
Presentism and endurantism are natural bedfellows: arguments have been mounted from endurantism to presentism and vice versa. I generalise an argument against the compatibility between presentism and endurantism offered recently by Tallant (forthcoming. “Presentism, Persistence and Trans-temporal Dependence.” Philosophical Studies). I then show how to reformulate endurantism so that it is compatible with presentism. I demonstrate that this reformulated version of endurantism can do the same work with respect to the problem of temporary intrinsics as can standard definitions.
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
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