Hawthorne, J. (2015). Comments on transient truths: An essay in the metaphysics of propositions (Berit Brogaard). Inquiry,58(6), 617-624. United Kingdom: Routledge. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1077014
This paper distinguishes two importantly different kinds of temporalism. According to one version, the truth value of propositions is parameterized to times. According to a second version, propositions have a truth value simpliciter, but some propositions that are true will be or were false. I point out that the second version is neglected in Berit Brogaard's Transient Truths (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), and explore whether there are good arguments against it implicit in that work. I also critically engage with various arguments presented by Brogaard against semantic eternalism.
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
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