Baron, S., Miller, K. & Norton, J. (2014). Groundless truth. Inquiry,57(2), 175-195. United Kingdom: Routledge. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855652
We defend two claims: (1) if one is attracted to a strong non-maximalist view about truthmaking, then it is natural to construe this as the view that there exist fundamental truths; (2) despite considerable aversion to fundamental truths, there is as yet no viable independent argument against them. That is, there is no argument against the existence of fundamental truths that is independent of any more specific arguments against the ontology accepted by the strong non-maximalist. Thus there is no argument that the strong non-maximalist herself will find dialectically motivating.
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
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