Ordinary Language Arguments and the Philosophy of Mind

Submitted by
Timb D. Hoswell B. A. Hons

A thesis submitted in complete fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

School of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy

Australian Catholic University
Research Services Office

40 Edward Street
North Sydney New South Wales 2060
P.O. Box 968
North Sydney, New South Wales, 2059

July 2020
This thesis contains no material extracted in whole or in part from a thesis by which I have qualified for or been awarded another degree or diploma. No parts of this thesis have been submitted towards the award of any other degree or diploma in any other tertiary institution. No other person’s work has been used without due acknowledgement in the main text of the thesis.

Signed: ......................................

Date: 14/7/2020
To my mother, Elisabeth Moore, who, despite the death of my father, raised me as best she could around the hospitals, psyche wards and nursing homes she worked in, and I spent much of my early years, and to her complete, unapologetic and incorrigible love of medicine and the medical sciences.

To Myf. This is what I was doing at the university.

With special thanks to Dr John Gerad Quilter, my Pater Philosophici, who fought for this thesis the entire way.

Also, many thanks to Louise Clayton-Jones for her patient editing and grammatical notes.

With further thanks to Associate Professor Michael Griffith for supporting me and encouraging my originality in something of a guardian spirit role. Dr Edward, ‘Ted’, Sadler for teaching me to be painstakingly thorough in my scholarship and historical research as an undergraduate. Such lessons have stayed with me through my life. To all of my lecturers of past, present and future. Lastly to all of the Philosophy and Theology Department at ACU for all of their support over the years.

Thank you.
**A note on the text**

Where I introduce an important term either from a philosopher or author, or refer back to that term after a considerable break I use quotation marks. For instance, the term ‘report’ is very important within Wilfrid Sellars’ work and when I introduce such a term in the paper I put it in quotations. However, when I adopt a philosopher’s term, and change its meaning either through consideration of peer review, my own arguments or by augmenting it with considerations from other philosophers I will treat the term with capital letters referring to the concept I am developing. For instance, ‘report’ which refers to Sellars’ use of the term will become ‘Report’ once I consider Andrew Gleeson’s points about affective vocabularies and develop what is meant by that term further through the thesis. The reason why some terms are treated this way, while others are not, depends on whether I take the terms as the original authors and philosophers intended them, or whether I develop them conceptually for the purposes of the argument presented in this paper. At times it is necessary to refer to differences between my development of a term, and the author’s original use of that term. At other times it is necessary to compare an author’s specific technical use of a term, with what is meant in ordinary language when somebody uses the same term. Here I will use quotations for the author’s use and leave the ordinary everyday English use without alteration.
# Contents

*Introduction* ................................................................................................................................................. 8

The Languages of Mind...................................................................................................................................... 8

Ordinary Language Arguments and the Project of Anti-Psychologism in the Philosophy of Mind.................................................................................................................................................. 58

Anti-Psychologism and the Occult Phenomenology............................................................................................ 65

Can the Chalmerian zombie in the Sellarsian Village learn to speak Rylean? ............................................. 76

The Three Tiers of Solving the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem in the Philosophy of Mind......................... 80

*Part One:* ...................................................................................................................................................... 94

Ordinary Language and The Cartography of the Mind....................................................................................... 94

Chapter One Dissection of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account of the Mind ..................................................... 94

Linguistic Behaviourism and Logical Behaviourism.......................................................................................... 94

David Chalmers............................................................................................................................................... 100

Morris Weitz .................................................................................................................................................... 111

Chapter Two.................................................................................................................................................... 127

Linguistic Behaviourism................................................................................................................................... 127

Episodes and dispositions. ................................................................................................................................. 127

What exemplifies Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourist Claims? .................................................................................. 127

Chapter Three.................................................................................................................................................. 134

Ryle and Analytic Philosophy.......................................................................................................................... 134

Ryle’s Two Most Fundamental Insights on the Mind and the Relationship between these Insights and Linguistic Behavioural Arguments ......................................................................................... 134

Chapter Four................................................................................................................................................... 146

The Primacy of the Sentence and Propositional thought .................................................................................. 146

Capacity and Tendency configurations. ............................................................................................................ 153

Chapter Five................................................................................................................................................... 159

Gilbert Ryle, Wilfrid Sellars and science. .......................................................................................................... 159

Chapter Six...................................................................................................................................................... 193

Ryle’s Moodology and ‘Flash Bangs’................................................................................................................. 193

Chapter Seven.................................................................................................................................................. 206

Chalmers, Judgements and Phenomenal Zombies........................................................................................... 206
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Two</th>
<th>Introspection, Retrospection, Consciousness and the Log Keeper of the mind</th>
<th>212</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eight</td>
<td>Introspection</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Nine</td>
<td>Sea Water, Consciousness and Introspection. Gilbert Ryle on Mindfulness</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Ten</td>
<td>Ryle’s Log Keeper of the Mind</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eleven</td>
<td>The Three Examples of what you cannot do with language alone</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Twelve</td>
<td>Ryle’s Diachronic attack on consciousness</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Three</td>
<td>The Ghost in Ryle’s Grammatical Machinery</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Thirteen</td>
<td>Ordinary Language Arguments and their ability to affirm or negate claims about the mind</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Fourteen</td>
<td>Phenomenological arguments</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Fifteen</td>
<td>Midway map of the paper</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Three Chief Types of Argument Found in <em>The Concept of Mind</em></td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummett and the Implicit Language Philosophers</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chalmerian zombies and the ‘flash-bangs’</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The end for the Ordinary Language Philosophy thesis as a Grand Unifying Theory of Mind</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Robert Wolf Paper and Autophenomenology</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Four</td>
<td>Internalization and the Language of the ‘Flash-Bang’</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Sixteen</td>
<td>Observational and Report Languages</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seventeen</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Language ........................................360
Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of Mind ........................................................................360
Endo-Affective Languages .................................................................................................379
Chapter Eighteen ............................................................................................................389
Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars and the argument for Private Access ...................................389
The Beetle in the Box Argument and the Chalmerian phenomenal zombie. .................389
The Incompleteness of the Philosophical Investigations ..................................................401
Wittgenstein’s Account of Language Acquisition for Phenomenal Experiences in the
Philosophical Investigations .............................................................................................408
Chapter Nineteen .............................................................................................................415
Wilfrid Sellars’ Re-formulation of Wittgenstein’s Language Rules Regress ....................415
Chapter Twenty ...............................................................................................................429
Insights into Dispositional Terms from the Age of Anti-Metaphysicians .......................429
Conclusion and Afterword ...............................................................................................449
Works Cited ....................................................................................................................467
Give me a keen understanding,

a retentive memory, and

the ability to grasp things

correctly and fundamentally.

Grant me the talent

of being exact in my explanations

and the ability to express myself

with thoroughness and charm.

Point out the beginning,

direct the progress,

and help in the completion.

From Thomas Aquinas

A Student Prayer
Ordinary Language Arguments and The Philosophy of Mind

By Timb D. Hoswell

Introduction

I

The Languages of Mind

To engage your interest in this dissertation I offer to you a curious question to ponder. How often does a psychiatrist or a psychologist get the chance to ask themselves whether the words that they use to describe the mental life of their patient mean the same thing to the patient as they do to the doctor or analyst using them? Does the patient understand what the doctor or analyst is telling them? Equally importantly there is a question whether the patient’s verbal reports mean the same thing to the doctor or analyst as the patient thinks they mean. At first this may seem trivial given the doctor or analyst’s extensive
training and education. Surely this is a one sided question one might say. Surely
the doctor or analyst can understand the patient but the patient may not have
the educational background and training to understand the doctor’s or analyst’s
terms, which the doctor or analyst is using to describe the patient’s own mental
life.

One might persist in reasoning in this way, claiming that knowledge is all
on the medical practitioner’s side, until the point is raised that the patient may
have experiences the analyst or doctor does not have. For instance, one might
ask whether a psychological analyst can ever truly understand what it is like to
have bipolar and experience a manic high? What about schizophrenia or
Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder or Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome?
On what foundedations are the communications between a patient and a doctor
built? What underlies their ability to talk about deeply personal experiences
given that one person has them while another has not?

This is the central philosophical issue wrestled with by this paper. On
what rests our ability to talk about personal and private experiences which do
not have publicly observable parts, components or properties? Communication
seems to take place, but what allows such communication to take place? How
does one cross the gulf of private unobservable experience with words?

Ordinary Language Arguments are one attempt at solving this otherwise
seemingly unsolvable mystery. This introduction is aimed at acquainting the
theorist of mind, common practitioner, researcher, cognitive therapist or curious layman with the problems that surround Ordinary Language Arguments.

This paper will begin with the problems arising from referential indeterminacy in theories of mind. The ‘Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference’ is a significant issue for research theorists and arises from the language they use to describe the mind. How do the terms they use relate to the mind? Do they propositionally ‘picture’ entities ‘in’ the mind in true ways? Are terms like ego, anger, jealousy and inner-child merely convenient fictions and metaphors to talk about the mind? Do these terms refer to and label ‘parts’ of the mind? What is the relationship between these terms and the mind?

One possible solution emerges from an Analytic Philosopher who wrote in the immediate post-war era called Gilbert Ryle. Gilbert Ryle developed Ordinary Language Arguments as one possible solution to a number of intersecting philosophical and psychological problems. However, I argue that the Ordinary Language Argument Solution, though on first glance seems promising, is fundamentally flawed. Instead, I argue that sources for the study of the mind are better understood by a Heterophenomenological and Autophenomenological distinction. This raises the question as to which of the two is stronger and/or prior to the other when these sources produce claims that clash or contradict each other.
Psychology and the problem of language reference.

One of the more interesting and promising areas to emerge from modern psychological research has been Kimberly Francis’ work on Strain Theory. Strain Theory was originally developed in the 1950s by Robert K. Merton to explain why the same patterns of socially deviant behaviours were found in groups of teenage boys with similar demographic characteristics\(^1\).

Francis’ research follows the school of General Strain Theory started by Merton in the 1950s. However, what Francis’ modern research recently purported to discover was that girls fundamentally manifest deviant behaviours that are significantly different from those of boys. Francis’ work suggests that previous models of female deviance have been mistaken because they applied male criteria for deviant behaviour to female subjects. This suggests the reason why girls have been under-represented in statistical samples of deviant behaviours is because their deviant behaviours remain invisible to researchers who are essentially looking for patterns of male deviant behaviours, because

these deviant behaviours were originally established by studies into teenage boys. The problem evidently, for Francis, is that researchers are applying the criteria for the patterns derived from the original male orientated studies to girls.

The fundamental thesis of Francis’ work argues that girls experience ‘negative internalizing emotions’ which change the way they react to harmful factors in their environment that put them at risk. Key to her theory is the interaction between what she identifies as ‘anger’ and how this ‘anger’ interacts with what she calls ‘co-occurring emotions’ that arise in girls and change the way these girls experience anger. Francis’ work points to the established findings and definitions of General Strain Theory which found that boys engaging in deviant behaviours are likely to lash out in acts of anger at their environment. These forms of lashing out may take such forms as vandalism, graffiti and acts of violence against others. In contrast Francis draws on her research to argue that girls experience ‘co-occurring emotions’ like ‘depression’ and ‘guilt’ alongside feelings of anger. She thinks these ‘co-occurring emotions’ change the way girls experience that anger and thus have an effect on the patterns and behaviours by which they express their deviant behaviours. According to this view, Francis argued that instead of lashing out, these ‘co-occurring emotions’ lead girls to internalize their anger. Drawing on her research Francis claims that co-occurring emotions internalize anger and direct it inward
where it manifests as feelings of guilt, shame, helplessness and frustration, and where she thinks these co-occurring emotions more likely to produce self-destructive forms of behaviour. According to this view, whereas a boy lacking these ‘co-occurring negative internalizing emotions’ might break a window or attack a classmate and thus externalize their rage, girls manifest a tendency to turn the anger inward towards self-destructive behaviours like self-harm, self-sabotage or avoidance behaviours where they may simply skip class rather than lash out or confront the cause of the problem. Francis argues that girls deviant behaviours include withdrawal from friends and social circles, running away from school or home, or both, and lose interest in the things that motivate and inspire them².

If Francis’ insight is right then her work is a revelation that should change the way teachers, psychologists, youth workers, counsellors, government groups and pastoral workers look at girls at risk. Her work is polarizing and controversial because it challenges assumptions about the fundamental nature of mental processes in teenage boys and girls and what appear to be developmental stages and tendencies towards emotional differences between the genders. None of what I say in this brief introduction is intended to detract from the societal, political, or socio-gender based importance of her theory. I encourage people to read it. It is an ethically polarizing work with abundant

---

² Francis, *General Strain Theory, Gender and the Conditioning Influence of Negative Internalizing Emotions on Youth at Risk*. 2014.
material for philosophy and in my view has not received its due recognition. However, it does also illustrate an obscure and underlying problem with the way theorists of mind use language, of which hers is an example.

For we should ask what are these ‘negative internalizing emotions’ which Francis uses in her model actually referring to? This is an important question because it brings to light what I will call ‘referential indeterminacy’ which is a gateway concept into the problem of Ordinary Language Arguments and the subject of this thesis. Inquiring into what these ‘negative internalizing emotions’ are based on in Francis’ research is thus germane to introducing the philosophical thesis of this paper and why the fate of Ordinary Language Arguments is important in fields of research into the mind.

Francis writes

Respondents rated various emotional/behavioral problems experienced now or in the last 6 months as not true (0), somewhat true (1) or very true (2) for her or him. . . . Anger is the mean response to 5 items: “I have a hot temper,” “I argue a lot,” “I am stubborn,” “I scream a lot,” and “my moods/feelings change suddenly.”

We can see here that Francis’ data sample is based on five phrases that any competent ordinary natural speaker of English should understand. However
there arises a number of questions when we move from the use of the word ‘anger’ in ordinary discourse to Francis’ theory about the mind. What is the word ‘anger’ referring to in Francis’ theory?

To borrow a Fregean term, we might ask what are the ‘referents’ of these ‘negative internalizing emotions’ that Francis bases her research and theory on? Are these ‘negative internalizing emotions’ parts of the mind? Are they brain processes and chemicals in the subject’s head? Are they experiences the subject goes through? Are they behaviours that are publicly visible and observable?

Allow me to progress this line of thought in the following way. I argue that while it may be one thing to use the word ‘stubborn’ in an everyday context as part of publicly accessible discourse, it is another thing to ask what ‘stubbornness’ refers to in a theory of mind. I suggest that in the theoretical and research-based studies of mind there arises a gap of vagueness between a subject’s use of a term like ‘anger’ and what the theorist refers to when using the term ‘anger’ in the advancement of their theory. Do they mean the same thing? There is a problem here that a Fregean might call ‘referential indeterminacy’.
Francis, her subjects and Wittgenstein’s Beetle in the Box Argument.

One way we might approach issues arising from this Indeterminacy of Reference Problem is to look at the ‘Beetle in the Box’ argument in the Philosophy of Mind. Wittgenstein originally formulated the ‘Beetle in the Box’ problem because he was curious about the types of access one can have to one’s own private experiences of emotions and pains. He characterized this as like having a beetle in a matchbox. The beetle is like the content of a private experience i.e. a specific type of pain or sadness. Another person cannot see the colour of the beetle while it is in the box. Colour here is symbolic of a distinctive emotional experience. My experience of one emotion, say anger may be like a red beetle, while what I call sadness may be a blue beetle. Joy may be green for instance. How do we know that both my and your anger are red beetles? Might they not be different colours? Could my anger be a red beetle and your anger be a green beetle? This of course is what happens in David Chalmers’ Inverted Spectrum Argument.

---

3 See Wittgenstein’s Account of Language Acquisition for Phenomenal Experiences in the Philosophical Investigations in Chapter Eighteen in this thesis for an extensive breakdown of Wittgenstein and J.J.C. Smart’s treatment of the ‘Beetle in the Box’ problem.

Might not one of Francis' participants be experiencing feelings which she reports as anger, while her friend may be experiencing feelings of what the first subject would term sadness, but the second girl would herself report as 'anger'? The individuation and identity conditions of emotions seem highly important for the model Francis proposes since the claim that girls experience co-occurring emotions that 'internalize' anger differently to boys depends on girls having the same experiences as each other. The two Wittgensteianian beetles in the box, on a Fregeian view, would need to be the same colour for a true semantic statement of reference and an identity claim to be defensible. However, Wittgenstein's argument tells us that what one girl may classify as anger, another girl may classify as sadness. This is a problem, since Francis' theory about the co-occurring internalizing effect of emotions depends upon identifying anger within a 5-item subscale based on the subject's understanding of the term in everyday discourse. The Private Access and Beetle In A Box Argument presents problems for an emotional identity claim because the emotional experience of what one subject describes as emotion x may not be the same as another subject who claims that a different type of emotional experience is x. The same words may be used in the public discourse, but attached to these words there may be different emotional experiences. At best this type of psychology is limited by its speculative assumption that the Wittgensteinian beetles, or the emotional experiences they represent, are all the same colour, or in some way the same fundamental types of experience.
We can perhaps approach closer to the insight on offer in this paper if we next consider recent work done in psychometric testing and a formal case of the type of Fregeian Indeterminacy of Reference which arises when one considers differences in methodological developments in psychology and psychiatry\(^5\) and the senses in which terms enter a language.

**Indeterminacy of Reference**

As most people involved in Intelligence Quota testing know, the battery of educational tests which have come to be known as ‘psychometric tests’ were historically developed as part of a Eugenics’ Agenda in the United States\(^6\) which resulted in the sterilization of large numbers of homosexuals and the poor children of Italian, Mexican and Spanish migrants at the turn of the twentieth

---

\(^5\) Note the use of lower case. My use of captials for psychology and psychiatry will become clear later in the paper. I will give the reference for these at the end of this footnote, but it is not necessary for the reader to look these up. I am merely explaining why I have adopted this convention. Where I capitalize the terms, I refer to a de jure idealized reconstruction of literal and figurative explanatory tendencies, within those disciplines. I do so in relation to a Sellarsian reconstruction of a specific stage in language development and a tension between the timeline of development between two of his papers. Where I use lower case spellings, I refer to psychology and psychiatry, de facto, as we find them in the real world. See *The Tfigurema of Normativity for Different Types of Claims about the Nature of the Mind*, in Chapter Five of this thesis. Also see *Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of Mind*, in Chapter Seventeen for why there are so many caveats and careful distinctions between different uses of terms like psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, psychologism and anti-psychologism in this paper.

century. The Social Darwinist body of theory and social policies developed in literature promoted around these tests later came to be enacted under the controversial California Sterilization Laws, and in relation to these, various versions of the Alfred Binet and Stanford-Binet tests were developed and used as a criteria to sterilize poor migrant children. Recent work within the psychometric field has produced a new series of tests specifically designed to trigger disorders based on the Weschesler Psychometric Model along with redevelopments of older tests. A subset of these tests claim to be able to discern dyslexia, AD(H)D, autism and several other types of learning disorders. The reliability of detecting AD(H)D with these tests is in particular a contentious issue because there are problems with the test and re-test abilities of people who at one time appear to have AD(H)D and at other times do not.

Different to the psychological psychometric studies, recent developments in neuroscience and psychiatry over the past three and a half decades have resulted in a vaster, broader and deeper understanding of brain chemistry than

---

7 See also Greyway, Robert J. *Psychological Testing* Illinois Allyn & Bacon, 1996. Pp 1 – 32. The early Binet-Simon tests conducted by Henry H. Goddard on Ellis Island found that 83% of Jews, 80% of Hungarian, 79% of Italians and 87% Russians were 'feeble-minded'.


was previously thought possible\textsuperscript{10}. Psychiatry has developed admirable diagnostic tools which are able to scan, magnetically image, measure and spectrally analyse brain activity. Added to this are the ‘Object Languages’ of science, including chemistry, bio-chemistry and physics which medicine has adopted and psychiatrists receive as part of their training. Psychiatry offers a strongly scientific understanding of the mind through which to apply medical knowledge of anatomy and the functioning of the brain as an organ of the body. These advancements mean psychiatrists now know that deficiencies of a specific type of neurotransmitter in the pre-frontal cortex of the patient are correlated with specific patterns of brain activity that have been connected to behavioural descriptions of Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder\textsuperscript{11}. By treating patients with a dopamine stimulant to accommodate deficiencies, psychiatrists are able to change the patterns of brain activity registered by their diagnostic equipment to those resembling a neurotypical person along with a decrease in the observable behavioural traits associated with the condition\textsuperscript{12}.

However, when one places the descriptions side-by-side, one discovers that there is an indeterminacy of reference involved in these matters. Both psychological psychometric testing and neuroscientific psychiatric forms of diagnosis use acronyms for attentional deficit problems. However when the


psychologist is talking about AD(H)D, seemingly he or she is referring to specific test scores which originated from sets of tests that were originally developed as part of a social agenda to sterilize the children of poor migrants. When the psychiatrist is talking about AD(H)D, he or she is talking about a lack of dopamine in areas of the pre-frontal cortex as part of a body of knowledge developed from modern physics, medicine and bio-chemistry. To put this distinction crudely we might say that part of what the former means when referring to ‘Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder’ are stop watches and pieces of paper with questions and attentional-based problem solving exercises written on them. Part of what the latter is talking about are the chemical structures of the neurotransmitters inside the brain and a lack of them in some cases which has been identified as Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder using diagnostic brain imaging equipment which can capture the non-neurotypical conditions which exhibit a specific pattern of brain activity. This pattern is, of course, the one that some people who share behavioural and concentration problems have in common, and is different to what people without these behavioural traits tend to display in the diagnostic equipment.

Are they talking about the same thing?

In a perfect world we might hope that both the (1) psychometric test scores, and (2) the psychiatric models based on modern medical diagnostics both refer back to a case of (3) AD(H)D, and are referring in different ways to the same thing. We would like to say that this is a case like the Morning Star and
the Evening Star and the same referent is known in two different senses. However, consider, for instance, a case where a patient is diagnosed by a psychiatrist with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder using the benefit of modern (f)MIR, EEG, PET and spectral chemical analysis, and this finding is repeatedly verified by independent psychiatrists in the patient’s history. However, the patient manages to pass all of the psychometric tests, perhaps, because the patient has developed coping mechanisms, or perhaps because the patient is medicated or drank coffee which contains a dopamine stimulant, or any combination of these. Does this patient have AD(H)D? The psychiatrist says yes, the psychologist says no. The law of identity tells us they cannot both be referring to the same thing. The patient cannot both have AD(H)D and not have it. If we assume both tests were administered correctly and both practitioners of mind are using the term ‘AD(H)D’ correctly in their field of discourse then we have the Fregean Problem of Referential Indeterminacy.

The Problem of Twin Mental States with Identical Neurological Information that feel different.

What should be emerging from the above examples is a genuine problem with referential indeterminacy in the sciences of mind. Firstly, we have the Wittgensteinian Problem of the Beetle in the Box and the possibility of
something like an emotional inverted spectrum interfering with an emotional identity claim. Since subject to subject the person filling out Francis’ survey might mean different emotional experiences when they use terms like ‘stubborn’ and ‘anger’, there are class predication and identity problems with subject-to-subject dependent claims expressed in a language. Next, researchers of mind themselves might mean different things since they come from a wide array of theoretical and methodological backgrounds and are likely to be influenced by these. We have an example of this sort of cross-disciplinary indeterminacy with the problem of the student who tests positively for AD(H)D on the psychiatric test, but then tests negative on the psychometric one. The law of identity tells us that in some cases researchers themselves are using words about the mind differently since the student cannot both have AD(H)D and not have it.

What other options are there?

Suppose we side with psychiatry and neuroscience and have access to the latest psychiatric research tools and diagnostic equipment and could look at the activity and chemical composition of the brain being tested on one of those subjects.

We might begin to develop data which reveals to us that statements about feelings or reports of certain emotional experiences were correlated with activity in certain parts of the brain. This seems like a plausible way of mapping different types of emotional data by using the emerging neuroscience. On first glance this is promising. However, there is an emerging problem with ‘twin
states’ that have identical neurological information but feel different to the same subject. One such instance is emerging research into the Insula Cortex.\textsuperscript{13}

The problem with the Insula Cortex is that activity within this area has been associated with different feelings of ‘mistrust’, ‘revulsion’ and ‘anger’ by the same subject.\textsuperscript{14} This presents a problem with using neurological data to individuate the content of mental states. The problem we have is that sometimes instances of the same neurological activity and data will be defined by the subject as two different experiences. There is also the problem that the same types of experiences may result in different types of neurological activity. This has happened with research into anger where subjects may use the same word but the corresponding neurological data locates activity in different places in the brain and gives different types of feedback for the word that the subject is using.\textsuperscript{15} The same word given in reports by a subject can have different types of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{13} Carter, \textit{Mapping the Mind}, 2010. Pg 171, 87.
\textsuperscript{14} Carter, \textit{Mapping the Mind}, 2010. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Anger has turned out to be far more neurologically complex than anyone anticipated. The main strands of hard neuroscientific research to emerge which suggest anger is not a singular activity or chemical reaction in a specified part of the brain are the diverging and converging fields of research into Tourette’s Syndrome, Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome and a condition that has come to be called Syndrome E where people blank out during states of rage and have no recollection of the event. There is also further hard evidence of an entirely different condition which originates in brain damage and irritative lesions to the brain that trigger outbursts of rage different again to the other areas of research. The neurophysiology of anger, rage and ire in these cases involves different pathways through the somatosensory cortex, activity in the ventromedial cortex, the amygdala, and the limbic system. The same word ‘anger’ will have different pathologies, neurological data and bio-electrical information connected to it depending on the subject and their own history and chemistry. For instance there are grounds for supposing the possibility for a referential indeterminacy in the word ‘rage’ when someone with Post-Traumatic Stress is using it to explain what they were feeling compared to someone with irritative lesions in the emotional cortex. See Carter, \textit{Mapping the Mind}, 2010, pp 89 – 94, 55 – 97, 81 – 84. The same word can have different meanings across different patients, and supposing a patient with Tourette’s and Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome, or the difference between non-Post-Traumatic-Stress-Syndrome anger, i.e. regular rage, and Post-Traumatic Stress induced rage, perhaps even in the same patient. Like ‘anger’ and ‘rage’ the search for a ‘pain-centre’
\end{footnotesize}
brain activity associated with it at different times, in different circumstances and contexts.

**Context Dependent States**

Andrew Gleeson’s work is important for exploring problems with Functionalism related to context dependent claims. In *Animal Animation*\(^16\) he points out an underlying problem with using environmental effects to determine mentalia.

Functionalis often define mental states in terms of in-puts and out-puts, internal response precedents, or antecedent-behaviour-consequent patterns\(^17\). As 

---


Gleeson points out this makes them a school of behaviourism, or more accurately as they have come to be called in psychological departments Applied Behavioural Analysts. This is the term we will use when referring back to this branch of Functional-Behaviourism. They are behaviourists (Applied Behavioural Analysts) as Gleeson points out because they look to the behavioural response a subject has to an input. Functionalists since Putnam have suggested doing this for the simple fact we cannot experience or observe another person’s inner responses to an input or antecedent stimulus. Thus, practically, it seems, we must look to their response behaviours when studying the mind. Because they rely on behaviour many Functionalist Applied Behavioural Analysts look to the effects a being has on the environment to formulate an analysis of its behaviour. Gleeson’s paper points out the broad general underlying problem with ‘context dependent claims’ like David Lewis argues for in early Functionalist literature, of ascribing mentality or intentionality to things that are not conscious or do not possess mental states\(^{18}\).

Many of the findings emerging from neuroscience support Gleeson’s insight into problems with broad stroke approaches to environmental effect analysis of mental states characteristic of these new Functionalist Applied Behavioural Analysis schools. Neuroscience has repeatedly demonstrated a problem with using the context of an experiment to determine the identity of a

neurological state. The problem arises from the fact that the same action at different times and different people at the same time often experience and react to the same situation or stimulus with reports of different feelings and different publicly accessible responses. Someone might experience ‘revulsion’ at the sight of a snake, while another person may experience ‘excitement’ or ‘fascination’ because they are interested in reptiles\textsuperscript{19}. The responses do not just vary in the language used, but in the behaviour and physiological features of the person giving those descriptions. In some cases the same stimulus will produce different neurological data in different subjects. Sometimes the same stimulus presented at alternate and differing times may present different data from the same person or different people. This undermines the foundation of context-dependent neurological identity claims. For instance a person interested in reptiles may be drawn to the snake and press themselves up against the glass of a reptile exhibit to get a better look. Someone who says they are revolted by the snake may draw away, or lower their eyes, or leave the room. The same person who is interested in reptiles may at another time lose interest in them altogether or may have a phobia triggered by social behaviours or events related to other people and behave exactly as the revolted person.

On a deeper, harder scientific level we now know there are inherited responses to certain stimuli that may be present in some people which can be

triggered by social factors like behaviour in peer or parental groups\textsuperscript{20}. While present in some, these responses are not present in others either because they have not inherited the disposition, or they have not had their ‘instinctive phobia’ triggered by the right social circumstances\textsuperscript{21}.

It is recognized within the research parameters of neuroscience that Situational Responses are highly problematic for this reason\textsuperscript{22} and are a major obstacle researchers are only able to navigate around by treating them as ‘ill-defined problems\textsuperscript{23}’ and limiting research criteria to pre-selection limits and developing experiments that focus on highly simplified and seemingly unproblematic responses but which often develop into cherry picking subjects whose behaviours are consistent with tests\textsuperscript{24}. But even so, given all of this, the subject’s claims are highly problematic to neuroscience researchers. This ongoing recalcitrant issue has resulted in what David Chalmers has called ‘The

\textsuperscript{20} Carter, \textit{Mapping the Mind}, 2010. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Carter, \textit{Mapping the Mind}, 2010. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} British Neuroscience Association. ‘Significant New Reform in the Reporting of Clinical Trial Results.’ https://www.bna.org.uk/mediacentre/news/significant-new-reform-in-clinical-trial-publication/: BNA, 2017. Also see Carter, \textit{Mapping the Mind}, 2010 Pp 93 – 101. In particular the work done on phobias and triggering response. They found that some subjects possessed the disposition for certain phobias into snakes and spiders, which could be triggered by peer phobic behaviours, while other subjects had no such subsceptability or reaction. See also Andrea Mulizia. ‘Brain Imaging in Affective Disorders’. In \textit{Mood Disorders, Clinical Management and Research Issues}, edited by Eric Griez, Corto Faravelli, David Nutt, Joseph Zohar. Pp 229-289. West Sussex. John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 2005, which also covers a number of similar issues.
Search for a Formalism’ that will allow neuroscientific research to progress with a standardized and systemically informed methodology for taking ‘accurate’ verbal responses from subjects rather than the wide range of eclectic, unreliable and assorted ones currently on offer\textsuperscript{25}.

Thus the subject’s language which expresses his or her claims with information about their private experience presents a major problem for neurological researchers. It is this information researchers want access to in order to be able to explain the facts and offer a theory of the mind. Since any identity claim regarding private experience types which rests on the similarity between two pieces of neurological data is then open to a further report by the patient as to whether (a) the two experiences under which the similar pieces of neurological data that were recorded were indeed of the same experiential type, or (b) whether the two tokens of neurological data that appear similar or the same, are in fact experienced by the subject as different states entirely (as in the case with ‘disgust’ and ‘mistrust’ and the Insula Cortex), then it follows (that since the distinction is decided by the subject), that the identity states correlating pieces of neurological data are foundationally dependent for the missing premise on the reports of the conscious experience of the subject for their identity. The reason why it follows is that the subject can tell us whether

the two instances of the neurological data which were recorded from the subject are indeed the same experience, or dissimilar. If they are dissimilar then they cannot be identified as the same type of mental experience without incurring a contradiction and breaking the laws of identity. The subject’s personal private experience thus decides the underlying identity conditions for the neurological information which at the bare minimum tells us whether two experiences are similar, the same or different.

Moreover, the fact that people will respond with different overt behaviour to the same stimulus, situation or experimental conditions has also become recognized as a problem in neuroscientific research. This problem means that the identity of the mental state or experience cannot be drawn from the stimulus itself.

Along with the problem of Situational Responses, recalcitrant problems with Context Dependent claims and subjects reporting different types of emotional content for similar, or identical samples and tokens of neurological data such as in the case of ‘revulsion’ and ‘mistrust’, we also have the problem of the emotional inverted spectrum.

In the emotional inverted spectrum problem, we are unable to know if what one person describes is the same sort of emotional experience, in terms of the private content of that experience, as what another person who has described it with the same words. For instance the emotional experience that one subject of Kimberly Francis’ test might be describing as ‘anger’ could
actually be closer to what the person administering the test might refer to as ‘sadness’. At the centre of this question, which spans neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry and medicine, is a question about what the language people use in a theory of mind actually refers to. Are practitioners of mind talking about the phenomenal experiences people have for various moods, feelings and emotions? Are they referring to the semantic elements for the thoughts in people’s minds? Internal monologues? Entities that exist in the mind in some Realist sense? The results in tests? The chemical and bio-electrical exchanges and the corresponding neurological data? What do the terms in psychological theories refer to or mean?

At the core of Francis’ claim about the ‘negative internalizing emotions’ which women experience as ‘co-occurring with anger’ and which her theory then claims result in different types of deviant behaviour in girls is a question about what her subjects mean by the language they use when filling out the questionnaires and the status of the words that the theory is based on. What does Francis think the words refer to or mean in her theories. What does she think her subjects mean and how is this knowledge shared between them?

This is a problem for any type of psychological theory that uses some sort of language sampling or therapy to form theories. I selected Francis’ work for introducing this problem because it is such a promising theory with what I think is a genuine insight into the human mind, but also, because I think her work is rich with implications across philosophical domains. However, this dissertation
focuses on the problem that arises from the question about what the words in Francis’ theory refer to. This quandary might equally be made to apply to Marcia’s Theory of Identity Formation as well as Berzonsky’s redevelopment of the ‘Identity Diffusion’ state in Marcia’s theory based on Berzonsky’s own research into the transition between high school and university. It might be applied to various incarnations of Klein’s repudiation of the ID and her argument in favour of the Post-Freudian concept of the Death Drive. The question might be raised in certain contexts about Albert Bandura’s sub-types of self-efficacy and statements by what might be termed resilient self-learners.

---

26 See for instance James Marcia, Ruthellen Josselson ‘Eriksonian Personality Research and Its Implications for Psychotherapy.’ Journal of Personality 81, no. 6 (2013): 617-626.


28 King, Pearl. ‘Background and Development of the Freud-Klein Controversies in the British Psycho-Analytical Society.’ In The Freud-Klein Controversies, edited by Riccardo Steiner Pearl King. London: Routledge, 1992. See also Kristeva, Julia. Melaine Klein Translated by Ross Guberman. New York Columbia Press, 2001, pp 27 – 29. The rejection of Freud’s Id-Ego complex and the pleasure principle actually goes back to Karl Abraham’s concept of objects. For Abraham the death drive manifests as attachment to an object. See also Devan Hodges, Janice Doane From Klein to Kristeva Michigan University of Michigan Press, 1995, and in particular the discussion of Nancy Chadorow’s rejection of Freudian psychology as inadequate for women because it focuses on the development of the Oedipus complex during development which dealt with male fears and ignored female development. Freud himself argued, of course, that women’s fear of castration manifested in statements about the fear of loss of love from the mother since their genitals were hidden during the phallic stage. See Freud, Sigmund. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Translated by James Starchey. London Penguin 1991, pg 91. Here, of course, I am merely scratching our some of the threads involving research into a patient’s inner lives and suppressed emotional complexes.


The problem with these types of theories arises from asking questions about (x.1) what the theorist thinks they mean by the terms in the language he or she uses, (x.2) what that language refers to in the context of the theory and (x.3) what the research subject means when they use the terms. By the ‘subject’ I mean (x.3.1) the person whose data the theory is constructed from in its research phase (in the form of verbal reports, explanations and descriptions of their experiences), or (x.3.2) the language that is ultimately used by the patient to explain their own thought processes, experiences and mental-life. It is not clear that what that person (that is the research subject who gives verbal or written reports) uses, at (x.3.1) is the equivalent to (x.3.2), or that (x.3.1) or (x.3.2) are either collectively, or individually equivalent to (x.1), and (x.2), even in cases where the theorist or therapist is using what appears to be the same words, or expressions that appear synonymous to those of the subject.

For instance, it is not clear that a patient describing a sort of ‘anger’ at seeing their mother with a particular man is exhibiting a ‘Freudian Oedipal’ jealous rage as a Freudian Psycho-Analyzer understands those terms. The Psycho-Analyzer may think that the anger is a manifestation of an Oedipal jealousy that arises from a threat to the connection between the man and his mother formed during infancy and the anal stages of the patient’s development. This may not be the case. The subject may be racist and what he feels in his anger may simply stem from his racism, and this is how he understands and feels his emotions, not as a specific Oedipal jealousy that arises from a threat to
his relationship with his mother. He might be fine with her finding a partner so long as it is not a person of a specific race or perceived ethnic background. His dislike, resulting in what he describes as an ‘anger’ may simply be motivated by some sort of racial prejudice. Moreover, his direct and intense experience of his emotions, and the heated and agitated way they fit into the system of his racist beliefs from the first person view-point may be nothing like the cool, clinical observations of his therapist from the third person.

From the forgoing examples of Francis’ work, as well as the racist man and the Freudian Analyst my aim is to illustrate one emergent fact across a range of theories and research into the mind. That is, the problems of referential indeterminacy are deeply rooted in a gap of ambiguity that originates from an assumption that what the therapist, subject and text-book theorist all mean is the same thing. The semantic problem stems from theorists and therapists using terms like ‘anger’, ‘fear’, ‘aggression’, ‘anguish’ and ‘anxiety’ indiscriminately and assuming that these terms correspond, one-to-one, with their patients and each other’s usage, in the first person, third person and theoretical sense\textsuperscript{31}. Those problems derive from a question as to whether language is sufficient to cross the gap of ambiguity between when a person self reports in the first person, and

\textsuperscript{31} Once theorists begin using terms like ‘anger’, ‘sadness’ and ‘regret’ in theories they become entangled in a range of epistemological issues about the status of what such terms refer to. Psychologists are often vulnerable to questions about the ontological and epistemic status of the terms their theories refer to. One often becomes frustrated when reading books, and speaking with psychologists about whether they are using a term like ‘anger’ in a nominalist or realist sense? One often meets with much difficulty when broaching questions of sense, meaning, ontology, reference, and so on, with psychologists and theorists of mind. Hence the inquiry of the paper.
when someone makes a statement about a person in the third person. If there is a difference between the use of terms referring to emotive or mental experiences in the first and third person then this creates problems for theorists of mind and raises questions about in which person they are using the term.

One very basic and fundamental problem that emerges from a difference between the ways in which we take a term in the first and third person is that of inverted meaning. For instance if what Sally refers to as feelings of ‘mistrust’ are what Sam refers to as feelings of ‘shame and apprehension’ and what Sam refers to as mistrust is what Sally would call ‘guilt and fear of inferiority’, then whose terminology is the correct one to use when referring to the emotional experiences of the subjects for either firstly; the purposes of the theory, or secondly; for conducting research into a theory?

This might seem a trivial matter until we actually pick up a psychological theorist who uses these terms in their theory and we are left asking whether we should take the terms in Sally or Sam’s sense? For instance, we might select Erik Erikson’s Eight Stages of Epigenetic Personality Development.32 We might ask in what sense are we to take the first five of the eight stages given in Erikson’s theory? If we refer to Sally and Sam in the third person, rather than either person individually, this would break the law of identity since the same

---

term refers to different referents in one and excludes referents that belong in the same class of phenomenal experiences in the other. The other option is to take the terms in the first person, but which ever person we choose – whether it be Sam or Sally – renders the other person’s language for their experiences false and we have no reason at this stage to favour one person’s experiences over another. The problem of referential indeterminacy arises once again.

We might extend such indeterminacy to terms like ‘self efficacy’, ‘negative internalizing emotions’, ‘hot and cold cognition’ and ‘identity diffusion’ or any other number of terms found in psychological theorizing. All these theories have the same ambiguity between whether the terms in use refer to the subject’s experience, entities in the subject’s head, parts of the subject’s mind, third person observations of the subject, or theoretical beings posited on (Quasi-Carnapian) Nominalist grounds for the sake of a theory. In all cases we still have the problem of taking the terms either in the first or the third person points of view. If taken in the third person then we have the problem of possible referential indeterminacy between two different users who are using a term in the first person, and who may be referring to different things. If I offer a term like ‘anger’ from the first person to describe my experience of my current frame of mind it is unclear that there is any guarantee that what I mean when I use the term is the same as what another person means when they use the term. If the argument can be made that I and another person have the same meaning and experience of anger from the first person, then can another argument be
made that our two uses correspond with the theorist writing the psychological textbook? Is there any guarantee that all three of us will refer to the same thing? If not then whose use and which semantics do we privilege as correct?

In one way or another all these theories that run into problems with fixing identity claims draw upon research into areas of the mind which crosses this point. What is common to these areas of cognitive research and these theories of the mind is that those that do not make allowances for or explain these questions all run into the Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference. The types of problematic theories and approaches I am picking out are of a type that struggle to explain the sense in which the objects they refer to (mental experiences of emotions, motivations, drives, inspirations, motives, etcetera) are presented. By ‘sense’ and ‘presentation’ I am referring to a Fregeian conception of the problem of meaning. All of these problematic theories are talis de genus in that they have similar types of problems about fixing their identity claims with meaning, and the modes of presentation such theories draw upon for research, or theoretical speculation.

A helpful way of conceptualizing the difference involved in this gap of ambiguity is to think about the Beetle in the Box argument and the private accessibility of emotions. Is language enough without opening the box to look at the experiential content of the emotion? In this metaphor the colour of the beetle in the box signifies the identity of an emotional experience. The word on the box
signifies the emotion. Do we need to go beyond what is written on the box and open it to look inside? Can we? If we can, how are we to do so? If we cannot, then what follows from the discovery that we cannot do so, for the understanding of mind? It is the aim of this paper to explore these questions and come to some answers on them.

Publicly Observable Behaviour and Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism.

At this point someone might ask ‘what about behaviourism?’

The trouble with behaviourism is that since Skinner, Pavlov, Thorndike and Watson thrived into a movement in the nineteen fifties and sixties ‘behaviourism’ has become a diverse collection of approaches within psychology and psychological research. We have Cognitive-Behavioural Therapies33, Positive Behavioural Interventions34, catchall Socio-Cognitive-Behavioural Theories35 and Functionalist Schools of Applied Behavioural Analysis. Through-

35 Dykeman, et al. ‘Psychological Predictors of School-Based Violence: Implications for School
out the paper I will make careful distinctions related to different uses of the
term ‘behaviour’ and ‘behaviourism’ to avoid what may be construed as any
slippage or equivocation in usages.

What we might call here a ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ is a little
bit different to what gets labelled as Functionalist Applied Behaviourism or
Applied Behavioural Analysis.

By ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ I mean specifically the language
that Jones develops within Sellars’ myth of the Rylean tribe but with a
distinction between environmental effects and affective life which comes out of
Andrew Gleeson’s insightful work.

There is also a further distinction I shall make throughout the thesis
based on whether a ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ which developed from
an Ur-language is a ‘Psychiatric’ or ‘Psychological’ one depending on the types of
access it has to language structures like metaphors, similitude, figurative
devices and literal fact stating roles. The picture that will emerge is one where
psychological explanations have a tendency to rely heavily on figurative devices
like metaphor and similitude, but have extremely limited or no access to fact
stating roles from the developed sciences; like anatomy, chemistry, biology and

---

36 Sellars, _Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind_, (various editions) See sections 53 – 63.
physics. When we look at the types of explanations psychologists offer, they are not ones that describe, for instance, the actual interaction of specific and testable organic chemical compounds found in the brain of a patient, which can explain the fluctuations in that patient’s mood disorder during a manic, or a depressive episode. (Such explanations, of course, as one may find in the body and practice of psychiatry). Rather than engaging with the hard sciences in fact stating roles, what we find is that most psychological explanations are trapped behind a wall of metaphors, historical myth and figurative uses of language. When they do engage in the vocabulary of the hard sciences, psychological explanations have a tendency to borrow from the developed sciences only in metaphorical ways. For instance, in describing group behaviour, a psychological explanation might refer to the behaviour of a cluster of people as being like ‘molecules’. Such a theory is not referring to the actual oxygen and hydrogen bonded hydroxy compounds making up the dopamine neurotransmitter released into the brain during stimulating social discourse. No. Such a psychological explanation is using a simile. The psychological reasoner is saying ‘like’. They are saying the people are acting ‘like’ a molecule that forms together from other molecules to form a compound. Similarly, a psychological explanation might sample the languages of physics and describe different types of thinking metaphorically as ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ forms of cognition. However, such a ‘hot and cold cognition model’ is not actually referring to testable hypotheses about electro-magnetic radiation and the laws of thermodynamics. Rather, the
The psychological explanation is employing the terms ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ in metaphoric ways. In neither case does chemistry or physics feature as a fact stating role that is continuous with the developed hard sciences in the psychological explanation. The psychosocial explanation is limited to figurative uses of scientific vocabularies. Psychological explanations have a tendency not to bridge continuously with the hard sciences, or share in discoveries from them, but only to borrow from their vocabularies in extended metaphors, different types of similitude and use those languages as merely figurative devices.

Psychiatry, however, does bridge with the hard sciences. Psychiatric descriptions tend to feature explanations that utilize the vocabularies, discoveries and postulates of organic chemistry, medical anatomy and pharmacology in fact stating roles. Psychiatric research ventures deep into the postulates, discoveries and findings of physics in its quest to develop new diagnostic methods and understand the nature of mind. Psychiatry will feature factual descriptions of the chemicals and organic compounds in fact stating roles to offer explanations of human behaviour like why the patient is experiencing episodic highs of mania and depressive lows. Where psychological explanations have a limiting tendency to metaphorical and figurative uses of language, psychiatry will ‘telescope’ (to use a Sellarsian phrase), with the hard sciences along with metaphorical and figurative language use. This difference between the linguistic uses and tendencies in psychological and psychiatric methods of
explanation becomes important when a Paleo-Behavioural Ur-Language develops into what I will describe as an ‘Endo-Affective Language’.

However, it is, perhaps, too premature to spell out the full implications of the psychiatric and psychological explanatory tendencies at this early stage of the thesis. What is important to the Gleeson and Sellars picture this thesis draws is Gleeson’s concept of Animal Motion and what Gleeson thinks is involved in common language vocabularies that utilize ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’.

Andrew Gleeson’s critique of the Methological Behaviouristic Tendency in Functionalism and the Problem of Diagnosing Computers with Attention Deficit Disorder.

Functional Applied Behavioural Analysis of the type identified and critiqued by Gleeson suffers, as Gleeson points out, from problems associated with context dependent claims and the attempt to identify mental states by their effects on the environment. ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ as I read into Sellars’ developmental stages of Socio-Linguistics37 is much closer to Gleeson’s account.

---

37 Where I use capitals for ‘Socio-Linguistic’ I am referring to Sellars model in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. I criticise this heavily later in the paper, comparing it to his ‘Process Anthropology’ in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. The criticism arises from a tension between the two accounts about the neccessary order of epistemic linguistic development of a fictional Rylean tribe, he proposes in the former work. The reason why I adopt such is that Sellars proposes two different and contrary accounts of the order necessary for concept development in a language in the two works. ‘Socio-Linguistics’, capitalized, refers specifically to the account in
of ‘Animal Motion’ but Sellars’ own account was perhaps naïve to the distinction between bodily behaviour and ‘environmental-effect strains’ of behaviourism which Gleeson makes (and to the twin problems of co-extension of vocabulary and attributing mentality to what may simply be differential environmental effects). For instance, one might construct a computer program which can take a psychometric test and give a result indicative of AD(H)D. Does that mean the computer test or automata has AD(H)D? Obviously not, most would agree. Yet the computer program produces the same environmental effect outputs as a boy or girl who is being tested and has AD(H)D. Gleeson thinks that what separates the child from the computer is a set of concepts and linguistic terms for them which we apply to ‘affective’ life forms and that these terms are not co-extensive with descriptions that feature purely environmental effects. Gleeson’s point is evident. If the ‘affective’ and ‘sensitive’ vocabulary terms we use to animate and talk about ‘Animal Motion’ were co-extensive with those of environmental effects, then we should not be able to conceptually differentiate between the computer and the child. If the terms were co-extensive then we would have no trouble saying the computer that took the psychometric test had AD(H)D,

---

*Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.* Where I use ‘socio-lingistics’ I refer to either the processes of language creation in society as I describe them in this paper, or the building of my own hypothetical model for the purposes of arguing that a phenomenal zombie could not learn a Rylean language.
because the outputs the computer gives when taking the test match the child, and the diagnostic criteria.

The way this paper explores the difference between affective and environmental vocabularies of motion and behaviour is to plot out the developmental stages that a community would need to undergo to develop the languages for both of these vocabularies, in a Sellarsian speculative history. In terms of a speculative history of human socio-linguistics this paper argues that the difference between Gleeson’s environmental and affective vocabularies has its source in what we might call the ‘Paleo-linguistic era’ of a developing Rylean linguistic community.

The Paleo-linguistic era begins with the vocabulary of a Sellarsian Jonesian Behaviourist who appears in the early ‘dawn ages’ of a Rylean tribe and teaches them his Paleo-Behavioural Ur-language prior to the emergence of any affective vocabularily. The Ur-language of the Jonesian Paleo-Behaviourist contains descriptive vocabularies of actions which are the primal seeds and primitive versions of what will eventually become ‘expressivity’, ‘sensitivity’ and

---

38 Assuming, of course, that the problems psychometrics has with test and re-test scores could be overcome and a less fallible diagnostic criteria were reached when given for specific neurotypes where brain chemistry fluctuations, episodic and mood disorders, medication cycles, regulation and stabilization of the dopaminergic pathways, etcetera, were overcome without recourse to medico-psychiatric tools like brainscans and spectral blood analysis. That is, supposing a psychometric test could be developed, for argument’s sake, that does not suffer from the current problems of psychometric tests, and without recourse to the psychiatric neurosciences, then it would still have problems telling the difference between a computer and a real boy. I call this Gleeson’s Pinocchio Problem. The problem arises, as Andrew Gleeson points out, because we still rely on concepts of animal animation from our inherited folk vocabularies to ‘animate’ beings from objects even when we think that we don’t.
the ‘affective’ vocabularies after internalization and projection. Those seeds are
the initial stage of what this paper defines as a Gross-Body-Language
Behaviourism

These seeds will eventually grow into an approximation of what Gleeson
refers to as an ‘Animal Motion vocabulary’ (which uses the vocabularies of
‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ to animate things) with a caveat which I refer to as a
‘longitudinal fragment’ crossing several stages of the afore-mentioned
speculative Socio-Linguistic Developmental Theory. However, at the beginning
of my constructed Neo-Sellarsian language history of a Rylean community in
which Jones first arrives, the language is not yet Gleesonian.

I draw the framework for this speculative socio-linguistic history out of
Wilfrid Sellars’ famous account of some of the stages a Rylean linguistic
community must undergo in order to talk about each other’s mental and
emotional lives, which Sellars, of course, provides at the end of *Empiricism and

---

39 Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism is further defined by whether it is purely and simply (a)
figurative, metaphorical and psychological or (b) uses a fact stating vocabulary that involves
chemistry, physics and anatomy like psychiatry tends to inherit from its association with medicine
and the medical sciences.

Although the material for the distinction Gleeson makes between environmental and
affective vocabularies existed in the historically situated ‘psychological behaviourism’ of Sellars’ day,
no one from that period in time seems to have been placed to capture the distinction between
environmental effect and embodied affect as insightfully, deeply or profoundly as Gleeson has. In
most strains of the Historically Situated Behaviourism of Ryle’s day, behaviour was viewed as
having causal relationships with the environment. In Skinner this relationship was modelled in the
terminology of Operant Conditioning

Operant Conditioning terminology reconstructs these causal
relations in terms of both extinction and reinforcement to reflexes, actions and behaviours
Prior to Skinner most of the language was modelled in terms of reinforcement and conditioning of reflexes.
The potential for the criticism for a distinction like Gleeson makes, thus, can be seen in Skinner’s
original work, but Skinner himself has not made it there. See for instance Skinner, B. F. *Beyond
the Philosophy of Mind. This Gleesonian ‘longitudinal fragment’ which I draw into Sellars’ speculative Socio-Linguistic history, will provide the missing stages in Sellars’ account, necessary to tell the story of how these Gleesonian vocabularies of ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ develop from Jones’ original Paleo-Behaviourist Ur Language. Reading Sellars and Gleeson into each other offers a completed picture. In this way I will offer a speculative account of how people come to use affective vocabularies. My ultimate purposes being development of a larger argument that involves a phenomenal zombie\textsuperscript{40} and offers an attractive insight into the mind. I am going to argue, by the end of this thesis, that a Chalmerian zombie in a Selarsian village can not learn to speak Rylean. The implications for this argument will be calamitous for the view that an Ordinary Language position that embraces Anti-Psychologism can unify the disciplines of mind, and instead offer the reader fresh grounds for returning to a Pre-Fregeian approach to cognitive semantics.

The difference between Ryle and Gleeson’s critique of Behaviourism.

Ryle’s critique of Psychological Behaviourism differs from Gleeson’s critique of Analytic Functional Behaviourism. Ryle wants to reject the causal hypothesis of

\textsuperscript{40} Here is perhaps too premature to spell this out but read on. I mention it here so that the reader can see the structure of the argument presented in this paper and how those pieces fit together.
Psychological Behaviourism altogether, and specifically in the historically situated Psychological Behaviourism of his day. Ryle sees the causality of Behaviourist models as part of what he, (Ryle), calls the ‘Bogey of Mechanism’ and a continuation of a larger historical contamination of ‘Ordinary Language’ by importing technical and specialized vocabularies from the sciences and special disciplines. Ryle thinks Behaviourists mistakenly impose a mechanical world view on to the human mind, when they should be looking for the mind in the way ordinary people speak.

Gleeson is in one sense very similar to Ryle, but in another sense very different. Gleeson wants to critique Functionalism which he sees as a specialized type of Behaviourism. Gleeson thinks Functionalist claims about looking to the effect on the environment for an output are either mistaken or fraudulent. He thinks they are mistaken or fraudulent because in practice such reductive programs are not co-extensive with the type of folk vocabularies Analytic Functionalists like Braddon-Mitchell and David Lewis are relying upon. He thinks that Analytic Functionalists, (what we are referring to under the Cognitive Science designation of Functionalist Applied Behavioural Analysts) are importing vocabularies that are already loaded with concepts about

---

consciousness. He thinks such loaded vocabularies apply concepts of animal motion that smuggle in sensitivity and affect.

Gleeson is interested in what makes up our concept of affective life and which he thinks ‘affective life’ can be seen to display through the common ordinary language vocabularies used to describe it and the concepts applied when these vocabularies are used. For Gleeson the vocabularies embodying the concepts of ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ are not simply a matter of linguistic discourse but form a foundation for a fundamentally distinctive way of seeing an entity or form of life to which we might apply the concepts. That is, he thinks the vocabularies the Functionalists are using already come loaded with the idea the beings they are applying them to are consciousness.

If we take Gleeson’s argument for its networth and apply it to the foregoing discussion about the diagnosis of children and computers with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder, by the outputs of psychometric tests, we can begin to see his point. One reason why we might be happy to diagnose the child, and not the computer with a lack of attention, is because the concept of ‘attention’ is already loaded with the Gleesonian vocabularies of ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’. Even though the program and the child may give the same outputs to the test, if we apply Gleeson’s insight, we can see that we already attribute the concept of consciousness to the child when we test it. We might say things like ‘the child is trying to concentrate’, ‘the child is being distracted’, ‘the child is struggling to stay focused’, ‘the child is plying, striving and attempting to
complete the tasks. When we turn to the computer program designed to give the same outputs on a psychometric test as the diagnostic criteria, we ourselves struggle to diagnose the computer because we do not use terms like ‘trying’, ‘struggling’ ‘distracted’, ‘seeking’, ‘attempting’, ‘striving’, ‘suffering’ or ‘making an effort’ for inanimate objects. These vocabularies contain loaded concepts like sensitivity, intentionality and affect. If we take Gleeson’s point, the Functionalist can either (a) diagnose both the computer and the child with AD(H)D and abandon the range of terms that Gleeson identifies as being ‘affectively-loaded’, or (b) give up the project of a science of mind based solely on environmentally orientated outputs.

Gleeson’s insight is important because the ability to project and understand concepts, on to the behaviour of others can be used to fill in blanks in a developmental stage in Wilfrid Sellars’ story about how people develop the ability to talk about their private emotional lives. Gleeson’s distinction between interpreting behaviour by bodily ‘expressivity’ and ‘environmental effect’ will emerge within the paper in the development of a language capable of describing human action and behaviour at the gross publicly observable level43. Gleeson’s

43 Specifically, Gleeson’s paper is important because he draws attention to this caveat on Functionalist-Behaviourist schools which arises due to the difference between environmental and bodily interpretations of behaviour. On one side we have environmental accounts of behaviour that rely on effects in the environment to define mental states. On the other hand, we have Gleeson’s concept of ‘animal motion’ in which we project intrinsic concepts like ‘plying’, ‘struggling’, ‘trying’, ‘suffering’ on to things we perceive as being types of ‘affective life’.

Underlying Gleeson’s concept of affective life and what we project on to it is his elusive concept of ‘expressivity’. ‘Expressivity’ implies within it the notion of ‘sensitivity’. Gleeson thinks we come to understand something of this expressivity in the embodied life of other beings when we perceive them to have ‘affective life’. Coming to view other beings as having ‘affective life’ and
point changes how we read Sellars’ developmental stages of language and impacts heavily on the final stages of Jones’ Language. As such it will be critical to what happens when the phenomenal zombie enters the Sellarsian village and attempts to speak the language.

**Jones’s Language**

The creation of Jones’ Behaviourism with its Paleo-Behaviourist Observational Language is part of a developmental stage in a ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory of Language’ that this paper draws from Wilfrid Sellars’ work. Originally Wilfrid Sellars simply called this behavioural stage ‘Jones’ Language’. Sellars hypothesizes that this Ur-Language is an early stage in his account of how a Rylean Community comes to be able to talk about their private and emotional

---

capable of ‘expressivity’ involves projecting our own concepts of sensitivity, pain, suffering and humiliation on to other life forms. Taking on board Gleeson’s insights, I argue that Jones’ Ur-language contains the ancestral germinations of what will become ‘expressivity’ and ‘affective’ life-form vocabularies. It contains these germinations in a Gleesonian-esque version of what Sellars calls an Observation Language.

Observation Languages draw on other languages in figurative and metaphorical ways to describe things without being propositionally factual in their account of things. For instance, at one stage saying ‘x looks like a flying saucer’ when confronted with a UFO is drawing on the language of dinner table settings for a figurative description. The person is not saying literally the object is a ‘saucer’, but they are affirming a descriptive content while withdrawing assent to a literal propositional formulation. Jones’ Paleo-Behaviourist vocabulary is one of these Observation Languages and contains the seeds for what this paper argues will develop into a full Gleesonian Affective Language which contains concepts of ‘expressivity’ and ‘sensitivity’ which Gleeson identifies and that this paper will show can be applied in Analogical Constructs to understand others.
lives at the end of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*.\(^4^4\) Gleeson’s paper and his argument about sensation and expressivity give us the materials to not just hypothesize Jones’ language as a stage but a way to argue for how that stage happens by rejecting a methodological tendency in Functionalism and Historically-Situated Psychological Behaviourists to focus on the environmental effect rather than the projection of affect on to the physical behaviour of another.\(^4^5\)

It is important to note that Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism is only a stage in the account being developed in this thesis and cannot give us a final account on the nature of mind as a ‘cover-all’ philosophy. The problem with a purely Gross-Body-Language Behavioural Psychology is that it cannot detect when someone is feeling an emotion but displaying no outward behaviours for that emotion. This is the Cogitation vs Vegetation problem which also can be seen to emerge from Gleeson’s critique of the problems with behavioural strains of Functionalism. Since a Functionalist relies on behaviour to flag a cogitative

---


\(^4^5\) This is what I think Sellars may have meant in his original account of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, but I do not think he had developed the full scope for the sophistication that would give him the resources to argue for it in that pioneering work. Sellarsian Jonesian Folk Behaviourism does not focus on the distal effects of object displacement to arrive at descriptions for a vocabulary of action. If it did, Jones’ Language would merely be a continuation of the Object Languages it borrows from, and simply describe people in terms of environmental out-put effects, not a Paleo-Behaviourist language. Since such a language, were we to imagine it, does not evolve from a Paleo-Behavioural origin, it follows that the users could not come to use affective concepts like sensitivity and expressivity to animate objects. Such a language would have no Gleeseonian vocabulary of animation. Of particular interest to the reader may be Sellars amendments to the 1963 edition. See Sellars, Wilfrid. *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. 1963 ed. Electronic Text. 1963 Amendments, edited by Andrew Chrucky. http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm.html 1995.
state, the Functionalist has trouble differentiating if someone is thinking when either (a) that person is exhibiting no behaviours or (b) producing no environmental effects. In layman’s terms the Functionalist cannot tell the difference between when someone is in a very relaxed state and ‘vegging out’, perhaps even dozing or sleeping, or if they are cogitating furiously, if they either (c) offer no signs of bodily expressivity or (d) create no ‘distal effects’ in the environment. For instance, consider the soulful meditations and musings of an obstinate Buddhist monk who refuses to move or respond when prodded with an input, against a brain-dead trauma patient, and Nikoli Tesla deep in furious cogitations about numbers and electricity. The monk, most certainly, is a problem for the Functionalist and Functional Behavioural Analyst. Is the monk cogitating or merely vegetating when he gives no response to the input of a stimulating antecedent? What about Tesla and the brain dead trauma patient? Let us suppose that all three are to be found lying on their backs in a room and we knew not which one was which. Are all three in the same mental state? We would surely answer no. Yet all three are exhibiting the same observable behaviours. The problem becomes even more complex when it comes to dividing objects into animate and inanimate categories when they evince no behaviours, or when there are what seem to be behaviours but no agent to cause them.

46 I choose this example because monks have been known to set themselves on fire in protest and sit in the lotus position for the duration of the conflagration.
Might the meditating monk be dead? What about the unresponsive state of the brain-dead trauma victim? If we kick both, and we kick a tree, they return the same behaviour. What of the tree? Is it in the same cogitative state as the other two? Let us explore this problem deeper.

Consider these next two examples as a way into Gleeson’s critique of Functional-Behaviourist In-put/Out-put models of mind endowed entities. Firstly, what of a blind man in a house full of creaks? Secondly, what of a blind man and a silent intruder? In these last two cases we have dissimilar problems. In the first case, that of the blind man alone in a house full of creaks, there is behaviour but no animate object. There are creaks. The blind-man hears what appears to be an entity moving around the house. He observes what appears to be the consequences of antecedent behaviours. The creaks might sound indistinguishable from those that would be made by some entity shifting around the house. But we know he is alone. It is just an old house. In the second there is an animate object, a mind endowed entity, an intruder, but no discernible behaviour. The intruder is silent. It has, perhaps, been trained in the way of a ninja. To which would the blind behavioural functionalist attribute mental states? The silent house with an intruder? The empty house full of creaks? The former has behaviour, i.e. creaks, while the latter has no behaviour but a silent intruder. In both cases the blind behavioural functionalist would attribute the presence or absence of mind in an entity, (a.k.a. a Gleesonian animated object),
incorrectly. The blind functionalist is wrong about the presence and absence of mind on both accounts.

There are wider practical problems than merely detecting the presence and absence of mind based on behaviours, for a purely Functional-Behaviourist approach to mind, which Gleeson’s paper also brings to light. People are clearly capable of having emotions without displaying any of the behaviours of those emotions. People can be angry without letting on they are angry. People can be deeply upset without crying or yelling. These are deeper problems for a Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism than merely the Cognition and Vegetation Problem of the Stubborn Buddhist monk. So a fully developed affective vocabulary applied to the behavioural actions of others is not the full story either.

A moment’s reflection will show why the indeterminacy of reference problem effects neuroscience as well as Behavioural Gross-Body-Language descriptive strains of psychology like the Paleo-vocabularies of Jones this paper theorizes (for the hypothetical problem of whether a phenomenal zombie could learn a Rylean language), but I shall spell it out nonetheless.

What Gleeson’s paper begins to reveal is a deeper problem that plagues the Mental Sciences and Disciplines which use environmental context to determine claims about mental states. Strapping the Buddhist monk or person who is non-visibly upset in to an EEG to reveal what the behavioural reactions our fully developed affective behavioural vocabulary cannot reveal will not fill in
the blanks, because neuroscience itself suffers from an indeterminacy of reference of its own as we saw with the research into locating anger and the problem of mistrust and distrust and activity in the Insula Cortex. In some cases what subjects identify as the same state might have different neurological data associated with instances of that state, while what are identified as different states entirely may originate in the same activity and have the same token of neurological data associated with them. The EEG cannot give us an authoritative view on what the Buddhist monk’s overt behaviour is hiding because the EEG has its own problems with indeterminacy.

I have thus far pointed out that Neuroscientists and Psychiatrists have the following problems:

(1) ‘Situational Responses’. This is where different patients respond differently to the same stimulus. Thus, the stimulus cannot be used to identify a mental state since the response between patients can be different and thus a singular identification breaks the laws of identity.

(2) The problem of ‘non-identical twin states’. This arises because the authority of a claim about the identity of two neurological states with identical

---

47 See subsection The Problem of Twin Mental States with Identical Neurological Information that feel different, earlier in this introduction. i.e. the problem with the insula cortex and patients who describe feeling different mental states for the same neurological data. Also see Problem (2) below.
neurological data is still open to a third claim by the subject, who can then claim that they do not ‘feel’ like they are experiencing the same state. We saw this in the case of ‘mistrust’ and ‘revulsion’ which share the same neurological data and activity originating in the same area of the brain but are identified as different types of feelings by subjects.

(3) Private experiences. The fact is evident and observable that people can often describe their private emotions without evincing the publicly observable behavioural or physiological changes, including narrated histories about prior emotional experiences and cases where the person is feeling the emotion but not displaying the symptoms.

Thus (C), it follows that the context, the neurological data and thorough body-language descriptions do not furnish the resources for comprehensive identity and individuation claims about what mental state types the patient is experiencing.

It also follows from (1), (2), (3) and (C) that both forms of research, the ‘Gross-Body-Language Behavioural Psychologist’ and Neurophysiological Psychiatrist have recourse to the patient’s own verbal statements for how the patient ‘feels’
in establishing the identity of the claim. In all three cases\textsuperscript{48} the statement of the person carries enough weight to negate the neurological or body-language behavioural characterizations provided we have reasons for believing the veracity of the subject. Thus, like other various strains of psychology that draw on linguistic statements or are language samples, theorists of mind applying neuroscience and ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ both have recourse to either (a) the domain of ‘Ordinary Language’ and what the everyday ordinary language speaker knows, or (b) a praeter-linguistic domain beyond language for which language is a mere code.

\textsuperscript{48} i.e. (1), (2), (3).
II

Ordinary Language Arguments and the Project of Anti-Psychologism in the Philosophy of Mind.

It is well known by people who study the problems of Analytic Philosophy that they are often highly abstract. This abstraction can often create an obscurity in what are profoundly significant insights about language, the mind, knowledge and meaning. Such insights can have applications across a vast domain of knowledge. I argue that this is the case with Ordinary Language Arguments and their place within the Philosophy of Mind.

One of the ongoing projects within the Philosophy of Mind has been the attempt to lay out what are the significant facts that a theory of mind has to explain. Ordinary Language Arguments belong to one particular type of account that tries to explain what are fundamental grounds for advancing a theory of mind. This type of theory holds that language is foundational to thought. It can be seen that Ordinary Language Arguments thus belong to one particular type of account of what the facts are that constitute the domain for forming a theory of mind. I shall argue that at least one practitioner of the Ordinary Language
approach, Gilbert Ryle, obscured a complexity in these arguments because of the level of abstraction at which he works.

There is a very important question about meaning and the relative priority between language and mind which many theorists of mind in cognitive fields seem to gloss over or dismiss. In Philosophy of Mind the relationship between mind, language and meaning has been the subject of debate and conjecture for well over a hundred years. This great debate has been captured in the Psychologistic and Anti-Psychologistic divide and is concerned with whether there is anything meaningful that can be thought prior to the minimum requirements for linguistic competence and expression in a language.

One might argue that if we always and only think in ‘words’ and ‘languages’ and there is nothing meaningful deeper since nothing can be said without using words, then one might also argue that thought is merely a form of linguistic discourse and that the mind, when thinking, is as it were talking to itself\(^49\). There are deeper reasons for arguing this, such as claims that thoughts that lack propositional elements cannot be about anything and so, are empty and not thoughts at all\(^50\). Indeed there are doctrines of judgement that take such an approach and originate in readings of Kant\(^51\), as well as semantic theories

---

\(^49\) Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983, pg 36  
\(^50\) Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1956, pg 52  
\(^51\) Brandon, Robert. *Articulating Reasons*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001. NB, I distinguish between these doctrines of judgement, with a lower j, from Chalmers Judgements, which I use an uppercase J, to keep the terminology tight and precise.
about language referents and the senses we can know them in\textsuperscript{52}. This is what Michael Dummett argues is constitutive of Anti-Psychologist thought\textsuperscript{53}. The strongest strain of the Anti-Psychologist School, Dummett argues, are the Ordinary Language Philosophers\textsuperscript{54}.

Gilbert Ryle is one such philosopher. He argues everything there is to know about the mind is already contained in our understanding of ‘ordinary language’. The reason why he thinks ‘ordinary language’ has this special status is because it is the non-technical common language people think in. He argues vehemently that there is no important difference between thinking something and saying it out loud. Since it is the language people speak, think and converse in, and it is the non-specialized ordinary everyday language which people use to describe each other’s conduct in the world, Ryle argues that ordinary language is the best foundation for understanding the mind. He thinks facts about the mind will arise from the facts established by an investigation into language. As such, Ryle argues, we begin with ordinary language and from it we construct a theory of mind. On Ryle’s view language is prior to mind. This makes him Anti-Psychologist.

From a Rylean Anti-Psychologist ‘ordinary language’ perspective what the ordinary language speaker knows when answering a survey, giving a report,

\textsuperscript{52} McDowell, John. ‘On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name.’ \textit{Mind} 86, no. 342 (1977): 159-185.
\textsuperscript{54} Discussed later in this paper.
constructing a theory about the mind or expressing their emotions is a problem that sits at the centre of a theory of mind. A Rylean perspective on Ordinary Language argues that analysis of mind begins with the non-specialist language of the everyday world.

The appeal of Ordinary Language Arguments is a sort of ‘the buck stops here’ approach. If Ordinary Language Arguments are sufficient one can construct theories of mind based on the knowledge the ordinary language speaker uses in their discourse about the mind. More generally ‘Ordinary Language Arguments’ are arguments that attempt to make a claim about the mind by the examination of the use of language used by the ordinary language user when speaking about the mind. If this is the right approach to establish the foundations of a theory of the mind then there is no need to go any deeper. The enquiry into mind stops at common language about the mind.

For psychology a theory of linguistic meaning is critical because one of the only ways it has of collecting data to formulate models about the mind is from the things people say and what they think those words mean when they say them, read them, fill out forms, talk to their therapist, read books or articles by psychologists or formulate their own theories and share them. Unlike behaviourally oriented strains and the neuro-psychiatric medical sciences, psychology is often limited to the domain of expressible language when collecting data or creating theories.
Ordinary Language Arguments are very interesting because they seem to offer the attractive promise of finding a simple way to get out of the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem. The Indeterminacy of Reference Problem, of course, is that words from the languages of mind can have different meanings and uses depending on which discipline, theorist, research field or subject is using them. The hope is that meaning in data collection, subject reports, theories and research on the mind can all be united under an appeal to Ordinary Language. An Ordinary Language position would argue against a ghostly stage with referents that pose as actors for the terms used by a patient, subject or research theorist. A psychologist who adapted such a Rylean Ordinary Language view could argue that there are no Fregian referents in a ghostly world ‘inside’ the mind. There is only language and language is what people think in. On a Rylean Ordinary Language approach there is no difference between saying “I am angry” out loud and thinking it in *sotto voce*. There is no difference between Fred thinking about going fishing on the weekend, and Fred talking about going fishing on the weekend. Ryle argues that people think in the same language they speak in, every day. For Ryle there is no ghostly beetle hidden in the matchbox. No. There is only the word on the box, and for Ryle, saying it out loud is the same thing as soundlessly thinking it.

Here, on a Rylean approach to Francis’ project we might list statements drawn from a common language and the participants could agree to how much those statements apply to them based on the shared knowledge of the language
between the person who wrote the statements and the person who reads them. But there is no need to go beyond that and speculate about whether Tiffany and Sue have the same ghostly objects that their statements about feeling angry refer to.

If we took up a Rylean position, this would give us a school of ‘Ordinary Language Psychology’, and what on first glance appears to be a highly attractive research proposal. Ordinary Language Arguments seem to offer the psychologist the hope of a way out of any indeterminacy of reference problems. However, I argue this is a false hope.

I develop a critique of Ryle which relies on a distinction between third person publicly accessible discourse about the mind and first personal ascriptions whose semantics, at a first pass, can be partially captured in terms of the private phenomenology of the experience which they express. I call this distinction ‘Ryle’s Three Mistakes’ and refer to it as such throughout the paper. When one has this kind of distinction between first person and third person uses of a term referring to one’s mental life, the questions arise (1) are the two really different? (2) If they are what is the difference between first personal experience and third person discourse? (3) Is one of them prior to the other in relation to the semantics and meaning of language about the mind?

In effect Ryle seemingly answers a resounding “no” to the first question. Nonetheless, however resounding his “no” to question (1) at first glance seems, I still argue that many of his arguments, when broken down to their ‘nitty-gritty’
parts, actually rely on there being a surreptitiously hidden ‘occult’ difference and that these differences are phenomenological in nature. As you shall see from reading it, a large part of this paper is concerned with a study of this ‘occult phenomenology’ in Ryle and bringing out the full implications of what is hidden away in there. I argue that what is hidden behind Ryle’s arguments is a surreptitious misuse and obfuscation of the difference between publicly accessible linguistic behaviour and private personal experiences. Ryle manages this through a concealment of reflective practices which he gets the reader to undertake when reading his arguments. I call this strain of argumentation in Ryle the ‘Occult Phenomenology’.
III

Anti-Psychologism and the Occult Phenomenology.

Historically Psychologism as a thesis began with an objection Frege had to Kant’s philosophy of mathematics. Kant thought that both geometry and arithmetic could be grounded in the categories of space and time as extensive and intensive forms of magnitude. This in effect tied mathematics to human perception. Gottlob Frege disagrees with Kant on this point. Frege rejects the notion that mathematics is simply a relic of man’s perception and a product of his faculties. Frege’s overall project can be seen as the attempt to objectify mathematics through set theory. Frege used the term ‘psychologism’ pejoratively for Kant’s view on mathematics and described his own project to objectify mathematics as Anti-Psychologistic.

Since Frege, Anti-Psychologism has been extended into the theory of language, chiefly, by Dummett and McDowell. Both criticize ‘psychologism’ as an

---

56 Here, of course, there are many sources one could point to, and write an extensive treatise on this point. I list Otfried Hoffe’s discussion for his expertise and what is generally considered an unbiased orthodoxy between Analytic and Continental receptions of Kant. See Hoffe, *Immanuel Kant*, 1994. Pp 44 -47, 59-72.
untenable project. Tim Crane deviates from the Anti-Psychologistic consensus adopted by most Analytic Philosophers. Tim Crane explains what McDowell thinks Psychologism is, including what McDowell argues that a Psychologistic Theory of Language is, which of course McDowell argues against. John McDowell is Pro Anti-Psychologismistic.

Tim Crane writes

(McDowell argues that) Psychologism is the view according to which ‘the significance of others’ utterances is a subject for guess work or speculation as to how things are in a private sphere concealed behind their behaviour.\(^{58}\)

Meaning, on this view, would not be transparently open to intersubjective understanding. People would need to guess what words meant and what the people using them were getting at. In the paper I refer to this problem that Psychologism faces as ‘The Guess Work Objection’. ‘The Guess Work Objection’ is a very good reason, on first appearance, to abandon Psychologism since people appear to be able to understand one another. However, I will offer an alternative account of why it seems that this is the case. That account, which I offer, will involve what I call ‘Analolgical Constructs’. Unfortunatley it is so early in the

sequence of arguments making up this paper that any explanation now will serve only to confuse. It is better if the reader remembers the term and how it fits in with the objection McDowell and Dummett raise and the promissory note issued here, that what I am calling ‘Analogue Constructs’ will offer an explanation to answer the ‘Guess Work Objection’.

Tim Crane also points to an acquisitional-autobiographical element in Dummett. Crane explains that what Dummett construes Psychologism as being arises from a confusion between the ways and means people have to acquire concepts and what it means to have concepts\textsuperscript{59}. What is perhaps confusing is that, as Crane points out, Frege himself held certain notions about Psychologism in his theory of language so that while Frege himself delved into aspects of Psychologism and the relationship between language and thought with his account of Vorstellung and Gedanke\textsuperscript{60}, the Fregeian concept of Anti-Psychologism grew into a broader Analytic Anti-Psychologism under Dummett and McDowell and the broader Analytic Community. Crane points out that this broader Anti-Psychologism of philosophers like Dummett and McDowell was applied beyond the original scope of Frege’s objection to Kant’s view of mathematics. Crane argues that Dummett and McDowell’s Anti-Psychologism has gone largely unchallenged in terms of both scholarship and advocacy of the

\textsuperscript{59} Crane, \textit{Aspects of Psychologism}, 2014, pg 2.

\textsuperscript{60} Crane, \textit{Aspects of Psychologism}, 2014, pp 4 - 7, and in particular see page 6.
correct theory on mind, as well as languages, thought and their relationship to semantics.

One reason I can see for rejecting Anti-Psychologism and embracing Psychologism, while also rejecting McDowell and Dummett’s position would be the argument that there are elements of mind that we understand that are non-linguistic. Another is that people’s use of a language may rely on semantic elements that are not publicly accessible which leads to guesswork about people’s meaning. I shall argue for both and the reason for doing so will be revealed as deriving from insights into the difference between first personal experience and third person discourse⁶¹.

Crane also defines another aspect of Anti-Psychologism as being one that involves it in research and analytic endeavours based on describing mentalistic concepts in terms of language and grammatical descriptions. It is this school of Anti-Psychologism that I am attacking, because I think, given the work of Dummett and McDowell and the inherent appeal of Ryle’s arguments, which is revealed by how deeply influential Ryle’s arguments have been in Analytic Philosophy of Mind, that Ordinary Language Anti-Psychologism appears to be

---

⁶¹ The distinction is drawn from David Chalmers insight into the different types of data one finds between the first and third person in his paper Chalmers, David. ‘How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness’ Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1303, no. 1 (2013). One might argue in a trivial sense that the distinction between first and third person is linguistic, however I argue that the data is not. The types of phenomenological arguments in Ryle I am drawing attention to rely on the data of first-person experience and not the linguistic distinction. In fact, a lack of ‘linguistic behaviour’ is what characterizes these types of behaviour. They do not exemplify in a single concrete manifestation with inheritance properties for the inter-sentential relationships between words and a grammatical analysis that can uphold the distinction they are based on.
the strongest approach to describing the mind with language. Thus, one very compelling reason for using Ryle, qualified by Dummett and McDowell is that removing the strongest root will have an effect towards uprooting the entire tree.

I argue that Anti-Psychologism, of which Ordinary Language Arguments represent a subspecies, has a problem with the irreducible differences between first personal experiences and third person discourse. This difference is an unwritten autobiographical story that takes place between the ascription of meaning in a term learnt in a sphere of public exchange and the ways and processes through which someone comes to grasp and use the concept they attach to the term. This unwritten story contains non-linguistic elements in a hidden realm behind the first person ascription that, I argue, requires guesswork to construct an interpretation of. I call these areas of guesswork and hidden non-linguistic elements ‘Analogue Constructs’. As stated above in my ‘promissory note’ the account of ‘Analogue Constructs’ on offer in this paper will provide an explanation to counter “The Guess Work Objection”\(^\text{62}\) launched by Anti-Psychologistics\(^\text{63}\). This account will explain why people appear to be evidently able to talk about and use highly complex vocabularies of affect, which

\(^{62}\) I have copied Dummett’s separation of guesswork into Guess Work, and capitalized it, to separate it from my own use of the term guesswork, throughout the paper.

\(^{63}\) An Anti-Psychologist is not a Anti-Psychologist. Psychologism and Psychology are different notions, and thus their antitheses are different also. For further clarification see *Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Languages*, as well as *Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of Mind, and Endo-Affective Languages* all in *Chapter Seventeen* in this thesis.
refer to private experiences with publicly inaccessible properties but also using a publicly accessible language.

Once I remove ‘The Guess Work Objection’ I will then present evidence against Anti-Psychologism in the form of an extended argument about the acquisition of language by a subject whose capacity for private experiences of phenomenal content have been removed. This is the “Phenomenal Zombie Argument” I mentioned earlier. For Ordinary Language Philosophy to work as a thesis about the mind it needs publicly accessible discourse to be able to capture everything there is to know about the mind. If a subject who is missing these private faculties cannot grasp and use a language competently, then this presents a problem for the view that a publicly accessible discourse is able to capture everything. There are reasons this paper lays out why the subject (the phenomenal zombie) cannot do this. These reasons need to be explained in further depth. However, the critique in this paper, seen thus, presents a threat to the general project of Anti-Psychologism.
Psychology, Psychiatry and the Object Languages of The Medical Sciences.

Long before medicinal neuropharmacology and neuroscientific psychiatry blossomed into hope and effective treatments for Manic-Depression as well as newer types of antipsychotics for schizophrenia⁶⁴, and a raft of other treatments that offered the chance of a non-institutionalized life to what have been historically considered as ‘the incurable mad’, Wilfrid Sellars foresaw the way medicine and science would intersect and unlock knowledge about the mind. Sellars saw that scientific developments would lead to new modern diagnostic technologies of the brain. He foresaw that such developments along the scientific front would result in a new image of humanity. Indeed, long before a whole vista of knowledge about learning disorders and other cognitive conditions was made possible by a new wave of (f)MIR, PET and EEG diagnostic technology, Sellars realized that there would come a point where the ‘Scientific Image of Man’ being developed by the fledgling neurosciences would come to challenge the established Manifest Image handed down and inherited from the Folk Ages. It

⁶⁴ The timeline is significant. Viable antipsychotics developed in the 1960s and spread during the 1970s. Significantly neuroleptic medications became widely available for standardized use in clinical practice by the 1980s by which time common, practical and lived knowledge of their uses and effects became commonplace for nurses, doctors and patients. Sellars' philosophical foundations and research date from the post-war period of the late 1950s and 1960s, before such knowledge was commonplace in the medical workplace and practice. It is worth considering his work with an eye to the developing common practices in medicine. Common insights freely available in our era were not so at the time that Sellars was writing and forming his views. Psychiatry was yet to yield the pharmacological revolution that emerged during the second half of the 20th century.
should stand to his credit that Wilfrid Sellars was one of the first philosophers to realize the vast potential for neuroscience to come to radically challenge the way we look at the mind. It is my goal, in this part of the thesis, to begin to place his insight within the developing methodological explanatory tendencies of psychiatry and psychology.

In the world and history of cognitive research and theory there are many places where psychology and psychiatry\textsuperscript{65} overlap. Both embody normative descriptions of what should be viewed as healthy. Some might see this normativity as grounds for questioning how scientific either one actually is\textsuperscript{66}. But it is also true that much of the actual research being done in cognitive fields stems directly from these two disciplines. Moreover, what emerges from the two are methodological and historical tendencies in practices. Psychology tends more towards being grouped with the social sciences. In addition to this grouping psychology also peddles talking cures\textsuperscript{67} and uses language-based data sampling in its research and questionnaires. Moreover, the language of some of its foundational schools is drawn directly out of folklore and myths like Freud’s Oedipus and Electra’s complexes, or Jung’s use of European folk stories. For good or ill many psychologists actually describe their research as ‘empirical

\textsuperscript{65}Later in the paper I will come to refer to a Psychological Image and a Psychiatric Image. Where I use captials for Psychology, or Psychiatry like I have just done, I refer to the ‘Images’ in the Neo-Sellarsian model I build, idealized by methodological tendencies we find in real world psychology.


studies’ and for these reasons I characterize its tendencies as an applied field of the Manifest Image within Sellars’ framework\textsuperscript{68}. Psychiatry, on the other hand, tends to inherit the harder sciences of medicine like chemistry, biology, anatomy, as well as advanced areas of physics and pharmacology as noted above.

We might see the potential for conflict between the normativity in psychiatry and psychology in quasi-Sellarsian terms in the following analogy. Suppose an athlete damaged their knee while training. The fitness instructor would be able to rub it, would be able to say ‘it looks like a torn hamstring’ from the way the athlete limps around on it, but ultimately would not be able to cut the leg open and fix it nor have the diagnostic ability to confirm whether it was in fact the hamstring, or if it was the knee. The surgeon on the other hand has a knowledge about the knee joint and reconstructive surgery from his medical training which would allow him to cut the knee open and fix the joint. In this case we would say that the surgeon has a superior knowledge to the fitness instructor.

If we refer this back to the case of the psychometric test and the psychiatrist’s EEG device, we can see the surgeon as analogous to the psychiatrist and the fitness instructor as analogous to the psychologist. A clash

\textsuperscript{68} Sellars framework for the Manifest Image in \textit{Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man} is of course, that it contains two older Images. One is the Anthropomorphized Image, and the Other is the Empirical Image which is a negation of the Anthropomorphic Image (presented as The One), which categorizes ‘nature’ as the domain of ‘truncated persons’. Certain tendencies in psychology towards folk sources, empirical doctrines and talking cures lead me to characterize those tendencies in that framework. Later, and through out the paper, I will, of course, provide many arguments that defend this view.
between a psychiatrist and a psychologist over whether a patient has AD(H)D is a genuine clash between two different frameworks much like the clash of the Manifest and Scientific Images Sellars envisaged in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. In the psychologist’s case, like the Fitness Instructor, they may be able to say ‘it looks like AD(H)D’ in the way the Fitness Instructor says ‘it looks like a hamstring injury’.

However, sophistications within the psychiatrist’s language about the brain and diagnostic equipment give the psychiatrist, like the surgeon, a methodological superiority. This superiority will be explained at length in the paper as deriving from the fact stating ‘roles’\(^69\) that medicine inherits from the Object Languages of the medical sciences. This is important as it relates to the differences in Observation and Report Languages in Sellars’ developmental Socio-Linguistic story and to an insight that comes out of Ryle’s argument about the contamination of natural languages by specialized sciences. A ‘pure psychology’, in the view offered by this paper, is trapped at a Post-Jonesian ‘observation stage’ of Sellars’ Socio-Linguistic development and limited to metaphorical descriptions that resist rational fact stating assent. The argument presented in this paper has a deeper and more pessimistic moral about the

---

\(^69\) Sellars’ use of the term.
inability of Psychology, or rather the Psychological Image\textsuperscript{70}, to rise above metaphorical speculation.

It is important to point out that I am using ‘Object Language’ in relation to my reading of Sellars and not in the standard Object Language/Metalanguage distinction in Semantics\textsuperscript{71}. By Object Language, as will be explained, I mean the stages of Sellars’ theory where he is dealing with Observation and Report Languages that deal with inanimate objects, or the stages in his Anthropology where Sellars argues that Empiricism when it develops at the foot of the Scientific Image, truncates anthropomorphic qualities left over from earlier ages. I read into Sellars’ distinction Andrew Gleeson’s point about the languages of object and ‘affect’\textsuperscript{72}.

It is also important not to confuse my claim that (i) Neo-Sellarsian Psychiatry which has access to Fact Statements from highly advanced Object Languages is able to progress, while Psychology because of its limited access to metaphorical uses of the Object Languages is doomed to a ‘speculative science’

\textsuperscript{70}In part I was inspired by the way David Misselbrook read into Sellars Two Images the idea of medicine. We do not often think of medicine as one of the sciences but here, of course, we are mistaken. Where else would we see the amalgamation of our scientific knowledge of man coalesce but in medicine? David Misselbrook was right. I am deeply indebted to his paper for this insight. See David Misselbrook. ‘Images of Man; the ‘scientific’ versus ‘the manifest’ images of Wilfrid Sellars. British Journal of General Practice. 63, no 614. (2013). 484.


\textsuperscript{72}Gleeson’s original use of the term.
with my claim that (ii) Autophenomenology is foundational to claims about the mind.

**Can the Chalmerian zombie in the Sellarsian Village learn to speak Rylean?**

In the full scope of the thesis it will be argued that (ii), Autophenomenological introspection is a type of normative source that actually underlies many common ordinary language claims about the mind. It is this same source which offers insight into the use of a number of emotive words. This insight can only arise once someone has passed through a certain stage and learnt to internalize a language. This is because the stage after internalization is the one where people begin learning how to make Analogical Constructs. This stage is the one where a person learns to use their internalized vocabulary and applies it to others to understand what they are saying, to make claims about their emotional life and to try and understand other people’s behaviour. In the final stage of the Socio-Linguistic theory developed in this paper it will be revealed that while the ascription of third personal terms derives from behavioural foundations, the meaning of the terms derives from first person insight. Thus, it can be argued that the meaning in these terms is based on Analogical Constructs built up from the first person by someone who is competent in using a fully developed language meaningfully. To understand this claim, however, it is necessary for
the reader to undertake the developmental stages of language built into the thesis. In order to discover the reasons why David Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie cannot learn the language of Wilfrid Sellars’ fictional Rylean tribe it is necessary to take the reader through a systematic exploration of each one of those stages.

Once a subject has undergone the stage I refer to as ‘internalization’ they can then build up ‘Analogical Constructs’ that allow them to apply experiences they first learnt words for while either displaying or witnessing publicly observable behaviour. Later they are able to connect these words with the private emotions they felt while displaying those behaviours and use the terms when feeling private emotions without displaying the emotions behaviourally. ‘Analogical Constructs’ are created out of a type of analogical reasoning that allows them to make the connection between their own private experiences and to use these when reasoning about what someone else might be experiencing.

Within the scope of the thesis it will be revealed that this inability to internalize and connect words with private qualitative experiences is the reason why Chalmers’ zombie cannot internalize to move beyond Jones’ Language with its proto-vocabulary of publicly observable behaviours, (what we are calling a

---

73 The reason why the Chalmerian phenomenal zombie cannot learn the Rylean language of the tribe is it cannot undergo all of the Sellarsian stages necessary for Gleesonian language competency. It is by going through those stages am I able to show the reader exactly where the zombie falls short.
Gross-Body-Language Behavioural Language\textsuperscript{74} to Self Reports of a private experience. The phenomenal zombie has no private experiences to connect to Jones’ word beyond the public display of a behaviour. The phenomenal zombie thus cannot talk about instances when it is feeling emotions but not displaying the body language for those emotions because it does not have any of these emotions.

The Psychologistic thesis (not to be confused with Psychology or Psychological\textsuperscript{75}) this paper offers is also further supported by the view that a pure neurological language cannot cover the facts of mind relevant to a theory of mind, because pure neuroscience is just another Object Language. A pure neuroscience might talk about the bio-electric frequencies the brain emits which are detectable with a certain device or the complex organic chemistry involved in neurotransmitters that pass bio-electrical chemicals producing the frequencies the brain emits. It might begin to talk about the relationship between cell membrane and the way dendrites relate to each other with complex strains of protein and describe how this process changes according to bio-chemical shifts at the cellular level, and ways of looking at this activity on a larger scale using a (functional) Magnetic Resonating Device and some of the complex physics that makes such imaging possible. But such an approach of itself has no ‘human’

\textsuperscript{74} The repetition of the term ‘language’ here is perhaps confusing. In the first use the term ‘language’ refers to physical gestures, posture, and movements. In the second ‘language’ here refers to the names someone like Jones develops for them and then begins teaching the community.

\textsuperscript{75} See Chapter Six: Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Language in this paper.
concepts to connect this Object Language to. Indeed, I shall argue no, the Chalmerian zombie cannot learn to speak Rylean.
The Three Tiers of Solving the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem in the Philosophy of Mind.

What emerges from the problem as I have laid it out should begin to be discernible as a three-tier system of proposals that have emerged as attempts at solving a highly abstract problem. The first tier is what we might characterize as ‘off-the-shelf’ theories and bodies of research into the mind which run into problems with referential indeterminacy. These are the fields of research around the sciences and disciplines of mind like Kimberly Francis’ work in Strain Theory, or emerging neuroscientific research into the Insula Cortex. The second tier are Ordinary Language solutions which seem to offer a way out of the referential indeterminacy problem and various disciplines and sciences of mind. This Ordinary Language approach seems particularly promising for psychology which has limited access to the hard scientific dialects of the ‘Object Languages’, but which I argue is a forlorn hope. The third tier is where this paper picks up in *medias res* as the flaw in Ordinary Language Arguments and what I propose is the solution. I will now lay out the three tiers in detail bringing us to the argument about ‘David Chalmers’ zombie’ and ‘Wilfrid Sellars Rylean tribe’, before beginning the thesis formally which will lay out the caveats for this argument and present it.
The First Tier: Fregeian Theories of Meaning and Naïve Psycho-Realist Theorists of Mind.

When a theorist of mind starts using terms like ‘anger’, ‘cathexic charge’, ‘inner child’, ‘enantiodromian pathway’, ‘negative internalizing emotions’, ‘besetzung transmogrifier’, ‘super-ego’, ‘noetic pole’, ‘fixation of the mortido drive’ or ‘the dark anima of the psyche’, it is always interesting to ask such a theorist preliminary ontological Carnapesque questions to inform us in what sense we are to take their theorizing. Do they (a) think such terms as they use have real world referents and existent entities, or (b), are such terms merely convenient fictions the theorist uses to talk about and understand the mind? If after some thought the theorist answers yes to (a), the first part of that dilemma, and no to (b), the second part of that dilemma, then we would call that theorist a ‘Naïve Psycho-Realist’.

On a ‘Naïve Psycho-Realist view’ words like ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ refer to actual and existent mental entities, and not merely convenient fictions for ways of talking about the mind. On such a Psycho-Realist view statements using such terms that are made by a theorist of mind ‘picture’ these entities as ‘parts’, ‘organelles’, ‘mentalia’ or ‘elements’ of the mind. On a Psycho-Realist view truth

---

76 If they answer yes, however, to the second part then they are a Psychologist in the sense of the Figarato-Literao model as discussed in Chapter Sixteen and Chapter Seventeen of this paper. That is, a Psychologist as one who speaks of the mind in convenient fictions, riddles and metaphors, but withholds assent to the fact-stating role of the languages they borrow from to construct riddles, similies and metaphors.
arises in a sort of naïve ‘picture theory’ in which the theorist’s words ‘picture’, describe and/or truthfully assemble, in propositional form, the relationship between these mentalia making up the mind. I shall now give two simple examples. (i) If we were to argue there really are ‘entities’, ‘organelle’, ‘parts’, ‘complexes of parts’, ‘thoughts’, ‘experiences’ or ‘constituents’ either ‘making up the human mind’ or ‘forming the mind’ or ‘in the mind’ corresponding for instance to Francis’ ‘negative internalizing emotions’ then we would be adherants to a Psycho-Realist position. Likewise, (ii) if we were to believe that in some entity called ‘the mind’ there really is an ego which we can dissect to discover an ID, or an entity or mental organelle corresponding to what we might refer to as parts of an Oedipus Complex then we would also be naïve Psycho-Realists.

---


78 By ‘naïve’ I am referring to a dewy-eyed ignorance leading to a lack of jadedness about the raging debates between Descriptivists and Referentialists about ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ semantics of the referent and definite descriptions. See Kallestrup, Semantic Externalism, 2012. Pp 10 – 57 for the kinds of debates a ‘naïve’ Psycho-Realist would be unaware of.

The reasons why a Psycho-Realist position is indefensible in neuroscientific forms of psychiatry is different to psychology. The problem with a Psycho-Realist theory in psychology is that a psychologist has no means of proving or refuting the truth of this Realist position since they have no recourse to the mind except through language. They are limited to speculation about whether the word ‘anger’ means the same thing between two different subjects using it in reports, data collection or therapy sessions. They cannot connect patients to an EEG or an (f)MIR to see what their brain activity is, or work out what the chemical relationship underlying the neuronal exchanges related to that activity are. There is no way to obtain (what appears to be) evidence that ‘anger’ means the same thing between different people since, in general, there is no way for a psychologist to check that the word stimulates the same types of bio-electrical feed-back registering as activity in brain scans and other similar devices.

In neuroscientific forms of psychiatry there are problems related to Situational Responses and cases where Two Twin States have identical neurological data but feel different like in the case of activity in the Insula-Cortex and the non-identical feelings subjects report of mistrust and disgust corresponding with similar or identical activity in this area.

These sorts of issues create a fierce frost storm which rains down a silver thaw of unsolvable problems. These problems accumulate around the edges of research projects and eventually solidify into a philosophical glacier over what is
the real hidden issue plaguing all of the various avenues of research into the mind. Such an issue involves recalcitrant struggles with semantic ascriptions and obrogation. Obrogation is a term which describes the ‘caveat authority’ by which a research subject can correct a therapist or researcher about what the research subject is actually feeling. Even though researchers might be able to locate activity in the insula-cortex using brain-scanning equipment, they rely upon the subject to report whether they are feeling mistrust, or disgust to identify the brain activity. This is particularly true when there are states with similar or identical patterns of brain activity in the same parts of the brain, which subjects experience as different states.

This hidden problem cannot be solved in the case of neuroscientific psychiatry by looking beyond the mind to the types of scenarios and contexts likely to cause either disgust or mistrust, respectively. Such an attempt leads back with circularity to the problem of Context-Dependent Identity Claims and Situational Reponses. Situations and contexts can not offer identity foreclosure on a patient’s emotional experiences where neuroscientific data falls short, for the simple fact that different people will respond to the same situation or context in different ways.

For instance, Jane might like Tom. If presented with Tom, Jane might give a specific type of reaction. However, Joanne does not like Tom. If presented
with Tom, Joanne would give an entirely different reaction. The emerging context for Jane and Joanne’s responses to Tom cannot be indexed as “Tom-dependant” for an identity claim about their brain-states, nor can they be situationalistically dependent on meeting Tom because Jane and Joanne can be seen to experience different emotional reactions to seeing Tom. If we try to base an identity claim on the context of encountering Tom in relation to Jane’s and Joanne’s brain scans, or what either one professes to feel for Tom, we will break the law of identity because they both feel different things.

The ‘take-home message’ at this early stage of the paper is that disciplines like psychiatry, psychology, cognitive science and branches of neuroscience fit what we might describe as naïve ‘Psycho-Realism’ when there is a hidden assumption or implied supposition that the words they use for mental beings,

---

80 This is a very polite way of putting the problems they had with getting female primates to present for male primates to measure male sexual activity in the brain. See Y. Oomura, et al. ‘Central Control of Sexual Behaviour.’ Brain Research Bulletin 20, (1988): 863-870. One of the emerging reoccurring problems with affective life forms, or ‘conscious beings’ is that they often react to the same stimulus or situation differently. So while context dependent states might be fine for defining at what temperature lead melts or water boils, there is a problem with conscious beings and defining mentalia by situational context. Gleeson brings this to the forefront with his critique of Functionalism as a form of ‘behaviourism’ and also points out the general problem with assigning mentality based on environmental effects. The other side of this problem with environmental effects and context dependent individuation of mentalia, of course, is that a computer program might be designed to display personality traits or score within a certain percentile on a psychometric test; it may use pattern recognition software while taking the Holtzman ink blot that correlate with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Likewise, the computer might be programmed with language and numeracy patterns such that when it takes the WAIS-VI arithmetic and written subsets, it presents out-puts consistent with a dyslexic diagnosis. Does that mean the computer has schizophrenia or dyslexia? Normally we would say that no, it doesn’t. The Gleesonian ‘affect/effect’ distinction brings to light this side of the problem. I argue that the difference between a computer and a human taking these tests is the concept of ‘affect’ which we ascribe to the subject. The other side is the problem where affective life forms may not react to a stimulus in the same way. The question these two sides of the problematic raise is, of course, what do the categories, concepts and vocabularies of affect which we apply to other beings, ultimately, rest on? I answer that question at the end of this paper.
emotions, feelings, thoughts or sensations correspond to universalized entities, experiences, parts, bio-electrical feedback, electro-magnetic activity, or elements making up the mind\textsuperscript{81}. As has been argued such theories have a tendency to suffer from an ‘indeterminacy of reference’. The ‘Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference’ arises most acutely when researchers and theorists from the fields studying the mind are using language about the mind that can change between first-person and third-person use. There is a difficulty in establishing whether the words such theorists and researchers use in their theories refer to the same things that their subjects are talking about, and if these meanings are the same between different subjects.

\textsuperscript{81} The paper will reveal that the problem with words like ‘anger’ is that they are not entities at all, but rather a confusion between two different sources of information, that become entwined together because of the stages involved in language acquisition. These two sources will be revealed as approximating to what we think of as first and third person perspectives and will be refered to in the later part off the paper, after many caveats, as the normative source inside of Heterophenomeological and Autophenomenological arguments. These sources end up being developmentally codified together due to the stages of language development. I invite the reader to come back and reflect on this point once they have read the entire work and digested it, if they wish.
The Second Tier: Ordinary Language Arguments and the hope of unifying discourse about the mind.

The second tier of problem-solving approaches to arise in the history of Twentieth Century Philosophy is the Ordinary Language approach. Ryle spearheaded this approach with a novel solution. That is to say a Rylean position on language would allow one to build a theory of mind based on the knowledge and use of terms of the everyday ordinary language speaker. On first appearance this seems to be a most tenable position. It offers the attractive proposition that researchers and theorists of mind speak and think in the same language as the subjects they study. On this view the words are intersubjective and meaningful whether they are in the mouths of the patients or the books read by the common ‘head-shrink’. This view is especially attractive to psychological researchers and the ongoing search for a ‘talking-cure’.

Since psychology lacks what I refer to as an ‘Object language’, (not to be confused with the distinction between object/metalanguages in semantics\(^{82}\)) and

we have carefully separated Behaviouralist Strains of Thinking, it thus remains
that the chief method psychology has of discovering and studying the mind of
another is through the use and analysis of language. For psychological
investigation to work as a branch of research into the mind all the facts relevant
to the domain of a theory of mind need to be discoverable through language. If
they cannot draw information from observing the behaviour of a research
subject, then psychologists need to talk to thier research subjects to get
information. Language is the conduit through which a nexus of mind and its
research flows in this case. The research subjects then relate their emotions and
thoughts in everyday, non-specialized language, assuming they have not been
trained at any length in the specialized languages of psychology and its
branches.

This being so, and given the other factors above; if Gilbert Ryle is right,
this would appear to make Ordinary Language the best type of theoretic scheme
for discovering the mind. Moreover, the curious consequence follows that if
Gilbert Ryle is right then Anti-Psychologism is the right approach based on
Ryle's argument that language is explanatorily foundational for developing a
'concept of mind'. If Anti-Psychologism is the right approach and language is
explanatorily and foundationally prior to any theory of the mind then this makes

____________________
psychologists Anti-Psychologistic. However, there is a problem with the Indeterminacy of Language to first consider before making such an argument.

Consider the problem that the indeterminacy of language presents for statistics and statistical research. If 9 out of 10 people tick ‘anger’ on a survey question, then how do the researchers know these statistics present an accurate finding in a sample? What if 3 of those people had been referring to what another 7 of them thought was sadness? Where a neuroscientist or psychiatrist can consult PET scans or blood-chemical analysis for further analysis of dopamine, or readings on hormone levels, and present some kind of medico-factual grounds, the psychologist does not generally have recourse to the same sorts of ‘Object Languages’ of the medical sciences when trying to establish the identity conditions of a mental state, entity, part, constituent, organelle or etcetera. Language is the best and most readily available currency the psychologist has to spend on his or her research.

Therein lay the appeal to the psychologist and why Ryle is an attractive proposition. The novelty of Ryle’s Ordinary Language position on the mind rests on the fundamental assumption that we think in language. The authority, on his view, for a theory about the mind derives from the analysis of the language used.

---

83 I must apologize at some point, and this is as good as any, for the binary slant of the language I have used throughout the writing of this paper. I am aware there are non-binary terms such as ‘they’, ‘shem’, ‘non-male’, ‘non-binary’, ‘neuter’, ‘non-gendered’ and so on for people who do not identify as masculine and feminine, and also terms for those who do not identify as people, such as ‘wolf-kin’ and other ‘non-humans’. I acknowledge those here and apologize to them for the binary language I use in the formal context of the academic thesis I am presenting.
by the ordinary natural language speaker when talking about the mind in everyday discourse.

The chief importance of Ryle’s argument lies in the claim that his Ordinary Language Account of the Mind can cover all of the facts necessary for a theory of the mind. This is Ryle’s weak spot, and it is this which I attack in the thesis.
The Third Tier: Introspection, Phenomenology and the End for Anti-Psychologism.

The third tier is introspection. Here I refer to phenomenology and first person exploration of consciousness and the mind. Where that introspection is applied to another I call it ‘insight’. Insight is a specific type of Analogical Structure, however there is not room here in this introduction to talk about insight and what makes insight possible. Where phenomenology differs from psychology is in its ego-centricity. By ego-centricity I mean something that emerges out of the final parts of this paper where it is possible that each person has a different meaning for ‘anger’, but within their own use of language it is consistent. Here there is no indeterminacy of reference between subjects, theorists, other subjects or any combination because each person sets their own references for the words they use. The way this occurs will be laid out systematically in the developmental stages of a socio-linguistic theory of language development and will include Wilfrid Sellars’ treatment of the Infinite Regress of Rules in Wittgenstein’s account of language application and public meaning. The completion of the thread of arguments dealing with Wilfrid Sellars’ treatment of Wittgenstein’s treatment of the paradox of language rule-attrition will involve developing a language between a teacher and a student for an experience which the student has, but the teacher does not.
Unfortunately, detailing the complexities of that argument involving firstly Wittgenstein, secondly Sellars’ work on Wittgenstein and thirdly, the hypothetical construction of a language between a teacher and an autistic-spectrum student, at this early stage of the thesis will only serve to overload the reader with too much information too early. There is deep and complex scholarship that involves different threads of Wittgenstein’s self-criticism, as well as Sellars’ treatment of Wittgenstein’s work which is far too detailed and technical an argument to offer anything, but broad brushstrokes at this stage of the paper. However, I invite the reader to keep this argument in mind as it will ultimately offer insight into the processes of language internalization.

The processes of language internalization, it will be revealed through the course of the paper, are part of a stage in the development of a language where people come to be able to report in the terms they have learned for their experiences. The account of the processes for internalization which this paper offers is integral to my argument, because ultimately, it provides the groundwork for answering Dummett’s Guess Work Objection. Dummett’s Guess Work Objection is the strongest argument against my position and my argument for a return to a Pre-Fregian Theory of Meaning. So, it is critical that I address it, which I do.

Along with an answer for Dummett’s Guess Work Objection, the processes of language internalization I argue for later in this paper during the section dealing with the scholarship on Wittgenstein, also offers an attractive
autobiographical account of language meaning. The autobiographical theory of semantics this paper offers is one in which the meaning of a term and the process of acquiring that meaning are ceaselessly and interminably ravelled together. This autobiographical semantic theory presented in this thesis offers the reader one possible reply to McDowell’s Autobiographical Objection. Together the replies to Dummett’s and McDowell’s objections to Psychologism, presented in this thesis, offer an argument for the feasibility of a return to a Pre-Fregian Theory of Mind.

---

Part One:

Ordinary Language and The Cartography of the Mind

Chapter One Dissection of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account of the Mind

I

Linguistic Behaviourism and Logical Behaviourism

In contrast to all the different varieties of Psychological Behaviourism I am using the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ to refer to Ryle’s claims that describe

---

\(^{85}\)See, for instance Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Mind. London: The Muirhead Library of Philosophy, 1951, for Russell’s discussion of Watson, page 52, or Thorndike’s laws page 53, or how Russell builds these into psychological definitions as part of his behaviour cycles pp 64 – 65. This Russellian Taxonomy of Behaviourism is interesting, and indirectly influences some of the terminology of this thesis. The problem with Russell’s taxonomy and definition for Behaviourism, is it has not been updated since Russell wrote it. So it does not contain insights from Putnam and Ned Block’s work in Functionalism, or recent developments in Functionalist Applied Behavioural Analysis, or Gleeson’s critique of Functionalist-Behaviouralist terminologies. However, when I refer to waves of Historico-Psychological Behaviourism later in the paper, I do so with a nod to Russell’s taxonomy. For Skinner’s own formulation of a definition see Skinner, B. F. Beyond Human Freedom and Dignity. Middlesex: Penguin, 1976. Skinner analyzes behavior in terms of aversion and reinforcement on page 104, which he builds into a definition of good or bad starting with survival contingencies. On page 124 these natural contingencies of survival become conditioning in society. He thinks that this conditioning is positive or negative depending on whether it rewards or punishes behaviour. And he speculates on the connection between this and whether a response reinforces behaviour or is aimed at its extinction. On page 140, Skinner argues that when behavior is followed by reinforcement either in rewards or praise it conditions the subject and replaces natural contingencies of the environment. This completes his definition which he starts on page 48, with his discussion of dignity. Skinner argues that dignity is the illusion that arises from not knowing the true conditions of a person’s conditioning while freedom is simply the illusion that allows a person to be conditioned by random chance and events rather than structured reinforcement for behaviour. Skinner’s own Psychological Behaviourism, of course, falls criticism to Gleeson’s critique of animated vocabularies. Skinner’s vocabulary of ‘freedom’, ‘pain’, ‘pleasure’, ‘positivity’, ‘dignity’ and ‘reward’ is filled with animate, sensitive and affective concepts and subject to Gleesonian criticism and hence problematic as a foundation to start this paper. Hence why I have rejected it as a point of origin for a definition or taxonomy, despite Skinner’s historical significance. It will be revealed over the course of the paper that the root of Gleesonian vocabularies of affect and sensitivity lay in what I call...
‘Autophenomenological appeals’ which are the normative source for concepts of mind. Hence, I have not classified Ryle using Skinner’s terms because Skinner is subject to both Ryle and Gleeson’s critiques, in different ways and such classification would be erroneous. See also, for instance Sellars, Wilfrid. ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, pp 1 - 40. California: Ridgeview, 1991. See, specifically, page 24 – 30 for Sellars’ own Behaviouristics distinctions. See also Willem A. DeVires, Timm Triplett. Knowledge, Mind and the Given. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 2000, pp 136-140 for a insightful and penetrating discussion of Sellars on this point, and specifically, the distinction between philosophical and methodological behaviourism. However, I was lead to reject both of these as a point of origin for this paper, after careful reading, because of an underlying tension between a number of Sellars’ papers about the order that he thinks a language needs to develop in, in order to develop a vocabulary of the mind. See Observation and Report Languages, in Chapter Sixteen of this thesis for a discussion of the tension between Sellars’ papers. For the dubious classification of Ryle as a ‘Philosophical Behaviourist’ see Stout, Rowland. ‘What You Know When You Know How Someone Behaves.’ The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, no. 7 (2002): http://ejap.louisiana.edu/archives.html. I argue contra Rowland, that Ryle, himself, rejected Behaviourism and you will find discussion of Ryle’s critiques of Behaviourism in Chapter Seventeen, of this thesis, in the subsection Where Ryle and Gleeson’s Critiques fit into the Neo-Sellarsian Psychiatric and Psychological Model. This thesis, as it progresses offers a very attractive and developed lexicon and taxonomy of Behaviourist strains of psychology taken from different theorists and philosophers views on what they think a ‘psychological behaviourist’ move is, including an earlier and later critique by Ryle as already mentioned. This is done in stages because misreadings of Ryle have often classified him as just another type of behaviourist without taking a closer look at what he argued or the nature of some of the claims he makes. Hence why I start over with a description of him as a Lingsuitic Behaviourist drawn from what Weitz got wrong. In this footnote I have listed some of the background influences and places where people might go to find ‘other’ Behavioural Taxonomies which I have rejected after studying them. In contrast to these taxonomies and readings of Ryle as a ‘behaviourist’, I argue for a new definition and a new study. I argue that Ryle developed a method I call ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’, which is not a form of ‘behavioural psychology’, although psychologists might make Linguistic Behavioural claims. Rather than a movement, ‘Linguistic Behavioural Arguments’ are a type of argument that provides a grammatical analysis of a concrete manifestation of language in order to either advance an Ordinary Language Argument that upholds a claim about the mind, or to negate claims made by another philosopher on a linguistic basis. All Linguistic Behavioural Arguments are Ordinary Language Arguments but not all of what Ryle claims are Ordinary Language Arguments turn out to be Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. The term ‘Linguistic Behaviour’ is taken directly out of Ryle, where he calls his investigation into the interaction and relationship between words an investigation into their ‘behaviour’. This word ‘behaviour’ and the term ‘behaviourism’ when used in conjunction with ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ has no direct derivation from Skinner’s term, nor Watson’s use of the term, nor Thorndike’s Laws, nor Russell’s classifications, nor Rowland’s classification of Ryle via Behaviourism. This is purely derived from Ryle’s own word, and originates from Ryle, and I use it with ‘linguistic’ to distinguish this closer reading of a specific type of argument that Ryle made from the much more general ‘Logical Behaviourist’ interpretation and classification which Weitz, inter alia, presents, and which I argue is inaccurate and problematic, for which see the chapter affixed to this very long footnote. My intention of course, in writing this footnote is to cut off any objection as to why I did not use such and such’s theory of behaviourism, to distinguish Linguistic Behaviourism as not being derived from, or unrelated to, instead of the actual critiques of Behaviourism I draw out of Ryle and Gleeson, or fragments of Russell and Weitz.
or can demonstrate relationships between bits of language spelled out in grammatical descriptions of linguistic behaviour.

Ryle’s arguments contain many interesting and attractive appeals. Ryle himself argues that the appeals in his argument constitute an ‘Ordinary Language Account of the Mind’ and that they arise from what is common and everyday people already know about language about the mind. For he thinks ‘Ordinary Language’, when taken as an authoritative and normative source, can provide the resources for a theory of mind that covers all of the relevant and germane facts of mind without recourse to theories of consciousness, analogies of sea water, light, motion, introspection, or the invention of some new specialized vocabulary to explain what he thinks people already know and talk about, by virtue of having a mind and possessing a common and shared language already to talk about it. Ryle thinks relevance, in this case, is taking the facts other types of theory of mind try and often fail to explain, and instead explaining these facts using his everyday language account of the mind based on the way people already talk about it.

However, this is an ambiguous claim. The ambiguity arises from Ryle’s own arguments. There are several different types of argument hidden in his ‘Ordinary Language’ account of the mind. By carefully redefining the components of Ryle’s style of argumentation we can dissect the nature of the appeals in his arguments and see if they do in fact arise from the same normative source. I shall argue in this paper that they do not, that ultimately
there are other normative and formative claims in his argumentation, which Ryle cannot account for in the official terms of his account and that his ‘Ordinary Language’ account falls short. A close re-examination and classification of the ‘argumentata’ that appear within Ryle’s work *The Concept of Mind* will allow us to do this.

This re-examination of Ryle’s arguments on offer in this thesis will show the following: a) There are facts about the mind that language analysis cannot cover. b) There are facts in the domain of Ryle’s own arguments (and generally applicable to the domain of a theory of mind) which the type of argument he makes in his polemic against consciousness cannot cover. That is Ryle has arguments against consciousness, but some of his arguments against consciousness implicate the very types of conscious mental acts he argues against. c) That the critique of Ryle presented in this thesis threatens the general project for an Anti-Psychologistic theory of mind. A re-examination and classification of the ‘argumentata’ that appear within Ryle’s work *The Concept of Mind* will allow us to do a, b and c.

From this point on, what I have just said shall serve for the purposes of fixing a beginning to what I refer to as Ryle’s ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’. This is one particular kind\footnote{‘Species’ is perhaps a better word if we take Ordinary Language Arguments to be the genus. While all Linguistic Behavioural arguments are a kind or a species of Ordinary Language Arguments, Ordinary Language Arguments are not a species nor kind of Linguistic Behavioural Argument. The two terms are not equivalent. Not all Ordinary Language Arguments are Linguistic Behavioural Arguments.} of ‘Ordinary Language’ argument Ryle uses, where in his
own words he analyses the 'behaviour of words' in the context of their ordinary common usage to reveal hidden properties in the relationships certain words have, when expressed in a given turn of phrase.

I should first like to distinguish Linguistic Behaviourism from several mistaken readings of Ryle that representation out of his philosophy under the term of 'Logical Behaviourism' and most commonly paint it as a forerunner of 'Reductive Functionalism' as he has often been interpreted and classified in Twentieth Century histories of the Philosophy of Mind. By now there is such a wide variety of meanings for the term 'Logical Behaviourism' associated with 'Gilbert Ryle' that the simplest way forward is to show two species of interpretation and why the problems arising between them suggest that we need to start over and leave all the other readings by the wayside. To these ends the two most pertinent thinkers to the present project are Morris Weitz and David Chalmers.

Morris Weitz was, perhaps, the first person to define Gilbert Ryle as a Logical Behaviourist. He uses the term 'Logical Behaviourism' to describe Ryle without referencing anyone, and I, myself, can find no earlier. He tried to capture the spirit of Ryle's linguistic analyses in three propositional model sentences that describe behaviourally descriptive categories. On first appearance Weitz's project seems a good one. For if we are able to reduce behaviour to propositional models then there is the promise we can further define those models using a criteria of meaning and truth values. Therein lay the promise of
uniting behaviour and what we know about propositions and the burgeoning field of mathematical logic to develop a new science: ‘Logical Behaviourism’.

Chalmers is, perhaps, one of the most important thinkers in Philosophy of Mind today. His outstanding work on the conscious mind and his research into neuroscience have changed the face of Philosophy of Mind, and re-written the history of how we have come to re-examine the role of consciousness in the development of philosophy from Descartes to the modern era.

It is from these two accounts of ‘Logical Behaviourism’ that we will begin our ‘Linguistic Behaviourist’ and ‘Ordinary Language’ thread of argumentation. We will focus on what is essentially missing from both accounts and thus will give us our Ordinary Language and Linguistic Behavioural threads. The goal of these two threads, starting from Weitz and Chalmers, will be to forge tools in order to ‘dissect’ Ryle’s arguments.

Ordinary Language Arguments use an ‘it makes sense to say’ statement to advance a normative claim about language related to another claim about the mind that draws on the knowledge possessed by the speaker in that language to endorse the claim. Ordinary Language Arguments thus support Linguistic Behavioural arguments since the speaker of a language needs to agree with the use of the sample of language. However, later I am going to argue that not all Ordinary Language Arguments are Linguistic Behavioural Arguments.
One of Chalmers great services to Philosophy of Mind has been to dissect Western conceptions of cognition into two rival theories of mind. Chalmers thinks that the philosophical concept of mind can be divided into two dominant concepts that arose from a division that began with Descartes and ended up developing into Functionalism. These two concepts of the mind are the ‘phenomenal’ and the ‘psychological’\textsuperscript{87}. The introspective qualities of what thoughts are like Chalmers calls the ‘phenomenal’ and he characterizes as

---

‘feels’\(^{88}\) while the psychological he gives a first approximation as what the mind ‘does’ in differential responsiveness to the environment\(^{89}\).

Chalmers writes

The phenomenal and the psychological aspects of mind have a long history of being conflated. Rene Descartes may have been partly responsible for this. With his notorious doctrine that the mind is

---

\(^{88}\)Chalmers. *The Conscious Mind*. 1996 Pg 11 – 17, pg 182 shows how these two processes parallel each other. This comes out in his treatment of judgments. For Chalmers judgments are beliefs with all of their phenomenal properties subtracted. This explains his earlier claim on pg 174, that judgments are purely psychological states. The difference is important for his central thesis. This difference comes out in the discrepancy between (2) and (3) of the conditions that make up the paradox of phenomenal judgment. Chalmers holds that whereas judgments about consciousness are logically supervenient on the physical, consciousness itself is not. This in turn explains the argument on pg 95 and the claim that phenomenal zombies are conceivable, since they would only employ Judgements, and not have Beliefs, and in turn Chalmers argues that this explains how a phenomenal zombie might think he is conscious when he in fact is not, since the structure of his judgment is determined by his psychological state and not the content of his phenomenal experience. This parallel between phenomenal and psychological states later develops into the principle of structural coherence, see page 219. I shall argue, in systematic stages through the course of the thesis, that there are certain judgments like whether the ‘flash’ one feels is one of ‘anger’ or ‘regret’ which it requires the phenomenal properties to make. I maintain that in order to make a meaningful statement about whether one feels anger or regret one needs the emotional experience for the semantics of one’s statement. The phenomenal zombie, of course, will not be able to make meaningful statements based on its Judgements because it does not have the emotional content of a ‘flash’ of ‘anger’ or ‘regret’ to tell the difference. Its Judgements do not have a one-to-one correspondence with its real-world twin, who has the semantical content to make such a Judgement because of his or her experience.

\(^{89}\)This approximation is problematic. I take it he means ‘does’ in a functionalist in-put and out-put sense, although there are causal problems with configuring the Freudian position in terms of in-put and out-put analysis. There is a problem because some of the Freudian’s drives are causally generic and in-built, and thus are not determined by in-puts and therefore can’t be functionalist by the definition he gives. See the block quote from Chalmers, which I’ve reproduced below on Freud. For Freud himself on this matter see Freud, Sigmund. ‘Three Essays on Sexual Theory.’ In *Psychology of Love*, Pp 111-220. Victoria: Penguin, 2010, pp 138-142 for the sexual drive in neurotics, and Freud, Sigmund. *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Translated by David McLintock. London: Penguin, 2004. Pp 17-25 for his discussion of the drives and the in-built causal efficacy of the pleasure seeking principle.
transparent to itself, he came close to identifying the mental with the phenomenal. Descartes held that every event in the mind is a cogitation, or content of experience. To this class he assimilated volitions, intentions and every type of thought\textsuperscript{90}.

In Chalmers’ history this Cartesian tradition of a conscious mind is not seriously challenged until Freud who, Chalmers argues, makes a move towards the psychological by arguing that accessibility to consciousness is not essential to explaining a mental state or its existence.

Chalmers writes

It appears that Freud construed the notions \textit{causally}. Desire, very roughly, was implicitly construed as the sort of state that brings about a certain kind of behaviour associated with the object of the desire. Belief was construed according to its causal role in a similar way. Of

\textsuperscript{90}Chalmers. \textit{The Conscious Mind}. 1996 pg 12
course Freud did not make these analyses explicit, but something along these lines clearly underlies his use of the notions. Explicitly, he recognized that accessibility to consciousness is not essential to a state’s relevance in the explanation of behaviour, and that a conscious quality is not constitutive of something being a belief or a desire. These conclusions rely on a notion of mentality that is independent of phenomenal notions.

According to Chalmers the next stage separating the phenomenal from the psychological started with the Behaviourist Movement. The significance of the Behaviourist Movement, for Chalmers, was the rejection of the introspective tradition for an objective brand of psychological explanation. Chalmers argues that some behaviourists recognized consciousness but ignored it, and some denied it existed. However Chalmers holds that the overall significance of the Behaviourist Movement, when taken together with the Freudian, was the creation of a new Freudian-Behaviourist Orthodoxy which was ultimately

---

established and preserved in the move towards Functionalism and then
Cognitive Science.

Functionalism, Chalmers argues, is the converse of Descartes’ argument
that all psychological phenomena can be assimilated to the phenomenal. The
reason why it is the converse, Chalmers holds, is that Functionalism, as defined
by David Armstrong93 and David Lewis94 takes it that a mental state is defined by

(a) the stimulation that produces it
(b) the behaviour it produces
(c) the way it interacts with other states.

This history is important to David Chalmers’ conceptualization of Ryle’s Logical
Behaviourism. Chalmers sees Ryle’s Logical Behaviourism as a sort of precursor
to Functionalism. I take it that David Chalmers means ‘reductive functionalism’
in this earlier part of the book because later he goes on to announce that his
overall project is the search for a non-reductive functionalist account of
consciousness95 and to these ends gives a deeply insightful account that focuses

on the difference between Beliefs and Judgements, consciousness and awareness, and various bridging principles.

Indeed, it is easy to see how an account of dispositions like Ryle’s might be important to the development of (reductive) functionalism as conceived by Armstrong and Lewis, of particular importance here is defining a mental state by (a) the stimulation that produces it and (b) the behaviour it produces.

Chalmers argues that between the historical rise of the Behaviourist-Freudian orthodoxy and (reductive) Functionalism is the period of Logical Behaviourism. This is where Ryle fits into his history.

---

96 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 As I noted he reveals that judgments are beliefs with all of their phenomenal content subtracted on pg 182. Prior to this on page 175 he lays the foundations for this move and reveals that the contents of First Order Judgements make up the contents of awareness.

97 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996. The difference between consciousness and awareness is one of the central themes of the book and starts with the discussion of Ned Block’s discussion of consciousness on pg 29. However, immediately preceding this he has a discussion of Armstrong’s concepts of introspection and reportability. Pg 228 is where he finally posits the principles for the basis of the distinction. The paper Chalmers draws from on page 29 of The Conscious Mind is Block, Ned. ‘On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, (1995): Pp 227-47.

98 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 NB The concept of bridging principles he, likewise, introduces early, but spells out on page 237 as part of the discussion about using coherence principles as epistemic levers.

99 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 My parenthesis. He defines his project properly on page 229 but doesn’t seem to clarify it any earlier. I take it that this is what he means. There is a discussion on pp 104 -106 and a reply to Searle on pp 130-131. In the former he argues that proponents of reductivism favor functionalism because it is the only tenable option. The latter is a rebuttal to Searle’s position that consciousness must play a ‘functional role’ which Chalmers thinks ignores the fact that consciousness is ‘ontologically novel’. Neither capture the ‘(non)’ of the (non)-reductive aspects of functionalism he develops later in the work.

Chalmers writes

In philosophy, the shift in emphasis from the phenomenal to the psychological was codified by Gilbert Ryle, who argued that all our mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways. This view, Logical Behaviourism, is recognizably the precursor of much of what passes for orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of psychology. In particular, it was the most explicit codification of the link between mental concepts and the causation of behaviour\textsuperscript{101}.

This focus on ‘associated behaviours’ and ‘dispositions to behave in certain ways’ may be true in certain aspects from a historical interpretation-of-Ryle point of view, and certainly there are those who may have read Ryle this way\textsuperscript{102}.

\textsuperscript{101}Chalmers. \textit{The Conscious Mind}. 1996 pg 14
\textsuperscript{102}G.E. Myers for instance, see Myers, G. E. ‘Motives and Wants.’ \textit{Mind} Vol. 73, no. 290 (1964): Pp. 173-185. Pg 173. Also, see \textit{Chapter Eight, Was Ryle a Behaviourist? If so which type of Behaviourist?} In this thesis for a discussion of the link between Myers and Chalmers view in the history of Western
However, Ryle thinks the true normativity for a claim about the mind comes from analysis of common language intuitions. What I think Chalmers has identified in his potted history is a historical tendency to misread Ryle, that reoccurs in much of the peer-review literature. There are problems with labelling Ryle either as a (a) Freudian or (b,) some kind of Skinnerian or Thorndike behaviourist. I will deal at length with this elsewhere in the paper\textsuperscript{103}.

More problematic is what is missing from Chalmers’ account about the type of arguments that Ryle made. For Ryle was first and foremost an Ordinary Language Philosopher. His approach to the mind was firmly centered in the view that the mind reveals itself through the common use of ordinary language and this is what we need to study to understand the nature of the mind. Ryle thinks that everyday use of language has a special status in the Philosophy of Mind. The reason why it has this status for Ryle is that everyday language is the language that, he argues, people think in. Chalmers does not address the normative source of force behind Ryle’s arguments.

In a discussion related to Augustine’s ‘volitions’ and the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’, Ryle lays out a general criterion for mental states and mental acts:

\textsuperscript{103} See the chapter Ryle’s Limited Uses of the Terms ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Introspection’ in this thesis. See also Ryle’s argument against conceptualizing the mind in causal terms. See Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983 The Bogey of Mechanism Pp 74-80.
Ryle writes

If ordinary men never report the occurrence of these acts, for all that... they should be encountered vastly more frequently than headaches, or feelings of boredom; if ordinary vocabulary has no non-academic names for them; if we do not know how to settle questions of their frequency, duration or strength, then it is fair to conclude their existence is not asserted on empirical grounds...\(^1\)

---

\(^1\) Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983 Pg 64. I take it that when Ryle says 'empirical grounds' he leaves it open that rare and unwonted mentalia could be justifiably posited on empirical grounds. While this may be so, it seems clear from *The Concept of Mind* and later writings, that Ryle does not regard the posits of the theories of mind of his day to be justified posits on 'empirical grounds'. What he would think of as posits of theories in special sciences of mind in our day is less clear. The relation of, say, 'negative internalizing emotions' that are not usually reported by girls in abusive circumstances to 'empirical grounds' for assessing their existence is probably more fraught, in a Rylean perspective, than, say, the relation of positrons to the empirical grounds for positing them. If theories in contemporary psychology where empirical grounds for the existence of their posits maybe stronger, the issue that can be anticipated is whether the conception of those posits is sufficiently like something mental or psychological, as analogously conceived, to count as being part of a theory of mind. So once due acknowledgement is given to Ryle's openness to novel posits justified on empirical grounds, the point remains that it is a presumption of Ryle's approach to mind that the onus is on such a conceptual venture to justify its existence by its empirical power, but, otherwise, if it is no part of the layman's understanding of him or herself, and others' mental lives, got from his or her competence in ordinary language discourse about the mind, Ryle would argue that it is likely to cause unnecessary puzzles and other forms of confusion. In this sense I put this 'test' as criterion of mental items in Ryle.
Ryle’s argument here is that if the terms or a claim about the mind can not be found in common, then he will dismiss it. Thus, Ryle must reject any theory of mind that posits facts about the mind which must be inaccessible or undiscovered in the way that a psychological theory of mind as defined by the Freudian psychoanalytic theory might suggest. This is a problem for Chalmers’ claim that Ryle is part of the Freudian-Orthodoxy\textsuperscript{105}. There are also issues with painting Ryle as a Psychological Behaviourist which I will touch on in Ryle’s critique of Psychological Behaviourism when I deal with Ryle’s use of the term ‘Introspection’ later in the thesis\textsuperscript{106}.

For Ryle, legitimacy in a theory of mind demands that linguistic knowledge must already be known in some intrinsic sense to the competent ordinary language user. According to Ryle’s view the authority behind claims about the mind arises from what it makes sense to say in an ordinary language with the vocabulary of the everyday user. For Ryle the ‘orthodoxy’ he condones must be one of ordinary language and not of the unconscious or the strictly proto-functionalist behavioural orthodoxy\textsuperscript{107}. The exact nature of this ‘intrinsic


\textsuperscript{106} See Chapter Nine in this thesis, the subsection titled Sea Water, Consciousness and Introspection. Gilbert Ryle on Mindfulness.

\textsuperscript{107} In the B. F. Skinner sense of the ‘Psychological Behaviourist Movement’ popular in the 1960s that Chalmers is referring to in his history, and not the ‘Linguistic Behavioural sense’ this paper is developing. See Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, See, specifically, the introduction by K. Kolenda’s , pp 1 – 17, and in particular pg 1, where he sketches out Ryle’s basic move against a Cartesian or Behaviorist account. Kolenda writes ‘Ryle’s basic move is well, even notoriously, known. He inveighed repeatedly against a twin mistake: to put the concept of mind into either a mechanistic (Behaviorist) or a ghostly (Cartesian) framework. . . Ryle undertook the task of reminding us of what we pace Behaviorist or Cartesian distortions, are perfectly familiar with.’
sense’ is important to Ryle’s position and I shall also bring this out later in the paper\textsuperscript{108}.

Suffice it to say, at this stage of the paper, the problem with Chalmers’ account of ‘Logical Behaviourism’, for our purposes, is that it leaves out precisely what is essential to Ryle’s ‘concept of mind’. Ryle thinks what is special about everyday language is that people think in it and they have common language names and terms regarding the mind in the language of those thoughts. Ryle was not just rejecting the Cartesian tradition of phenomenal consciousness. Rather he was rejecting the concept that the academic and scientific had anything more to teach us about the mind that we didn’t already know or could not be gleaned from competent ordinary language use and its analysis.

\textsuperscript{108}This is the ‘later Ryle’. There are two stages of Ryle’s critique of historically situated Psychological Behaviourism based roughly on Ryle’s analysis of mind into two types of dispositions. The earlier Ryle thinks he can provide an account of the concept of mind from the Tendency Dispositions and some of their inheritance properties and inter-sentential linguistic relationships. The later Ryle of On Thinking is less concerned with tendency verbs, and more concerned with developing the adverbial phrases for the Rylean capacity verbs. The critique he develops of Historico-Psychological Behaviourism changes between the two works.
III

Morris Weitz

Morris Weitz’s concept of Logical Behaviourism is a much closer reading of Ryle’s position in *The Concept of Mind* than David Chalmers because he takes into account Ryle’s position on ordinary language. Weitz bases his taxonomy of Ryle’s analysis of ordinary language on propositional structures or model statements. This seems like a good idea in many respects. If we can base a

---

109Weitz, Morris. ‘Professor Ryle’s ‘Logical Behaviourism’.’ *The Journal of Philosophy* Vol 48, no. 9 (1951): Pp 297 - 301. To be fair, Ryle does describe his project with a certain ambiguity in the preface, that could lend itself to Weitz’s analysis. However, a closer reading of Ryle’s actual arguments shows Weitz’s position to be quite naïve. This reading is supported and clarified by Ryle’s position in his paper on *Use, Usage and Meaning.* See Gilbert Ryle, J. N. Findlay. ‘Use, Usage and Meaning.’ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society; Supplementary Volumes 38,* (1961): Pp 228-229. Ryle differentiates between ‘language’ and ‘speech’, where language is ‘having words’ and speech is ‘saying things with them’. Confusing the two results in equating the use of the sentence with its meaning. The use of the sentence depends on inter-sentential relationships with other words, whereas looking for the meaning, Ryle thinks, results in treating sentences ‘as if (they) could be solecisms’. This accords with Dummett’s concept of an implicit language theorist which, I think Ryle is. For this reason I have rejected the dominant tradition of a ‘Logical Behaviourist’ reading which interprets Ryle’s account of dispositions as using model propositional sentences, Weitz being the earliest concrete example I could find, and possibly even the origin of the error. The distinction Ryle makes in *Use, Usage and Meaning* influences my reading of him, and why later, as we will see, I put him in the implicit language position in relation to meaning with Michael Dummett. This reading of Ryle makes him important to the ‘indeterminacy of reference’ debate because on first glance Ryle seems to offer an attractive a way out. What Ryle presents is what seems to be one possible way of solving the indeterminacy problem with the argument that words do not refer to phantasms in an abstract realm of thought, or ghostly actors on a haunted stage, rather, Ryle argues that words are the thoughts themselves. Ryle insists that the words we use to talk about our mental lives are our mental lives. Ryle would maintain, for instance, that there is no essential difference between thinking ‘this seminar boring’ to ones self, and saying aloud ‘this seminar is boring’. Ryle maintains that the words do not refer to any extra thoughts, because they are the thoughts. However, Weitz’s reading reintroduces The Problem of Indeterminacy for while the categorical sentence ‘Reg drove his car on Tuesday’ presents itself as unproblematic in terms of naming referents of the sentence that would make it true in a propositional sense if it pictured a true state of affairs, truly, the categorical sentence ‘Reg felt upset on Tuesday’ reintroduces the very problem of indeterminacy that Ryle offered us the promise of a way out of. To adopt Weitz’s version of Ryle would not only be erroneous, it gets us no-where.
linguistic model of the mind on propositional structures then we can utilize what we know about logic and truth conditions for the understanding of the mind. I take this to be the most common understanding of the term ‘Logical Behaviourism’ and the beginning of ‘functionalism’ in the sense Chalmers offers in his account. Weitz is a very early example of this reading of Ryle. Weitz’s account of Ryle provides the semantics to differentiate three model sentence structures. Before turning to the specifics of Weitz’s interpretation a general comment on Weitz’s work is in order.

While Weitz provides a much closer reading of Ryle’s arguments, than Chalmers does, it is still not entirely accurate. Ryle himself bases his analysis in *The Concept of Mind* not on three model sentences with propositional structures, but on extra-sentential relations of words that arise from sets of Linguistic Behavioural distinctions based on grammatical analysis of language at the level of nouns, verbs, epithets, adverbs and adjectives. The reason they are extra-sentential is that Ryle’s analyses contain appeals to properties, relations and characteristics that defy analysis at the level of whole model sentences. If one thinks of the antonyms love and hate, then as antonyms these words share an extra-sentential relationship of meaning to each other. While love has its own internal logic, and relates the subject to the object of affection in a propositional form, love as an antonym to hate has a meaning that does not require a propositional structure to be meaningful. The two words can exist as a dyad of extra-sentential meaning in comparison to each other. It is part of the meaning
of the words that they express antonymy to each other. In the same way that love and hate have extra-sentential antonymy between them, many of Ryle’s configurations and language clusters share extra-sentential relationships of meaning to each other. Ryle uses these language structures to build many of his Logical Behaviouristic claims about the mind.

Ryle does not engage in a doctrine of judgements\textsuperscript{110} like that for instance of Brandom’s analytic reading of Kant\textsuperscript{111}. Ryle’s investigation of language is not one that requires analysis of whole sentences expressing propositions like most Analytic Philosophical theories of meaning. This is because Ryle’s language behaviour analyses can pick out configurations of words comparatively, i.e. by comparing them to each other, and thus can differentiate between groupings of vocabulary items which are not limited to presentation in a model propositional form. Ryle does not base his work on formal propositions or complete sentences, but on comparing words, and specific manifestations of language. He is not interested in truth values, but in the way people use specific words and what

\textsuperscript{110} Note that where I use Judgement, with capital J, I am specifically referring to Chalmers account of Judgements being comprised of experiences and beliefs without phenomenal properties. On this account a red Judgement is the ability to detect red, without necessarily having an experience of red. Here above, however, in this part of the introduction, I am not referring to Chalmers, but rather, I am referring to Kant’s doctrine of judgements and Brandom’s reading of Kant. One of the problems is that philosophers will often use the same word. Thus, through out the paper I make distinctions like capitalization and extensive taxonomization to keep which term and reference I am using clear. See the footnotes to Wittgenstein’s Account of Language Acquisition for Phenomenal Experiences in the Philosophical Investigations in Chapter Eighteen of this thesis for an account of what I adopt from Chalmers’ Judgments.

that reveals about the mind. To make this clearer, it is best if we turn now to what Weitz and Ryle actually said.

Weitz writes of the first model sentence

There are, first of all, the categorical, those sentences which describe episodes, like ‘Jones looked for his dog,’ or ‘Jones solved the puzzle.’ These are simple narratives utilizing the many tasks and achievement verbs at the command of ordinary speech\textsuperscript{112}.

On the second type Weitz writes

Secondly, there are sentences whose logical behaviour Ryle calls ‘hypothetical’ or ‘dispositional’. Among them are sentences like ‘Jones is vain.’ ‘Jones is a careful driver,’ and ‘Jones knows French’. None of these is a categorical, in spite of its surface similarity to ‘Jones sees a dog.’\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{112}Weitz, \textit{Professor Ryle’s Logical Behaviourism}, 1951 Pg 296.
\textsuperscript{113}Weitz, \textit{Professor Ryle's Logical Behaviourism}, 1951 Pg 297
Weitz writes of the third type

The third logical species of ordinary mind-sentences which Ryle’s logical behaviourism discloses is one that he calls either ‘mongrel categorical’ or ‘semi-dispositional’. . . So far as ordinary mind-sentences are concerned these mongrel-categoricals are embodied especially in sentences containing ‘heed’ concepts; ‘noticing’, ‘taking care’, ‘concentrating on’, ‘knowing what one is doing’, and the like. Consider for example the difference between ‘Jones is a careful driver’ and ‘Jones is driving carefully’. The first is completely dispositional; when ordinary people utter it, they mean that if Jones were to drive, under certain specified conditions, then he would obey traffic laws, be on the alert for other drivers and pedestrians, etc. But the second says more,
and is spoken only if Jones is driving in such a manner\textsuperscript{114}.

If we take the second type of sentence in Weitz’s taxonomy, the dispositional sentence ‘Jones is a careful driver,’ for example, Weitz lacks the linguistic resources, on the propositional sentence-based structure of that taxonomy, to distinguish between the specific types of dispositions which are a distinctive feature of Ryle’s analysis of ordinary everyday language use. Take ‘careful’ from the example above.

‘Carefulness’ refers to a disposition of a certain type that belongs alongside a set of semantic distinctions which Ryle makes on the basis of the linguistic behavioural traits of adjectives and adverbs and specific grouping of verbs they can be applied to. This distinction drawn from the types of verbs that carefulness can qualify adverbially, bottoms out in the behaviour of two distinct groupings of verbs which, Ryle argues, reveals something he thinks is very important about the nature of mind. ‘Carefully’ as an adverb can be used on the set Ryle calls ‘capacity verbs’. These are different from the set Ryle calls ‘tendency verbs’. Ryle would argue that ‘careful’ and ‘carefully’ could never be used for the set of linguistic behaviours related to the tendency verbs, neither in an adverbial phrase nor as a dispositional description. Ryle would no doubt

\textsuperscript{114}Weitz, \textit{Professor Ryle’s Logical Behaviorism}, 1951 Pg 299 - 300
claim that Weitz is mistaken in his analysis and has fallen into the trap of assuming that there is a ‘one-pattern intellectual process’ for dispositions and thus Ryle would argue that Weitz has made the mistake of assuming that dispositions have a uniform exercise.

Ryle writes explicitly as follows

Epistemologists, among others, often fall into the trap of expecting dispositions to have uniform exercises. For instance, when they recognise that the verbs 'know' and 'believe' are ordinarily used dispositionally, they assume that there must therefore exist one-pattern intellectual processes in which these cognitive dispositions are actualised.\(^{115}\)

Weitz’s mistake, of course, is to assume there is a one pattern intellectual exercise. Weitz, if not among the epistemologists, would no doubt be among the others. Rather than limiting the role of natural language analysis to a set of model sentences with a uniform exercise, as Weitz’s Logical Behaviourist’s treatment of Ryle’s dispositions does, Ryle’s own examination is implicitly

\(^{115}\text{Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983 Pg 44. Italics, mine.}\)
interested in an investigation into the specific sets of relationships and structures that arise from the behaviour of natural language at a level that bottoms out, not just at propositions and whole sentences, but in extra-sentential relations that hold between groups and configurations of expressions that can be defined by linguistic behaviours at the level of adjectives, verbs, nouns, epithets and adverbs and comparisons between them. Ryle will often make comparisons in his arguments between individual words in the way a linguist might compare the words 'hut/ house/ mansion' to find layers of meaning brought out by the comparison of the behaviour of the words in the configuration. Ryle’s methodology for the most part is to analyse everyday language about the mind and construct arguments out of these analyses usually using grammatical observations and vocabulary.

Ryle is interested in sets of relationships that hold between different words at the level of the dispositions themselves and their expression in everyday common discourse in conversational references and utterances about the mind. Ryle is not looking for uniform propositional models. In this case ‘to know’ and ‘to believe’ have different kinds of sets of word relations and subsentential patterns that Ryle is deeply interested in, and which a linguist might describe as ‘layers of meaning’ that characterize them. These different patterns arise because the verbs and their cognates behave differently when compared with each other and other words in subsentential sets like the lists of adjectives that can qualify them, and those that cannot. Such is Ryle’s interest in
constructing his arguments about the mind from grammatical analysis of everyday language.

Ryle writes

but even when it is seen that both (know and believe) are dispositional verbs, it has still to be seen that they are dispositional verbs of quite disparate types. 'Know' is a capacity verb, and a capacity verb of that special sort that is used for signifying that the person described can bring things off, or get things right. 'Believe', on the other hand, is a tendency verb and one which does not connote that anything is brought off or got right. 'Belief' can be qualified by such adjectives as 'obstinate', 'wavering', 'unswerving', 'unconquerable', 'stupid', 'fanatical', 'whole-hearted', 'intermittent', 'passionate' and 'childlike', adjectives some or all of which are also appropriate to such nouns as 'trust', 'loyalty', 'bent', 'aversion', 'hope', 'habit', 'zeal' and 'addiction'. Beliefs, like habits, can be inveterate, slipped into and given up; like partisanships,
devotions and hopes they can be blind and
obsessing; like aversions and phobias they can be
unacknowledged; like fashions and tastes they
can be contagious; like loyalties and animosities
they can be induced by tricks\textsuperscript{116}.

As we can see from the above, Ryle distinguishes among verbs by using
grammatical descriptions of the behaviour of adjectives and the nouns that are
qualified by them and sorts them by the specific adverbial structures these
qualifications discriminate. In the broad he creates two sets or ‘families’ of
dispositions based on sub-sentential relationships found among adverbs and
adjectives that apply to specific types of verbs and nouns, and not at the level of
whole sentences with specific propositional structures as Weitz’s suggests. Ryle’s
_The Concept of Mind_ has its roots in the distinctions made by relationships
between the sub-sentential parts found making up sentences. ‘Sub-sentential’
here refers specifically to adjectives, and the relationship certain adjectives have
to verbs and related classes of nouns in comparisons Ryle makes.

This distinction between dispositional terms used in everyday talk about
beliefs and knowledge is based on adjectives that can describe the nouns

\textsuperscript{116}Ryle, _Concept of Mind_ , 1983. Pg 128.
identified by Ryle's own grammatical description of the behaviour of the verbs as well. He also draws upon corresponding adverbs separating the verbs with the same distinction.

The distinction between knowledge and belief does not end here but is part of a much larger configuration that runs through *The Concept of Mind*. There is a model of the mind inside Ryle's work based on a tendency/capacity distinction between verbs. On one side of the configuration Ryle argues are the capacity verbs constituting one family of dispositions. On the other side we have the tendency verbs constituting the other family. This difference between the two groups of disposition making up the 'Capacity/Tendency Configuration' is further supported by the form of epithet applied to people who simulate or fake one side or the other.

Ryle argues

Both skills and methods can be simulated, but we use abusive names like 'charlatan' and 'quack' for the frauds who pretend to be able to bring things off, while we use the abusive word 'hypocrite' for the frauds who affect motives and habits\(^{117}\).

---

Hence for people who lie about their skills and methods and the related family of verbs that Ryle allocates to Capacity Dispositions\textsuperscript{118} on the Know-How side of the ‘Capacity-Tendency Configuration’ Ryle points out we use the epithet ‘charlatan’ and ‘quack’. For people who lie about their beliefs, motives and habits we use the term ‘hypocrite’.

The reading of Ryle as a Logical Behaviourist of the sort proposed by Weitz, simply fails to take into account the full range of Ryle’s arguments at the level of sub-sentential analyses for his descriptions. The trouble with a Logical Behaviourist interpretation of Ryle like Weitz offers is not only that it is too crude to capture these distinctions behind the configurations but in its crudeness, it ignores the detailed linguistic behaviour revealed by the analyses of the relationship between specific parts of natural language that Ryle is interested in. These sorts of Logical Behaviourist readings are particularly troublesome for distinctions Ryle makes when ryle appeals to the linguistic behaviour of ‘how’ and ‘that’ because they ignore the difference between capacity and skill dispostions, and those that contain families of linguistic behaviours that are linked to beliefs, motives, inclinations, aspirations and predilections. Weitz has missed some of the most important points about the specific linguistic

\textsuperscript{118} Where I capitalize ‘Capacity Dispositions’ or ‘Capacities’ I am refering to the body of linguistic behaviours Ryle brings together as a family, including verbs, nouns, adjectives and epithets. Where I use capacity verbs or capacity adverbs I am refering to the specific behaviours of grammatical classes. Ryle did not think of verbs as parts of the mind, but rather he had a classical concept of mind that he wanted dissolve using analysis of inter-sentential relationships between the linguistic behaviours of different parts of language.
behaviours that Ryle was interested in, in his classification of Ryle's philosophy into three model propositional sentences.
IV

**Summarizing the findings of the first chapter.**

Let us now summarize the progress we have made this chapter by drawing attention to the problems with Chalmers’ and Weizt’s ‘Logical Behaviourist’ readings of Ryle. Rectifying these problems will begin the Ordinary Language, and Linguistic Behaviourist threads running through the paper.

Firstly, the problem with the Logical Behaviourism that Chalmers attributes to Ryle in his ‘potted history’ was that it missed Ryle’s fundamental philosophical claim and what is perhaps most interesting and novel about Ryle on mind. Chalmers neglects the novelty of Ryle’s overall project which was to produce an ‘Ordinary Language’ account of the mind. Chalmers reduced Ryle’s complex and novel position to a proto-functionalist account, which he characterized as a ‘codification of the Freudian-Behaviourist orthodoxy’ with a focus on ‘dispositions to behave in certain ways and associated behaviours’. Chalmers’ concept of the ‘psychological’, what we will refer to as ‘Chalmerian psychology’ (so as not to confuse it with the development of an Endo-Affective Neo-Sellarsian Psychology Language, which I will introduce later in the paper),
is the pro-functionalist interpretation of the mind as to what it ‘does’, and is contrasted with the ‘phenomenal’ which is what Chalmers defines as what the mind ‘feels’. It would be interesting to compare Chalmers view with Gleeson’s critique of Functional Behaviourism, but it is too early in the paper to do anything but foreshadow this specific insight.

However, what we can see at this stage is that there is a lacuna in Chalmers’ account of Ryle because he misses Ryle’s attempt to explain the mind using an analysis of common language. Ryle’s novel and highly interesting claim, of course, was that Ordinary Language has a special status in the Philosophy of Mind because it is the language that people think in. From this lacuna in Chalmers’ account we will go on to develop Ryle’s insight into the normative power that ordinary language has for justifying claims about the mind.

Secondly the problem with Weitz’s account was that he neglected the complexities of linguistic behaviours that Ryle was interested in, because Weitz neglected the unique type of argument that Ryle was making. From the deficit in Weitz’s account we will develop the thread that will result in Linguistic Behavioural Arguments.

What emerges from the deficits in Weitz’s and Chalmers’ accounts, what both philosophers failed to pick up on, are two different but yet inter-related types of argument that Ryle uses. (I) Ordinary Language Arguments are characterized by claims about what it makes sense to say in a language, while
(II) Linguistically Behavioural Arguments are characterized by detailed grammatical analysis. It is by comparing, these two that this paper will reveal an ‘occult phenomenology’ hidden within *The Concept of Mind*.

Thus, let us finish the first chapter with the following; neither David Chalmers nor Morris Weitz provides adequate grounds for an encounter with Ryle. As such, let us abandon the term ‘Logical Behaviourism’ and further define ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ and ‘Ordinary Language Arguments’ from our own intrepid investigation into the types of arguments and claims that occur in Ryle’s philosophy.
Chapter Two

Linguistic Behaviourism

I

Episodes and dispositions.

What exemplifies Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourist Claims?

So far, we have looked at two attempts to define Ryle’s philosophy of mind. Both attempts were too coarse grained to capture the nature of the types of claim Ryle advances in *The Concept of Mind*, nor do they succeed at capturing why Ryle thinks such claims are fundamental to the exploration and understanding the nature of mind through language.

In Chapter One of this thesis it was revealed that Chalmers’ account failed to identify the normative force behind Ryle’s argument. Recognizing what was missing from Chalmers’ account, gives us an opportune place to begin to explore rich philosophical complexity of the normative thread of Ordinary Language Philosophy running through *The Concept of Mind*. Ryle justifies his arguments by *what it makes sense to say* in ordinary language. However, Weitz is a little more tricky. Weitz did not allow for a linguistic difference between dispositions expressing Beliefs and Capacities, and thus we might say Weitz (to
paraphrase Ryle’s own words) ‘fell into the trap of expecting dispositions to have uniform exercises\textsuperscript{119} by assuming that there exists a ‘one pattern intellectual exercise\textsuperscript{120}’. This error emerges from close analysis of Weitz’s second type of sentence\textsuperscript{121}. Weitz’s general mistake, of course, is to focus on whole sentences rather than the implicit understanding expressed in relations between different categories of words which I refer to as ‘configurations’, and the subsentential families Ryle thinks these relations between words belong to.

However, while this illuminates what was wrong with Weitz’s analysis of Ryle’s philosophy of mind, it does not reveal what Ryle bases his claims about language and linguistic behaviour on. For that we need to look more closely at Ryle’s distinction between Dispositions and Espisodes.

Ryle writes

The verbs 'know', 'possess' and 'aspire' do not behave like the verbs 'run', 'wake up' or 'tingle'.

We cannot say 'he knew so and so for two minutes, then stopped and started again after a breather', 'he gradually aspired to be a bishop', or 'he is now engaged in possessing a bicycle'\textsuperscript{122}.

\textsuperscript{119}Gilbert Ryle’s actual phrasing. See Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 44
\textsuperscript{120} Again Gilbert Ryle’s actual terminology. See Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 44
\textsuperscript{121} Morris Weitz calls these sentences either ‘hypothetical’ or ‘dispositional’ and uses the terms interchangeably. Weitz, \textit{Professor Ryle’s Logical Behaviourism}. 1951.
\textsuperscript{122} Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983 Pg 112
One set of verbs, the determinable set, ‘know’, ‘possess’ and ‘aspire’ do not
*behave* like another set of verbs which belong to the group that contains ‘run’,
‘wake up’ and ‘tingle. In Ryle’s own words the first group do not ‘behave’ like the
second group. (This is where I draw the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ from). In
Ryle’s own terminology what he is doing is analysing the ‘behaviour’ of everyday
language to construct arguments about the mind.

The paper will carefully build up Ryle’s case, and show why his Linguistic
Behaviourism falls short of explaining all of the facts in the domain that his
Ordinary Language Account of the Mind purports to cover. These ‘facts’ are not
additional facts added to his account of the mind, but are facts about the mind
discoverable from some of his arguments. These arguments which contain facts
about the mind he cannot offer an account for, and I shall refer to later as an
‘occult strain’ of argumentation hidden in Ryle.

I use the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ because ‘behaviour’ is the word
Ryle himself uses for his type of grammatical and linguistic analysis. I am
careful to distinguish Ryle’s ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ from Historical
Psychological Behaviourism which covers specific instances of the kind of work
behaviourists like B. F. Skinner, Thorndike, Pavlov and Watson were associated
with, or Psychological Behaviourism as we might think of the movement itself
historically situated as the work of Skinner, Thorndike, Pavlov and Watson collectively.

**The difference between Wilfrid Sellars’ Ryle and Gilbert Ryle’s Ryle.**

If a specific difference is desired, initially, then it can be pointed out that Sellars’ model of Ryle is developmental and part of a stage in a Socio-Linguistic theory. Ryle’s *Linguistic Behaviourism* on the other hand is engaged in ‘field-work’ analysis of language as we find it used in the everyday world. Ryle examines samples of everyday language to make claims about the mind. I use the term ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory’ for Sellars’ theoretical model of the developmental stages a community must go through to build up the resources of a fully functioning language as he explained in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. I use the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ for Ryle’s analysis of everyday language as we find such language commonly used in the world. Since Ryle’s language analyses relies upon the way people use words, it is also normative because it assumes common usage is the correct usage and this adds weight to his argument when we find ourselves agreeing with him, because we ourselves, as common language users, use language in such a way. When Ryle attaches a claim about the mind to a sample of his language analysis this is what I call a Linguistic Behavioural argument. But is this a fair methodology for Ryle to
adopt? There is a question that arises as to whether language is enough to cover all of the facts of mind?

One of the key arguments built into my thesis concerns what I argue would happen if a Chalmerian zombie were to enter into the Rylean community which Sellars hypothesizes at the end of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind and were to try to learn Sellar’s Rylean tribe’s language. If the zombie were able to learn the language of the tribe and use it competently, then all would be fine and dandy in what we might call the ‘annals of Anti-Psychologism’ and there would be no reason to suspect that language is insufficient for an account of the facts relevant to the domain which a theory about the mind must cover. If, however, the phenomenal zombie cannot learn to use the language of the tribe because it/she/he is a phenomenal zombie, then this suggests that there are non-linguistic phenomenal facts that competent use of language requires in order to master competency. This in turn suggests that semantics rests at least partially upon non-linguistic facts since one must have a grip of these facts to competently use a language. If the phenomenal zombie cannot learn the Sellar’s Rylean argot, then, suffice it to say, this is bad news for Anti-Psychologism.

Before my thesis reaches that stage I spend some time dealing with Ryle and various claims about whether he was a behaviourist and what type of behaviourist he was. I will carefully define behavioural terms used within the thesis in greater detail. These distinctions will show a plurality of Ryles against the background of a multiverse of behavioural theorists and interpretations of
what Behaviourism means as a movement and from which historical readers of Ryle drew their interpretation of, in order to classify Ryle as part of that particular school. However, to begin this process and at this stage of the paper we are only interested in showing what is wrong with many of the Logical Behaviourist readings of Ryle. So, having distinguished Sellars’ Ryle from Gilbert’s Ryle, and how this distinction fits in to the overall paper, it is best now to return to the rich and rewarding Linguistic Behaviourist reading of Ryle on offer in this paper with these qualifications in mind. Let us do so now.

The Second Set of Verbs. The Episodes.

The second set of verbs in the ‘Dispositional-Episode Configuration’ of course are the episodic verbs that Weitz tried to capture in his first model sentence; the ‘categorical narratives’ and what Chalmers characterized as ‘associated behaviours’ in his history.

To grasp this difference between episodes and dispositions, on the side of the episodes, we might say of someone, say one Reg, that if Reg is running down the road, or if Reg ran down the road, if Reg has started running down the road, that the behaviour of these verbs are governed by a set, or sets of instances in time which we mark by tenses like the Imperfect, the Pluperfect, the Past-
Imperfect, the Past-Completed, and thus belong to a specific episode embedded in a time frame with a content, namely, that of Reg running.

In contrast to these episodic verbs, Ryle asserts that dispositional terms, the afore-given examples ‘know, aspire and possess’, are not singularly episodic in the same way that we might describe the time we saw Reg running down the road being chased by Rod. That incident involving Reg and Rod refers to a single event that unfolded around a specific pattern of tenses used by the speaker describing the event. The event in question contains lots of smaller events, i.e. now Reg is ducking Rod, now Reg is dodging Rod, now Reg is running back this way to escape Rod. For instance ‘Wake-up’ refers to an episode. One moment Reg is asleep. The next he has woken up. The bit between is the waking up.

Ryle thinks dispositional and episodic verbs reveal something interesting about the mind which we can only understand from a grammatical examination of the way words behave.
Chapter Three

Ryle and Analytic Philosophy

I

Ryle’s Two Most Fundamental Insights on the Mind and the Relationship between these Insights and Linguistic Behavioural Arguments.

Ryle thinks that his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments are good arguments because people think in everyday language. He thinks that by examining the language of everyday use we can learn something about the mind and its relationship with the world. Ryle thinks the interaction between the mind and the world discovered through language analysis is important for dealing with the sorts of views that are characterized by what he sees as a ‘Cartesian mistake’, which he thinks involves the view that the mind is its own ‘place’ separate from the world.

Ryle’s first ‘radical insight’ is that the ‘world is the place where minds happen’. By that I mean that Ryle’s most fundamental argument, and where he
breaks with classical philosophy, is that the world is literally where we find the mind at work, at play, at toil. I do not dispute this claim. I think that philosophers have been far too long under the illusion the mind happens inside the head. Ryle thinks that when we look at a colourful, richly landscaped bed of flowers, we see the beautiful mind of the lady who planted them. When we look at a finely crafted desk, we see the mind of the woodsmith in every turn, notch and dovetail. Ryle thinks separating the mind from the world is a category mistake. For Ryle the mind happens in the world. However, Ryle’s second radical insight is connected to a range of problematic claims. He thinks people already know all there is to know about how to talk about the mind happening in the world.\textsuperscript{123}

Ryle writes

\begin{quote}
We possess already a wealth of information about minds, information which is neither derived from, nor upset by, the arguments of philosophers. The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the
\end{quote}

logical geography of the knowledge which we
already possess.\textsuperscript{124}

What ordinary language speakers do not have, Ryle argues, is a map or a
drawing board of how those concepts fit together.

It is, however, one thing to know how to apply
such concepts, quite another to know how to
correlate them with one another and with
concepts of other sorts. Many people can talk
sense with concepts but cannot talk sense \textit{about}
them; they know by practice how to operate with
concepts, anyhow inside familiar fields, but they
cannot state the logical regulations governing
their use. They are like people who know their
way about their own parish, but cannot construct
or read a map of it, much less a map of the region
or continent in which their parish lies.\textsuperscript{125}

This is an interesting point. To see why consider Dummett’s paper *What Do I Know When I Know a Language?*\textsuperscript{126} For it would seem to follow from Dummett’s argument that he should, prima facie, argue that what Ryle is attempting to do is impossible since it seems Ryle wants to make explicit what people know implicitly. It is that ‘about’ in the Ryle quotation that I put in italics which causes the problem.

The central argument of Michael Dummett’s paper involves two types of knowledge, these are implicit and explicit. The implicit / explicit distinction in Dummett is important for the Linguistic Behavioural thread of the thesis because it has an impact on how we conduct language analysis of ‘la parole’ or the concrete manifestation of language we are looking at. On an ‘implicit’ view we may adopt the sorts of configurations Ryle brings out in comparing one set of verbs with another set of verbs and their relationship to adverbs and other sub-sentential components. On an explicit view we would be confined to propositions about language and its use, and formal statements about meaning. (Such a theory is perhaps the view of the model Weitz is working on).

Let us assume that explicit knowledge entails a propositional body of statements. Assume also that explicit and implicit knowledge cannot be assimilated into the same mode of exercise of competency. This is because one

form, the explicit, involves a propositional body whereas the other, Dummett argues, occurs in the exercise of the knowledge itself and can be found in types of knowledge where the expression is intrinsically difficult. Explicit knowledge can only be expressed where there is implicit knowledge to be expressed, however implicit knowledge may be exercised even when the person may not be able to explicitly express the knowledge they are exercising.

This can result in a pragmatic paradox where the person knows how to do something but cannot tell you how they did it. If asked explicitly they might say ‘I don’t know’ when clearly the performance demonstrates the implicit knowledge that they do.

Dummett writes

Explicit knowledge is manifested by the ability to state the content of the knowledge. This is a sufficient condition for someone being said to have that knowledge only if it is assumed that he fully understands the statement that he is making; and, even if it is assumed that he fully understands the statement that he is making; and, even if we make this assumption, his ability to say what he knows can be invoked as an adequate explanation of what it is for him to
have that knowledge only when we can take his understanding of the statement of its content as unproblematic\textsuperscript{127}.

This is a problem because

In many philosophical contexts, we are entitled to do this: but when our task is precisely to explain in what, in general, an understanding of language consists, it is obviously circular. If we say that it consists in the knowledge of a theory of meaning for the language, we cannot then explain the possession of such knowledge in terms of an ability to state it, presupposing an understanding of the language in which the theory is stated\textsuperscript{128}.

Ryle has already considered this point, in relation to what Ryle considers to be one of the central problems of psychology, but from a different angle.

\textsuperscript{127}Dummett, *What Do I Know When I Know a Language?*, 1993.

\textsuperscript{128}Dummett, *What Do I Know When I Know a Language?*, 1993.
Ryle says

Indeed, supposing that one person could
understand another's words or actions only in so
far as he made causal inferences in accordance
with psychological laws, the queer consequence
would follow that if any psychologist had
discovered these laws, he could never have
conveyed his discoveries to his fellow men. For ex
hypothesi they could not follow his exposition of
them without inferring in accordance with them
from his words to his thoughts.\(^{129}\)

For Ryle, meaning must be conveyed within the expression of a language.\(^{130}\)

Without recourse to telepathy, on this view, language is the only means we have

\(^{129}\)This was the problem with Chalmers and Freud I pointed out earlier. It is also the reason why I avoided the Extended Mind debates and 'The Historian Argument' of Ryle. See Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983 Pg 55 – 57 The novelty of Ryle's solution is it seems to allow us to side step the causal issues that plagued Descartes by concentrating on the way people talk about the mind and the mind's relationships with people's activities through the types of things people do in the world. See also G, Steiner, *After Babel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. Pg 26 and Parkinson, *Translation Theory of Meaning*, 1977: See Pp 14-16 for his discussion on Ryle's Historian Argument.

\(^{130}\)See Ryle, Findlay, *Use, Usage and Meaning*, 1961, for Ryle's distinction between 'language' and 'having words to say things with' and 'speech' which involves 'saying things with them'. Ryle thinks that language and the meaning of words as found in a dictionary is a different thing to using words and saying things with them. The failure to distinguish between them leads to a view of sentences as 'solecisms'. The attempt to explain the meaning of such solecistic sentences in terms of truth values, instead of the relationship between words, like the inheritance properties Ryle uncovers through his grammatical analysis, leads to what Dummett would call an explicit theory of meaning. Ryle, of course, rejects the explicit criteria of meaning. It is a mistake, Ryle thinks, and a costly one.
of conveying meaning. On this view if a new theory of linguistic behaviour emerged then the psychologist would only be able to tell his colleagues and peers about it, using language itself. This is the point of Ryle’s move towards finding sets of relationships, properties, internal relations and characteristics using Linguistic Behavioural kinds of argument.\textsuperscript{131} Ryle thinks that analyses of the mind must be done inside language using the resources available to the language user. Moreover it must be ordinary language. For Ryle, going beyond ordinary language into models of scientific causation say, would be to represent the facts belonging to human action and thought in the idioms and analogies of something else. He thinks the history of philosophy has been filled with these sorts of mistakes.

That is why Ryle says

To explode a myth is accordingly not to deny the facts but to re-allocate them. And this is what I am trying to do\textsuperscript{132}.

Because

\footnote{I’ve focused on the arguments in The Concept of Mind, for the purposes of this thesis, but such as they are my reading is decidedly influenced by Ryle’s view in Ryle’s 1961 paper Use, Useage and Meaning over some of the peer review literature like that advanced by Weitz.}

\textsuperscript{131}Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 52.
\textsuperscript{132}Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 10.
A myth is, of course, not a fairy story. It is the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another. ¹³³

That is to say, Ryle, I take it, simply wants to explain what features of natural language about the mind are significant, to re-order the idioms that have been appropriated by different myths and in doing so, explore how these relate to each other, and some of the ways meaning is expressed by these features. This will give him the elements he needs to construct a geography for the concept of the mind from the ways people speak about the mind in the world. According to Ryle’s view the nature of the mind is already known and this knowledge is implicit in the way people use language.

An interesting question here is whether Ryle is committed to Psychologism since he is no longer dealing with an explicit theory of meaning. It is worth asking the Psychologism question in light of the Dummett paper. Ryle’s analysis of word uses borders on breaking what has been called ‘The Primacy of the Proposition’. The Primacy of the Proposition¹³⁴ has a methodological tendency to influence language analysis among Western Analytic philosophers to be done at the level of complete sentences or whole propositions because they are considered ‘meaningful’ since it is only at the level of a complete sentence

can the sample of language assert something true or false. The common doctrines maintaining The Primacy of the Proposition originate from generations of philosophers reading Frege’s philosophy of language\textsuperscript{135}.

Analytic Philosophers often describe incomplete sentences as ‘gappy’. For instance ‘is a girl’ is meaningless because it does not have a noun in the subject case. The transitive verb, preposition and noun which makes up a predicate and affirms ‘is a girl’, does not affirm it about anyone. It is thus incomplete. The collection of words ‘is a girl’ can be neither true nor false because the predicate of the sentence has no subject to affirm it of.

This type of analysis which was driven by doctrines of meaningfulness in terms of truth value has a methodological tendency towards complete sentences, and/or propositions. Ryle does not do that. He conducts analysis of predicates and sub-sentential and sub-propositional collections of words to find relationships between them.

As an example, these relationships, like that Ryle points out between verbs like ‘shoot’ and adverbs of manner like ‘carefully’, contain the semantic materials for the inheritance conditions which define the two major families of dispositions in The Concept of Mind. Ryle also describes in detail one side of the normative values for these inheriatence conditions where sets of words in different grammatical categories inherit relationships such as the ‘Take-heed’

family of adverbs of manner. ‘Take-heed’ concepts are the set of semantic relationships between verbs, adverbs, classes of active noun expressing what Ryle thinks of as the ‘mind and the world’ and certain adjectives, which the Capacity Dispositions inherit.

For Ryle the ‘Take-heed’ family of linguistic behaviours is significant. The relationship between ‘Take-heed’ inheritance conditions forms one wing of the primary attack on the Two Worlds Myth which Ryle mounts. Ryle maintains that the failure to recognize the role and importance of the ‘Take-heed’ family of adverbs, made up of words like ‘carefully’ and ‘attentively’, leads to a philosophical puzzle and the illusion which creates Cartesian Dualism. Ryle thinks that the mistake that comes from not recognizing the importance of the class of adverbs describing the family of Skill and Capacity Dispositions, adverbs of manner like ‘carefully’ and ‘attentively’, is to assume that the situation were one where one must first plan how to do something in a mental world of causation and then proceed to carry it out in the physically material world of causation. If one were to progress in this way, Ryle thinks, one would end up in

---

136 Not all Ordinary Language Arguments are Linguistic Behavioural arguments, however Linguistic Behavioural Arguments, are by normative force and the way they work, Ordinary Language Arguments. They must be so because they rely on what the reader knows about language use to make their argument through analysis of nouns, verbs, adverbs, and so on. Here in the ‘Take-care’ strain of the Capacity Family set of arguments about the two different families of Dispositional Genus found in The Concept of Mind, we can see the way Ordinary Language arguments are connected to Linguistic Behavioural analysis. More importantly we can see how they are aligned in order to negate another philosopher, in this case, Descartes. The normative force in Ryle’s argument against Descartes is something noteworthy, and worth thinking through and reflecting on. It is an elegant and attractive piece of reasoning. Later I shall provide another example drawing on David Hume.
an infinite regress where one, for instance, plans to plan how to do something. That further planning precedes planning to plan how to do something, and this in turn would require further acts of planning, and so on, repeat ad nauseum.

Instead of this ‘Two-Worlds myth’, Ryle argues that adverbs like ‘carefully’ reveal that the relationship between the mind and the world is one where thought and action occur as the same thing. Ryle thinks part of that importance is that adverbs like ‘carefully’ reveal that the ‘Two-Worlds myth’ is a category mistake. One can sweep the driveway carefully or carelessly. One can play a rugby game carefully or recklessly. Adverbs of manner, in this way, describe the mind as we find it in the world. For Ryle the mind is not a separate fantasia of causality, or a ghostly Macbethian stage populated by phantasms. Ryle thinks the mind is all around us in the way we organize our offices, drive our cars, enjoy our leisure and keep our gardens. In this way Ryle argues that analysis of terms like ‘carefully’ and the inheritance conditions that hold between words found in different grammatical categories, once properly understood, reveal that this is the case and that the origin of the mistake of Cartesian dualism arises from not understanding how words work. Such a lack of understanding, Ryle argues, leads to confusions between the two different types of Dispositional Families and is what he thinks lay behind the origin of the Cartesian category mistake.
Chapter Four

I

The Primacy of the Sentence and Propositional thought

As Dummett and others point out\textsuperscript{137} the Doctrine of the Primacy of the Proposition has dominated analytic philosophy circles of thought for the past century. For Dummett it begins with Frege’s argument that words have meaning only in the context of the sentences they appear or can appear in. The idea is that a word’s meaning consists in the contribution the word makes to the meaning of the sentences in which it either appears\textsuperscript{138}, or can appear\textsuperscript{139}.

Dummett writes

Philosophers before Frege assumed... that what a speaker knows is a kind of code. Concepts are coded into words and thoughts which are compounded out of concepts, into sentences, whose structure mirrors, by and large, the complexity of the thoughts. We need language, on this view, only because we happen to lack the faculty, that is, of the direct transmission of thoughts. Communication is, thus essentially like the use of a telephone: the speaker codes his thoughts in a transmissible medium, which is then decoded by the hearer\(^{140}\).

Why is this important? Dummett writes

The whole analytical school of philosophy is founded on the rejection of this conception, first

---

clearly repudiated by Frege. The conception of language as a code requires that we ascribe concepts and thoughts to people independently of their knowledge of language; and one strand of objection is that, for any but the simplest concepts, we cannot explain what it is to grasp them independently of the ability to express them in language.\(^{141}\)

So, what does Dummett think Frege’s major contribution was? Was it in fact the ‘primacy of the sentence’ or was it the rejection of this theory that language is some sort of code for putting thoughts into? If the latter, then does Dummett go over to ‘the other side?’ Does Dummett, (pace Tim Crane’s analysis of him\(^{142}\)), argue himself into some form of advocacy of ‘psychologism’?

Dummett in the same paper writes

> I am not here concerned with the particular features of Frege’s theory, but only with the general line of approach to the philosophy of

\(^{141}\)Dummett, *What Do I Know When I Know a Language?*, 1993

\(^{142}\) See *Anti-Psychologism and the Occult Phenomenology* in the *Introduction* to this paper. Also see Crane, *Aspects of Psychologism*. 2014. Pg 2’.
language of which it was the earliest example. Frege’s theory was the first instance of a conception that continues to dominate the philosophy of language, that of a theory of a specific language. Such a theory of meaning displays all that is involved in the investment of words and sentences of the language with the meanings they bear. The expression ‘a theory of meaning’ may be used in quite a general way to apply to any theory which purports to do this for a particular language\textsuperscript{143}.

The general line of approach Dummett is concerned with is the primacy of language in the Philosophy of Mind for formulating a theory of mind. An Anti-Psychologistic approach to a theory of mind holds that language and a theory of meaning is essential for establishing a theory of mind independently of any pre-linguistic knowledge of mind.

As David Simpson rightly points out, Dummett avoids the charge of psychologism ‘because of his insistence (that) knowledge of implicit use of language must be manifested in (that very same) use of language’\textsuperscript{144}. Dummett

\textsuperscript{143} Dummett, What Do I Know When I Know a Language?, 1993

\textsuperscript{144} Simpson, David. ‘Language and Know-How.’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 5
argues against an explicit theory of meaning, but he has not gone all the way back to a Pre-Fregean psychologism. Dummett is still arguing for the priority of language to a theory of mind. To be sure, he is arguing against Frege’s theory of meaning as a model for explicit theories but he has not argued all the way to the point of advancing a position that views language as a code for thought. Dummett thinks that meaning needs to be implicit inside language expression and that a philosopher’s business is to spell out the form and parts of language in which meaning is itself manifested.

Dummett is anti-explicit but he is also anti-psychologistic. This is because an anti-psychologistic theory of meaning need only argue that implicit knowledge of meaning is prior to or necessarily undermines an explicit theory of meaning. The reason why such is so is because arguing that either (a) implicit knowledge of meaning is needed to understand an explicit theory of meaning or (b) that implicit knowledge of meaning is fundamental, intuitive, non-reducible, primitive, or foundational for an explicit theory of meaning, (that is arguing for either (a) or (b) of the dilemma), is not the same thing as arguing that non-linguistic knowledge is prior to any fundamental relation to implicit or explicit knowledge of meaning. If Dummett argues that meaning bottoms out in, arises from, or is grounded in implicit understanding of language then he has not gone over to the psychologistic side of the Language of Mind Debate. He still upholds (2010): 629–643. Pg 638.
an anti-psychologist theory of meaning. He has, therefore, neither reverted, nor abdicated to psychologism. Psychologism argues that regardless of claims whether knowledge of linguistic meaning is more fundamentally theoretical and explicit, or more implicit and practical, non-linguistic knowledge is prior to knowledge of linguistic meaning. Dummett has not argued for non-linguistic knowledge, but rather, he has argued for implicit linguistic knowledge as essential to a theory of meaning.

Ryle has the same general thought as Dummett, or at least this is what Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourist arguments try to implement. They analyse pieces of natural language inside the idiom of their usage. As such Ryle argues a similar position to Dummett’s. The Linguistic Behaviourist side of Ryle, and in fact the central block of his most consistent and clear argumentative practice, is that implicit knowledge of meaning is fundamental to making precise the meaning inside language.

Dummett writes

> It is part of the business of a philosopher of language to explain in what specific feature of this use a speaker’s knowledge of each particular part of the theory of meaning is manifested

---

If we refer Dummett’s requirement back to Ryle, we can see that this agrees with what Ryle is doing in his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. These arguments draw attention to the linguistic relations, structure and configurations in the use of mental language in which the ordinary speaker’s understanding of that language is manifested. So while Ryle at least might be seemingly cleared of psychologism at the level of his official self-understanding, the overall significance of my argument and of the thesis is that he is not. Ryle makes a number of arguments that have surreptitiously hidden phenomenal appeals. These arguments, when fully spelled out, offer strong support for a psychologistic position on in the Philosophy of Mind debate.

In the meantime it is important for our immediate purpose to note that insofar as Ryle moves from Linguistic Behavioural claims and descriptions of the way language behaves to an argument in which the perfect domain for doing philosophy of mind is inside a purified and idealized domain of common language free from scientific and terminological contaminations, he is making a normative move.

For the moment let us return to the thread of exposition I started on Ryle’s use of the Linguistic Behavioural argumentation method.
Capacity and Tendency configurations.

As already pointed out Ryle divides the dispositional verbs by their behaviour, into two groups he calls ‘families’ of dispositions. This division of dispositions into two family groups goes right through his concept of mind and will be important for understanding the critique of Ryle offered in this paper. These two groups are, of course, the ‘capacity’ and ‘tendency’ dispositional verb sub-groups whose ‘behaviour’ is individuated and grammatically described by similarities in sets of verbs and applicable adjectives like ‘waver, obstinate, inveterate’ as well as the grouping of these two families of dispositions under the ‘hypocrite’ and ‘charlatan’ epithets based on people who lie about one family of dispositions or the other.

Ryle supports this division of ‘capacity’ and ‘tendency’ verbs in several different ways but the following will suffice to note for our purposes. The adverbial form ‘carefully’, as part of the ‘take-care’ genus that Weitz partially identified, needs a capacity to identify its execution. For ‘carefully’ to apply to someone they need to be doing something that requires the execution of skill or a capacity. The ‘carefully’ adverb refers to the action that is being done in the manner in which it is being done.
Ryle argues that one important difference between Capacities and Tendencies as sets of identifiable linguistic behaviour can be found in the ‘inheritance conditions’ one can attach to the respective families of verbs and nouns, through specific adverbs of manner. Ryle argues the term ‘carefully’ separates the capacity verbs from the family of tendency verbs because it does not make sense to use ‘carefully’ with certain tendency words that describe beliefs, motives, desires, longings, addictions or aspirations.

For example, Ryle holds that it does not make sense to have either ‘careful motives’ or ‘careful beliefs’. One can be careful about their beliefs, but this refers to the ‘how’, which is accompanied by, or answered with the verbs either for the skills, or that feature in descriptions of the methods employed in forming the subclause or answering an interrogative. The person might be careful to check into things, or check up on things. They may exercise their scepticism regularly as part of good practice in building, making or establishing their beliefs, or they may be selective in what they bring to light to consider for

146The term ‘inheritance property’ I’ve adopted from Ryle’s intellectualist legend to refer to whether something is done intelligently or stupidly, carefully or heedlessly, which Ryle at various times refers to with adverbs, ‘mongrel categoricals’, verbs, adjectives, adverbial phrases and so on. See Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983, pp 130 – 134, for uses and types of ‘heed concepts’, pg 32 for the distinctive claim that intelligence is a practice not an antecedent or an event. See also the discussion on pp 67 – 69 for the question of fault and adverbial structures in relation to capacities related to heed concepts, pp 47-48 for the semi-episodic, semi-dispositional mongrel categorical which Ryle lists as examples ‘alert’, ‘careful’, ‘critical’, ‘ingenious’. See Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, pp 17 – 31 for Ryle’s discussion of adverbs and ‘adverbial verbs’ of thinking. I refer to all of these structures, for simplicity, as ‘inheritance properties’ in, associated with, or related to an act, except where I refer to a specific construction and its linguistic behaviours. ‘Inheritance properties’ simply refers to the tendency for words to display certain relationships and typical behaviours according to the intuition of the native speaker, like the relationship between (a) ‘carefully’ and the verbs belonging to the Capacity Family of Dispositions, or (b) ‘wavering’, ‘obstinate’, ‘inveterate’ to ‘beliefs’, ‘habits’, ‘convictions’ and the Tendency Family of Dispositions.
their belief. Even so these are all sets of skill verbs that one uses to establish one’s belief, and not verbs, adverbs or adjectives that feature in the description of the belief. Similarly, one can be careful ‘about’ one’s motives. Here the ‘about’ may refer to attempts at concealing one’s motives, being critical and self-conscious\textsuperscript{147}, or simply ‘being alive to’\textsuperscript{148} the ways in which one makes decisions.

\textsuperscript{147} Specifically the sense in which Ryle allows self awareness. See Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983, pg 149 for where Ryle makes the ordinary language philosophy of mind ‘implicit claim’ that ‘the sorts of things I can know about myself are the sorts of things I can know about you.’ What he means here is related to the public accessibility of language. Ryle has two theories of consciousness. One is an ‘occult’ stream, implied by the sorts of phenomenological style arguments he makes. The other is an overt stream where he thinks he can cover all of the facts attributed to ‘consciousness’ in traditional theories of mind with language analysis. Such language analysis involves Ryle’s criteria for making ‘special status reports’, an ‘internal narrator’ and his use of the term ‘being alive to what one is doing’ to which Ryle ascribes a certain importance. I will go into some detail on this, but for the purposes of curiosity, and to show where this is headed, the overt stream is chiefly made up of types of ‘talk’ and the way people use the term conscious, so for instance Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983 pg 150 he distinguishes self-conscious as associated with embarrassment, and associates this with types of ‘guarded talk’. Another use is similar to Ned Block’s ‘phenomenal’ and ‘access’ consciousness distinction in his paper, Block, \textit{On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness}, 1995, where a person might become conscious of a noise only after it has stopped, or similarly they might lose consciousness from the knees down. It is what Chalmers identifies as a type of functional state he refers to as awareness. The phenomenal aspects of an experience might be present but the awareness isn’t. On page 150 of \textit{The Concept of Mind}, 1983 , Ryle refers to consciousness indirectly by referring to ‘unconscious’ ‘phobias’ and ‘desires’. But here there is a problem, since they are unconscious the person would not be able to give a ‘special status report’ since they would not be ‘alive to what they are doing’ and this would clash with the conditions he lays out against volitions. That is Ryle argues that the person can’t make a report about volitions since he would not know what to say about them. Ryle argues that it \textit{doesn’t make sense to talk about} how many volitions it takes to get out of bed and there is no ordinary language sense in which one encounters talk about the term. Here Ryle must decide one side or the other, either he allows volitions, even though people can’t make reports on them, and he dismisses his argument against them, or he rejects unconscious desires in the Freudian sense. I should argue on the basis of page 99 where he argues that a man ‘finds out he is tired because he yawns’ and the log keeping role of retrospection on page 160 of \textit{The Concept of Mind}, and the general thesis that his philosophical condition would collapse if he allowed Freud’s unconscious states that he would most likely dismiss them. The conflict between Ryle’s own strictures about the reportability of status reports would mean that Ryle would drop ‘unconscious’ ‘desires’ and ‘fears’ from his account since there are no common terms for Freud’s states that men use and they would thus suffer the same fate as Ryle’s ‘volitions’ if Ryle were being consistent on this point. See Ryle’s \textit{Use Of the Terms ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Introspection’} and \textit{The Species of Mindologue} in this paper for Ryle’s ‘log keeper roles’ and the way Ryle allows the use or the terms ‘introspection’ and ‘consciousness’. See also \textit{Was Ryle a Behaviourist? And What type of Behaviourism} for Ryle’s retrospection and Wilfrid Sellars ‘in forro interno’ reading of Ryle ‘concept of mind’ as an ‘in forro interno’ log keeper.

\textsuperscript{148} Another piece of Rylean. We will explore this terminology at length later in the paper. For the moment refer to the distinctions in the above footnotes.
Again these are skill verbs and if one questions them one is inclined to use a ‘how’ in the interrogative to uncover the corresponding sets of verbs for the skills being employed. ‘How is he being careful about his motives?’ ‘How is he careful in establishing his beliefs?’ These are different questions from ‘why would he do that?’

Motives, Inclinations and Beliefs, thus explained, come under a different family of dispositions from Capacities. Ryle’s Motives, Inclinations and Beliefs belong to the ‘why-that’ side of the linguistic behaviours and have a different set of adverbs and adjectives apt for use with them. These adjectives and adverbs of manner like ‘waver, obstinately, inveterate’, are used to describe motives, beliefs and inclinations, i.e. one might say ‘obstinate in his belief’, or ‘obstinately held on to his beliefs’, and these are located on the other side of the How/Why-That Configuration which Ryle uses to separate the ‘tendency’ and ‘capacity’ verbs. Ryle separates the tendency and capacity verbs by arguing the tendency verbs lose their meaning when applying the adverbs of manner from the other family. Neither ‘he obstinately swept the driveway’ or ‘he inveterately woke up that morning’ entirely make sense because they are from the wrong family of adverbs. Here we can see a direct appeal to our own common natural language intuitions. We know ‘he inveterately woke up that morning’ sounds wrong from our grasp of the language as natural speakers, and knowing that it sounds wrong, compels us to agree with his argument.
Beliefs and motives are linked together, according to Ryle, the same way skill and methods are. Ryle writes

Roughly, 'believe' is of the same family as motive words, where 'know' is of the same family as skill words; so we ask how a person knows this, but only why a person believes that, as we ask how a person ties a clove-hitch, but why he wants to tie a clove-hitch or why he always ties granny-knots. Skills have methods, where habits and inclinations have sources\textsuperscript{149}.

The reason that Ryle thinks there are two terms on this side of the knowledge-how/ knowledge-that divide is because he thinks that 'how' has a double function as both an interrogative and as a relative adverb of manner introducing a sub-clause. One can ask, 'How do you know that?' One can also state 'this is how you do it' when demonstrating some knowledge. Similarly, it makes sense to Ryle to ask someone \textit{why they believe that}, but Ryle thinks it does not make sense to ask, \textit{how do you believe that}? Knowledge, as Ryle envisages it, is almost entirely

\textsuperscript{149}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983 Pg 129
based on ‘know how’ as an extra-linguistic process about the ‘mind’s doing’ in the world and he thinks this extra-linguistic capacity is captured by the class of adverbs ‘carefully’ belong to. That is Ryle thinks the skills identified by the linguistic patterns of the capacity verbs do not need an extensive account of thought as language\textsuperscript{150}.

\textsuperscript{150} Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983, Pg 266. Ryle rejects the notion that people always and only think in language while performing tasks, skills and pieces of work. The confusion arises from a failure, in many readers of Ryle, to make the Capacities/Tendencies distinction, and thus many readers have failed to notice that there are more than one type of disposition in Ryle. Ryle rejects the notion that all of the dispositional capacities are linguistic, nor that people are thinking ‘\textit{in sotto voco}’ when performing such tasks. See the ‘ball of wool’ argument on page 266, where Ryle argues that untangling a skein of wool involves no private soliloquy or mental self-talk.
Chapter Five

Gilbert Ryle, Wilfrid Sellars and science.

Part of the confusion with many contemporary accounts of Ryle in the Philosophy of Mind arises from the fact that he was read by a wave of early Analytic Pro-Science Materialists and Physicalists. Indeed, he was read by highly influential and talented people like J. J. C. Smart and David Armstrong who looked towards Ryle as a novel way out of mind-body dualist arguments and the lingering spectre of Descartes. These early reactions to Ryle have also since become confused with much of the Historically Situated Psychological Behaviourism of that period. The result is that many books and articles written on the history of Analytic Philosophy of Mind have erroneously interpreted Ryle as offering a materialist ‘pro-science’ psychological behaviourist\textsuperscript{151} account about the mind.

For instance, Professor Weed writes

\begin{quote}
Head-scratching is objectively observable.

Incestuous desire is not; nor is universal doubt,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{151} As in a pro-science, materialist, Historically-Situated Behaviourist of the same ilk as Watson, Skinner and Thorndike.
apprehension of infinity, or Cartesian

introspection. Philosophers like Carl Hempel and

Gilbert Ryle shared the view that all genuine

problems are scientific problems\textsuperscript{152}.

I just don’t think that was Ryle’s view. In fact Ryle thought that many

philosophical muddles about the mind actually originated in ‘science’ and that

attempts to apply scientific vocabularies to the mind were the cause of the

problem. Ryle maintains the view in \textit{The Concept of Mind} that the complex

thetical languages of the sciences create confusions which this kind of

philosophy inherits. Ryle, of course, concluded that the way to solve this was to

elevate the status of ‘ordinary language’ and examine the behaviour of the

language we use in our everyday talk about the mind.

Ryle ‘himself’ in \textit{The Concept of Mind} writes

Whenever a new science achieves its first big

successes, its enthusiastic acolytes always

fancy that all questions are now soluble by

extension of its methods of solving its

questions. At one time theorists imagined

\textsuperscript{152} Weedd, Laura. ‘Philosophy of Mind an Overview.’ \textit{Philosophy Now} Nov/Dec, no. 87 (2011). Pg 6. Weedd is, perhaps some might think, rather aptly named for this type of error.
that the whole world was nothing more than
a complex of geometrical figures, at another
that the whole world was describable and
explicable in the propositions of pure
arithmetic. Chemical, electrical, Darwinian
and Freudian cosmogonies have also enjoyed
their bright but brief days. 'At long last', the
zealots always say, 'we can give, or at least
indicate, a solution of all difficulties and one
which is unquestionably a scientific
solution'\textsuperscript{153}.

Indeed, 'at long last (the zealots always say) we can give, or at least indicate, a
solution of all difficulties and one which is unquestionably a scientific solution'.
This is what Ryle actually wrote, tongue in cheek, which, of course, is contrary
to Weed’s assertion and numerous introductions to Ryle and the Philosophy of
Mind. This is important because a history of errors in reading Ryle have created
an alternative view of Ryle. This alternative view impacts accounts of Ryle like
that we found in David Chalmers, and it obscures the novelty and insight in his
argument, as we will see.

\textsuperscript{153}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983 Pg 74.
Ryle’s argument here is that fanaticism by ‘scientific zealots’ contaminates the domain of ordinary language with philosophical muddles and category mistakes which he is at pains to clear up and repair.

One example of such a muddle for Ryle is the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’. Ryle argues the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ has two parts and is a type of problematic reoccurring ‘language construct’ in the Philosophy of Mind which Ryle thinks was originally created from trying to treat the mind like a machine. Volitions form one side of this language construct and thus make up one of those parts.

Ryle writes

The physical sciences launched by Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and Boyle secured a longer and a stronger hold upon the cosmogony-builders than did either their forerunners or their successors. People still tend to treat laws of Mechanics not merely as the ideal type of scientific laws, but as, in some sense, the ultimate laws of Nature. They tend to hope or fear that biological, psychological and sociological laws will one day be 'reduced' to mechanical laws though it is left unclear what
sort of a transaction this ‘reduction’ would be\textsuperscript{154}. 

The physical sciences, Ryle thinks, cause contaminations when applied to mental concepts which result in ‘myths’ like the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ which Ryle sees as a contamination of ordinary language with mechanistic accounts of the mind. For Ryle science is the cause of the problems and confusions in Philosophy of Mind.

Sellars disagrees with Ryle.

Sellars writes

My point is rather that what we call the scientific enterprise is the flowering of a dimension of discourse which already exists in what historians

\textsuperscript{154} Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1984. Pg 74 This is the reason I avoided using Aizowa and Adams’ paper. I should argue that the ‘Mark of the Cognitive’ is a special application of what is at the base of the Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind since it individuates on the basis of causal factors. See Adams, Fred. Aizowa, Ken. ‘Defending the Bounds of Cognition.’ In \textit{The Extended Mind}, edited by Richard Menary, Pp 67-80. Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 2010. Pg 40, and pg 70: since individuation for the ‘Mark of the Cognitive’ depends on intrinsic representations with non-derived content, then cognition on this view would be little more than the origin of causal processing and representation. Menary clarifies this point; See the ‘Introduction.’ In \textit{The Extended Mind}, edited by Richard Menary, Pp 1 - 25. Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 2010. Pp 18-19. This position that Adams and Aizowa put forward on individuating cognition on a causal basis clashes with Ryle’s Anti-Cartesian position on the problem of causation which Ryle argues leads either to ‘The Two World Myth’, or the ‘Bogey of Mechanism’. Specifically, Adams and Aizowa’s position would be subject to classification of that passage on pg 79, Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1984, which was pointed out a few footnotes ago, where Ryle claims men are not machines. This, I argue, would lead Ryle to the position of viewing Adams and Aizowa’s position as just another development on the Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind, with its faults, since Adams and Aizowa seek to individuate cognition on the basis of causation.
call the ‘prescientific stage,’ and that failure to understand this type of discourse ‘writ large’ -- in science -- may lead, indeed has often led to a failure to appreciate its role in ‘ordinary usage,’ and, as a result, to a failure to understand the full logic of even the most fundamental, the ‘simplest’ empirical terms\textsuperscript{155}.

This Sellars thinks is because \textsuperscript{156}

\textit{scientific discourse is but a continuation of a dimension of discourse which has been present in human discourse from the very beginning.}


\textsuperscript{156}In Sellars, \textit{Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man}, 1991, Pg 24 the Scientific Image starts off as a methodological development of the Manifest Image, see pg 20. What characterizes the Scientific Image is its use of imperceptibles, pp 18-19. However, as Sellars later points out, in ‘The Language of Theories.’ In \textit{Science, Perception and Reality}, Pp 106 - 126. California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 120, if our theory is a good one (kinetic theory) we are entitled to say that the entities (molecules) exist. There is a genuine rivalry. However, as Sellars points out at the end of \textit{Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind}, 1997, pg 113, to ask how impressions fit together with magnetic fields is mistaken. This is because impressions themselves are theoretical entities that we come to perceive, pg 111, 115. I will bring this move out more in my discussion through out the paper.
This argument that the ordinary, everyday view of the world is replaced by a scientific account is problematic for Ryle because it threatens Ryle’s assumption that Ordinary Language is a special and distinct normative source for arguments. Sellars argument is a threat to Ryle’s project of providing an ‘unmuddling’ to problems he thinks the theoretical vocabularies of science have created. The reason, of course, is that if Sellars is right, ordinary language and the special vocabularies of science are not as separate as Ryle would like them to be.

The position that Ryle introduces in *The Concept of Mind*, is not, of course, the position he maintains in all his writing. In *On Thinking*, his philosophy is implicitly in the domain of Ordinary Language, and his analyses for the most part are confined to Linguistic Behavioural descriptions even though he is not explicitly or implicitly universally Anti-Psychologistic about understanding the Capacities. In *Dilemmas*, for instance, Ryle’s view is that

---

157 Ryle, *On Thinking*, 1979, pp 17 - 31. See also Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983, Pg 266. The error in the scholarship arises from people who read into Ryle the idea that there is one uniform type of disposition. Ryle has several different families of disposition. This was one of Weitz’s mistakes. Chief among Ryle’s families of language-uses, which are built up from inter-connected distinctions based on extra-sentential relationships between different word configurations are the Tendency and Capacity Families of Disposition. Ryle argues that the Capacities do no require mental chatter, silent soliloquy, (what Sellars refers to as thinking ‘in sotto voce’), or mentally stated propositions. The most direct evidence for this is the skein of wool argument in *The Concept of Mind*, on page 266. While performing tasks, exercising skills and fulfilling capacities Ryle does not think that thought is characteristically linguistic. However, he does argue that the way we describe these actions and behaviours is linguistic. We use terms like ‘carefully’ or ‘heedlessly’. These are the adverbial descriptions he refers to as ‘heed concepts’ with inheritance properties. These inheritance properties derive from the person carrying out the action. If John is a careful driver, we would say he drove ‘carefully’ and this is ‘characteristic’ of him. If he drove recklessly, then we would say this was ‘uncharacteristic’ of him. But, this does not mean John necessarily need think the word ‘carefully’ in order to drive thus, or that he mentally narrates his driving, or forms statements about his driving as he does so, or that the exercise of his capacity to drive is foundationally linguistic. However, the
highly theoretical vocabularies exist alongside an Ordinary Language domain, but they exist as a different way to see the contents of that domain. There, Ryle argues the view that science is just another perspective on the world, a ‘peninsular offshoot’ as Sellars might describe it. In *Dilemmas* Ryle thinks the ‘world of science’ is rather like ‘the world of poultry’ or ‘the world of entertainment’ that can co-exist with the mundane world described by the Ordinary Language user, but in a different vocabulary.

Ryle writes

> We know that a lot of people are interested in poultry and would not be surprised to find in existence a periodical called ‘the Poultry World’...
>
> It is quite innocuous to speak of the physicist’s world, if we do so in the way we speak of the poultry keeper’s world or the entertainment world. We could, correctly speak of the

---

Tendency Dispositions, Ryle thinks, are governed by a different group of linguistic behaviours. We could not describe a man’s motives, beliefs or inclinations with adverbials like ‘carefully’. The description of a person’s motives, habits, beliefs and inclinations are very different and are related to the behaviour of a different set of families. These are the Propensities and the Occurrences which is where we find a description of the moods and their relationship with the Family of Tendencies. Here, Ryle is implicitly Anti-Psychologistic and argues that these are foundationally linguistic. For a breakdown of Ryle’s description of the linguistic behaviours governing the ‘Propensities’, and their relationship to mood terminology, see *Ryle’s Moodology and ‘Flash Bangs’* in Chapter Six of this thesis. See also Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983, Pg 81.


bacteriologist’s world and the marine biologist’s world\textsuperscript{160}.

He goes on to support this view of ‘science’ as a collective noun unifying all the concepts associated with science, with an analogy. The analogy is that of a deck of cards. Ryle argues we may view, for instance, the house of hearts in the highly technical vocabularies of either Bridge or Poker, but this does not privilege Bridge, as a more truthful representation of, say, the Queen of Hearts, than that which would place it as a Poker schema in a Royal Flush\textsuperscript{161}. For Ryle of the \textit{Dilemmas} the Queen of Hearts is the domain of Ordinary Language, while the Poker and Bridge interpretations are technical vocabularies, analogous to the special sciences and chicken farming. In short, contra-Weed, Ryle does not put any special credence or importance in the discoveries of science.

\textsuperscript{160}\textit{Dilemmas}. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1987. Pg 72 - 73
\textsuperscript{161}Ryle, \textit{Dilemmas}, 1987. Pg 86 - 87
The Influence of Rudolf Carnap on Wilfrid Sellars’ Epistemology and the Tension between *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* and *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*.

There are problematic strains in the accounts Sellars offers in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*\(^{162}\), and *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*\(^{163}\). These strains emerge from two papers he presents between them\(^{164}\). The papers *Truth and ‘Correspondence’*, and *The Language of Theories* are both part of a refutation of Carnap and a larger riddle that Sellars is trying systematically to resolve. This riddle is most explicitly expressed in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* where Sellars characterizes the everyday world as the ‘Manifest Image’. The Manifest Image contains, most notably, the Empirical Image, but also the Original Anthropomorphic Image. The Empirical Image contains ‘all of Mill’s inductive canons’, Hume’s philosophy, and is the grounds from which develops Sellars’ classification of Substantive Dualism\(^{165}\).

Alongside the Empirical Image, making up the Manifest Image, is the Original Primal Category of Persons in which natural objects and forces are personified into anthropic beings. In this early stage of the Manifest Image the


wind is personified as being ‘cheeky’, while lightning may be personified as being ‘angry’. The Original Primal Category of Persons, what we might call the penultimate achievement of an Anthropomorphic Age, is actually what Sellars thinks sets the stage for a transformation into the Empirical Age. The way Sellars thinks that transformation occurs is that the polydeistic anthropomorphic beings like the ‘cheeky’ wind and ‘angry’ lightning eventually give way to a Mono-Anthropomorphic Age, which contains a single entity Sellars calls ‘the One’. The negation of the personhood of the One is what allows the Empirical Image to come into existence as the truncated domain of persons and negated anthropic traits in nature. In order for this to occur, the entire history of Sellars’ Process-Anthropology needs to begin with an Anthropomorphic Age. One could pin-point the tension between *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, and *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* by raising the question where would a Pre-Jonesian Society get the behavioural concepts for this Anthropomorphic Age?

Allow me to explain. In this earlier Anthropomorphic Age of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, which precedes the era of the Empirical Image and the domain of nature as ‘Truncated Persons’\(^\text{166}\), the wind for instance is treated as possessing a personality\(^\text{167}\). During these Folk Ages the totality of the world when seen in the singleness of a unified mono-anthropomorphic entity


forms the Primal Category of the One, and this is what Sellars categorizes as ‘The Perennial philosophy’. The society in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* must begin with a language of personhood.

We might view the argument Sellars presents in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* as a type of ‘Process Anthropology’. In the first part of this Process Anthropology, the animistic and anthropomorphizing eras finally culminate in what Sellars refers to as ‘the Primal Category of the One’. This is a view of all of nature as one grand and universal entity; what a Christian might call ‘God’ or a Jew might refer to as ‘Elohim’. Here we can imagine a sort of transition from Polytheism to Monotheism, and finally to Deism. The negation of the One produces a sort of ‘Atheistic Stage’ which allows for the truncation of nature into a de-personalized, non-anthropic category with no personality traits or anthropomorphic properties. This truncated category Sellars refers to as ‘the Empirical Image’. The Anthromorphic and Empirical Images make up two halves of the Manifest Image. The Manifest Image is what we might refer to as the collective vision of humanity’s image of itself and society in the world during the Folk Ages. The Folk Ages we might use to refer to humanity during these early stages of development. The Manifest Image, according to Sellar’s theory of Process Anthropology in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* is finally

---

superseded by the development of a ‘Scientific Image’ which is fundamentally different to the Manifest Image, which contains the earlier two stages.

The Scientific Image is different from the Original Anthropomorphic and Empirical Images making up the Manifest Image because the Scientific Image, according to this theory, accesses unobservables and uses theoretical entities in its explanation. Here we can see Carnap’s influence on Sellars’ thinking in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. Throughout *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* we see Carnapian themes. We see the influence in (what perhaps might be given the following Baroque label) Sellars’ Para-Carnapian Quasi-Compte-ian idea that a Scientific Image emerges alone and distinct from the misty Folk Ages with the determinate and distinctive ability to utilize theoretical and unobservable entities in its explanations of observable phenomena. This same Para-Carnapian Quasi-Compte-ian Positivist Process of Anthropological-Episteme for an Emergent Scientific Image – if we are to give a name to it – is what is at odds with the ‘Socio-Linguistic Process Epistemology’ Sellars offers in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* for two reasons.

Firstly, Sellars maintains in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* that the linguistic practices underlying modern scientific processes are continuous with earlier and older linguistic practices in ordinary language which I dealt with above\(^\text{170}\). Moveover in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*,

\(^{170}\) See last chapter, *Chapter Five. Gilbert Ryle, Wilfrid Sellars and science*, in this thesis. Sellars writes ‘scientific discourse is but a continuation of a dimension of discourse which has been present
unobservable and theoretical entities become ‘reportable’ when they enter the space of reasons and shift from postulates and descriptions of an Observation Language to becoming part of the Report Language. As Sellars points out scientists learn to see the mu mesons in Wilson Cloud Chambers.

Secondly there is the problem of the development of anthropic language. The order of development is ‘out of whack’ between Sellars’ Process Anthropology and the stages of his Socio-Linguistic Theory. In order to develop the rich psychological resources of the Primal Category and an Anthropomorphic Age that would allow tribes living in this era to think of the wind as cheeky, or to view lightning as angry, they would need to develop the full resources of a Post-Jonseian Linguistic Age.

In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind the vocabulary for reporting using rich expressions like ‘angry’, ‘happy’ or ‘cheeky’, can occur only after the Messianic Sellarsian Behaviourist called Jones has come along and taught the tribe an Observational Language for understanding Gross-Body-Language at the level of of actions, gestures and various acts. Jones’ Language lays the neccessary grounds for the pre-requisite sophistications that allow a Rylean tribe to describe phenomena using a developing language of theoretical

\[\text{Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 80.}\]
entities such as intentions, thoughts, and motives. According to Sellars’ Socio-Linguistic account in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, it is only after this language has passed through social conditions and a space of reasons that it develops the ability to make reports in an anthropomorphized language. The reason why Jones and his age are necessary is because those resources necessary for anthropomorphic reports develop from Jones’ language. The linguistic resources that allow Rylean tribe members to describe the wind as ‘cheeky’ or lightning as ‘angry’ grow out of the seeds of Jones’ language during a period I label in the tribe’s history as the Paleo-linguistic era.

In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* the Psychological Report Language used by the Rylean tribe is the last stage in development of the language which begins with the ability to talk about publicly observable objects. The order of the developmental stages in Wilfrid Sellars’ Socio-Linguistic Theory in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, is at odds with the order in which the Manifest Image develops in the Process Anthropology of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. In one of Sellars’ papers the language of personhood emerges at the dawn of that civilization and begins the epistemic process of development towards what will become a Scientific Image of Man. In the other

---

171 Here, see the now seminal Jay F. Rosenberg, ‘Wilfrid Sellars on ‘Mental States”’. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, no 28. (2004): 239 – 265. We stand upon the shoulders of giants, and, of course, Rosenberg is right about the Myth of Jones. It is a theory of thoughts.

172 My name for the period when Jones is teaching the tribe his language and the tribe are learning how to use it for the first time.

of Sellars’ papers the languages of personhood comes at the end of that tribe’s development, and must draw on the resources of those earlier developmental stages to fully develop\textsuperscript{174}.

We may temporarily set aside this problem by positing that the rich psychological vocabulary necessary for an Anthropomorphic stage in the Manifest Image, which of course is neccessary (prior to the development of the Empirical Image with its domain of nature as truncated persons) is fertilized by inserting Jones into the Pre-history of Sellars’ Process Anthropology. Later, as we shall see, this will create a problem with the transition to the Scientific Image in the developmental stages of Sellars’ ‘Process Anthropology’. The problem arises because processes and special features that are supposed to emerge and separate the Scientific Image from the Empirical Image are already present in the developmental stages of Jones’ Language and its development from an incomplete descriptive proto-behavioural tribal argot, taught by a wandering Jones, to fulfilling the role of a ‘Konstatierang’ fact-stating language capable of reporting the rich affective, sensitive and personifiable terms from the kind of Gleesonian vocabulary necessary for an Anthropomorphic Age. The development of Fact Stating Roles arises from a thread of arguments on offer in this dissertation that originates in Ryle’s ‘Moodology’ and what I label ‘flash-bangs’, which will ultimatley, later in this paper, cause us to reject Sellars’

\textsuperscript{174} Sellars, \textit{Empiricism \& the Philosophy of Mind}, 1997.
account of the Manifest and Scientific Images in favour of an acceptance of a
genuine rivalry between Neurophysiological data and Linguistic Behavioural
style analysis of specific ‘la parole’ manifestations of language. This rivalry is
one of three which I will explain in the next section. There I will also briefly
illuminate how these three sources of normative claim about the mind will
eventually fit into the Heterophenomenological and Autophenomenological
distinction. Keep in mind the conditions I laid out for the type of Psychologism I
am selling. We are moving towards a theory where language is passed down in
linguistic communities, but meaning is ascribed in at least some instances
individually according to a private realm of individual experience. In arguing so
this thesis will thus advocate a type of Psychologism which Crane drew out of
Dummett and McDowell, and which I discussed in my Introduction. However,
there are several stages that need to be developed first.

Language Analysis vs Neuroscience.

What is the foundation for our strongest claims about the mind?

So, let us return to the contention between Ryle and Sellars over the argument
for the authority of Ordinary Language and the developing ‘Scientific World
View’. Sellars, from the perspective of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of
Man* would maintain, that the Scientific Image, while it methodologically feeds
on the Manifest Image\textsuperscript{175} may very well be like the world of poultry, and a peninsular off-shoot from the Manifest Image. But, Sellars would also argue, countering Ryle of \textit{The Dilemmas}, that when the Scientific Image is strong enough it becomes a genuine rival to the Manifest Image and will eventually replace it\textsuperscript{176}.

However, while the Scientific Image is developing Sellars thinks that the Scientific Image can feed off the Manifest Image. One important feature of the Manifest Image for Sellars is the way thought is treated. For Sellars somewhat agrees with Ryle, at least during the period of the Manifest Image, that thought is or at least can be treated as somewhat analogous to language.

Wilfrid Sellars writes

\begin{quote}
It is no accident that when a novelist wishes to represent what is going on in the mind of a person, he does so by 'quoting' the person's thoughts as he might quote what a person says. For thoughts not only are the sort of things that find overt expression in language, we conceive of them as analogous to overt discourse. Thus, \textit{thoughts} in the manifest image are
\end{quote}

conceived not in terms of their 'quality', but rather as inner 'goings-on' which are analogous to speech, and find their overt expression in speech -- though they can go on, of course, in the absence of this overt expression.177

Sellars thinks that when we move into the Scientific Image what we know about thought which we can represent with italicised speech like the thoughts of a character in a novel, will come to be replaced with information from devices like EEGs and Polygraphs which can inform us about mental phenomena in the form of neurological information conversant and derived from physiological processes178. Sellars thinks that the move from treating language as thought to also being informed by neurological information is one of the last stages in the developing Scientific Image of Man. However, Sellars makes a distinction between sensory information and conceptual information, the latter of which he conceives of as ‘roles’ which have a specific significance within the terminology of his philosophy179 and which you’ll find running through the Post-Sellars

---

178 The term ‘role’ has both neurological and sociological meanings within Sellars’ work. For instance, he thinks it is possible to get around the problem of introspection by ignoring the ‘qualitative’ aspect of a word related to an experience or feeling, and focus on the ‘role’ it plays. Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1954. See subsection VI. The Primacy of the Scientific Image. A Prolegomenon. In Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 1956, language roles have sociological and epistemic conditions attached to them like for instance Observation and Fact Stating Reports which vary in the authority ascribed to the ‘Fact Stating Role’ by the community according to standard conditions and whether the person themself has mastered the ability to report in that
vocabulary this thesis is written in. Conceptual thinking which is comprehended as analogous to language by people during the age of the Manifest Image, Sellars conceives of as being replaced by Neurological Information. However sensations create a dilemma for him that results in a ‘sensory-conceptual’ dualism he is unable to solve without turning the physical sensations of the Manifest Image into theoretical entities\textsuperscript{180}.

While *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* was originally presented as a series of lectures given at Pittsburgh in December 1960 and *Empiricism and The Philosophy of Mind* was published four years earlier\textsuperscript{181} there is reason to suspect that these papers were either not written in the order they were presented and published in, or they were not intended to be read in that order. The reason for this is the order that the papers are presented in Wilfrid Sellars’ book *Science, Perception and Reality*, begins with *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*\textsuperscript{182}. The order in the book then follows *Being and Being Known, Phenomenalism, The Language of Theories* and finally *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. This suggests to me given the

\textsuperscript{180} Sellars, *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, 1954. See subsection V. *The Clash of the Images*, and also VII. *Putting Man into the Scientific Image*.


methodocial and systematic nature of Sellars’ philosophy he intended the works to be read thus.

Another key reasons why the order of presentation in Science, Perception and Reality is important is because the problem he is left with at the end of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man about whether reducing sensations and impressions to theoretical entities\(^1\) will solve the theoretical trilemma arising from Descartes higher and lower mental states, is the same one that occupies him for the majority of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind\(^2\). We will return to Sellars’ position in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind concerning theoretical entities and sense impressions in depth, and consider it further with an oft overlooked criticism by Fodor\(^3\). Fodor argues that there are limits to the theory-ladeness of perception. This will give us a chance to present an answer to Fodor that is already latent in Sellars’ account of sensory experience and theoretical entities in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, but which needs to be brought out to avoid this possible objection and caveat.

Exploring Sellars’ account of sensation and theoretical entities in light of Fodor’s criticism of the ‘New Look School’ will also provide us with insight to go

---

\(^1\) Here see Jay F. Rosenberg. ‘Wilfrid Sellars on ‘Mental States”’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, no 28. (2004): 239 – 265. I agree with Rosenberg. Sellars introduces the Myth of Jones to explain how human thought develops through a language in a community, moreover, to explain human thoughts as theoretical entities and solve problems that are the focus of his other papers.

\(^2\) See Chapter Seventeen. Observation and Report Languages in this thesis for the start of an indepth discussion of Wilfrid Sellars in relation to the problem of sensory experience and theoretical entities.

\(^3\) In Chapter Sixteen, Observation and Report Languages of this thesis.
further and explore the different types of epistemic language creation processes in Sellars’ Epistemology and the types of fact stating and language access they offer when formulating arguments and avenues of research into the mind. We will be able to apply these insights to a developing model of Psychology\textsuperscript{186} and Psychiatry that takes into account what is, perhaps, most fruitful in Sellars’ distinction between the Manifest and Scientific Images once we have resolved the tension between the timelines in his two papers by looking closely at the types of access an Anthropomorphic or Paleo-Behaviouristic language has to other types of ‘Non-Anthropo-Behaviouristic’ specialist languages\textsuperscript{187}. It will emerge that this ‘access’ is a type of access Psychology and Psychiatry inherit to the ‘Object Languages’ from the types of disciplines that feed into them, that is defined by different ways of talking about them. Psychology draws very deeply from Folk and Humanistic traditions and utilizes a lot of metaphors, similies, forms of similitude, myths, various religious concepts, and religious practices like meditation and forms of confession. It inherits a lot of metaphoric, mythological, allegorical and figurative uses of language. Psychiatry, on the otherhand, inherits a lot of very hard, scientific concepts about the mind as an organ of the body. Psychiatry utilizes a lot of scientifico-medical knowledge

\textsuperscript{186} Note the capitalization. This is in anticipation of the Litero-Figurative Model I adopt later in the paper. See Chapter Seventeen. Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Language. \textit{I. Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of Mind.} In this thesis.

\textsuperscript{187} The way I solve the problem between the two incongruent timelines in Sellars seminal papers is to propose two different types of Images, one Psychological and Psychiatric. Where I refer to these Images I use capitals and treat them as proper nouns in accordance with Analytic Philosophical conventions for treating normative sources as formal proper nouns i.e. ‘good’ and ‘the Good’. 
about brain chemistry as well as physiological symptoms and even cognitive impairments that can be located in the structural anatomy of the brain. What will be further revealed is the way Psychology and Psychiatry vary in their use of Fact Stating Roles when drawing on the resources of the developing ‘Object Languages’ while forming Observation Languages about the mind. Psychology draws on myths like Electra or metaphoric uses of other languages like “hot and cold” to talk about types of cognition. Psychiatry sometimes uses these, but it tends towards a different type of explanation that is less commonly found in Psychology, because Psychiatrists get a lot of hard science from the linguistic-educational medical complex that doctors, nurses and surgeons are trained under. Psychiatrists usually undertake medical training in areas like anatomy, chemistry, micro-biology, pharmacology. Psychiatry thus tends to utilize Fact Stating Roles that draw on the Scientific Object Languages very strongly, not just in theory, but in the practices of diagnostic methodology, pharmacology, and surgical intervention as well. Psychiatrists will tend to use the medical equipment developed from medicinal science while making their diagnosis and in ongoing treatment. They will tend towards using (f)MIRs and EEGs, blood spectral analysis, nurse’s observations, blood pressure, fecal and urine samples, and so on. I will use this Psychological and Psychiatric model not only to develop a Neo-Sellarsian framework that can repair the rift between Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, but also more importantly, to also explain what is causing it\textsuperscript{188}.

As I indicated above, if we read Sellars works in the order he organized them in for his volume of collected papers\textsuperscript{189} we can see that between Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man and Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars’ position on theoretical entities begins to change with a critique Sellars develops of Carnap’s arguments about observational frameworks.

In The Language of Theories Sellars breaks from Carnap’s frameworks and argues that if a theory is a good theory it should entitle the holder of the theory to claims that the postulates of the theory exist and are not merely theoretical entities. Specifically, Sellars argues that if kinetic theory is a good theory it should entitle the holder to claim that molecules exist. Sellars argues against Carnap’s notion that molecules are not just useful fictions we attach onto our empirical observations and experiences with linguistic frameworks, but rather than convieniant nominal fictions, Sellars thinks that learning molecular theory will come to shape and radically change the way a person sees the world. Sellars argues that the holder of kinetic theory may not be able to see the molecules, but he can see the effects of the molecules and this should, according to Sellars, entitle him to the view that the molecules exist and are not simply part of a “merely” theoretical framework. The explainatory space the theorist

\textsuperscript{188} See Chapter Sixteen, and Chapter Seventeen in this thesis.
utilizes for explaining the way they see the world, is, of course, the start of what
Robert Brandom calls the ‘space of reasons’ in his own development and
expansion of Wilfrid Sellars philosophy\textsuperscript{190}. In \textit{Some Reflections on Language
Games} Sellars begins to construct a framework around ‘language entry
transitions’ and ‘language departure transitions’ in order to solve a vicious
regress that arises from one of Wittgenstein’s arguments. Sellars’ formulation of
Wittgenstein’s infinite regress focusses on the public accessibility of rule
interpretation and rule applications. The Wittgensteinian Metalanguage
Regress arises from the need for a metalanguage when obeying a rule, and the
need for a metalanguage for obeying the metalanguage of the rule, and so on\textsuperscript{191}.

The ‘entry transition positions’ in Sellars language epistemology are
learned responses to a stimulus. This is what Sellars calls a ‘Report Language’
in \textit{Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind}. The move between ‘Report
Languages’ and ‘Observation Languages’ is the way in which Sellarsian beings
which Brandom labels as ‘Sapients’ come to see theoretical entities as real.
While formulating his or her theories and conducting new experiments Sellars
argues that the scientist will use an Observation Language. The Observation
Language will use ‘models’ and ‘similes’ and objects already within the scientist’s

\textsuperscript{190} See Brandom’s famous and seminal commentary on Wilfrid Sellars. Brandom, Robert. ‘Study
Guide.’ In \textit{Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind.} edited by Richard Rorty. United States: President
\textsuperscript{191} Wilfrid Sellars. ‘Some Reflections on Language Games.’ \textit{Philosophy of Science} 1, no. 21 (1954). In
particular see section 18.
linguistic framework which the scientist has inherited from the community. Sometimes components of the Observation Language are drawn from other co-existing domains and used in assent with-holding metaphorical and similitudinal structures for interpreting a stimulus. However, Sellars argues that when the scientist begins to see the effects of the molecules in his or her experiment as *the molecules themselves* the scientist has shifted from the use of what Sellars calls an ‘Observation language’ to what Sellars calls a ‘Report Language’.

This ability to move from Observation Languages to Report Languages is an important feature for Sellars’ philosophy. Report Languages can change. Sellars argues that we are brought up with them as part of the system he refers to as ‘Language Roles’ within the ‘Standard Conditions’ of a linguistic community. These ‘Standard Conditions’ allow for Konstatierang statements to be made by members of the linguistic community. However, beyond Konstatierang fact-making states of a Report, given for a stimulus in standard conditions, Sellars thinks there is a descriptive framework where theoretical objects can be described with similes, metaphors and similitudinal models drawn from objects and descriptive properties already describable in that language as part of an Observation Language, but for which the Fact Stating Role is denied. These figurative uses are important in Jonesian productions of behaviourist vocabularies and when given time can become Report Languages within a space where sufficient reasons are given for seeing the stimulus in a
new way within the practices of that language community. When these new Observational Languages become part of the Report Language that the subject uses, Sellars argues that the subject sees the entities or postulates no longer as merely theoretical, descriptive or metaphorical, but as actual entities. The holder of the theory comes to see the world in terms of their theory. The structure changes from figurative to literal ‘Statements of Fact’ when the subject learns how to give a report on it. This is important because people can also see themselves in the terms of a Behavioural Language and begin to self-report. This will be important later in the dissertation in the argument on Wittgenstein and Private Access\textsuperscript{192}.

\textbf{The Conflict between Ryle and Sellars over the Predominance of Science or Language in the Philosophy of Mind.}

However for the moment I want to highlight this tension in Sellars and the unresolved issues at the end of \textit{Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man} and draw attention to a developing sophistication arising from Sellars’ account that will be important to the central thread of this dissertation. In \textit{Philosophy and

\textsuperscript{192} See Chapter Seven: Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars and the argument for Private Access in this thesis.
the Scientific Image of Man Sellars introduces us to a ‘Bi-Componential View’ where his account of mind contains a view of (1) thinking as analogous to speaking, as well as (2) hard neurological information about mental processes.

Both sources of Sellars ‘Bi-Componential View’ of the mind are publicly observable. (1) The Ordinary Language platform maintains some authority of language in arguments about the nature of mind, however Sellars would argue that (2) the Scientific Neurological platform presents stronger normative grounds since he argues in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man these developments will come to replace our Folk Ages vocabularies of mind (which we are calling the Ordinary Language platform) for arguments about the mind (specifically Conceptual Roles) as the Scientific Image replaces the Manifest Image.

Ryle, however, argues that Ordinary Language is a stronger source for arguments and claims about the mind. Ryle maintains that science is a source of confusion and the ‘bad guy’ when it comes to the mind because it introduces theoretical language constructs and highly technical vocabularies borrowed from other domains which, Ryle thinks, then muddle our understanding of the mind and obscure it. Ryle argues that the ordinary language of everyday people is the language that people think in and can reveal for us the mind if we’d only stop paying attention to scientists, philosophers and psychologists. For Ryle

---

193 My term for describing Sellars view that language and neuroscience will merge at the crossing over point of the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image.
philosophers and scientists thus confuse what is evident in ordinary common language about the mind when they apply what Ryle refers to as their ‘specialized vocabularies’ to talk about it. For Ryle, this affords Ordinary Language a special place in arguments about the mind since he thinks it can be used to clear up mistakes introduced by scientists, psychologists and philosophers. Thus, Ryle views Ordinary Language as a stronger source of support for arguments and theories about the nature of the mind than the specialized vocabularies of the sciences.

The Trilemma of Normativity should now emerge. We have three competing sources in claims about the mind; (1) language, (2) scientific discoveries like neuroscience, and (3) phenomenology. This does not present a problem, so long as these three sources are consistent with each other. But what happens when they are not? Which is the stronger source? Which is foundational? At the foot of this emerging conflict is an argument over whether we should use language or we should trust science. We saw this in the Introduction to this thesis in the conflict between psychology and psychiatry in the prescriptive and diagnostic methods for AD(H)D. The psychologist has problems with whether the words in the text book mean the same thing as the ones the patient uses to describe their experiences. The psychiatrist has a different problem, one that arises with caveat authority. Sometimes patients react differently to pharmacological agents and sometimes they describe different experiences for identical neurological data.
We can see that the origins for this debate over which is a more authoritative source in claims about the mind first emerge between the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Ryle. Is ‘science’ a stronger foundation for making claims and arguments about the mind like Wilfrid Sellars argues in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, or is it ‘Ordinary Language’? In a case where you have the developing Scientific Image of Man saying one thing, and arguments based on Ordinary Language discourse supporting contradictory claims about the mind, which is the source one should support? Should one support what scientists are saying about the mind with their studies and specialized vocabularies, or what the ordinary person in the street claims to know about the mind from the common language they use to talk about their emotions and experiences?

Both Scientific\(^{194}\) and Ordinary Language sources are publicly accessible. This makes them both what will be referred to later in the paper as ‘Heterophenomenological sources’. ‘Heterophenomenological’ is a term that will come to mean specifically evidence which can be drawn from the ‘third person

---

\(^{194}\) Where I use capitals, in reference to distinguishing types of argument in Sellars and Ryle, I am referring to a normative source identified by either Sellars or Ryle, and the strength that such a normative source presents for accepting a claim. Rivalries often arise between different claims and the normative value of the claim is often put forward when the question is asked about what type of claim it is, and what it is based on. Within Sellars I identify ‘Scientific’, capital S, with fact-stating literal roles within a community of like-minded researchers, which he describes as ‘telescoping’ with the developed hard sciences, i.e. anatomy, physiology, physics, chemistry and so on. Later I will offer a resolution on both of these types of claims and the conflict between Ryle, and the two Sellars using the idea of Heterophenomenological analysis and the insight that the normative value of both types of claim are open to scrutiny from the third personal perspective, while Autophenomenological ones are in a very specific sense, private. I refer to this privacy as ‘first personal’.

188
direct view’. This is in contrast to the term ‘Autophenomenology’ which refers to what will be described as the ‘first person direct view’ after a critical engagement with Wittgenstein. The direct views contain special types of primary information from those perspectives. The ‘indirect view’ will be shown to contain ‘Analogical Constructs’ incorporating secondary assumptions drawn from the direct views which create the illusion of the unity of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account of The Mind as a homogenous single Hetrophenomenenological source. It is this illusion which the thesis will reveal underlies Ryle’s failure at providing an Ordinary Language Account of the Mind.

The Occult Strain of Phenomenology hidden in Ryle is made up from surreptitiously concealed Autophenomenological appeals to a reader’s own experiences. Once we remove the Occult Phenomenological Stream of Argumentation hidden in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account of the Mind, we are left with his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. Linguistic Behavioural Arguments are, of course, Heteropheneomenological by default since the linguistic behaviour analysed contains grammatical examination of rules, uses and conventions which are publicly observable.

The argument to arise out of this framework against Ryle is as follows. A Linguistic Behavioural Account of the Mind stripped of all occult phenomenology is insufficient to cover all the facts within the domain which Ryle thinks a theory of mind would require. The Linguistic Behavioural Account of the Mind left in
Ryle, once we remove his ‘occult phenomenology’ cannot even cover all of the facts present in Ryle’s own arguments.

What we will be left with is a ‘chastened account’ of Ryle’s Ordinary Language philosophy. This chastened account lacks the semantic resources to provide a distinction between different instances of a specific ‘flower’ in the garden of ‘Ryle’s Moodlogy’ that he calls ‘feelings-proper’\(^{195}\) to which I will attach the label ‘flash-bangs’ in the next section. Without hidden and surreptitious use of phenomenological insight, Ryle’s chastened account lacks the resources to discern a behaviour that can distinguish between the language of the ‘canny reader’ and the ‘witness’ of an event in Ryle’s ‘Reader/Witness’ argument\(^{196}\). Nor is Ryle’s chastened account able to provide a behavioural analysis with a set of grammatical rules or descriptions that can cover introspective insight into the process of thinking that Ryle describes in his ‘Anticipatory Thought Argument’\(^{197}\).

The work for scrying this occult phenomenological thread hidden in Ryle that these three arguments will emerge from, began in this thesis with David Chalmers’ description of ‘phenomenal’. I build on this by applying Ryle’s problem of accounting for different flash-bangs with a Linguistic Behavioural distinction,

\(^{195}\) Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1983, see Chapter IV for Ryle’s ‘Moodology’ pp 81 – 110.
\(^{197}\) I refer to Ryle’s argument where he gets you to try and anticipate your next thought before you have it. You need to try the exercise of anticipating one’s next thought before one has it to realize the ‘Occult Phenomenological Argumentative’ paradox. Ryle offers none and I submit that there are no rules in grammar or model linguistic behaviour that can account for this insight. It arises from trying the exercise out. Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983, pp 186-189.
to one of Chalmers phenomenal zombies. I will then develop this critique revealing an important difference between Chalmers and his phenomenal zombie twin which will demonstrate, Counter-Chalmers, that Chalmers is capable of content-bearing cognitive ‘Judgements’ which his zombie is not. This argument will occur in Sellars’ Rylean Community, after a number of caveats and careful qualifications.

Emerging from the central thread of the thesis are three normative sources that the reader should now be able to discern. These are three rival normative sources foundational to arguments for claims about the nature of mind. These are (i) analyses of the use of common ordinary language, (ii) scientific neurophysiological investigation (iii) phenomenological insight. Moreover the reader should be able to see that (i), (ii), and (iii) can be further categorized by the Autophenomenological/ Heterophenomenological Distinctions. Both (i) Ordinary Language Arguments (once they are divested of occult surreptitious phenomenal appeals) and (ii) scientific neurophysiological sources will be revealed as Heterophenomenological, while what will be exposed as a hidden source of appeal in some of Ryle’s arguments, namely (iii) phenomenological insight, will be revealed as hidden sources of

---

198 Note here I am using my typical notation for turning terms used by a philosopher into proper nouns, but also, specifically, here I am referring to David Chalmers’ doctrine of Judgements which is quite different from analytic readings of Kant’s doctrine of judgments. Where I use a capital J I am referring to Chalmers, where I use a little j, I am referring to analytic philosophical reading of Kant’s.
Autophenoemnological appeals based in arguments that conceal Analogical Constructs.
Chapter Six

Ryle’s Moodology and ‘Flash Bangs’.

For Ryle, expressions for Occurrences, in contrast to those for the Propensities, contain an interesting sub-species of linguistic expression that I think can further our purposes towards good philosophical practice by illuminating the difference between Behavioural Linguistic claims from those of Ordinary Language Arguments. This subspecies of Occurrences is designated by Ryle as ‘feelings proper’ and can be isolated by their unique linguistic structure. They will be important later in this paper because they form part of the thread making up the ‘flash-bang’ strain of arguments which will reveal reasons why a Chalmerian zombie cannot join a late Rylean community that has passed through all of the Sellarsian developmental stages and possess a Gleesonian vocabulary of ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ and learn its mental language. But first, we need to establish grounds for distinguishing the Linguistic Behavioural and Ordinary Language strains in Ryle, which include (i) how to distinguish between them, and (ii) why they are an interesting species of argument. Then we will be able to discern the Phenomenological strain of arguments hidden in Ryle from the difference between Linguistic Behaviourism and Ordinary Language
Arguments that shall emerge. To do that, it is best if we observe the difference between ‘Occurrences’ and ‘Propensities’ very early on.

Properly speaking, emotions as Ryle describes them in his ‘Moodology’ have four different types. Two of those types are collapsable into each other. A third is what happens when those two collide either with each other, or contrary versions of themselves, or a factual impediment; and a fourth type, which is separate from the other three.

Ryle writes

\(\text{T}he\ \text{word 'emotion' is used to designate at least three or four different kinds of things, which I shall call 'inclinations' (or 'motives'), 'moods', 'agitations' (or 'commotions') and 'feelings'. Inclinations and moods are not occurrences and do not therefore take place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts or states. They are, however, propensities of different kinds, and their differences are important.}\)\(^{199}\)

So, under the designation of Propensities, we have (1) Inclinations or Motives (2) Moods (3) Agitations or Commotions. Different to (1), (2) and (3) is (4) Occurrences. Occurrences can take place *publicly* and *privately*. A subspecies of these Occurrences will become important to the overall project of this paper and these, of course, are the ‘flash-bangs’. Let us keep them in mind. If we turn now to the first subspecies of the Propensities, which include (1) the Inclinations and Motives, we can see how both (2) and (3) emerge from the linguistic behaviours of the expression for them. This is because both (2) Moods and (3) Agitations, for Ryle, actually originate from properties and linguistic behaviours Ryle identifies between the language vocabularies of the Inclinations and Motives.

Take (3) Agitations as an example of this derivation process.

Ryle writes about agitations

A keen walker walks because he wants to walk,
but a perplexed man does not wrinkle his brows
because he wants or means to wrinkle them,
though the actor or hypocrite may wrinkle his
brows because he wants or means to appear
perplexed. The reason for these differences is
simple. To be distracted is not like being thirsty
in the presence of drinking-water; it is like being
thirsty in the absence of water, or in the presence of foul water. *It is wanting to do something while not being able to do it, or wanting to do something and at the same time wanting not to do it.* It is the conjunction of an inclination to behave in a certain way with an inhibition upon behaving in that way. The agitated person cannot think what to do, or what to think.

For Ryle Motives and Inclinations are not Agitations, but they are what we might call ‘combinatorial’ or ‘contributable’ or perhaps ‘collectively formative’ when combined together in certain ways into Agitations, and because they can form Agitations they can thus form Moods. Ryle argues something similar happens with Habits which are the semi-agitated forms of the Commotion.

Ryle writes

Motives then are not agitations, not even mild agitations, nor are agitations motives. But agitations presuppose motives, or rather they presuppose behaviour trends of which motives

---

are for us the most interesting sort. Conflicts of habits with habits, or habits with unkind facts, or habits with motives are also commotion-conditions. An inveterate smoker on parade, or without any matches, or in Lent, is in this plight\textsuperscript{201}.

Agitations thus presuppose Motives and Inclinations, the same way Commotions presuppose Habits and Addictions.

The Ryleistic idea, however, is simple enough. We can get out our notebook, sit down, and calculate an Agitation. Combine any two contrary Inclinations, or Motives, or one Inclination, or one Motive with one factual impediment, and you’ll get a specific type of Mood, an Agitation. Moods, of course, are the genera to which Agitations are the species.

But Ryle also cautions us that

Mood words are commonly classified as the names of feelings. But if the word 'feeling' is used with any strictness, this classification is quite erroneous. To say that a person is happy or

\textsuperscript{201}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 94.
discontented is not merely to say that he has frequent or continuous tingles or gnawings; indeed, it is not to say even this, for we should not withdraw our statement on hearing that the person had had no such feelings, and we should not be satisfied that he was happy or discontented merely by his avowal that he had them frequently and acutely. They might be symptoms of indigestion or intoxication.\(^{202}\)

But what are these feelings, these ‘tingles’ and ‘gnawings’. How might ‘tingles’ and ‘gnawings’ be mistakenly applied to Moods, and why are Moods, as Propensities, different to Occurrences? Moreover, why might someone who has ‘feelings’ in this second sense of ‘gnawings’ and ‘tingles’ and claims to be in a ‘Mood’ deserve our dubious glare? What separates these mistaken Moods from feelings? Why does Ryle think the title ‘feelings’ so improper?

Ryle writes

> Feelings . . . are *occurrences*, but the place that mention of them should take in descriptions of

human behavior is very different from that which the standard theories accord to it. Moods or frames of mind are, unlike motives, but like maladies and states of the weather, temporary conditions which in a certain way collect occurrences, but they are not themselves extra occurrences²⁰³.

Again, Ryle speaks of *Occurrences*, from the Propensities and Occurrences distinction, which I pointed out at the start of this section.

So, it seems, Moods can also contain collections of Occurrences but are themselves not Occurrences even though feelings are of course Occurrences. That much would make sense, since both Inclinations and Motives are Propensities. However, we still do not have an account of what feelings are. What exactly does he mean by ‘feelings’?

Ryle writes

> By 'feelings' I refer to the sorts of things which people often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows,

---

loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings and shocks. Ordinarily, when people report the occurrence of a feeling, they do so in a phrase like 'a throb of compassion', 'a shock of surprise' or 'a thrill of anticipation'.

At this point I will introduce my own piece of jargon because these little ‘throbs of compassion’ these ‘shocks of surprise’ and the ‘thrill of anticipation’ will be important to our account, and what, I shall argue, is haunting Ryle’s elaborate grammatical machinery. These are the ghosts in Ryle’s machine. The term I shall use is ‘flash-bangs’ for the veritable and genuine quality the term evinces of the feelings.

Flash-bangs are, if a definition is sought, Neo-Rylean semi-Linguistic Behavioural terms, that are in Original Rylean feelings proper as a subgenera of Occurrences, with specific structures that employ either bits of onomatopoeia left laying around from other linguistic phenomena, or fragmented bits of adjective connected either to a noun of emotion in the genitive case, or an emotional adjective functioning substantively.

---

204 Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 81.
205 Later I will be introducing Rylean sub-dialects. Neo-Rylean are the set of handles I use for these. Original Rylean is the Ryle in The Concept of Mind.
Flash-bangs are ‘semi’ Linguistic Behavioural terms in the developing description of Ryle’s Linguistic Behavioural methodology because they have a number of peculiar properties. The question of just how peculiar these properties are is part of the job of this thesis to determine. Just so the form of the argument being developed in this thesis is clear, later. I will attack this point from several fronts before I question Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourist distinction to show where it breaks down and how we can locate the Occult Stream of Phenomenology in Ryle. This is done by locating a point where he uses an Ordinary Language argument to justify or ground an argument that Ryle doesn’t have a Behavioural Linguistic analysis for. I am going to argue that this type of argument is found by locating an Ordinary Language argument without a Linguistic Behaviourist description attached and examining the basis on which it rests its distinction or point. In most cases it will be a ‘phenomenological’ argument. This customized mini-methodology I develop to draw out the ‘occult’ phenomenological content, and thereby cross classify the arguments Ryle uses in the Concept of Mind. I have called this mini-method ‘Ghostography’ because it reveals where all the ghosts haunting the work are hiding. We will see it in action.

Ryle writes

Feelings, in any strict sense, are things that come and go or wax and wane in a few seconds; they stab or they grumble; we feel them all over us or
else in a particular part. The victim may say that he keeps on having tweaks, or that they come only at fairly long intervals. No one would describe his happiness or discontentment in any such terms. He says that he feels happy or discontented, but not that he keeps on feeling, or that he steadily feels happy or discontented.206

So far, we can see that flash-bangs have a semi-episodic structure to them, but they also have this other part to them, this 'feely' bit, that is, we feel them like pin pricks. This of course, is part of the problem with a mere Behavioural Linguistic description of them because, as Ryle says;

It is an important linguistic fact that these names for specific feelings, such as 'itch', 'qualm' and 'pang' are also used as names of specific bodily sensations. If someone says that he has just felt a twinge, it is proper to ask whether it was a twinge of remorse or of rheumatism,

though the word 'twinge' is not necessarily being used in quite the same sense in the alternative contexts\textsuperscript{207}.

It is here that we move from a Linguistic Behaviorist claim to an Ordinary Language argument, because we are no longer describing linguistic behaviour in the claim but calling upon the user’s knowledge of common language.

Let us, in fact, consider the difference between ‘a glow of pride’ and a ‘glow of warmth’. How are the two forms in fact different? Are they different? What is the difference between feeling ‘warmth’ and feeling that sudden glow of ‘pride’? How would we tell the difference? One might, justifiably say that the difference is in the use of the expressions and although we can’t actually tell the difference from the way the language behaves because the two structures may in all other respects behave the same way, so we might still fall back on a common domain of language use. That is to say Ryle might claim that it depends on the common knowledge possessed by the average user of that language, and say ‘well he knows the difference’.

But suppose this isn’t enough. Suppose that our philosopher insists the following, ‘I know he knows the difference, but in your original project, you pointed out that he already knows how to use these concepts, but he doesn’t

\textsuperscript{207}Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 81.
know how to correlate them, and if your project is to be merit worthy, you also promised to give us a map that would show us how to correlate these differences. And the map must include this difference. If a map it is, it must be able to map it.’

‘Now’ such a philosopher might declare ‘where’s the map?’

And indeed this is a problem for Ryle because the very way out of this problem of the difference between glows of pride and glows of warmth, he’s cut himself off from because he has disavowed consciousness and introspective reflection. If one tried to answer ‘well pride feels this way, and warmth feels that way’ and he might accompany this difference by standing our intrepid philosopher next to the fire, and then showing the philosopher a picture of a woman holding a baby. But is this enough, or does he need the stubborn philosopher to participate in the distinction in some way? Does he need the philosopher to ‘feel’ these differences? Indeed, he does. The only way one can tell the difference is by the exact thing Ryle is arguing against. One must ‘feel’ the difference.

What exactly is it that one ‘feels’?

If we all know what a glow of pride or a glow of warmth is and we can relate to them, then what exactly is it that is going on in that act of relation? Do we have to stop, take a non-sensory look inside of ourselves, and find that difference? Is this some sort of act of ‘introspection’ perhaps? It is here that we enter into the third domain of Ryle’s arguments, the surreptitiously hidden
Occult Strain of Phenomenology running through Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments.
Chapter Seven

Chalmers, Judgements and Phenomenal Zombies.

One of the most insightful and important philosophers working in contemporary philosophy of mind today is David Chalmers\textsuperscript{208}. In \textit{The Conscious Mind}, Chalmers defines Consciousness and Judgements in relation to each other.

He writes

Alongside every conscious experience there is a content-bearing cognitive state. This cognitive state is what I am calling a first-order judgement\textsuperscript{209}.


\textsuperscript{209} Chalmers, David. \textit{The Conscious Mind}. London Oxford University Press, 1996. Pg 175. Note, where he has used the term judgements in his own writings which I quote, I have retained his use of lower-case j, however when I use his terminology, and not Kant and Brandom’s doctrines of judgement, I use an uppercase J.
Phenomenal zombies as Chalmers explains them lack the ‘conscious’ part of their cognizance but they are in full possession of the cognitive-content-bearing state. So, for instance a phenomenal zombie might be able to detect that a patch of colour is red, and the zombie may be able to judge that it is red, but the phenomenal zombie would not be able to have a ‘red experience’. We might understand this better if we imagined some sort of device that can detect a specific wave-length of light that passes in front of its lens, but it does not have an experience of the rich and vibrant shade of red that we see.

What is important to this unfolding thread of argumentation in this thesis about Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie is the claim that the zombie has the same Judgements as David Chalmers. What Chalmers means by this is that the zombie does not have ‘experiences’ but Chalmers thinks that it is still able to form the same Judgements as him. For Chalmers Judgments are Beliefs stripped of all of their phenomenal properties\textsuperscript{210}. Phenomenal properties are experiences of colours, tastes, smells. A phenomenal zombie might be able to detect garlic in the sauce but it would not have the experience of smelling or tasting the garlic. Nonetheless he affirms that the phenomenal zombie would have exactly the same corresponding Judgements. It will be this that I will be bringing into question.

Chalmers writes:

As I am using the term, I think it is natural to say that my zombie twin judges that he has conscious experience, and that his judgements in that vicinity correspond one-to-one with my mine.\footnote{David Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind}, 1996, pg 174.}

Chalmers’ argument is interesting and no doubt a valuable addition to the Philosophy of Mind. One of the difficulties I’ve have with Chalmers’ argument involves the notion of phenomenal zombies and applying the notion of ‘flash-bangs’ I introduced in the section immediately prior. I do not think Chalmers’ zombie has enough semantics to tell the difference between a flash of joy and a flash of anger. I think that pursuing this thread leads to a refutation of Chalmers’ claim that both he and the zombie have one for one, the exact same Judgements\footnote{I adopt Chalmers term Judgements but reject his ‘Three Orders of Judgement’ for Sellarian reasons that have to do with the pseudo-subjunctive-conditional structure of fact-w itholding assent by members of a linguistic community. See the footnotes to Wittgenstein’s \textit{Account of Language Acquisition in the Philosophical Investigations} in \textit{Chapter Eighteen} of this thesis for more discussion on this point.} even though the zombie does not have the phenomenal component in its thoughts. For while I might be able to envisage a zombie or a device like a phenomenal zombie that can detect a ‘flash of red’, I find it difficult to imagine a phenomenal zombie that can detect and then discriminate a ‘flash of anger’ or a ‘pang of regret’ without feeling the anger or the pang of regret. The
reason why is that neither context, nor linguistic behaviour can offer the grounds to do so.

Chalmers writes

Judgements can perhaps be understood as what I and my zombie twin have in common. My zombie twin does not have any conscious experience, but he claims that he does; at least, his detailed verbal reports sound the same as my own.\footnote{David Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind}, 1996, pg 174.}

The trouble I have with Chalmers’ claim, and which I argue leads to a refutation later in the thesis\footnote{See Chapter Ten: Neuroscience and the Identity of Emotional States in this thesis.}, begins with the ‘detailed verbal report’ the phenomenal zombie gives. If we return to the problem with Ryle’s ‘flash-bangs’ then there arises a questions about where does the zombie get the semantics to tell the difference between a ‘flash of sadness’ and a ‘flash of anger’. It might, I concede, be able to judge the difference between a ‘flash of light’ and a ‘flash of heat’ without recourse to a conscious experience. But without conscious experience of what a ‘flash of anger’ is, how does the zombie get the resources for the semantic knowledge to tell the difference between flashes of ‘anger’ and ‘sadness’?

There are different types of anger to be sure.
The type of anger I am thinking of right now is what might begin as a heavy feeling in the gut. We might call it ‘gut anger’. Gut anger for me starts heavy then passes through me in a flash. It has something like a physical internal sensation all of its own. I have found myself using the phrase ‘sick to my stomach’ in conjunction with the start of it. It is a unique and specific type of anger with a specific character to the way it feels. Without that internal feeling, that ‘flash’ one unmistakably feels passing through them, it is difficult to know what a ‘flash of anger’ actually is. The semantics for the meaning of the word are intimately related to my own experiences of what such a ‘flash’ feels like. Envy feels different to a flash of ‘gut anger’. To me they both feel distinctly different to what I would describe as sadness.

Without those feelings it is puzzling where the phenomenal zombie gets its understanding to tell the difference between the ‘flashes’ in order to make its verbal reports about how it feels?

I put the following forward in this thesis. While Chalmers might be able to get his phenomenal zombies to form Judgements about cognitive states concerning the detection of publicly observable sensory objects like ‘red’ and ‘hard’, or temperature, through covariance with the environment like Price’s Thermostat, the trouble I have is with the ‘non-optical’ introspective sensory qualities of emotions, ‘feelings proper’ or ‘flash-bangs’ and the verbal reports the zombie might offer about its emotions. Quite simply I think that the zombie does not have the semantic understanding to make the same meaningful statements
about ‘flashes of anger’ or ‘flashes of envy’ that humans can make. I think it can not do so, firstly, because it can not develop semantic language competence for these statements, and secondly, because it simply can not feel them. It is a phenomenal zombie. By definition it can not have ‘flash-bang’ experiences.

However, before I can demonstrate that point at length, we need to examine Ryle’s arguments on language and thought, even deeper because they will reveal a fatal flaw in attempts to reduce all thought to mere language and why language is insufficient for covering all of the facts in a domain of mind. These will not be new or exotic facts, but rather facts drawn from Ryle’s own philosophical arguments. To do so we need to clear up a few facts about Ryle, and correct some common tendencies in historical misreadings. It is to this that we will now turn in the next chapter.
Part Two
*Introspection, Retrospection, Consciousness and the Log Keeper of the mind*

Chapter Eight

*Introspection*

I

*Was Ryle a Behaviourist? If so which Ryle and which type of Behaviourist?*

As David Armstrong points out, one of the most puzzling aspects of *The Concept of Mind* is Ryle’s position on introspection and consciousness.

Armstrong writes

As a physicalist I originally thought, when young, that Gilbert Ryle’s *Concept of Mind*, read as a sophisticated behaviourism, might do the trick for the mind. I was always troubled, though, by the apparent denial of introspection. Ayer’s clever
remark that a behaviourist must pretend to be anaesthetized struck home.\textsuperscript{215}

Indeed G. E. Myers in his taxonomy of Rylean Behaviourism and Rylean Behaviourists, echoed by David Chalmers, tends to think that the significance of a ‘behaviouristic’\textsuperscript{216} move in psychology which they see Ryle as making is to disengage from introspection, consciousness and introspective states while offering an account of mind\textsuperscript{217}. But just because Ryle is attacking historical doctrines of phenomenal consciousness does not make him a Behaviourist. I think this is where many misreadings of Ryle begin, for while Ryle does attack historical notions of consciousness\textsuperscript{218}, Ryle also attacks and critiques Behaviourism as being part of a Stoic-Hobbist tradition that commits itself to the ‘Bogey of Mechanism’ and seeks to provide a ‘volitional account’ of human behaviour.

Sellars’ position on Ryle is more informative. Sellars’ reading of Ryle focuses on (i) the ‘log keeper’ cognitive function in Ryle’s notion of retrospection, and (ii) various species of Ryle’s ‘mindologue’ along with the findings from Ryle’s Linguistic Behavioral Analysis, the most important of which, for Sellars, are


\textsuperscript{216}Not in these sense I use it, in the more general sense like G. E. Myers defines it. See the footnote immediately below.


Ryle’s ‘achievement verbs’. Sellars uses the term ‘in foro interno’ to refer to the mental narrator in our inner thoughts, which I take to equate with Ryle’s ‘log keeper’ role and certain species of ‘mindologue’\textsuperscript{219}. Here we find that Sellars has picked up on Ryle’s argument about language not referring to thoughts, but rather (just as Ryle argues that thought can be treated as language within the domain of a philosophy of mind), Sellars argues that thoughts can be treated as analogous to language in the fledgling stages of the Scientific Image of Man. However, Sellars’ position is not that of Ryle’s. The fledgling stages of the Scientific Image of Man occur, in Sellars’ Developmental Anthropo-Epistemology, when the newly emergent Scientific Image of the World clashes with the older inherited Manifest Image of Man. The use of language as a medium for capturing thought is merely a convenient stage in Sellars Developmental Anthropo-Epistemology. Sellars think the fledgling neurosciences will eventually surpass common language ascriptions of thought in a body of neurological and scientific knowledge. Sellars is pro-Ryle, but only until a proper neuroscientific project gets off the ground. Ryle is merely a stage in Sellars’ big picture.

Sellars thinks that a Rylean language can avoid paradoxes that arise from introspection by starting with a theory about the social conditions under which public meaning can become expressible as part of the linguistic practices of a

community and the development of language. Sellars’ ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory’ of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* focuses on the way in which Observation Languages, which contain certain features of natural language, like similes and metaphorical descriptions, become Report Languages which are capable of carrying the full epistemic authority of factual statements. Sellars sees the point of a Rylean Behaviourist language not as a denial that consciousness takes place, but as part of a developmental stage in his ‘Socio-Linguistic theory of language’ and critical for explaining what Sellars sees as linguistic processes underlying the creation of knowledge. Sellars thinks Ryle can provide the grounds for a stage in a theory about how language impressions and ideas develop as theoretical entities into a rich vocabulary that is able to explain human thought. The picture that emerges is one in which Sellars sees Ryle as part of a developmental story that entails a type of behaviourism which we characterized and filled out with caveats and insights from Gleeson, as ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ in the Introduction.

---

220 Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997 see pp 87 – 88 for Sellars account of ‘private reports’ which Sellars argues a Rylean language cannot posses. I agree with Sellars, Ryle, from a Linguistic Behaviourist perspective cannot argue for ‘private episodes’ in the sense of the phenomenological distinction in the Reader/Witness argument, or the Remember-How/Remember-When distinction although ‘Original Ryle’ does. Seen from this angle, my strategy is to focus on the inconsistency between Sellars reading and the arguments that actually occur in Original Ryle to bring out these phenomenological elements and exploit them as resources for an argument for a return to a Pre-Fregeian Psychologism.

221 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, (various editions). Section 34.

Ryle’s own position on Historically Situated Psychological Behaviourism is perhaps a little more cryptic because it changes between *The Concept of Mind*\(^{223}\), where Ryle thinks it is mistaken, but is also positively disposed towards the possibilities of its discoveries, and later in *On Thinking*, where he rejects it\(^{224}\). But even in his earlier positive phase, there is a highly critical element in his interpretation of what a Psychological Behaviourist approach entails. While critical, this earlier criticism is different to what emerges later in his negative account of Psychological Behaviourism in *On Thinking*.

In *The Concept of Mind* Ryle thinks that what is positive in strands of Historically Situated Psychological Behaviourism like Skinner’s and Watson’s is the rejection of what he holds as the “Two World’s Myth’ and the Cartesian notion that the mind is its own place. What he sees as the positive side of the Psychological Behaviourist notion is that it challenges accounts of psychology that rely on the assumption there is a mysterious inner world separate from the everyday world people live in. Ryle thinks that the place the mind happens is the world. He thinks that the mind of the Rugby Union player is not inside his head, it is on the football field. Likewise, the mind of the Judoka is out on the mat throwing his opponents.

Ryle writes in *The Concept of Mind*

The Behaviourists’ methodological program has been of revolutionary importance to the program of psychology. But more, it has been one of the main sources of the philosophical suspicion that the two-worlds story is a myth\textsuperscript{225}.

This is Ryle’s positive view of Historically Situated Behaviourism in *The Concept of Mind*. However, Ryle also sees a negative tendency in Historically Situated Psychological Behaviourist accounts to collapse into a kind of ‘mechanist’ view of human behaviour, akin to the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ where the Psychological Behaviourist engaged in research searches for causal factors of human behaviour\textsuperscript{226}. Ryle thinks this is a methodological fault in their research. Ryle sees this fault built into the methodological research project of Psychological Behaviourism in general and he thinks this causes it to veer off into the cluster of category mistakes and problematic language constructs that Ryle sees as making up ‘The Bogey of Mechanism’ he argues fervently against in *The Concept of Mind*\textsuperscript{227}. This is the same type of mistake that Ryle finds in Augustine and the Stoics. He sees Augustine and the Stoics as the start of a

\textsuperscript{225} Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983. Pg 310.
\textsuperscript{226} Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1983, pp 308 – 311..
historically situated strand of philosophical thinking that tries to explain human behaviour using ‘volitions’. This tendency to mechanize human behaviour, which he thinks derives from borrowing concepts about scientific causality, originates in Aristotle’s models of causation. It is this which lies behind the critical and negative side of Ryle’s reception of the historical schools of Psychological Behaviourist Theories in his earlier phase of The Concept of Mind. He thinks Augustine and the Stoics are the ancient part of a thread that develops into the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ during the Enlightenment and that the Behaviourists have picked up a version of this category mistake from Thomas Hobbes.

Indeed, he calls this methodological tendency to view human action in causal mechanistic terms a ‘Hobbist view’ of human behaviour when it is applied by Historical Behaviouristic Schools to a research agenda. Thomas Hobbes is of course famous for the view that thinking is but a motion of limbs and here Ryle thinks historical schools of Psychological Behaviourists like those started by Pavlov, Thorndike and Watson, are mistakenly searching for what causes those limbs to move to give an account of the mind.

In describing this tendency of the Psychological Behaviourist to veer towards Hobbesian Mechanism, Ryle writes in The Concept of Mind

---

It is a matter of relatively slight importance that the champions of this methodological principle have tended to espouse as well a kind of Hobbist theory, and even to imagine that the truth of mechanism is entailed by the truth of their theory of scientific research method in psychology.\textsuperscript{230}

Ryle’s view of Psychological Behaviourism changes in his much later work \textit{On Thinking}. As I pointed out earlier, in \textit{The Concept of Mind} Ryle rejects the notion that all the types of thinking that accompany the execution of the sets of verbs in the family of dispositions which he identifies as ‘Capacity Dispositions’ are essentially linguistic in character. For instance, Ryle rejects the notion that untangling a skein of wool involved thinking only in words\textsuperscript{231}. Ryle thought that a demonstration of competence did not necessitate or automatically entail the ability to state that knowledge in propositional forms which need-be encoded into sentences, or that internalized linguistic thought was necessary to accompany the execution of skills. In \textit{The Concept of Mind} Ryle’s thesis is that the everyday language that ordinary people use has a special authority in claims about the mind within the Philosophy of Mind. It has this authority, Ryle thinks, because this is the language that people think in. This focus on language

\textsuperscript{230} Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind}, 1983, pp 308 – 311. \\
\textsuperscript{231} Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983, Pg 266.
leads Ryle to reject consciousness and see it merely as a historically constructed notion within the larger picture he paints of specialized disciplines using their vocabularies to muddle Ordinary Language Discourse. Ryle replaces ‘introspection’ with ‘retrospection’ which uses what he describes as a log keeper account of the mind. The evidence for the existence of this ‘log keeper of retrospection’, Ryle points out, is if you ask someone what they are thinking about, they have no trouble telling you\textsuperscript{232}.

The foundation for the distinction between the types of dispositions which use language in their thinking, and those that do not can be found in his rejection of introspection and his assertion that introspection takes a ‘non-optical’ look at the contents of thoughts. Ryle thinks that the facts relevant to the domain, which most classical theorists of mind like Descartes and Locke thought could be established by introspection, Ryle thinks could be much better covered by retrospection and his ‘log keeper’ account. Ryle thinks classical thinkers of mind were mistaken in focussing their efforts on private experience, rather than focusing on language.

In \textit{On Thinking} Ryle develops a thesis with a very different focus to a historical critique of the concept of the mind in philosophy and the sciences. There he takes on the task of developing an ‘alphabet of thought’ based on the adverbs of manner\textsuperscript{233} which contain the inheritance conditions of the capacity

\textsuperscript{232} See \textit{Chapter Ten, Ryle’s Log Keeper of the Mind}, in this thesis.
verbs. These are the same kinds of capacity verbs which he identifies and originally talks about in The Concept of Mind. In On Thinking he also rejects the sweeping statement that all thinking is a form of talking to one’s self, and the related claim that all thought is language. Quantifiably this is the same thesis he presents in The Concept of Mind. (i.e. (∃x) (Lx . Tx) where L is language and T is thought). But in On Thinking he expands on his original discussion of capacity verbs, and explores relationships between adverbs of manner. In both works he maintains that some thinking is done in language, but not all. Where he changes is in the emphasis Ryle places on the strength of what that ‘some thinking’ entails.

The Concept of Mind, however, maintains a much stronger and philosophically novel view than On Thinking because it deals with the authority of Ordinary Language within the Philosophy of Mind. Earlier Ryle bases the authority of language analysis and the claim it can unravel the mysteries of mind, on refuting views about introspection, consciousness, feelings, sensations, motives, memories and so on made by other philosophers. The earlier Ryle is concerned with sketching a map made up from the families of Tendency Dispositons, Propensities, Occurrences, Moods, Motives, Commotions,

---

235 I mean specifically here, Ryle argues in The Concept of Mind (∃x) (Lx . Tx), some types of thinking is language. In On Thinking he argues (∃x) (Lx . Tx), some thinking is language. The doctrine that changes is what Ryle thinks the mind is. The categorical mistake is to equate all of thinking with the doctrine of mind offered by classical theorists since the Stoics.
Inclinations and ‘Feelings proper’. Earlier Ryle of *The Concept of Mind* uses his map and families of words to explain away the facts a theory of mind normally covers inclusive of an account that does away with the need to explain consciousness and doctrines about reflection, amphibolies, perceptibility, impressions, passions and introspection. *The Concept of Mind* maintains that Ordinary Language has a special type of authority in the philosophy of mind because this is the language people think in\(^{237}\). If this is so then it makes an anti-psychologistic project tenable. However, pace Ryle, I will argue, of course, that it is not\(^{238}\).

What differs between Ryle’s two works is that the emphasis on language to explain the mind in his account in *On Thinking* is not strong enough to support his earlier claims about the authority of Ordinary Language in *The Concept of Mind*. *On Thinking* focuses on skills, methods, abilities and, in particular, the Capacity Dispositions. It is my view that a theory that tried to reduce an account of skills and capacities to language would reduce the domain of those skills and capacities to instances of the mere expression of language which is plainly ridiculous. Such a theory would only make sense if people lived

\(^{237}\) What Ryle means by that can be found specifically in the argument that he can replace introspection with a log keeper account of the mind. Why this is important is because if Ryle is right he can cover all of the facts in the domain of a theory of mind about consciousness and introspection with a language-based account of the mind. He can use an Occam’s Razor to slice off the need for an account of consciousness and simply use his unique language analysis of the common spoken word to cover all the facts covered in traditional and classical theories about the mind.

\(^{238}\) See both the *Introduction* to this paper, and the *Conclusion and Afterword*. 
in internet chatrooms, inhabited books or everything one did had to be represented in language, to get done. I call this the Gumby view of the mind, and Ryle rejects it. Gumby was a fictional character in children’s entertainment, who could live inside the language of books and go on adventures. Ryle maintains a similar rejection to the Gumby argument that all thought must be language-based in *The Concept of Mind*, except there he argues that people can talk about the Capacity Dispositions, using adverbs of manner. However, while he thinks adverbs of manner like ‘carefully’ can identify capacity verbs, he also thinks it is not necessary to be thinking in verbiage while completing capacity tasks\(^{239}\)

Where the emphasis changes is that *On Thinking* does not attempt to replace historical doctrines about consciousness and the mind with an analysis of language. He has dropped the argument that he can replace the philosophy of mind, and a need for an account of consciousness with a philosophy of language. He has shifted from the family of Motive, Belief, Inclination, Propensities, Occurrences and Moods in his ‘map’ which he thought could replace a philosophy of mind, to examination of the other major family he touches on in his earlier work. *On Thinking* is chiefly concerned with developing a philosophy of the Capacity Dispositions. This is why it is so important to go back and correct Weitz’s mistake about Ryle and see that there is not one uniform type of disposition, but, in fact, there are many different dispositional types in Ryle.

\(^{239}\) Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983, Pg 266.
These different dispositional types are what lay behind Ryle’s why/how distinction. Ryle’s argument is that beliefs and motives are ‘that-clauses’ whereas skills answer how-clauses. This is also part of the body of the Linguistic Behavioural Arguments Ryle uses to separate the family of Motives, Inclinations and Beliefs he identifies, from the family verbs making up the Skill and Capacity Dispositions. The Skills and Capacity Dispositions are what concerns the later Ryle in *On Thinking*. At both stages of his development he does not think the Skills and Capacities are all reducible to linguistic expressions or that people are necessarily thinking in language while performing them. However, his thesis about how much of the mind can be explained away by language-analysis does change with his new focus on adverbs of manner for capacity verbs.

Along with his shift to adverbs of manner for capacity verbs in his *On Thinking* stage he also has a much weaker version of the thesis that *some* types of thinking are done in language. Accompanying this there is a shift in his view of what Behaviourism and Cartesian claims are based on, and a newer refined negative critique he develops of them from the adverbial descriptions of the verbs belonging to the Capacity Dispositions he is studying in *On Thinking*. What he is attacking are what he sees as Cartesian and Behaviourist versions of the view that all thinking is done as a type of language. His ‘adverse account’ of Behaviourism in *On Thinking* becomes the argument that Behaviourism tries to
reduce all of thinking to audible forms of soliloquizing or internal narration\textsuperscript{240}. His adverse account of the Cartesian mistake in \textit{On Thinking} is that it treats all types of thinking as an internal duplicate of language\textsuperscript{241}.

In both cases his criticism of Cartesian and Psychological Behaviourism changes from that in \textit{The Concept of Mind} to the one he offers in \textit{On Thinking}. In \textit{The Concept of Mind}, of course, he thought the mistake with the historical forms of Psychological Behaviourism budding in his era\textsuperscript{242}, was the tendency towards a causal mechanism he characterized as ‘Hobbist’, while the Cartesian mistake he also argues in the earlier work, \textit{The Concept of Mind}, was a series of blunders that led to viewing the mind as its own place. For the purposes of developing the thesis we are not interested with Ryle’s later work of \textit{On Thinking} because the adverbial account he develops for an ‘alphabet of thinking’ is not strong enough to support what is most novel in Ryle, which is the argument for an Ordinary Language Account of the Mind which can do away with the need for both theories of introspection and an account of consciousness. At this point it is well to recall, now, that the specific reason we are interested in Ryle’s account in \textit{The Concept of Mind} is that it offered psychologists a way out of the Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference which plagues statements, theories, surveys and collection of data in the disciplines of mind.

\textsuperscript{242} I.e. Pavlov, Thorndike, Watson &c.
There are other changes in *On Thinking*, and some incongruence in some of his statements that make *On Thinking* problematic for drawing material to support his earlier work. For these reasons this paper concentrates on his earlier work in *The Concept of Mind*.

I think that getting Ryle’s views on ‘psychological behaviourism’ ‘consciousness’ and ‘introspection’ (which have confused or puzzled many important philosophers as David Armstrong, himself admits), untangled is important scholarly work because it makes Ryle’s position clearer and secures many of his insights as accessible for future work. What I want to do, briefly, now is draw out exactly what Ryle means by ‘introspection’ and ‘consciousness’ in *The Concept of Mind* in as quickly, shrewdly and accurately a way as possible because interpreting what Ryle meant by ‘introspection’ and ‘consciousness’ has become a bit of a muddle in many contradictory accounts of what Ryle’s significance was, and as Armstrong admits, it has bothered many philosophers for several decades now.
Chapter Nine

Sea Water, Consciousness and Introspection. Gilbert Ryle on Mindfulness.

The account of Ryle’s position on ‘introspection’ I offer will be limited to that presented in *The Concept of Mind* and shall avoid confusing this with views in his other major works and papers. What makes Ryle’s arguments even more confusing than one might anticipate is the ‘Occult Strain of Phenomenological Argumentation’ hidden in the work itself. On the one hand, Ryle argues against introspective acts of consciousness but on the other hand he has an account of the mind’s eye which, as we will see, requires introspection of exactly the ‘non-sensory’ and ‘non-optical’ kind, the same kind that Ryle argues does not exist.

Understanding what is wrong with Ryle’s attack on introspection involves understanding the nature of the attack, which has two stages, and then contrasting this with some of his other arguments from *The Concept of Mind* that seem to require these very same introspective acts he eschews.

For the first stage of his attack on introspection Ryle argues that introspection is a theoretical and technical term introduced by art.

---

'Introspection' is a term of art and one for which little use is found in the self-descriptions of untheoretical people.\textsuperscript{245}. 

Ryle argues ‘introspective’ is used as an adjective for the type of person who pays more heed than usual to problems regarding ‘his own character, abilities, deficiencies and oddities’\textsuperscript{246}. This also fits in with one of the uses he allows for the term ‘self conscious’ which we will explore in a moment\textsuperscript{247}. However here “introspective” is being used in a dispositional sense as a personality trait much like an Inclination or a Tendency.

Ryle does not allow ‘introspective’ as an adjective to describe phenomenal properties of types of experience. He would reject the term ‘the introspective qualitative aspect of consciousness’ and dogmatically deny that phenomenal aspects of consciousness have introspectible qualities. This leads to the second stage of his attack. The second stage of Ryle’s strategy is to attack what I term ‘introspective scrutiny’.

\textsuperscript{245}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 156.
\textsuperscript{246}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg156.
\textsuperscript{247}See ‘the Species of Mindologue’ in the next subsection.
Ryle writes

(1)ntrospection is described as being unlike sense
observation in important respects. Things looked
at, or listened to, are public objects, in principle
observable by any suitably placed observer,
whereas only the owner of a mental state or
process is supposed to be able introspectively to
scrutinise it.\textsuperscript{248}

The difference here is that

Sense perception, again, involves the functioning
of bodily organs, such as the eyes, the ears, or the
tongue, whereas introspection involves the
functioning of no bodily organ\textsuperscript{249}.

There is a problem here in what Ryle is trying to do. The problem runs through *The Concept of Mind*, and once one has seen the cause of the problem, it immediately arises like a fault-line in the geological strata of his argumentation.

On the one hand Ryle argues against introspective scrutiny, in favour of the view that we can understand the mind using language. He thinks that consciousness is a false doctrine that arose from the Protestant Reformation, and that the notion of introspection is, likewise a mistake. He thinks it is mistaken because thought is not like sea water. For Ryle the types of thought that is normally discussed by theorists of mind as introspection, consciousness, conscience and contemplation are accessibly linguistic, and thought is language either in silent soliloquy (*in sotto voce* is Sellars’ term for Ryle’s doctrine of thinking in language), or spoken aloud in which case Ryle thinks it is clearly communicable since people are able to understand each others’ emotions, feelings and motives in the everyday world. Ryle’s argument why such is so, is that if you ask someone what they are thinking they can tell you. Moreover, when they tell you what they are thinking it is in simple and plain words and not the languages of Freudian fixations, Carl Rogers personal development or Blooms taxonomy. He argues that one person does not need special training or knowledge to understand the thoughts of another person when they ask them what they are thinking. Ryle thinks it is only when people utilize highly abstract academic languages about the mind that confusions arise over what the terms mean and refer to. What we think of as ‘consciousness’ Ryle typically thinks is a
mistake that has crept into our language from historical periods. For Ryle ‘consciousness’ is either ‘awareness’ of objects, the loss of sensation in some part of the body (I lost consciousness from the knee down), or noticing something different or new, (I was conscious the furniture had been changed.) Moreover, Ryle makes a further interesting claim which creates challenges for the Naïve Psycho-Realist. He thinks there are no hidden organs of introspection or consciousness in the mind. The evidence for this, Ryle thinks, is the fact that when asked to perform an act of perception or introspection, to introspect upon consciousness, or to talk about conscious perception, people can not do so without reference to some external object or to a bodily organ. Prima facie this seems like a good argument. One struggles to find talk of the ID or the enantiodromic pathways in everyday talk to analyze, but plenty of discussion of noticing a change in a room’s furniture or becoming conscious of an itching sensation on the nape of a neck.

On the other hand, however, Ryle uses arguments himself that rest their appeal upon hidden acts involving what it is natural to describe as introspective scrutiny. You could say that Ryle shoots himself in the foot, because many of the arguments buried in The Concept of Mind contain counter-examples to his leading arguments once one has sat down, and spent some considerable time reflecting on them. For instance, Ryle’s argument that ‘seeing’ involves visualization and seeing involves perception depends on an act of introspectable discrimination, which in turn requires the ability to differentiate between the
phenomenal aspects of consciousness involved in sense perception and visualization\textsuperscript{250}. This is a distinction so fine, Ryle thinks, that Hume was unable to discern it.

Ryle writes

To see is one thing; to picture or visualise is another. A person can see things, only when his eyes are open, and when his surroundings are illuminated; but he can have pictures in his mind's eye, when his eyes are shut and when the world is dark. Similarly, he can hear music only in situations in which other people could also hear it; but a tune can run in his head, when his neighbour can hear no music at all\textsuperscript{251}.

In particular, he needs these two senses of see and ‘see’ as well as hear and ‘hear’ to differentiate between two uses of the term ‘lively’ for which, he thinks, Hume was mistaken.

\textsuperscript{250}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 257 NB. This is the account of the ‘mind’s eye’ which I also mentioned in the introduction.

Ryle writes

Hume's attempt to distinguish between ideas and impressions by saying that the latter tend to be more lively than the former was one of two bad mistakes. Suppose, first, that 'lively' means 'vivid'. A person may picture vividly, but he cannot see vividly. One 'idea' may be more vivid than another 'idea', but impressions cannot be described as vivid at all, just as one doll can be more lifelike than another, but a baby cannot be lifelike or unlifelike. To say that the difference between babies and dolls is that babies are more lifelike than dolls is an obvious absurdity. . . . Alternatively, if Hume was using 'vivid' to mean not 'lifelike' but 'intense', 'acute' or 'strong', then he was mistaken in the other direction; since, while sensations can be compared with other sensations as relatively
intense, acute or strong, they cannot be so
compared with images$^{252}$.

Moreover Ryle writes

> When I fancy I am hearing a very loud noise, I
> am not really hearing either a loud or a faint
> noise; I am not having a mild auditory sensation,
as I am not having an auditory sensation at all,
though I am fancying that I am having an
intense one. An imagined shriek is not ear-
splitting, nor yet is it a soothing murmur, and an
imagined shriek is neither louder nor fainter
than a heard murmur. It neither drowns it nor is
drowned by it.

For Ryle sensations are not like images, and imaged or visualized things are not
like things one sees. An imagined or fancied sound is not like a heard shriek. To see
and ‘see’ and hear and ‘hear’ are different things. He needs something like a
theory of introspection of exactly the kind he eschews to differentiate between

---

the qualitative features and aspects of the phenomenal properties in either case and draw a qualitative difference between them. If he tries to base the difference between perceptual seeing and visualizational ‘seeing’ on the fact that one can do the latter while his eyes are closed he is going to run into problems with (a) the non-sensory element of visualization, that is, because no sense organ is being used while the eyes are closed and (b) which as Ryle admits the difference between the two types of ‘seeing’ can also be experienced while the eyes are open. Likewise hearing and ‘hearing’ requires one to take stock of differing introspective qualities between the two acts to fully appreciate the distinction. Surely one can visualize while one’s eyes are open or ‘hear’ a tune which someone else cannot without stopping up the ears. What Ryle needs is exactly what he eschews, that is Ryle needs a theory of ‘introspection’ as a process that ‘involves the functioning of no bodily organ’ to uphold this difference.

Indeed this is what I suspect has puzzled many philosophers because many of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments use introspective scrutiny and rely on an examination of different types of consciousness. These arguments will provide the key for the overall argument of this thesis and provide material for identifying the surreptiously hidden ‘phenomenal source’ behind many of Ryle’s arguments.
Chapter Ten

Ryle’s Log Keeper of the Mind.

Ryle posits a sort of log-keeper internal mechanism to replace the notion of introspection. This log keeper internal mechanism keeps a log of events and is responsible for a type of status report that can report events, activities and actions\(^{253}\).

Ryle writes

> It is certainly true that when I do, feel or witness something, I usually could and frequently do pay swift retrospective heed to what I have just done, felt or witnessed. I keep, much of the time, some sort of log or score of what occupies me, in such a way that, if asked what I had just been hearing

or picturing or saying, I could usually give a correct answer.\textsuperscript{254}

This last distinction is in line with a specific argumentative move that Ryle calls ‘being alive to what one is doing’. The argument here is that the person must be able to report their actions or thoughts in a verbal manner. Ryle thinks that if a person cannot or does not report the presence of a mental phenomena like that of Augustinian ‘volitions’, Humeian ‘passions’ or Freudian ‘castration fears’ as part of ‘being alive to what they are doing’ or as a status report for an activity like reciting ‘Little Miss Muffet’ backwards, then such terms and theoretical concepts are not applicable to an account of the nature of mind. This view is what underlies his argument for an implicit criterion like we investigated earlier in the chapter on Dummett\textsuperscript{255}. For Ryle the person needs to be able to

\textsuperscript{254}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 152. Also see Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind}, 1996. Pg 28, where Chalmers distinguishes phenomenal consciousness, consciousness, access consciousness and reportability which parallel the above distinction in Ryle. Specifically, what Ryle is describing parallels what is defined by Chalmers as ‘access consciousness’. ‘Access consciousness’ is a state in which the content of consciousness is poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, rational control of action and rational control of speech. My strategy is to focus on anological constructs that arise from what I claim is a pre-linguistic position accessible from the direct first personal perspective, and codified with the third person perspective when it enters into a language ‘role’. This insight depends on developing the argument from ‘flash-bangs’. That argument won’t make complete sense until the end of the thesis. Suffice to say, the linguistic codification of ‘access consciousness’ implicates, from the position argued by the end of this thesis, a third personal perspective. I will point out how the pieces fit together in the footnotes as we go along. See also Tim Bayne & David Chalmers. ‘What Is the Unity of Consciousness.’ In \textit{The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation} edited by Chris Frith Axel Cleeremans. Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012 @ http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198508571.001.0001/acprof-9780198508571 downloaded 05/06/2012: Oxford, 2003. Section 3, for Bayne and Chalmers’ discussion of Access Unity and Phenomenal Unity.

\textsuperscript{255}See \textit{The Primacy of The Sentence and Propositional Thought}, in this thesis.
communicate their thoughts because they think in language. Ryle and Dummett hold that language is the very medium of thoughts. For Ryle and Dummett language is not a code that thoughts are put into in order to transmit them. If every day people have no words in their ordinary everyday idiom to match the neologismistic speculations of the psychologist or philosopher then Ryle thinks such speculation has no place in an account of the mind.

The trouble facing Ryle for the ‘log-keeper role’ in his account of ‘retrospection’ is that he does not have the Behavioural Linguistic support for his own arguments. Like the question of whether a phenomenal zombie can make content-bearing Judgments without the ability to introspect on the phenomenal qualities of those Judgements, we may ask where Ryle’s log keeper gets the understanding to tell the difference between flashes of envy, sadness and anger if they do not have the conscious experiences to reflect on. If a log-keeper of the mind does not have the conscious capacity to distinguish between a ‘glow-of-pride’ and a ‘glow-of-joy’ because it cannot reflect on the way those emotions make them feel, how does it get the capacity to differentially articulate the way someone is feeling to retrospectively keep a log of it? The difference cannot be situational in the way that a person can make a report in the presence of a publicly observable object in standard conditions, and that report can be endorsed or rejected according to the standards of the community, like a Sellarsian Object Report Language. For people feel a multitude of different emotions in the same situation and the same publicly observable conditions. The
same ‘stimulus’ given in standard conditions can evoke anger, fear, disgust, envy, sadness or anxiety. The report given for the way something makes someone feel does not depend upon a correct interpretation of the stimulus according to the standard conditions endorsed by the linguistic community. Rather it depends upon the person’s reaction which is not publicly observable and accepted within the standard conditions interpreted by that community.

Without the ability to introspect it is very difficult to see where the internal narrator of the log keeper gets the understanding to talk about ‘flashes of grief’ and ‘flashes of anger’, and be able to differentiate between the ways they feel, in order to offer a Rylean retrospective account of the way something made them feel?
Chapter Eleven

The Three Examples of what you cannot do with language alone.

Ryle has more facts than he can cover in his theory of mind. That is, Ryle’s own arguments produce more facts than his language-based theory of mind can offer us the semantics for. These are not new or exotic facts, imported from another philosopher. They are facts which arise from Ryle’s own arguments. They arise from his occult phenomenology.

I am going to focus on three specific examples that go beyond his ability to offer an account using Linguistic Behavioural descriptions. By ‘occult phenomenology’ I mean specifically that he engages in phenomenological argumentation surreptitiously without acknowledging that he is doing so. By ‘phenomenological argumentation’ I mean argumentation that requires phenomenal introspection into what something is like, rather than relying on linguistic analyses of specific bits of language, i.e. concrete manifestations of language as an investigation characterized by either an implicit or explicit theory of linguistic meaning. Phenomenal arguments require insight into ‘what
something is like\textsuperscript{256} rather than simply grammatical analyses of competence in a bit of language. Where one compares the phenomenal properties of one introspective experience with the phenomenal properties of another introspective experience, to make an argument, and reflects on these differences I say that they are doing phenomenology.

The three examples will be (1) the Reader / Witness argument, (2) the species of Occurrences designated as ‘feelings-proper’ which I pointed out and called ‘flash-bangs’ so as to dramatize them in a memorable way and (3) the exercise of anticipating one’s next thought. These will allow me to isolate the Occult Phenomenological Strain hidden in Ryle’s method of argumentation. Differentiating this Occult Phenomenological Strain hidden from the Linguistic Behavioural Strain in Ryle’s argumentation is important because later I will use it to pin-point a contradiction that arises from Linguistic Behavioural descriptions of ordinary language uses of dispositions based on Robert Wolff’s argument against Ryle. Robert Wolff thinks dispositions act holistically when given and used to describe someone from the third person. Wolff thinks they describe what someone is likely to do rather than acting as a force compelling people to do different things and causing ‘aggitations’ and ‘commotions’. Ryle of course thinks they cause ‘aggitations’ and ‘commotions’ when certain

dispositions come into conflict with each other or are impeded by an obstacle. What Wolff’s argument reveals is the illusion in Ryle of dispositions acting like a force compelling people to act in certain ways rather than a description taken from the third person point of view. Ryle’s argument trades on a type of Autophenomenological Normativity which employs its persuasive force through an Analogical Construct surreptitiously hidden by what Ryle purports to be a linguistic description of common ordinary language usage. There is a type of first-person phenomenology that is active in some of Ryle’s arguments and this is where it exerts its influence. The result of such careful analysis in to the Wolff-Ryle dispute will be to show that a contradiction arises from rival claims if we take them both as Ordinary Language Arguments when in fact there are two different normative sources of appeal in Ryle’s argumentation. The rivalry between these two sources will set the scene for the final part of this paper.
Chapter Twelve

Ryle’s Diachronic attack on consciousness.

Ryle’s line of attack on the concept of consciousness is directed at giving an account for developmental diachronic stages\(^{257}\) of what Ryle thinks is a socially

\(^{257}\) The term ‘diachronic arguments’ I’ve ‘liberated’ from Semiotics where ‘diachronic’ is used to refer to the properties and shifts in meaning and use of concrete manifestations of language over time. In Semiotics the term ‘diachronic’ refers to a distinction that depends upon a polarization between ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’. This polarization of binary opposites is of course problematic as the Post-Structuralists point out. I use the term more loosely in a ‘family resemblance’ way to approximate similarities that can be used to describe arguments that depend upon chronological shifts in the meaning, usage and context of words over time. This species of argument is familiar enough though I won’t go much beyond defining them in a general sense for this paper. One might call them ‘etymological attacks’ as they make arguments based on the etymological roots of words. One might call them ‘philological arguments’ as Philology was often used in this way. These are like Nietzsche’s philological excursions into the origin of resentment, (Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Horace Samuel. New York: Dover, 2003 pp 19 – 21) for example. Lyotard’s ‘differend’ is based on the sorts of shifts in meaning that occur in language use. See Lyotard, Jean-Francois. *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute* Translated by Georges Van Dan Abbeele: University of Minesota Press, 1989. The sorts of archeological and etymological surveys we find in Foucault’s role and treatment of contradictions in the history of discourse are based on a diachronic style of argumentation that focuses on the shift in methodology and meaning over time, See Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. Oxon: Routledge, 2005. Pg 166-173. Likewise Katz and Fodor’s attack on Chomsky’s generative grammar is a very famous analytic example. Katz and Fodor attack Chomsky’s demarcation of the gender pronoun ‘male’ which historically meant a baby seal. They argue the fact the word ended up being a gendered pronoun is contingent on shifts of meaning in the development of English over periods of time and thus attack Chomsky’s use on ‘diachronic’ grounds. See Katz, Fodor. ‘The Structure of a Semantic Theory.’ *Language* 39, (1963): Pp 170-210., See also Pritchard’s arguments on the origin of moral philosophy for another example of a diachronic style of approach, in Prichard, H. A. ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ *Mind* 21, no. 81 (1912): Pp 21-37. These are arguments that focus on historical shifts in meaning and the use of language overtime, and in different social and historical contexts to make their point. One might call them ‘etymological arguments’ but they are not strictly limited to what language meant in the past from the present, but like Katz and Fodor, and Ryle’s argument on consciousness, they make arguments about processes of language. They are an interesting species of argument, not unrelated to ‘Ordinary Language’ arguments, in a general sense given that the normativity of such arguments rests upon the knowledge possessed by competent native speaker’s of the language at different points in history. For the purposes of this
constructed and mistaken concept that arose from historical contingencies. Ryle thinks that ‘consciousness’ is a myth that grew out of the Protestant Revolution and developed into a species of what he calls ‘para-optics’. Unlike ‘retrospection’ and his ‘log keeper’ account and rare instances that he thinks have crept into common usage (like ‘to be conscious of events’ or ‘being conscious the furniture had been changed’ or synonyms for being ‘awake’ like the way ‘losing consciousness’ is used synonymously for not ‘staying awake’), Ryle rejects the notion of consciousness altogether and sees it as a historical invention and a late fiction, and not a natural faculty that can reveal the inner workings of thought by reflection on prior or present acts.

Ryle writes

When the epistemologists' concept of consciousness first became popular, it seems to have been in part a transformed application of the Protestant notion of conscience. The Protestants had to hold that a man could know the moral state of his soul and the wishes of God without the aid of confessors and scholars; they

---

thesis, however, we will limit ourselves to Ryle’s claim in the context of the Philosophy of Mind and what Ryle’s ‘diachronic’ attack boils down to as a claim about consciousness and language, i.e. the aspects of language which semioticians were trying to target along with the ‘synchronous’ axis.
spoke therefore of the God-given 'light' of private conscience\textsuperscript{258}.

This Protestant version of ‘do-it-yourself' moral conscience, according to Ryle, gets picked up after the Reformation during the Enlightenment where it gains an other-worldly aspect with both dualist theories of mind and causal theories of consciousness.

Ryle writes

When Galileo's and Descartes' representations of the mechanical world seemed to require that minds should be saved from mechanism by being represented as constituting a duplicate world, the need was felt to explain how the contents of this ghostly world could be ascertained, again without the help of schooling, but also without the help of sense perception. The metaphor of 'light' seemed peculiarly appropriate, since Galilean science dealt so largely with the optically discovered world. 'Consciousness' was imported to play in

the mental world the part played by light in the mechanical world. In this metaphorical sense, the contents of the mental world were thought of as being self-luminous or refulgent\textsuperscript{259}.

In Ryle’s history the theory gets picked up by John Locke, in whom it becomes refined into a ‘reflective’ model in which, Locke claims, consciousness can turn back on itself and examine, or rather, reflect on its own operations by means of introspective scrutiny.

Ryle writes

This model was employed again by Locke when he described the deliberate observational scrutiny which a mind can from time to time turn upon its current states and processes. He called this supposed inner perception ‘reflexion’\textsuperscript{260},

\textsuperscript{260}Our ‘introspection’. See McCosh, James. \textit{Realistic Philosophy}. Vol. II. New York: Scribner, 1900. Pp 56 – 59. What Locke specifically meant, according to McCosh, who I agree with, was something as follows. Locke took the schoolmen’s vocabulary of ‘phantasm’, ‘notion’, ‘species’ whereby the schoolmen took ‘phantasm’ as the representation of a thing, ‘notion’ as an intellectual operation involved in apprehending the thing, and ‘species’ to refer to the visible appearance and objects classified. Locke then reduced them all to ‘ideas’. Ideas, for Locke, are produced by sensations which later become Hume’s impressions which fade into Hume’s ‘ideas’, but for Locke, these are produced by the primary qualities of the object. Primary qualities become ‘ideas’ via an ‘impulse’ in the sense faculties. (McCosh, Realistic Philosophy, 1900 Pg 58). Once the ideas are produced, reflection then sorts them out in to their proper place in categories via ‘semblances’. ‘Reflection’, on this view, is the focus of the mind on the inner faculties. For the distinction between ‘ectypal’ and ‘archetypal’ ideas, see
borrowing the word 'reflexion' from the familiar optical phenomenon of the reflections of faces in mirrors. The mind can 'see' or 'look at' its own operations in the 'light' given off by themselves.

The myth of consciousness is a piece of para-optics\textsuperscript{261}.

Consciousness, then, Ryle maintains, is a myth that began with the Reformation, underwent several modifications, or reincarnations, and ends up with a ‘reflective doctrine’ in John Locke. This, according to Ryle’s account, in turn gives us the causal theory of consciousness, which David Hume inherits, in which sensations impress ideas on us and from which their conjunction creates the sentiment of belief\textsuperscript{262}.

\textsuperscript{261} Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 153
\textsuperscript{262} Something that is perhaps troubling, reading back into Ryle, from Richard Rorty via Sellars, is the notion that perhaps we are able to introspect and we may also have consciousness simply because we’ve developed those abilities out of developments in history. That is, indeed Sartre may very well be right, one might argue when he pin points the implication of and uses for introspective arguments (for instance in \textit{Trnscedence of the Ego}, Abington, 2004), but one might try to counter this and argue that phenomenology is only possible because it developed out of a Western historical context. Prior to that context one could not introspect. See Rorty, Richard. \textit{The Mirror of Nature}. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2009. Pg 218-220. My reply is that one would have to reflect to see if that were true, and the instant somebody did, they will have discovered reflective and introspective consciousness. See also J. R. Oshea “The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones.’ \textit{Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences} 11, no. 2 (2012): Pp 175-204.
However, I just do not think this is the case. I think consciousness, conscious reflection, and introspection of conscious states are all faculties of human thought, and not historical inventions. I think something like introspection goes on and that Ryle in many of his arguments unwittingly employs it when he draws on his audience to observe the phenomenal differences arising from introspective qualitative distinctions.
Ordinary Language Arguments and their ability to affirm or negate claims about the mind.

In this section I will be exploring the ways Ordinary Language Arguments can be used to affirm or deny claims about the mind by considering some explicit examples. Specifically, the examples I will be looking at are those where Ryle purports to make a direct appeal to the reader’s knowledge of language and practice to support one of his arguments or lodge an objection against another philosopher.

For instance, Ryle argues as follows

the language of ‘volitions' is the language of the para-mechanical theory of the mind. If a theorist speaks without qualms of ‘volitions', or 'acts of will', no further evidence is needed to show that he swallows whole the dogma that a mind is a
secondary field of special causes. It can be predicted that he will correspondingly speak of bodily actions as 'expressions' of mental processes. He is likely also to speak glibly of 'experiences', a plural noun commonly used to denote the postulated non-physical episodes which constitute the shadow-drama on the ghostly boards of the mental stage\textsuperscript{263}.

In advancing this argument against the right wing of the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’\textsuperscript{264} Ryle makes a direct appeal to the domain of common language for justification. The authority for dismissing an account of action based on ‘volitions’, for Ryle, is founded in a direct appeal to the common consuetude of everyday language. He rejects an account of mind based on ‘volitions’, because he rejects the authority of the theorist, and with them the

\textsuperscript{263}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 62

\textsuperscript{264}The right wing of Ryle’s ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’, of course, is the Humean ‘passions’ see Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983, pg 91. Also Fredrick Adams and Kenneth Aizowa, \textit{Defending the Bounds of Cognition}, 2010 NB One of the reasons I avoided going into the Extended Mind hypothesis debate is that Adams and Aizowa’s ‘mark of the cognitive’ on a reading of Ryle would be a special version of this sort of Para-mechanical Theory since it individuates the ‘cognitive’ by specific reference to its cause in terms of causal mechanisms. However, the dissolution of Ryle’s Ordinary Language solution, I argue, re-introduces the problem of causation in theories of mind, and specifically, I’m going to argue at the end of this paper presents a new problem of causation in models that utilize theories about consciousness. See footnote 93 and 95. Read 95 only after carefully completing each stage of the paper. Redefining the bounds of cognition in terms of the irreducible direct first and third person positions, is of course, the project of a psychologism and the causal fixation model the paper finishes on.
normative source for meaningful talk about the mind to derive from either (x.1), or (x.2). This is an example of an Ordinary Language argument that refutes another thinker’s theory of mind, in this case the ‘volitional thesis’.

Here is the refutation.

Ryle writes

Despite the fact that theorists have, since the Stoics and Saint Augustine, recommended us to describe our conduct in this way, no one, save to endorse the theory, ever describes his own conduct, or that of his acquaintances, in the recommended idioms. No one ever says such things as that at 10 a.m. he was occupied in willing this or that, or that he performed five quick and easy volitions and two slow and difficult volitions between midday and lunch-time. An accused person may admit or deny that he did something, or that he did it on purpose, but he never admits or denies having willed. Nor do the judge and jury require to be satisfied by

\footnote{See the section \textit{Context Dependent States} at the beginning of this thesis.}
evidence, which in the nature of the case could never be adduced, that a volition preceded the pulling of the trigger. Novelists describe the actions, remarks, gestures and grimaces, the daydreams, deliberations, qualms and embarrassments of their characters; but they never mention their volitions. They would not know what to say about them. Notice here, the justification for dismissing volitions is based on several things: firstly, that the ordinary language user has no knowledge of ‘volitions’ so he would not know what to say about them. The argument simply put, is that ordinary people do not use ‘volitions’ in their vocabulary so Ryle thinks it follows that they must not exist. Ryle thinks the fact that a person may not know how many volitions are in an act, or how many volitions they may have performed that particular day, counts for evidence in his argument against them. Ryle is trying to avoid the response that people need to be conscious of their experience in some way so as to be able to report whether they experience volitions with his ‘log keeper’ account of the mind and the special status reports made from ‘knowing what one is about’ by surreptiously focusing only on the linguistic

---

266Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 63.
evidence. All of these types of appeals that Ryle makes, which focus on the statements of a person giving a ‘special status report’, are directed at the language user’s knowledge in both the speaker’s use, and that of the audience reading the argument. The authority for these appeals derives from (x.3.1) and (x.3.2)\(^\text{267}\). However, with (x.3.1) the patient has the caveat authority of obrogation to overturn statements about their emotional life.

This is not so in all of Ryle’s arguments. Some of Ryle’s arguments betray strands of an occult philosophy of conscious states running through Ryle’s work. Here I use ‘occult’ in the sense of something hidden or concealed. In Ryle’s case, surreptitiously.

Ryle writes

However, when a champion of the doctrine is himself asked how long ago he executed his last volition, or how many acts of will he executes in, say, reciting ‘Little Miss Muffet’ backwards, he is apt to confess to finding difficulties in giving the answer, though these difficulties should not, according to his own theory, exist\(^\text{268}\).

\(^{267}\) See ‘Context Dependent States’ in the Introduction to this thesis.

\(^{268}\)Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 64.
This is a sophistication on the earlier argument. Instead of depending on an
Ordinary Language criterion like whether or not people use ‘volitions’, Ryle is
drawing on the resources of a ‘special status report’, one which is consistent with
his position on thought possessing a log keeper role and the process he defines as
‘being alive to what one is doing’. Ryle’s line of thought here is problematic. We
should ask; without conscious introspection how would someone know what a
volition felt like? Even if Ryle could argue that one knew what a volition felt like
without violating his own strictures against conscious experience or his claim
that they do not exist, how would one know without the ability to introspect
whether one was having one? One would still need to take a ‘non-optical’ look
inside in order to determine whether one was having volitions. Ryle’s log keeper
account of the mind runs into the same problems with volitions as it did with
‘flash-bangs’.

Take this next argument from Ryle

[Consider] the use of the verb 'to remember' in
which a person is said to have remembered, or
been recollecting, something at a particular
moment, or is said to be now recalling, reviewing
or dwelling on some episode of his own past. In
this use, remembering is an occurrence; it is
something which a person may try successfully, or in vain, to do; it occupies his attention for a time and he may do it with pleasure or distress and with ease or effort\textsuperscript{269}.

Note that this is the episodic case, as in ‘to remember when’. This forms one side of the linguistic usage which is the episodic case of an event. The following passage from Ryle illustrates the ‘to remember’ (how) side of the configuration and shows how ‘to remember how’ can be used in the sense of having not forgotten a skill, as for example, in the instance Ryle compared linguistic useages in the descriptions of the way the teacher trains his pupils. This forms the other side of the distinction and connects the verb ‘to remember’ to the Capacity side of the configuration governing the distinction between Capacity and Tendency Dispositions.

By far the most important and the least discussed use of the verb is that use in which remembering something means having learned something and not forgotten it. This is the sense in which we speak of remembering the Greek

\textsuperscript{269}Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 259.
alphabet, or the way from the gravel-pit to the
bathing-place, or the proof of a theorem, or how
to bicycle, or that the next meeting of the Board
will be in the last week of July. To say that a
person has not forgotten something is not to say
that he is now doing or undergoing anything, or
even that he regularly or occasionally does or
undergoes anything. It is to say that he can do
certain things, such as go through the Greek
alphabet, direct a stranger back from the
bathing-place to the gravel-pit and correct
someone.270

Note the difference between the two uses. The former is episodic in the sense of
events that occur and the latter is dispositional in the sense of skills and
abilities. Note too that this distinction can be based on the linguistic behaviour.
‘Remember-How’ is linked to the linguistic behaviour of capacity verbs. This
forms one side of the knowledge-how/knowledge-that distinction Ryle maintains
throughout The Concept of Mind. We add to this a further distinction and we can
ask ourselves: why don’t people use the term for the other side of the

dispositional table? Why don’t people use it for the Motives, Inclinations and Beliefs somebody has? This gives us a further linguistic behaviour to differentiate Capacities and Tendencies since Motives, Beliefs and Inclinations are not the sorts of things somebody can ask a ‘remember how’ or a ‘remember when’ question about. But someone might ask ‘do you remember why you did that?’ if searching for a motive or a belief that can explain some behaviour.
Chapter Fourteen

Phenomenological arguments.

Not all of Ryle’s ‘phenomenological arguments’ can be read as having a Linguistic Behaviourist side like the ‘to remember’ and the ‘flash bang’ sub-strains we’ve looked at. It is just easier to discriminate the phenomenological content by using the treatment I have developed and to refer to it under the moniker of ‘Ghostography’. In using this ‘Ghostography’ we only have to look for Ordinary Language justifications without a corresponding Linguistic Behaviourist claim. When Ryle makes his Ordinary Language Arguments he usually offers the Linguistic Behaviourist analysis, either in traditional grammatical terms, or in his own bits of jargon referring to linguistic behaviours like ‘mongrel-categoricals’ or ‘heed-concepts’. Sometimes he offers a distinction that seems intuitively correct and justified from an Ordinary Language point of view, but he doesn’t offer the Linguistic Behavioural analyses with the
grammatical distinctions. If there is no Linguistic Behaviourist claim then we ask the question ‘what is the Ordinary Language Argument justifying?’ I submit that if one looks a little deeper one will see that the examples we’ve already gone through have a ghostly finger pointing towards a phenomenological content.

There are also a handful of pure phenomenological treatments in The Concept of Mind, which do not have Ordinary Language Argument justifications or Linguistic Behavioural Arguments attached to them. These seem to me to infringe directly on his prohibition against consciousness. If nothing else they undermine the general line of his etymological historically diachronic claim that the concept of consciousness is a piece of ‘para-optics’ that arose from the Reformation. Here Ryle unwittingly provides the facts which demonstrate that his language-based account of the mind cannot cover all of the facts relevant to a theory of mind.

Take the following as an example of a pure naked phenomenological argument out of Ryle. He writes

The reader of a report of a race can, subject to certain restrictions imposed by the text of the report, first picture the race in one way and then deliberately or involuntarily picture it in a different and perhaps conflicting way; but a witness of the race feels that, while he can call
back further views of the race, yet alternative views are rigidly ruled out\textsuperscript{271}.

To make that distinction one actually has to put one self in the shoes of the person at the centre of both cases. One has to think back to a day at the track or of a football game, from a specific vantage point in the stadium and then think about another case where, instead of watching from the stadium one has read the report in the newspaper; and thus compare the two.

To turn these into Linguistic Behavioural Arguments without phenomenological participation is very difficult. One can talk about seeing in the world and ‘seeing’ in the ‘mind’s eye’ as two different uses of ‘seeing’. It is very difficult to see how one can make that distinction in purely Linguistic Behavioural terms without the phenomenology.

On first appearance, if we take a witness to an event and a reader of a report about that same event and put them in different chairs and asked them questions, there are things the witness could not tell us, if Ryle is right, and that the reader of the report could, since the reader’s view, as he might imagine it, is not hampered by a man sitting in front of him, perhaps with a funny hat, unless the reader perhaps wishes to imagine the man there. The witness, if he was

\textsuperscript{271}Ryle, \textit{Concept of Mind}, 1983. Pg 262.
unfortunate enough to be seated behind the man with the silly big hat, may have had his view hampered, or be victim to any one of the endless varieties of contingencies his witnessing the event made him subject to on the day. The reader, however, would not be limited to one perspective, in reading the report, but only by his powers of conjuring up the details of the race’s report.

But let us imagine a canny reader, who, for his own reasons, needs to make a convincing report\textsuperscript{272} for he wishes to convince our canny Judge that he really was at the race track on the day in question. He, foreknowing the distinction between a witness and a reader, sits down and visualizes his entire day from start to finish as if he lived it. Since he has relative freedom to imagine the races from any perspective this should not be a difficult task, since he has only to imagine the one perspective, and to stick with it.

Were such so, I argue that there is no discernable difference between the linguistic behaviour of the cunning reader and the genuine witness at the level of a purely Linguistic Behavioural analysis. The witness might likewise make up his own details after the event for any parts he or she missed, with relative freedom, just like the reader.

Furthermore, there is no ‘ordinary language’ appeal or justification for this distinction in Ryle, and in fact, it is hard to imagine what an Ordinary Language justification or an appeal might look like. We can only understand

\textsuperscript{272} In the ordinary common language use and not Sellars, nor my own development of Sellars’ use.
this bit of phenomenology by stepping into it and thinking about it. The point of the argument only arises as ‘the sugar melts’ as Sartre likes to quote Bergson273. One must make consciousness itself, in this case the imagining consciousness, subject to an act of consciousness to see the distinction.

As such, the argument for the distinction between the reader and the witness at the race track is a purely phenomenological argument, and one that requires the twin processes of introspection, and consciousness, both outlawed by Ryle’s own strictures, in order for the argument to make sense. That is, by the very inclusion of this argument, in Ryle’s Concept of Mind, Ryle has argued against one of his own leading theses. He has undermined his thesis that the self luminous Cartesian and Protestant Para-Optic strand of philosophy of mind is an unmitigated mistake. Ryle demonstrates in practice that the introspective act itself required for this argument fulfils all the criteria of introspection by being deliberately conscious, attending to the phenomenal contents of consciousness twice, as well as drawing attention to non-optical and non-sensory elements that are not apparent in the act of perception, but only become present in the act of reflection through introspective scrutiny. And in fact, the only way to avoid this conclusion once Ryle has pointed out that the above act contains the very properties of consciousness he wishes to deny, is if Ryle then claimed not to be

able to perform the introspective act. But his very practice puts the lie to such a claim.

Recall that a Linguistic Behavioural claim involves a concrete manifestation of a piece of language, a la parole, and a grammatical description of that piece of language which purports to analyse the behaviour of the relevant words. An Ordinary Language argument bases the claim it forwards on what it makes sense to say in a language. There is nothing in the behaviour of the language of the canny reader, which can alert a canny judge to the fact that the reader was not there at the track on the day of the race. The insight on offer in the Reader/Witness argument does not depend on a specific configuration of words characteristic of a Linguistic Behavioural Argument. In fact, once one has grasped the distinction one can think about the difference between a reader of a race report, and a witness of the actual race in visual terms that do not rely on a specific set of linguistic behaviours described, in grammatical analysis.

This next argument is the ‘Anticipatory argument’. It involves attempting to anticipate one’s next thought before one has it.

Ryle writes

(W)hile normally I am not at all surprised to find myself doing or thinking what I do, yet when I try most carefully to anticipate what I shall do or think, then the outcome is likely to falsify my
expectation. My process of pre-envisioning may
divert the course of my ensuing behaviour in a
direction and degree of which my prognosis
cannot take account. One thing that I cannot
prepare myself for is the next thought that I am
going to think.\(^{274}\)

It is not immediately obvious, at least from verbs, nouns and adjectives, nor
from any immediately obvious idioms, that one cannot anticipate one’s next
thought. It is not until one tries the exercise that one begins to see the problem.
Likewise, the problem of advice is not prima facie obvious, otherwise we
wouldn’t go to people for advice. One cannot give the advice, and then give
advice on how to take that advice, and then give further advice on how to take
the two former bits of advice, and so on. There is a regress. Likewise, one has to
try anticipating one’s next thought in order to make the trick work. Let us note,
this is a phenomenological argument – at least so far as in the above example. It
is a pure, naked, phenomenological argument because one cannot account for
this phenomena in Behavioural Linguistic terms or find a way to justify it as an
Ordinary Language argument with what it ‘makes sense to say’ unless one first

\(^{274}\)Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983. Pg 188.
tries it out for oneself. The insight is found in the exercise and not the behaviour of specific clusters and classes of words.

Now consider another example from The Concept of Mind

A man is interested in Symbolic Logic. He regularly reads books and articles on the subject, discusses it, works out problems in it and neglects lectures on other subjects. According to the view which is here contested, he must therefore constantly experience impulses of a peculiar kind, namely feelings of interest in Symbolic Logic, and if his interest is very strong these feelings must be very acute and very frequent. He must therefore be able to tell us whether these feelings are sudden, like twinges,
or lasting, like aches; whether they succeed one
another several times a minute or only a few
times an hour; and whether he feels them in the
small of his back or in his forehead. But clearly
his only reply to such specific questions would be
that he catches himself experiencing no peculiar
throbs or qualms while he is attending to his
hobby. He may report a feeling of vexation, when
his studies are interrupted, and the feeling of a
load off his chest, when distractions are removed;
but there are no peculiar feelings of interest in
Symbolic Logic for him to report. While
undisturbedly pursuing his hobby, he feels no
perturbations at all276.

Firstly, this is another example of the hidden phenomenological strain of
arguments in *The Concept of Mind*. Secondly this, of course, is a demonstration
of the difference between flash-bangs on one side, and Motivations and
Inclinations on the other. It is important to see that one cannot actually make
this argument without the audience thinking it through for themselves. One

---

needs to think the argument through before it makes sense. However, two things are noteworthy that happen when you do think such an argument through.

While we can attach an Ordinary Language argument to it in the form of; ‘it doesn’t make sense to say that a man was so agitated by his interest in math that he couldn’t study it’ or ‘a man that was so patriotic that he couldn’t go to war for his country’, this is a different kind of argument from getting the audience to sympathize or asking the audience outright how many times in an hour of study does one feel the impulse to study logic? There are two arguments here. One asks what it makes sense to talk about in common ordinary everyday language. The second asks you to ‘take a (non-optical) ‘look’ at what is passing in (your) mind’ in the introspective sense.

Secondly, also noteworthy is what is missing from this argument. There is no Behavioural Linguistic claim attached here, to the “introspective’ (non optical)’ element, nor to the prior Ordinary Language argument. The Symbolic Logic Scholar Argument has a normative force from an Ordinary Language claim. That is to say, there is an Ordinary Language ‘it makes sense to say’ style of argumentation here, (i.e. ‘it doesn’t make sense to talk about a man who was so patriotic he couldn’t go to war for his country’ or ‘a man who was so interested in logic he couldn’t study it’). But there is no specific ‘la parole’ for us to analyse for linguistic behaviours. There is no bit of language at the centre of the Symbolic Logic Scholar Argument to be held up for Linguistic Behavioural
analysis. Instead there is a phenomenological act of introspective scrutiny hidden in the argument. We must examine our own past experiences of hobbies and studies to sympathise with the persuasive force in Ryle’s argument.
Chapter Fifteen

Midway map of the paper

I

The Three Chief Types of Argument Found in *The Concept of Mind*

We have progressed far enough into the technical complexity of the thesis that I can present a short map of the arguments, and how they fit together to lead to the call for a considered return to Psychologism. This I shall now do.

So far, we have looked at Ordinary Language Arguments and Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. I drew my definition of Linguistic Behavioral arguments from the shortcomings of Weitz’s ‘propositional model’ of Logical Behaviourism. Weitz’s simplified propositional model failed to make distinctions at the level of natural language analysis that Ryle was specifically interested in. Instead of looking towards the type of language ‘behaviour’ Ryle based his arguments on, Weitz focused on a generalized propositional model.

Weitz’s model and the subsequent Logical Behaviourist approach, of course, have similar sorts of problems with referential indeterminacy to the various cognitive disciplines and fields of research that we looked at in the introduction to this thesis because of the problem with correspondence theories.
of truth. These correspondence problems are the reason why Logical
Behaviourist models like those proposed by Weitz generally fail. It was generally
taken on tautological grounds, by early Analytic Philosophers that for truthful
propositions to be true they must picture true states of affairs. The terms of
the proposition, therefore, must picture what they refer to in true ways. It is
important on this view that the terms and their referents be semantically
determinate since if they are not determinate then it directly effects the truth of
any statements with propositions that utilize those terms with those putative
referents. We saw that while one of Weitz’s ‘Categorical sentences’ expressing an
episode like ‘Rod ran down the road on Tuesday’ may appear relatively
uncontroversial in terms of the determinacy of the references, the same is not
the case for propositions like ‘Rod is afraid of thunderstorms’ and ‘Rod felt upset
at not being invited’. What the speaker of the proposition describes as ‘upset’
might be closer to what Rod himself might refer to as ‘anger’ and ‘frustration’
while what Rod himself might describe as ‘upset’ might be closer to what the
speaker of the proposition describes as ‘sadness’ and ‘weariness’. Both of these
may have no correspondence to what a listener of the proposition might take

\[277\] Largely influenced by Early Wittgenstein, Russell and Logical Atomism. This was in the
background to Weitz and his generation and I argue, this is what has influenced his misreading of
Ryle. For an introduction to Logical Atomistic theories see Barry Gross. *Analytic Philosophy.* New
York, Pegasus Press, 1970. For an indepth analysis of Wittgenstein of the Tractatus see the under
treatment of Russell’s Atomist stage, in the development of his philosophy see C. W. Kilmister.
‘upset’ to mean in relation to their experiences. In any case since propositional models of human behaviour picture states of affairs, those states of affairs refer to things, and when they refer to human experiences of emotional content there is reason to question the determinancy of these references.

Chalmers psychological and phenomenal ‘potted’ history neglected the normative foundations of Ryle’s arguments. Ryle’s dispositions were not psychological, but linguistic. Ryle develops his dispositions from the analysis of language and argues the authority for them comes from what the average language user knows and what it makes sense to talk about. This lacuna in Chalmers history is the origin for our analysis of the strain of Ordinary Language Arguments in Ryle.

The critiques of the Chalmers’ and Weitz’ accounts of Ryle this paper started off with are important, because what is missing from each account furnishes the two strains of taxa of Ryle’s argument that run through this paper. The deficiency of Chalmers’ account of Ryle was the language-based justification for Ryle’s claims about dispositions and ‘associative behaviours’. This allowed us to begin our classification of Ryle’s argumentation. The critique of David Chalmers’ account of Ryle is the start of the taxa leading to the description of Ordinary Language Arguments in this paper. Deficiencies in the Weitz account allowed us to begin our analysis of Ryle’s Linguistic Behavioural Strand. The Linguistic Behavioural Arguments deal with specific ordinary examples of word
use, and reveal their behaviour through implicit examination of the grammatical constructions and the contexts of their use.

I will now provide a short chart of the arguments found in Ryle for the reader’s benefit should they need clarification or a point to refer back to through the remainder of this paper.

**Types of argument found in Ryle**

**Ordinary Language Arguments**
Employ a normative claim about what it "makes sense" to talk about with a language.

**Linguistic Behavioural Arguments**
Conduct analyses of specific bits of language and usually offer descriptions of the 'behaviour' of the language in grammatical terms.

**The Occult Strain of Phenomenological Arguments**
These are arguments that get their audience to examine the phenomenal aspects of conscious states, like the difference between experiencing an event and remembering it later, or what it is like to imagine a very loud sound, and to hear a very loud sound.

The Phenomenological Argument Strain is surreptitiously hidden in Ryle because of Ryle’s polemic against consciousness and introspection.

Footnote to the above chart

---

²⁷⁸ Our taxonomy of Ryle’s arguments can thus be summarized in this way. Firstly there are Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. These can be typified as the examination of verbs, nouns, linguistic phrases and grammatical terminology. Typically Linguistic Behavioural Arguments make claims about the mind based upon specific examples of language and that usually utilize grammatical descriptions of the linguistic behaviours of these examples of language. Some of these arguments focus on the behaviour of different verb components and sub-sentential configurations. Understanding the sub-sentential configurations is important for understanding what Ryle thinks he can capture in his language-based account of the mind because the relationship between different categories of words and their inheritance properties are what he bases his claims about the mind on.

Secondly the taxonomy contains the Ordinary Language Arguments. It is important to keep in mind what these two types of argument are because only by comparing them can the third type of argument in Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind* be revealed. Ordinary Language argumentation uses a special type of claim. This claim is based on what it purportedly makes sense to talk about in a language. These types of argument make claims that involve the term or one that is more or less synonymous with ‘it makes sense to say’ to forward a claim about the mind, or ‘it does not make sense to say’ to negate a claim about the mind. Ordinary Language Arguments draw on common everyday knowledge possessed by any competent language speaker, but as we have seen not all Ordinary Language Arguments justify themselves with grammatical analysis of concrete manifestations of language. We might describe some Ordinary Language argumentation as amphibious because it can be analysed with grammatical distinctions and descriptions, but it can also be thought of in a
Most importantly I have developed my methodology for drawing out the phenomenological content in Ordinary Language Arguments by looking for a claim that does not have a Linguistic Behavioural analysis attached to it. Not all Ordinary Language Arguments are Linguistic Behavioural Arguments even though all Linguistic Behavioural Arguments are Ordinary Language Arguments. The two are not equivalent. Ordinary Language Arguments are normative claims that purport to be about what it makes sense to say, while Linguistic Behavioural Arguments contain samples of concrete manifestations of language and are usually grammatical studies of these samples.

The basic strategy of this thesis is to bring out some of the facts of mind Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments present which his Linguistic Behavioural account cannot explain. This reveals the ‘Occult Strain of Phenomenological Arguments’ haunting Ryle’s argumentative practice. This ‘Occult Strain’ not only contradicts Ryle’s official arguments against consciousness, but it reveals the key that will be used to unlock the stages that a phenomenal zombie cannot undergo to learn the language of a tribe and reveal why the ‘Judgements’ and ‘Cognitive-Content Bearing State’ of David Chalmers and his zombie do not

---

phenomenal sense through conscious introspection of introspective properties. The latter use of introspection and introspective is, of course, the same type of introspection Ryle disavows.

Finally the third strain is made up of arguments that engage Ryle’s sureplicitously hidden phenomenological content. These types of arguments get us to bring certain aspects of our consciousness to attention through an exercise, in order to make a point or get us to engage with phenomenological acts in order to understand the argument. The stages of the argument may be written out in language but the argument itself is not based on grammatical analysis of those written stages as concrete manifestations of language.
correspond one to one. These stages, once revealed, will counter the Crane-Dummett-McDowell ‘Autobiography’ and ‘Guess Work’ objections to Psychologism.
II

Attacking the Myth About the Mind

Ryle argued that the facts that fall within the domain of a theory of mind are normally obscured from public scrutiny by a number of myths that have arisen from contamination of everyday non-theoretical language by sciences and theoretical branches of inquiry. Some of these myths discussed in this thesis, that come out of Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind* are the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’, the ‘Bogey of Mechanism’, the ‘Cartesian Two Worlds Myth’ and the ‘Double-life Account’. Ryle thinks he can dissolve the Cartesian Two World’s Myth, Double-life Account and ‘Private Consciousness’ positions with the argument that there is no difference between saying something aloud, writing it down, and thinking it in one’s mind. But for this to work he has to convince us that Ordinary Language can teach us everything there is to know about the mind. One reason for rejecting Ryle’s view would be the discovery there is something wrong with treating Ordinary Language as a unified source for justifying claims about the mind.

Moreover, Ryle argues that these facts of mind are made accessible in ordinary language by the intuition of the native speaker, which Ryle thinks has an authority above and beyond historical, specialized and theoretical branches of
philosophy, as well as psychology and other types of research into the mind. Ryle argues this is so because people think in the everyday language they talk in.

An implicit linguistic Anti-Psychologistic reading of Ryle is important because the old Logical Behaviourist readings of Ryle, like we find in Weitz, had Psycho-Realist tendencies since they relied on propositional models that functioned on truth values and implied referents that were pictured either truthfully or falsely in model propositions. The problem, of course, with terms like ‘anger’, ‘fear’ and ‘jealousy’ is that they are indeterminate. We do not know if what Sue means when she uses these words is what Jane means when she uses the words. Sue’s grief might be Jane’s remorse. Ryle wanted to do away with these kinds of puzzles by focusing on the ways people used language when talking about the mind.

Ryle railed against individual reflection, introspection, volitions, passions and causal theories of human behaviour. The project of *The Concept of Mind* emerges as the attempt to de-jargonize what Ryle sees as historical and socio-disciplinary mistakes of classical philosophy and attempts at creating new ‘sciences of mind’ which have fallen into language riddles. Ryle thinks these language riddles can be dissolved by returning to the way people speak about the mind in non-specialized, common, everyday discourse.

It is Ryle’s ‘concept of mind’ which interests us because his Ordinary Language Arguments offered the possibility of solving the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem by simply ‘stereoscoping’ language and thought together with
a log-keeper account and the notion of special status reports. On this view words do not refer to either parts ‘inside’ the mind or constituents making up the mind because words and their various combinations are simply thoughts and Ryle thinks that we can analyse the mind through the grammatical examination of the behaviour of language to make claims about the mind. This gave us Ryle’s Linguistic Behavioural Arguments which make claims about the mind based on analysis of concrete manifestations of words taken from everyday language.

I pointed out both Dummett’s criterion for the Pre-Fregeian view of psychologism and his arguments against it. A Pre-Fregeian view of psychologism holds that language is like a code that thoughts are compounded into. The thesis of this paper is to argue for a return to a Pre-Fregeian theory of mind because it offers us a chance to escape the pitfalls from the past century, and solves many of the underlying problems plaguing the use of language in the sciences of mind.
III

Dummett and the Implicit Language Philosophers

Ryle read in the light of Dummett presents the strongest case for an exclusively language-based account of the mind. The reason, of course, is that Dummett provides us with what I take to be strong grounds for rejecting the explicit attempt at an Anti-Psychologistic project of a theory of meaning. Dummett argues that an explicit form of Anti-Psychologism is one that can only lead into a vicious regress that ends in circularity. If this is so then it takes the explicit theorists out of the game and leaves only the implicit Anti-Psychologistic language theorists to argue what the foundations are for a theory of mind. Among the implicit language theorists, Ryle stands out as having developed a sophisticated and systemic analysis of the mind that uproots the major strands of thought in the history of philosophy about the mind. Moreover Ryle’s arguments also offer the attractive prospect of solving the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem that arises within many different branches and fields of research on the mind, as discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.

However, for Ryle’s account of the mind to work, he needs to present Ordinary Language as a unifying implicit source of knowledge for claims about mental phenomena. The weakness in Ryle’s account of the mind arises from an
‘Occult Phenomenological Strain’ hidden inside some of his arguments that undermines the overall general project of *The Concept of Mind*.

There are three ‘Occult Phenomenological Arguments’ I drew attention to which Ryle presents but cannot be broken down into these Linguistic Behaviours and logkeeper roles. These were (1) the Witness/Reader Argument, (2) Anticipating One’s Next Thought and (3) the Flash Bangs which were pointed out early on in this thesis and explained in depth in *Chapter Fourteen*, under the section entitled *Phenomenological Arguments*, of this thesis.

Out of these three ‘Occult Phenomenological Arguments’ haunting Ryle’s grammatical machinery in *The Concept of Mind*, the most important for this thesis is the ‘flash-bang’ strain which I will be raising again as the paper progresses. The theme of this séance with Rylean ghosts will be a voodoo one and involve zombies. Such zombies arise from David Chalmers’ concept of ‘phenomenal’. This paper will ask the question whether Chalmers’ own phenomenal zombie has the semantic resources to make statements about flash-bangs. The paper will argue that the zombie cannot, and since it cannot, this undermines the Anti-Psychologistic position.
IV

Chalmerian zombies and the ‘flash-bangs’.

To resolve the question whether Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie can make meaningful statements about the emotional experiences of ‘flash-bangs’ which it does not have (because it is a phenomenal zombie bereft of emotional qualia, sensation or phenomenally qualitative experience) I will introduce the phenomenal zombie into a Rylean community using the model of ‘Socio-Linguistics’ Wilfrid Sellars builds in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. This thread of arguments will culminate in the refutation of Chalmers’ claim that he and his phenomenal zombie twin have a one to one correspondence in their Judgements by showing one important difference when the zombie attempts to learn the Messianic Jones’s Language of human behavioural terms whence it enters the Rylean linguistic community.

The zombie’s inability to learn the language of the community shows that the resources needed for the semantics for one specific type of language behaviour exceed the resources of a publicly learnt language.
Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie is emotionally dead, overt behaviours not withstanding. It has no emotional feelings. It experiences no qualia. All phenomenal experiences are absent or dead to the zombie. Its inability to master the language of the tribe and express itself and understand others will show that language rests on non-linguistic knowledge that the zombie specifically lacks. The zombie either cannot learn certain words related to emotions, or if it uses them, it does not know what it is talking about. It does not have the semantic resources to understand its own statements because of its missing phenomenal experience. Such being so, the phenomenal zombie cannot mature into the full and competent use of a human natural language. Any words the zombie might use to try and describe its emotional experiences would have no more meanings than the Hangul characters in Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment. The zombie’s inability to learn the emotional language of ‘flash-bangs’ or discriminate between kinds of flash-bang and apply the concepts meaningfully to others, despite having all of the other resources available to it, will demonstrate that some parts of language get their semantics from non-linguistic components. The reason, of course, is that the zombie with all the resources of a linguistic community cannot make the leap to learn parts of the language and use it meaningfully because it does not have the experiences that the semantics of the language of mind rely upon for meaning. It either does not know what it is saying or it cannot make statements involving those parts of natural human language meaningfully.
The failure of the zombie to learn the language of the tribe will in turn show that a language-based account of the mind cannot cover all of the facts in its domain. I argue that the failure of a language-based account of the mind to cover all of the facts in the domain of a theory of the mind leads to the rejection of the Anti-Psychologistic project as untenable, since the nature of mind cannot be captured without loss by language and its analysis. Foundationally something prior to language is needed for some types of language to be meaningful. We must reject language as foundational for mind and instead search for what this thing is.

A theory of meaning in language must go beyond the linguistically expressible components of language and into the experiences which the zombie lacks. The reason, of course, is that the zombie cannot talk meaningfully about these experiences even with all of the language facilities it can develop. However people with those emotional experiences the zombie lacks can talk meaningfully about them. This leads to the final argument in the paper which is the dissolution of Ordinary Language as an authority in claims about the mind and the call for a return to Pre-Fregeian Psychologism in which a theory of mind is prior to a theory of both meaning and language in what I am marketing as a revisionist take on the layer cake hypothesis about explanation.
V

The end for the Ordinary Language Philosophy thesis as a Grand Unifying Theory of Mind

The strain of ‘Occult Phenomenological Arguments’ hidden in Ryle threaten the homogeneity and unification of his language-based account of the mind. The Occult Phenomenological Arguments once fully drawn out are what ultimately rupture the attractive and hopeful project of reaching a Unified Theory of Mind through Ordinary Language Arguments. This is, indeed, a sad outcome for Anti-Psychologism because such Ordinary Language Arguments presented themselves like a ‘padzar bezoar stone’ of the late Mahumad Bin Masud to the problems arising from indeterminacy of reference in fields of research on the mind. For if there are elements of the mind that lie outside the scope of either an implicit or explicit theory of meaning, that is to say, if there is phenomena that cannot be captured in specific analyses of words by a Linguistic Behaviouristic Account of arguments, but instead depends upon phenomenal reflection for the argument to have meaning, then this jeopardizes the tenability for an Anti-Psychologistic program. The reason such non-linguistic elements become a threat is that one can no longer search within language for an implicit criterion of meaning and build a theory of mind from language if the meaning of the terms of that theory of mind do not depend upon implicit use of the language
itself. Implicit explanations for the semantics of language were the best and strongest candidate for an Anti-Psychologistic theory of mind. They offered the best chance of solving the philosophical problem of mind based on Dummett’s arguments against explicit explanations. If Dummett is right about ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ language theories, then explicit statements of meaning are problematic and result in a trilemma. As we saw earlier in the paper, Dummett argued that explicit theories are doomed to either circularity, or an infinite regress, or termination in an implicit statement. Since the only way out of Dummett’s trilemma of explicit explanations without either circularity or an infinite regress is through a final and terminating implicit statement then the problem of extra-linguistic determinants, or praeter-linguistic components for meaning is one that effects explicit explanations. By extra-linguistic determinants, or praeter-linguistic components I mean elements of meaning which can obrogate the common consuetude of language about the mind. Praeter-linguistic obrogation means simply that there are non-linguistic components and determinants that either make up part of the meaning of words, or determine the words use, but which themselves are beyond language. Beyond language means that an entity bereft of these components could not learn to speak and use a language.

278 I distinguish between extra-linguistic determinants and praeter-linguistic components for reasons that are not immediately obvious here but will becomes so by the end of thesis. Extra-linguistic determinants refer to non-verbal forms of communication. Praeter-linguistic components refers, specifically, to the phenomenal experiences that a Chalmerian zombie lacks which determine whether something is described as a ‘pang of sorrow’ or a ‘pang of nostalgia’.
competently without them. In our own case the argument I am making is that a phenomenal zombie can not learn to speak the language of emotions because it can not tell the difference between what a ‘throb of anger’ and a ‘throb of jealousy’ feels like. Since it can not tell what this difference is with all of its language facilities then there must be some other source beyond language.

Obrogation means that these components can over-ride customary use of words. For instance, if Peter were yelling obscenities, we might say Peter was angry because this is one of the behaviours we predicate as “angry behaviour”. Later Peter can correct us and say he was yelling, not out of anger, but because he was fearful and terrified. Peter has obrogated our ascription of his emotional life to his behaviour by using information that is not directly available to us (in the third person) but gives him a caveat authority (in the first person) to correct third-person ascriptions. I will argue that such information is praeter-linguistic. Praeter-linguistic information is information that goes beyond the language being presented. In this case Peter’s first-person caveat authority to correct our third person ascriptions of what he is feeling is based on praeter-linguistic information\textsuperscript{280} that we do not have access to.

The relationship between caveat authority and praeter-linguistic sources is important to (x.3.1) and (x.3.2). This is because the authority for the sources

\textsuperscript{280} Such information may not be able to be put into language. Hence why I introduce the term here. It is my contention that, indeed, some of the information that informs our linguistic usage, itself, can not be made linguistic. But I will argue this, stage by stage, through the remained of the paper. Here I am simply using the term to refer to information that Peter has access to in the first person that gives him caveat authority over our third person ascriptions.
for (x.3.1) as well as (x.3.2) originate from and remain with the patient or subject. For instance, one might say to a person who did not want to go to a wedding “is it because you were angry with the groom?” The person might reply “no, not anger. I felt grief over losing a friend to her.” In this case the meaning of the word anger has been obrogated by the subject describing the state of mind behind their actions. He feels what he terms as grief at the loss of a friend to someone he does not like. The important question to ask here is where do you or I, or the subject (i.e. the man who didn’t go to the wedding), get the semantics to talk about our emotional life with meaning?

Consider how deeply this problem runs. If the meaning of words like ‘anger’, ‘sadness’, ‘grief’ and ‘joy’ depend on some component that can not be found in the common use of language, and the evidence of this is obrogation, that is subjects can over-ride third person ascription of something they experience in a first person state, then there is a real question about whether psychologists and theorists of mind can write about these terms with any certainty. This is why Ryle and the Occult Strain of Phenomenology hidden in his work is so important. It reveals an extra-linguistic component that arises as a normative force that can compel the reader to agree with the argument. It is only when one stops, and goes back and examines the argument, spurred on as I was by inconsistencies between Ryle’s overt stance against introspection and

---

281 See the section titled Context Dependent States at the beginning of this thesis.
consciousness, and the types of introspective acts hidden in his Occult Strand of Argumentation, that one realizes there is a hidden normative force in performing the exercises that Ryle’s arguments require in those instances.

If the strain of Ryle’s arguments which violates his own strictures about consciousness and introspection reveal a prater-linguistic component, that is, they reveal a component that is necessary for linguistic-determination of meaning, and that component is not found in a specific configuration of words or a set of propositions, but is instead found through the conscious act of performing the introspective exercise in the argument, then this reveals a problem for any theory that assumes it is able to discover what there is to know about the mind by simply using language. The revelation of these extra-linguistic determinants and prater-linguistic components can be found in the normative force of Ryle’s surreptitiously concealed introspective arguments. Such a normative force is found when one performs the introspective act hidden inside a phenomenological argument and one comes to agree with the argument because of what that introspection reveals upon performing the act. For instance, trying to anticipate one’s thought before one has it, or finding the difference between a flash of anger and a flash of regret both involve acts of introspection. The discovery of rival forms of normative force in Ryle’s arguments will upset his theory that the mind can be understood through the study of the consuetude and semantics in Ordinary Language.
Thus, this thesis argues that the clash between Phenomenology and Linguistic Behaviourism will undermine the authority of Ordinary Language as a unifying force in the philosophy of mind. That is to say Phenomenological style arguments and Linguistic Behavioural ones are not happy campers in the Ordinary Language park. This clash I am preparing the way for will be drawn out using an obscure Rylean critic, Robert Wolff.

VI

The Robert Wolf Paper and Autophenomenology

In my view Robert Wolff’s paper is important because it pinpoints an insight into problems with Ryle’s analysis and use of ordinary language. Wolff offers us an obscure criticism of Ryle that comes out of another age and epoch in philosophy, though, obscure as it is, it is a valuable insight in to the second of Ryle’s mistakes, which is the difference between first person experience and third person discourse.²⁸²

A redefinition of terminology will become necessary in the last parts of the paper to access this insight. Therein Phenomenology becomes Autophenomenology. Autophenomenology is redefined by an argument about the impossibility for neurophysiological data to transcend the irreducibility of the

²⁸² See Ordinary Language Arguments and the Project of Anti-Psychologism in The Philosophy of Mind, in the Tntroduction to this thesis for Ryle’s Three Mistakes. See also Conclusion and Afterword for what becomes of them.
first person. There are two further normative sources for arguments about the mind. These sources are Neuroscientific Object Languages and Linguistic Behavioural Analysis. Both are hetero-imperative. That is, the source of normativity for these claims is open to an intersubjective dispute from the third person point of view in such hetero-imperative uses. One cannot resort to a first-person subjective realm of personal experience for correction like in the cases of ascription and obrogation given above. The source of normativity for these arguments is not Heterophenomenal. When I re-define terms, both Neuroscientific Object Languages and Linguistic Behaviorual Analysis will be relegated to the domain of the third person Heterophenomenologies.

The argument for the transition of phenomenology to Autophenomenology is particularly important as it upholds the distinction between first and third personal points of view. The argument I present, briefly, is this. Even if I could experience your experiences these would be my experiences of your experiences. For instance, if technology ever reaches a point where they could implant your memories into my mind, these would be my experiences of your memories when I either experienced them or recalled them for the first time. Language, however, contains Analogical Constructs that allow me to apply my experiences to interpret your behaviours and equally independently ascribe meaning to some of your words. This is what creates the illusion of the intersubjective nature of language. These Analogical Constructs are actually what lay behind the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem. What the Analogical Constructs reveal is
that I apply my own meaning, based on my own experiences, to the words you use. This is deceptive and illusory and leads to methodological problems in the neurosciences which often depend upon first person experience producing data and third person techno-enhanced observations.

The reason why we each have our own private understanding of the meaning of common words (related to emotional experiences) is revealed when I discuss the processes of language internalization. This thesis argues that such internalization\textsuperscript{283} is part of the way we actually learn the communal aspects of the language components which are related to our private emotional lives. The process of learning the words for emotional ‘flash-bang’ experiences actually results in (1) the sense and meaning for each word deriving from the personal conditions under which the speaker learns to use the word competently. (2) Instead of trying to disprove the Guess Work Objection in some clever way, I argue for it. I argue that some of the language of mind when used in a third person ascription is largely guesswork about an unobservable realm of experience. This is, indeed, how I answer the ‘Guess Work Objection’. I advocate it as a philosophical position. We often don’t know what someone is feeling from their behaviour and words, we have to guess using many of our own experiences to try and understand what they are feeling.

\textsuperscript{283} Here I am deeply indebted to Daniel Kalpokas and his deep insight into Wilfrid Sellars’ and the problem of perceptual knowledge. Daniel Kalpokas. ‘Sellars on Perceptual Knowledge.’ Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 53, no 3. (2017): 425-446.
Instead of denying that emotive and personal statements are guesswork for other listeners like the Anti-Psychologistic philosophers argue, I say yes. Yes! Language is guesswork and speculation, but it involves a particular type of guesswork and speculation based on referential analogues of one’s own experiences. I describe these as ‘Analogical Constructs’ for the words used and the way meaning is applied to them. Our guesswork builds up into self-referencing systems of our own experience which we apply to the words of others. We then apply these self-referencing guesses to others based on their language and behaviour, but at no time do we know if what they are feeling, which is associated with their words and behaviours they have learnt and internalized, is the same as what we are feeling. What is important is that the meaning we get for understanding others and the language being used comes from our own private qualitative experiences. Without these experiences we have no meaning behind the words we use to describe ourselves, or when we guess what other people are feeling when we apply these words.

To partake and use an Analogical Construct the person needs to have a range of experiences as well as the ability to reflect and also needs to have undergone certain stages in the acquisition of language. As I say in the Introduction both (1) the ‘Autobiographical Theory of Meaning’ and (2) the Guess Work Hypothesis are conditions needing to be addressed or fullfilled for a Psychologistic theory about the mind to be considered tenable because they are the strongest objections Anti-Psychologism can raise. Tim Crane draws these
two objections from McDowell and Dummett. Both Michael Dummett and John McDowell argue against the type of Psychologism this paper is advancing. The reason why they argue against an Autobiographical Theory of Meaning in language, and the Guess Work Hypothesis, is that they both think such a view is untenable. I will argue the contrary and provide a story of how people discover meaning in autobiographical stages of language acquisition. I shall argue this based on firstly Sellars’ community of Ryleans which he presents at the end of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. Secondly I shall also draw on Gleeson’s critique of Functionalist Behaviourism. Thirdly I shall make use of Gilbert Ryle’s Occult Phenomenology. Fourthly, I shall draw on an obscure body of scholarship into inconsistencies, problematic trains of thought and lacunas in Wittgengein’s *Philosophical Investigation*. The combination of these four pieces of a puzzle, when laid out in the right order will unlock an insight into how humans learn the terms in a language for publicly unobservable mental phenomena (like personal emotional experiences). This access fulfils both the conditions necessary for a tenable form of Psychologism which Tim Crane drew out of Dummett and McDowell. Both McDowell and Dummett present these conditions as objections to the tenability of a return to Pre-Fregian Psychologism. Moreover, I will provide evidence such tenability of a return to Psychologism is so by showing that David Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie cannot learn the language of the community because he cannot learn to use flash-bang language. The zombie is missing essential elements of phenomenal
consciousness that make it impossible for it to experience and express emotion. Because of the type of creature the phenomenal zombie is, if it had these elements of experiences, which it doesn’t, those experiences would allow it to complete all the socio-linguistic stages of learning a Rylean language in an extended and detailed Neo-Sellarsian framework like that presented in this paper.

The full explanation for Analogical Constructs will actually arise from the critique of Ryle in the Robert Wolff paper. There the explanation for Analogical Constructs is prised open by the cultivation of two strains of argument that began with what was missing in the David Chalmers and Morris Weitz accounts of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Philosophy of Mind. If one were to sketch a thumb nail city map of the paper one would see that these two threads form a subway system through the paper with many stops, and along those stops are stations that reveal the third strain of argument hidden in Ryle. The third strain of argument was of course the Occult Phenomenological Strain of Argumentata hidden inside of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments. Such arguments as trying to anticipate one’s next thought, comparing how regret and nostalgia feel, or comparing the lived experience of being at a race, with merely imagining it from reading a report. This hidden third strain of argument in Ryle, containing a direct appeal to phenomenal aspects of consciousness, will emerge as a direct normative rival to the Linguistic Behavioural Argument. This is what is revealed in the analysis I present of the Robert Wolff piece. The rivalry between
the Linguistic Behavioural Argument and the Phenomenological Argument arises because both produce contradictory claims.

My treatment of Wolff’s article will illustrate the problem with using Ordinary Language Arguments as an authority in the way that Ryle does and respond to the premises of the three questions that underlie the mistakes of Ryle I proposed in the Introduction. These were

1) Are there differences between first and third personal perspectives and if there are, can such differences be found in language?
2) What do such differences consist in?
3) Is one perspective prior to the other?

Basically, the way I untangle the intersubjective illusion of language is to make an argument for Psychologism. This argument in favour of Psychologism will be defined in terms of the irreducibility of an Autophenomenological position. This irreducibility is important. I maintain that arguments that employ a normative force arising from an Autophenomenological source of investigation can not be reduced to the Heterophenomenologies of either Language or Neuroscience. The way I do that is to first show that a number of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments have rival forms of normativity buried in them. The reason why rival sources of normativity are bad is because they can lead to formal contradictions.
between propositions. Contradictions are, of course, bad for arguments and theories.

Ryle thinks Ordinary Language Arguments only have one source of normativity which he thinks is the consuetudinal everyday use of terms about the mind. However, as this paper has shown, there actually are two different rival types of analyses hidden in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments which can provide eristic normative forces for compelling readers to agree with his arguments in different ways.

Once one is aware of this distinction one can see that Linguistic Behavioural and Phenomenological froms of analyses are not mere sub-types of Ordinary Language Arguments, but instead they are eristic rivals. It will be shown by the thesis that the reason why they are eristic is that they create contradictions once some of the propositions that follow on from them are laid out. This is problematic for Ordinary Language Arguments. If (A) the two types of analyses derive from the same source of normativity, then (B) that source of normativity can not support rival contradictory claims. (If A then B). Being able to support contradictory rival claims is of course a very bad thing for any normative source. If any normative source supports two contradictory claims, then this invalidates the normative source and means it is inconsistent.²⁸⁴ By Modus Tollens, (A) the assumption that the two sources of analyses derive from

the same source of normativity is wrong, because (B) there is a contradiction between claims. (Not B, therefore, not A).

That is, if we treat the claims produced by a (C) phenomenological analysis, and the contradictory claim that arises from (D) Linguistic Behavioural analyses as both deriving from the same normative source, in this case Ordinary Language Arguments, then we have a normative source that provides us with a contradiction. (If C is true, then D is false. If D is true, then C is false). The conjunction of both C and D as true propositions will produce a contradiction. Both C and D must be true in order for B to be true. Since C and D can not both be true, this negates B which is the consequent to the antecedent of A. The negation of B, by Modus Tollens gives us the negation of A in the above paragraph. This means that Ordinary Language Arguments are not a consistent source of argument for a theory of mind.

The Root of the Inconsistency in Ryle

Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments are inconsistent because they can produce contradictory claims arising from the two rival eristic types of analyses. This, of course, is where that thread which began at the start of the paper with deficits in the accounts of Weitz’s and Chalmers' reading on Ryle will ultimately end.
Such an end will come with the insight hidden in Robert Wolff’s paper. The application of Linguistic Behavioural Arguments and Phenomenological arguments to the insight in Robert Wolff’s paper will reveal the source of the inconsistency in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments. It will show that Ordinary Language Arguments have a deep-seeded inconsistency that can produce contradictory claims if they are treated as a singular source of normativity. This thesis argues that the inconsistency derives from Ryle’s chief mistake. Ryle’s chief mistake is that he treated the meaning attributed by speakers in first person and third person statements as the same thing. The mistake originates because he thought saying something and thinking it were the same thing. This means that he either did not see the phenomenological appeal in his own arguments as a rival source of normativity to that produced by the analysis of linguistic behaviours, or Ryle simply ignored the fact it was there.

However, once we recognize that the first-personal perspective has access to non-linguistic components of experiences, and the third person perspective does not have that access then it can be seen that claims about the mind can produce two fundamentally different types of analyses. These two sources are found in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Philosophy, i.e. (I) a hidden phenomenology and (II) Linguistic Behaviourism and can produce an eristic rivalry. This eristic rivalry between the two fundamentally different types of analyses can, in some
cases, produce contradictory claims. This is what happens in the Ryle and Robert Wolff paper\textsuperscript{285}.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{285} See Chapter Twenty. \textit{Insights into Dispositional Terms from the Age of Anti-Metaphysicians}, in this paper.}
Part Four:

*Internalization and the Language of the ‘Flash-Bang’*

Chapter Sixteen

**Observational and Report Languages**

In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. Wilfrid Sellars points out that a report\textsuperscript{286} in the presence of a stimulus about that stimulus must have an authority that is recognized by a person. The recognition for the authority of a report ultimately rests upon the social conditions that make such a report possible. The stimulus itself is not enough.

Sellars writes

> For we have seen that to be the expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this authority must *in some sense* be recognized by the person whose report it is\textsuperscript{287}.

\textsuperscript{286}Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997. See pg 72 for the technical specification that Sellars gives for the form for a report.

Indeed, these social conditions are keyed into a background of standard conditions.

Sellars writes

And this is a steep hurdle indeed. For if the authority of the report ‘This is green’ lies in the fact that the existence of green items appropriately related to the perceiver can be inferred from the occurrence of such reports, it follows that only a person who is able to draw this inference, and therefore who has not only the concept $green$, but also the concept of uttering ‘This is green’ -- indeed, the concept of certain conditions of perception, those which would correctly be called 'standard conditions' -- could be in a position to token ‘This is green’ in recognition of its authority. 288

This authority constitutes the second part of Sellars direct refutation of empirical ‘giveness’ statements and the central core of his refutation of Empiricism.

In other words, for a Konstatierung ‘This is green’ to ‘express observational knowledge,’ not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of ‘This is green’ are symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.

Sellars’ point is evident. Not only must one have the standard conditions making up the fact stating role, but one must also have the concept of the fact stating role itself. Both rely upon a social background and a set of standard conditions. People are not geared up like Price’s thermometer to simply state ‘this is green’

---

290 Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 76 Again I take it that Sellars is referring to the ‘role’ of an achievement verb out of Ryle. This is important to the reading. See Triplett and DeVires discussion of William Aston on this point. Triplett, DeVires, Knowledge, Mind and the Given. 2000. Pg 84-86. I think once we take Sellars position from the perspective of Ryle’s achievement verbs it clears up the alleged ambiguity in Sellars’ claim. Wilfrid Sellars’ specific type of claim is linguistic about the use of achievement verbs sanctioned by a community and recognized by the user rather than an epistemic claim about the conditions of knowledge.
in conditions in which green obtains as the proximal stimulant on the visual organs of the human sensory apparatus in the way mercury reacts to the heat bulb of a thermometer. Rather, the act of a report must come from the specific practice in a socio-linguistic community\(^{291}\). Different communities have different ways of making reports. The correctness of a report comes from the sanctioning norms of the community\(^{292}\).

Sellars writes

As we have already noticed, the correctness of a report does not have to be construed as the rightness of an action. A report can be correct as being an instance of a general mode of behavior which, in a given linguistic community, it is reasonable to sanction and support\(^{293}\).

\(^{291}\) See O’Shea, Wilfrid Sellars, 2007. Pg 75-81 for a discussion on this point.

\(^{292}\) See Wilfrid Sellars’ ‘Truth and ‘Correspondence’.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, Pp 197 - 224. California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 203 for Sellars’ position on fact stating roles in a language and their relationship with forms of ‘correspondence’. Sellars treats a report qua ‘fact stating role’ merely as one ‘use’ or ‘role’, (role being his preferred terminology), in a language. However he thinks that a role and role aspects change in different languages, and they don’t all ‘correspond’. One example of this one might imagine could be the classic Whorf hypothesis that reports made of geological features by Native American speakers use a complex vocabulary of geometrical figures, compared with simile and metaphor which plays a larger role in English descriptions of Geological features. Another could be the deep structures that arise in English use of metaphor about containers, impersonalization, personification and deeper principles of coherence in structuring metaphors; see G. Lakoff, M. Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp 29 -30, 41-46, 49 – 51, 126 – 128. See also O’Shea, Wilfrid Sellars, 2007 and the discussion of Linguistic Communities pp 75-81, 102-105.

\(^{293}\) Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 76.
Sellars is forwarding a position on linguistic reports given in the presence of certain stimuli. In this case Sellars is arguing that social norms give the authority for what is essentially a fact stating role in standard conditions. One must first have the concept of the fact stating role and this concept must come out of social practice or a social linguistic context that allows one to acquire the concept of a fact stating role. This is a socio-epistemic claim which has roots in the linguistic practices of the community.

Initially, when Wilfrid Sellars scrutinizes perception in terms of dispositionally based responses and abilities in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, it is to the end goal of three moves based on the propositional and descriptive content that Logical Positivists took to be sense data, that appears in structures based around looks-talk. Initially he divides the treatment of looks-talk between a ‘sense datum’ and an ‘appearing’ in a disjunctive syllogism. The ‘appearing’ he argues is ultimate and irreducible and he dismisses it for reasons he doesn’t completely explain in the paper, but, which, are ultimately tied into what’s bothering him in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* and the Thomistic structure of the possible intellect in *Being and Being*.

---

294 I’m trying to avoid using the word ‘analyses’ in my exposition of Wilfrid Sellars because it acquires a highly technical use with specific applications in given contexts in relation to the body of his philosophy. See Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997. Pg 33, 86, pp 53-53.


Known\textsuperscript{297} where he constructs a vocabulary of the senses\textsuperscript{298}. However, in

*Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, the sense data, he argues, can be
dissassembled between an explanation and an analysis\textsuperscript{299}.

What is interesting is that Sellars introduces his final position early
on\textsuperscript{300}. In Section Nine after considering the problems raised by treating sense
data theories as an enriched code flagged\textsuperscript{301} from ordinary language expressions,
in his critique of Ayer\textsuperscript{302} he raises the possibility that sense data are actually

\textsuperscript{297} The senses informed by the character of the possible intellect. See the Tractarian criticism in *Being and Being Known*. Sellars, Wilfrid ‘Being and Being Known.’ In *Science, Perception and Reality* Pp 41 - 59. California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 49

\textsuperscript{298} Sellars, *Being and Being Known*, 1991. Essentially the difference between ‘picking’ and
‘signifying’, the former pertaining to the real order and the later to the logical order in his critique of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. The core of his concern involves the move from ‘first act’ in *Being and Being Known* which is dispositional, pg 43, in which someone gains the concept and the second act. The second act being the ability to think of something as an instance of that concept. The move involves being informed by the ‘thing’s’ nature. This in turn involves an isomorphism between the knower and the known, involving the intellect and the senses. Pg 41-48. For Sellars picking involves more than just the logical order of significance, it requires an isomorphism of the second act.

\textsuperscript{299} Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997. Pg 34

\textsuperscript{300} Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997. Pg 31

\textsuperscript{301} I am using flagged here in the highly technical sense Sellars introduces on pg 27, Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997

\textsuperscript{302} Triplett, DeVires, *Knowledge, Mind and the Given*. 2000. Pg 104-106 Comparatively, see also Triplett and DeVires summary. However I think it is problematic that they introduce their vocabularly. Many of the terms are irrelevant to explaining Sellars argument, like locutions, which is Austin’s vocabulary, not Sellars, nor is it Ryle’s which Sellars is using. See Lecture IX Austin, J. L. *How to Do Things with Words*. Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1975. Pp 109-120 for Austin’s locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Triplett and DeVires also do things like changing Sellars other highly technical terminology which puts the explanation of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* they develop out of synch with Sellars other papers. They replace Sellars technical term ‘report’ which is a specific type of ‘language role’ with ‘beliefs’, and although it is perhaps influenced by a Brandom reading it is nonetheless problematic. ‘Report’ has specific applications in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, as well as his other papers. Moreover it is problematic because it is not obvious that ‘language roles’ and ‘reports’ are synonymous given Sellars developments in Sellars other papers like ‘Naming and Saying.’ In *Science, Perception and Reality*, Pp 225 - 246. California: Ridgeview, 1991, and Sellars, *Truth and Correspondence*, 1991. Sellars, *Language of Theories*, 1991. Considerations about maintaining and preserving the consistency of Sellars’ highly developed technical vocabulary aside there are other problems. On a naive view, the general philosophical problem with treating ‘reports’ as synonymous with ‘beliefs’ as Triplett and DeVires do is that there is an interpretive ‘gap’ between reports and beliefs. One can take a beliefs as de dicto of the report or de re of the object the report is about. For a more sophisticated position on de dicto and de re see Devitt’s work in *Thoughts and Their Ascription*, 1984.
theoretical entities, but seemingly dismisses it in a slight of hand, on account of ‘no one thinking of them this way’. Sellars then argues that sense data theories are a mismatching of two ideas. The first is what Brandom will come to refer to as ‘sentience’ that is, that there are certain inner episodes without which it would be impossible to hear musical notes or see a three-sided patch of colour. That is to say, that such inner episodes are necessary for what you might call ‘higher functions’ like recognizing and knowing that a certain musical tone is the note C#. These at the basic sensory level are shared by man and beast alike but at the higher level have epistemic content linked to social factors and the sanctioning norms of the community. The second idea is that there are certain inferential ‘knowings that’. These are what Sellars reveals later as the fact stating roles of the subjunctive conditional structure revealed in looks-talk. Such subjunctive conditional structures arise between the withholding of a statement of fact and what Sellars refers to as the ‘residue’ of the descriptive content.


304 Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 33

305 Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 76.

306 What I am defending Sellars against in this reading is the charge that he advocates a ‘boundlessly theory laden view of perception’ and a criticism that his view is subject to critique by ‘bullheadedness’. See Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 1983. Pg 70. NB This ‘bull-headedness’ is a particular property of encapsulation that makes faculties, a fortiori, vertical. Vertical domains are modular by hypothesis and domain specific by definition, pg 101. Horizontal faculties are widely distinguishable across multiple content domains, pg 13. Fodor gives examples of these, and they are generally things like attention span, memory, perception, the multiplicity of imagination, pg 10-11. On this view a thoroughly horizontal faculty, functionally individuated, is one that may access mental content in other domains at one time or another. This horizontal and vertical architecture allows Fodor to distinguish input systems, which are encapsulated, modular and vertical, from central systems which are non-modular, un-encapsulated and involved in long term processes of review and chained reasoning like belief fixation. In put systems, on this view, would deal with the
My reading of Sellars presents a closer analysis of the ‘residue’ and fact stating role, in order to avoid Jerry Fodor’s criticism of the ‘New-look psychology’ and ‘the assumption all perception is boundlessly theory laden’. Fodor’s point is that if this were the case then we would learn to see the Muller Lyre arrowed lines at an equal length\textsuperscript{307}.

Fodor writes

The very same subject who can tell you that the Muller-Lyre arrows are identical in length, who indeed has seen them measured, still finds one looking longer than the other. In such cases it is hard to see an alternative to the view that at least some of the background information at the subject’s disposal is inaccessible to at least some of his perceptual mechanisms\textsuperscript{308}.

\textsuperscript{307}Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 1983. Pg 66
This, I think is a very important point that has been overlooked in much of the literature. However, I argue that there is a distinction in Sellars that takes account of this, and that distinction is strong enough to bear up to Fodor’s criticism as it parallels Fodor’s own distinction between input and central systems and can give an account of information encapsulation at the perceptual level\textsuperscript{309}. The distinction in Sellars arises from the subjunctive conditional structure in Sellars exploration of ‘looks’ language which can be revealed by a close and careful reading of \textit{Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind}. The subjunctive conditional structure is revealed by carefully scrutinizing the difference between the existential distinction and the qualitative distinction in the structure of claims based on the assent of the subject. The shift between existential and qualitative is the grounds for the transition between fact stating roles of a Report Language and the withholding of assent in an Observation Language. Sellars’ argument is that the withholding of assent is what allows the various features of an Observational Language to flourish, such as similes,

\footnote{Where the key clash occurs is between Fodor’s ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ architecture and Sellars ‘residuum’ and ‘percept’ and bottoms out in Fodor’s basic categorizations, in particular (g) the ‘giveness’ of the categorization which Fodor draws from the evidence of high frequency counts and associations in natural descriptions on pg 95 Fodor, \textit{The Modularity of Mind}, 1983. However Sellars would argue that these are acquired as part of a linguistic community. The residuum doesn’t change but our fact stating roles and linguistic practices do. Categorization in the sense Fodor means it in terms of information encapsulation as the essence of modularity involves fact stating roles and recognition, at least on the level of ‘perceptual encoding’. To insist that these are given basic categorizations, and as such that they cannot be changed as part of linguistic community’s set of roles or linguistic practices would be to commit the ‘myth of the given’. See Fodor, \textit{The Modularity of Mind}, 1983, pg 66, 71, 94 – 97.}
appropriated models, metaphorical structures and other figurative features that make an Observational Language possible. The existential and qualitative distinction is revealed by distinctions in three separate cases. The three cases are

a. Seeing that x, over there, is red
b. It’s looking to one that x, over there, is red
c. It’s looking to one as though there were a red object over there\(^\text{310}\)

As Sellars points out

(a) is so formulated as to involve an endorsement of the idea that x, over there, is red, whereas in
(b) this idea is only partially endorsed, and in (c) not at all. Let us refer to the idea *that x, over there, is red* as the *common propositional content* of these three situations\(^\text{311}\).


\(^{311}\)Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997 Pg 50 – 51. His italics.
That is, (a) agrees with this propositional content (b) partially agrees with it, and (c) is the existential case that disagrees with what is common between (a) and (b) namely the existence of x. The difference between (a) and (b) is qualitative, which he can explain away with a story about standard conditions. However (c), the existential case is more troublesome. The propositional content for (c) involves a claim about an object that isn’t really there. This is what leads him to his final position. But the propositional content is only the first part of the story. If the propositional content was the only part of the story then Sellars’ would be subject to Fodor’s criticism of what Fodor calls ‘the New-Look Psychology School’. However, on Sellars’ account all three share a residual descriptive content as well as the propositional content.

Sellars writes

The propositional content of these three experiences is, of course, a part of that to which we are logically committed by characterizing them as situations of these three kinds. Of the remainder, as we have seen, part is a matter of the extent to which this propositional content is endorsed. It is the residue with which we are now
concerned. Let us call this residue the descriptive content\textsuperscript{312}.

By separating the propositional content from the descriptive content of the ‘residue’ he can thus implement a distinction between the two within the subjunctive conditional structure that a denial in a ‘looks’ claim takes\textsuperscript{313}. The ‘linguistic behaviour’ of a denial in the language of an ‘x looks y’ or ‘there appears to be an x over there’ relies upon a mechanism that works on two levels. Instead of a flatly false antecedent indicated by a negation, (it is simply not the case that x is y), the protasis of the subjunctive conditional contains a denial and a description (x looks as though it were y). The denial is not a false truth value, nor is it a negation of the antecedent, but rather it is a withholding of propositional content to the descriptive residue by the agent making the claim. The agent asserts what appears to be the case, but also points out that it is not. This ‘wilful’ withholding is supported by an agent who is conditioned by factors

\textsuperscript{312}Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 Pg51, his italics.

\textsuperscript{313} My treatment of Sellars here closely parallels Triplett and DeVires, t. Knowledge, Mind and the Given, 2000.Pp 24 – 28. My reading runs along similar lines to DeVires and Triplett’s distinction between ascribing and endorsing a claim, except I follow what I consider to be a closer reading of the text and proceeded under the assumption that Sellars himself isn’t using ‘locutions’, which is Austin’s vocabulary, but ‘achievement’ verbs which is Ryle’s, like Sellars says in Section 16. See Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 Pg 40, Triplett, DeVires, Knowledge, Mind and the Given. 2000. Pg 223 of the DeVires and Triplett reproduction of Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind for the same section. Both state ‘I pointed out above that when we use the word ‘see’ as in ‘S sees that the tree is green’ we are not only ascribing a claim to the experience, but endorsing it. It is this endorsement which Ryle has in mind when he refers to seeing that something is thus and so as an achievement, and to ‘sees’ as an achievement word. ‘I prefer to call it a ‘so it is’ or ‘just so’ word.’
from the social background of a linguistic community, and what they perceive to be standardized conditions.

A ‘looks’ statement uses subjunctive conditionals, but it is not a proper counterfactual like those David Lewis develops in his theory of Trans-Finite Counterfactual Modal Realism in which the subjunctive conditional refers to counterfactual cases by quantifying over worlds using a strong and weak modal operator. Instead of truth values or a modal theory of worlds, Sellars discovers the values derived for the ‘looks’ statement are either affirmed or withheld depending on the socio-linguistic background of the speaker within the space of discourse and standard conditions accepted and initially taught to the agent by his or her linguistic community. The affirmation or withholding of the descriptive content of an antecedent-consequent Sellarsian pseudo-subjunctive conditional statement are intrinsically linked to norms of the social and linguistic community the maker of the ‘looks’ statement comes from, once they acquire the language roles for Observational and Report languages. The former Observational Statement withholds assent, the latter Report Statements features full factual use of affirmable descriptive content in statements.

Something doesn’t just look to be the case in a Report Language, it is the case.

---

314 Lewis, David. *Counterfactuals*. 
Sellars writes

Now, and this is the decisive point, in characterizing these three experiences as, respectively, a seeing that x, over there, is red, it’s looking to one as though x, over there, were red, and it’s looking to one as though there were a red object over there, we do not specify this common descriptive content save indirectly, by implying that if the common propositional content were true\textsuperscript{315}, then all these three situations would be cases of seeing that x, over there, is red. Both existential and qualitative lookings are experiences that would be seeings if their propositional contents were true\textsuperscript{316}.


\textsuperscript{316}Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 51 The italics are his however I should like to emphasize them as well, as they reveal the subjunctive conditional structure of the residuum and the fact stating role.
This pseudo-subjunctive conditional structure, the one Sellars is identifying with the indirect mechanism of assent in ‘looks-talk’, is concerned with the set of propositional statements that one would attach to descriptive contents given in a stipulation in which the social linguistic and standardized conditions of the linguistic community are obtained. The Muller-Lyre lines on the reading I am purposing would appear in the residue of the descriptive content. In this way, I argue, that the ‘residue’ or ‘residuum’ of the descriptive content, in Sellars’ argument, is flexible enough that it can account for recalcitrant modulation in the form of information encapsulation of the sort that Fodor’s criticism of the New-look school of psychology makes, without damaging Sellars’ essential claims that Observation and Report Languages change the way people see the world. Further I argue it does so without making Sellars himself subject to the ‘giveness’ of the sense data schools he criticizes.

That is to say the ‘bull-headed’ belligerence of the optical illusion for the Muller-Lyre lines to appear as though one were bigger than the other even while the viewer knows the lines are the same length can be accounted for by the descriptive residuum within the pseudo-subjunctive conditional structure of a ‘looks’ statement.

This is because, in Sellars’ account, as I pointed out, the confusion in sense data theories originally begins with the mix matching of a brute component with the ‘non-inferential knowings that’.

The brute
component is found in the residuum which remains common in statements as the descriptive content that is either qualitatively or existentially withheld or affirmed. The descriptive content of the statements does not change, but the affirmational propositional component does. That is to say the person does not hear, see or experience a different stimulus, but rather the nature of the propositional value of the descriptive component changes. The descriptive component is the residuum of the sensory experience that is either affirmed or withheld propositionally. This residuum is the common sensory content behind all three statements. The residuum remains even when the qualitative and existential endorsements change. It is in this residuum that we would find the recalcitrance of the optical illusion. That is to say what Fodor calls the ‘bullheadedness’ of the stimulus (which is the persistence for one of the lines to look longer even though they are of even length) remains in the residuum of the experience in all three cases of Sellars example. This residuum is the brute component of the sensory experience.

---

317 In *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, Sellars draws on a Cartesian a sensory/conceptual dualism with the lower sensory experiences of the world, what Ryle would call ‘sensations’ in his ‘sensations and observations’ distinction, and higher states of cognition like ‘wishing’, ‘wondering’, ‘judging’ separated. This distinction arises from his reading of Descartes who thought sensations could be located in the body and brain, but higher states would not. We can see the argument in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* as the solution to the problem in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, if read the way I have suggested in this paper based on the order of publication in *Science, Perception and Reality*. The key to this is to see the sensory part of the dualism, as the residuum, and the brute sensory component man and animal alike share, while the higher cognitive states of the Cartesian sensory/dualism in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* correspond with Sellars term ‘roles’ and the shifting propositional structures keyed into the
Sellars writes

(1) The idea that there are certain ‘inner episodes,’ e.g. the sensation of a red triangle or of a C# sound, which occur to human beings and brutes without any prior process of learning or concept formation, and without which it would -- in some sense -- be impossible to see, for example, that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular, or hear that a certain physical sound is C#. 318

And also

(2) The idea that there are certain ‘inner episodes’ which are the non-inferential knowings that, for example, a certain item is red and triangular, or, in the case of sounds, C#, which inner episodes are the necessary conditions of linguistic practices of the community in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. When read this way, it can be seen how the papers are a continuation of the central themes found in each one.

empirical knowledge as providing the evidence for all other empirical propositions.\textsuperscript{319}

Now the split between sensory qualities and the non-inferential *knowings that*, are ultimately based on a ‘conceptual-sensory’ dualism, or what we might call a ‘faculty-dualism’\textsuperscript{320}. Sellars left us with this ‘sensory-conceptual’ faculty-dualism at the end of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. The first side of the dualism is (a) conceptual and thinking processes which Sellars argues can be dealt with, firstly, by treating them as being analogous to the way novelists use sentences to represent people’s thoughts in novels, during the Manifest Image. Later he thinks these will be replaced with neurophysiological information like we now have with PET, (f)MIR and EEG devices in the technological growth of the Scientific Image. The second side of the dualism is (b), physical sensations like touch, taste and smell which he is unsure of what to do with at the end of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*.

The root of this conceptual-sensory faculty dualism begins with Sellars consideration of Descartes’ distinction between different levels of thinking. Sellars reads Descartes’ problem of the mind as originating from two levels of


\textsuperscript{320}My term used in a sense derivative of Fodor’s use of ‘faculty’ in *The Modularity of Mind*. By it I mean a dualism like that in Sellars, between thoughts qua thinking and sensations qua sensory faculties. This dualism, for Sellars, originates in Descartes distinction between ‘conceptual thinking’ and sensory correspondence of perception. See Sellars, *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, 1991. Pg 29 – 31 following the discussion of Eddington’s two tables.
cognition which he sees result in the final Cartesian unresolved and unfinished attempt to deal with mind/body dualism without recourse to a quasi-mystic Cartesian Platonism. In Sellars’ reading of Descartes human thought is split between (A) low-grade levels which comprise of sensations, images, and feelings and (B) the high-grade conceptual elements of thinking which Sellars sees in Descartes as the foundation of the Cartesian attempt to incorporate bodily sensation of the world and ‘higher’ consciousness states of cognition. Sellars sees the Cartesian project as representative of an early attempt at integrating what Sellars refers to as the Manifest and Scientific Images.

Sellars writes

Let us consider in more detail the Cartesian attempt to integrate the manifest and the scientific images. Here the interesting thing to note is that Descartes took for granted (in a promissory-note-ish kind of way) that the scientific image would include items which would be the counterparts of the sensations, images, and feelings of the manifest framework. These counterparts would be complex states of the brain which, obeying purely physical laws, would resemble and differ from one another in a way
which corresponded to the resemblances and differences between the conscious states with which they were correlated. Yet, as is well-known, he denied that there were brain states which were, in the same sense, the cerebral counterparts of conceptual thinking\textsuperscript{321}.

Basically,Sellars has worked out what to do with (A) higher cognitive states, that is, he treats them as analogous to speech which is how they are found in the Manifest Image. By focusing on language to model thought processes, like a novelist does, Sellars argues that this allows one to ignore the introspective qualities of those thought processes\textsuperscript{322}. Ignoring ‘introspective qualities’ allows one to side-step a number of problems about the nature of human consciousness.

Thus our concept of 'what thoughts are' might, like our concept of what a castling is in chess, be abstract in the sense that it does not concern itself with the intrinsic character of thoughts, save as items which can occur in patterns of relationships which are analogous to the way in

\textsuperscript{322} The problem of Introspection, Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 31.
which sentences are related to one another and to
the contexts in which they are used\textsuperscript{323}.

This allows him to envisage neuroscience as developing in such a way that it
begins by treating (A) conceptual thinking as analogous to speech processes,
picking out the role they play and identifying them with neurophysiological
processes\textsuperscript{324}. This, in turn allows him to see the Scientific Image merge with the
Manifest Image of Man without a clash.

Now if thoughts are items which are conceived in
terms of the roles they play, then there is no
barrier \textit{in principle} to the identification of
conceptual thinking with neurophysiological
process. There would be no 'qualitative'
remainder to be accounted for. The identification
curiously enough, would be even more

\textsuperscript{324} This is an over-simplification of the paper and his general position is a lot more complex than I have room to expand here. In Sellars see for example 'Truth and 'Correspondence'.’ In \textit{Science, Perception and Reality}, Pp 197 - 224. California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 197 – 207 where he distinguishes between thought as acts of thinking, and thoughts as that which is thought. Linguistic utterances can express an act of thinking if it is the culmination of a process in which the initial stage is the act of thinking. On the other side of this distinction he points out in Sellars, \textit{Language of Theories}, 1991. that not all linguistic roles are conceptual. See his footnote on page 115. The position offered by this paper supports the earlier close reading, where an emotional vocabulary is intersubjective because it is learnt as an achievement verb which becomes part of a Report Language after it shifts from an Observation Language where it starts as a Capacity Disposition.
straightforward than the identification of the physical things in the manifest image with complex systems of physical particles. And in this key, if not decisive, respect, the respect in which both images are concerned with conceptual thinking (which is the distinctive trait of man), 

*the manifest and scientific images could merge without clash in the synoptic view*\(^{325}\).

However, at the end of the paper the process of integrating (B) the sensory qualities of the Manifest Image, still eludes him. We will return to his treatment of conceptual thinking as analogous to language later in the paper. For the moment let’s take a closer look at how he resolves the problem of sensory qualities.

In *The Language of Theories* Sellars argues that the division between the theoretical elements like postulates, theorems and various calculi and the non-theoretical elements, conveys what seems to be an ontological dualism between observables and non-observables which is bothering him in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. This is the structural schema he inherits from Carnap’s frameworks where theoretical entities are attached to empirical

experience. In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man he is still dealing with this framework because the difference between observables and non-observables is what he characterizes as the main difference between the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image\(^{326}\).

In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man Sellars deals with Carnap’s epistemology\(^{327}\) by collapsing first the theoretical framework into the correspondence rules and then the correspondence rules into the observational framework\(^{328}\) giving us the first sight of his solution in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind of unifying ordinary language discourse with science, and the argument that theoretical and observational frameworks can shift over time. The way they shift is what Brandom will come to call ‘the space of reasons’ and the subjunctive conditional structure of withholding assent is important to this solution. Sellars’ solution of course, as Brandom points out\(^{329}\) will be to argue in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind that the difference between ‘theoreticals’ and ‘observables’ is methodological and not ontological.

The relationship that develops between ‘analyses’ and ‘explanation’ is interesting in this regard. Both embody elements of the faculty dualism that I mentioned has roots in issues arising from Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars holds that if the

\(^{327}\)See the Supplement in Meaning and Necessity
\(^{329}\)Brandom, Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. See Brandom’s commentary on Section 44, Pg163.
'looks' part of the sense datum is analysed then we find it hard to disbelieve the analyses, in this case, treating a car or B. C. Broad’s penny, say, as merely an oblong or elliptical bit of colour. However, if the sense datum in the way something looks is explained away we can believe otherwise because as Sellars points out one can accept a fact without accepting the explanation.

Eventually Sellars does away with ‘sense data analyses’ in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. He argues that it is merely a spatio-logical bit of sophistication that is related to our framework but does not belong to it.\(^{330}\)

Sellars’ argument here is that it is a spatial-conceptual sophistication to treat an object like a car as an oblong bit of colour and not a foundation on which our perception of the world is built. Sellars argues it is a sophistication to see the world in terms of shapes and not objects. He thinks that seeing an elliptical shape on the table instead of a penny is a sensory-perceptual sophistication that comes only after someone has acquired the language of a community and learned how to anticipate and recognize the propositional content in terms of that linguistic community. Here, his argument seems to be drawing on Ryle’s success verbs\(^{331}\) except that Sellars is taking Ryle both in the strictly normative


\(^{331}\)Sellars, *Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997. Pg 40 Sellars tells us that these correspond with Ryle’s success verbs in particular Ryle’s class of ‘see’ achievement verbs, which also have applications in a Linguistic Behavioural analysis that Ryle applies to the way sensations and observations linguistically behave. Ryle, of course, lacks the resources to make a number of the distinctions that he makes in order to uphold this distinction since he denies the existence of consciousness and introspection. Sellars’ position is pragmatic. He doesn’t deny the existence of consciousness, rather he thinks it is problematic for the Scientific Image of Man. For Ryle’s Observations and Sensations distinction see Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, 1983. Pg 190 – 200. In particular, see pg 196 for his argument on telescopes and confusion between sensations and
ordinary language sense and a naive phenomenal sense. But what Sellars is, of course, doing is developing specific grounds for the qualitative and existential distinction behind statements about the way something ‘looks’.

This then leaves him with what he holds as the only two remaining possibilities that the ‘sense datum’ in looks-talk can be explained by. The dilemma of these two possibilities is what leads to his third and final move\(^{332}\). Either we treat impressions or immediate experience as theoretical entities, or we make the discovery that the sense datum contains impressions or immediate experience as components. The later he’s already ruled out with the existential case since there is no object in the case of a vivid hallucination, hypnogogic image or optical illusion\(^{333}\). For the former he also needs to make a case for treating impressions and immediate experience as theoretical entities because we can withhold assent to a residuum even in ‘bull-headed’ cases like the Muller-Lyre lines, even when the illusory residuum component persists. That is even though we go on seeing the lines with the same lengths as different lengths because of the nature of the optical illusion, we can withhold propositional assent to it. Sellars then goes on to provide a story about a Rylean community to do this.

\(^{333}\) (a) and (b) vs (c).
The community begins with a language which can describe publicly observable objects, but which lacks the ability to talk about thoughts or the behaviours of its members. The way the tribe develops that ability is first through descriptions of behaviour and secondly the ability to come to see theoretical terms in observational descriptions. The point of the story is to make credible treating thoughts as theoretical entities which in turn gives an account for what seemed so puzzling about the existential looks case.

For Sellars the mechanics inside of the sense data of a bit of ‘looks talk’ is operated by a set of reasons that change the structure of a causally keyed-in disposition. This is what Brandom calls the space of reasons. Sellars structures the shift between an ‘x looks y’ claim to an ‘x is y’ claim by dividing the propositional content of the disposition possessed by the subject making that claim, from that of the descriptive content. The descriptive content is the residue at the back of the propositional content which possess a subjunctive conditional structure. We briefly looked at this a moment ago with Fodor’s criticism. This is the structural element that, were the propositional part true, then the descriptive part would be an accurate description. This is an important piece of Linguistic Behavioural analysis. For instance, ‘x seems to be the case’

---

states, counterfactually that ‘x isn’t the case’ but that it ‘looks’ to be. The ‘looks’
of course refers to the descriptive content. Similarly, ‘x looks y to z’ states that x
is not y, but that it carries the descriptive content of y, the residuum, which is
how things look for z. This is why Wilfrid explicitly rejects treating ‘looks’
statements as sets of relations.\(^{337}\)

To explain this division between a descriptive content and propositional
content with a counterfactual structure, Sellars introduces a short piece of
fiction about a tie shop on the cusp of the introduction of electric lighting.\(^{338}\) I
only mention it briefly as it illuminates the division of the descriptive content
from the fact stating role in the subjunctive of the conditional and the way
reasons can be keyed into dispositional statements. These ‘reasons’ given within
the practice of the community are what ultimately change a descriptive
statement of an Observational Language, into a fact stating role in a Report
Language. The Tie Salesman comes to see the tie that ‘looks’ green in the new
electric lighting of his store, ‘as’ green once someone has given him a reason to


\(^{338}\) For those unfamiliar with it: during the course of his career as a tie salesman, lighting is
introduced to the neighbourhood that John, the tie salesmen, works in. At first this puts John in to a
bit of a confusion as a tie which looks green suddenly appears blue. ‘I know it is blue, even though it
looks green.’ John might say. The ‘looks’ green is the part where John withholds his acquiesce from
the propositional content and simply states the descriptive residuum. However, were one to convince
John that electric lighting is a better medium to judge the visible band of electromagnetic radiation
by than the old kerosene lighting, then John would come to see the residuum, the descriptive part
that looks green, as if it were green. The standard conditions by which John takes to be true the
propositional content will have shifted. In this way, Sellars is able to solve the earlier problem of the
stereoscopic image between the Scientific Image and its methodological feeding upon the Manifest
Image, in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, and demonstrate how theoretical entities
become visible.
by explaining that the new electric lighting gives off a more accurate radiance when compared to older gas lighting.

Brandom in his commentary calls the move into the type of space the subjunctive conditional structure of ‘looks/is’ talk occupies between an Observational Language and a Report Language ‘entering the space of reasons’339. ‘Looks-talk’ and its descriptive vocabulary borrows heavily from other Fact Stating roles and Report Languages to build models, metaphors and similes which one uses to inform the descriptive statement the user of the language is employing, but withholding assent from. This is like when Robert Hooke first looked into a microscope and described the cell structures of cork as ‘cells’ borrowing from the language of monastic buildings and the ‘cells’ monks occupy. Brandom takes Sellars to be arguing that (a) ‘looks-talk’ is parasitic on ‘is’ talk, that is, the nature of the descriptive residue associated with a dispositionally keyed bit of observation is parasitic upon standard conditions, and (b) that reasons, such as an argument that the reliability of electric lighting is more loyal to the discernment of the visible band of electro-magnetic radiation, may cause the person to shift from withholding assent to a propositional content by instead of saying ‘x ‘looks’ y’, with the subjunctive conditional structure, to a propositional affirmation of the descriptive residue associated with the statement, to, of course ‘x is y’.

Recall now the move between the descriptive content and the fact stating role is a matter of whether someone uses either ‘looks’ or ‘is’ in their claim, or its propositional equivalent. The former ‘x looks to be the case’ is descriptive, and in natural language is indicative of similitude and figurative devices while ‘x is the case’, in the proper sense is fact stating.

Interestingly enough, to reinforce Sellars argument Brandom, in his commentary on *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, introduces an Ordinary Language argument with a Linguistic Behavioural analysis, that doesn’t appear to be in the original text. Brandom points out that ‘looks-talk’ doesn’t iterate, that is, we cannot withhold our assent more than once, because the withholding has already been done in the original structure of the subjunctive conditional. That is, *it doesn’t make sense to say* ‘it looks as though x looks y’ or *it does not make sense to say* ‘it seems like x seems to look like y’ and so on, through various iterations\(^{340}\). Since the user has withheld assent to the factual propositional content of the statement by saying ‘x looks y’ or ‘there appears to be an x over there’ it does not make sense for them to withhold assent again. There is no assent to withhold.

As I pointed out above, Sellars thinks that a Report Language itself is quite a sophisticated piece of linguistic behaviour that rests upon a foundation which brings with it a lot of social ‘baggage’. Not only must a perceiver know the

standard conditions, he must also know the socio-linguistic conditions of appropriateness 341. Before someone can make observations they need the ability to make an endorsement for a factual observation claim based in those conditions under which the observation takes place. This ability rests on linguistic competence and linguistic competence itself rests upon having the concepts 342.

Now, as I pointed out earlier, in section forty of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* 343 Sellars argues, pace Ryle, that science follows the pre-scientific stage of language, and further Sellars claims that failure to accept this will result in failure to understand ordinary language 344. Thus, the affirmation that ‘looks talk’ can be based in the Linguistic Behaviourist analyses of iteration and applied to a normative Ordinary Language argument can be made. That is the propositional shift of the qualitative distinction of the residue in the subjunctive conditional structure of the ‘looks’ statement revealed by a Linguistic Behavioural style argument, which of course is the inability to iterate, as a bit of linguistic behaviour, is supported by an Ordinary Language argument that requires some type of normativity.

While one might say ‘it is not the case that Jones is not the killer’ making Jones the killer via iteration of negation, saying ‘it looks as though it

looks like Jones did it’ or ‘it looks like it looks as though there is a red x over there’ does not have the same iterative effect. One can only withhold assent based on observational conditions of language once. Similes, metaphors and descriptions do not recapitulate meaning. This is because the assent to the descriptive content is only withheld, not affirmed nor negated. The claim ‘x is like a red rose’ is really a withholding of assent to the proposition ‘x is a red rose’, while still stating an affirmation of the descriptive content, i.e. the ‘redness’ and ‘rosiness’ which would obtain under standard social conditions for recognizing the descriptive qualities if ‘x is a red rose’ were true. This is important.

The social conditions for the observational language have to come from somewhere. Sellars thinks this is a process. Sellars creates his own tribe and from that builds up a developmental ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory of Language’ to explain this process. He begins with a socially observable language, and moves from that into a language capable of describing what Gleeson would call ‘affective forms of life’ in others. However, the stages of the development of this tribe’s social-linguistic capacities in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind clash with the developmental stages of the Quasi-Pseudo-Hegelian Anthropology Wilfrid Sellars argues for in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. We will now examine this conflict in-depth and resolve it.
Wherein the clash between the primacy of (a) Object Languages and (b) concepts of Affective Life in the conflicting sequences of the Developmental Stages of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy are resolved. These conflicting sequences of Developmental Stages occur between (i) Wilfrid Sellars theory of Socio-Linguistics in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, and (ii) the Process Anthropology of his *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*.\(^\text{345}\)

There is a tension between (i) the ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory of Language’ in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* and (ii) the developmental stages of the Two Images in the ‘Process Anthropology’ of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. This problem, when I introduced it earlier was temporarily confined to discussion of the Manifest Image. There I said a temporary solution was to place ‘Jones’ in the pre-history of the Manifest Image in order to account for the rich vocabulary of psychological terms used in the Anthropomorphic Era so as to be able to describe the wind as ‘cheeky’ or the lightning as ‘angry’ according to

---

\(^{345}\) I apologize for the affectation to a Kantian style of title. It does serve a purpose which is to make as overtly and technically clear as possible the purpose of this section of the thesis.
Sellars’ ‘Process Anthropology’ model of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*.

In *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* the Anthropomorphic era gives way to the Empirical Image when nature becomes the domain of truncated personifications left over from the Anthropomorphic Age. What I would call the Gleesonian ‘affective’ and ‘expressivity’ vocabulary and concepts that the Quasi-Hegelian Tribes people of this alternative history apply to wind, fire, the universe and each other must first be purged in order for Empiricism to arrive on the scene. The ‘Empirical Age’ is a necessary period according to the alternative timeline of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. Empiricism needs to happen in order for the Manifest Image to develop the resources that will allow for a Scientific Image to emerge and challenge it. The moment this happens is when the Manifest Image becomes sophisticated enough to account for ‘imperceptible’ objects with theoretical entities and bring on the development of the Scientific Image to achieve the dream of a Neo-Carnapian Epistemology and theoretical framework.

Between *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* (which can be shown on close analysis to use a Carnap-esque framework of theoretical and observational objects), and *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, which is a refutation of empirical-giveness, Wilfrid Sellars has another paper called *The Language of Theories*. What *The Language of Theories* reveals is that Sellars comes to reject a Neo-Carnapian framework.
In *Meaning and Necessity* Rudolph Carnap develops a sophisticated doctrine of ‘Linguistic Frameworks’ in which abstract entities are attached to empirical experiences of the world. By the time Sellars reaches *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* he has utterly come to reject Carnap’s view. It is a rejection of the empirical ‘giveness’ of Carnap’s seductive Empirico-nominalist treatment of language which I think is the stimulus behind why Sellars is writing *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. What, perhaps, confuses some people who read *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* is that it contains firstly, this refutation of Empiricism and the ‘given’, but that it also goes beyond this and into the description of the development of languages able to talk about non-observable emotional content and experiences. This additional story of how people seemingly come to be able to talk about private experiences seems ad hoc relative to the refutation of an increasingly complex empiricism which has dominated Anglo-Western philosophy for over three hundred years. The first time one reads *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, one wants to ask Sellars why not stop at simply refuting empirical giveness? Surely this is a momentus achievement in its own right?

The answer I argue is that Sellars saw the end of empiricism and the understanding of how we come to be able to observe body language and talk about emotions as part of the same underlying process. Empiricism comes with

---

sets of deep implications about what is observable and what is not. One reason for accepting an end to empiricism is the ability to explain wider phenomena and to give a broader account with whatever replaces it than empiricism could. One of the key things that empirical philosophies seemed to really struggle with, and particularly since J.J.C. Smart and his treatment of Wittgenstein’s Beetle in a Box problem\textsuperscript{347}, but also with roots going back to Thomas Reid\textsuperscript{348}, was the problem of how people come to be able to talk about private emotional experiences.

At the end of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* Wilfrid Sellars comes up with a story about a Rylean Tribe. The point of the story is to explain how a tribe is able to develop the resources for the types of complex descriptions of mind and intentionality that we find in Ryle’s Ordinary Language philosophy.

The reason for developing the story of this tribe and its language, Sellars writes, is

because the philosophical situation it is designed to clarify is one in which we are not puzzled by how people acquire a

\textsuperscript{347} Smart, J. J. C. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ *Philosophical Review* 141, no. 56 (1959).

language for referring to public properties of public objects\textsuperscript{349}, but we are very puzzled by how we learn to speak of inner episodes.

To explain how the tribe first develops descriptions of behaviour, Sellars invents the myth of a ‘Messianic Behaviourist’ called Jones who arrives, perhaps, ‘magi-like’ from the East with the descriptive vocabulary of an Observational Language that is capable of naming and offering descriptions of people’s actions. Since the language of Jones is an Observational Language it has available all the resources that arise from a subjunctive conditional structure which allows the user to implement a descriptive vocabulary with denial of assent to the fact stating content, that is it uses similes, models and metaphors with components appropriated from other parts of the language. The fact that it allows one to refrain from assent is important because it permits the user to create theoretical objects through a descriptive vocabulary. More importantly this is what allows the tribe to develop thoughts for the behaviours in Jones’ vocabulary. Thoughts are merely theoretical objects in the observational stage of the developing Jonesian language.

This means that language already contains the properties that allow for theoretical and imperceptible objects at the pre-Jones stage. More than this, the

\textsuperscript{349} This is where my term ‘Object Language’ comes from. It is taken from Sellars description of languages and their stages, and a specific type of language in \textit{Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind}, 1997. These are languages that can describe publicly observable objects in sets of standard conditions within a Socio-Linguistic Developmental Theory.
language in Jones’ Ryleans’ timeline of development can describe de-personalized objects. The developmental language of Jones’ timeline begins with the ability to talk about both public properties and public objects.

This is a problem for the ‘Quasi-Hegelian tribes’ in the alternative timeline of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. It is a problem because the developmental stage in the alternative time line of Sellars ‘Process-Anthropology’ for the transition to the Scientific Image from the Empirical Image, is marked by developing the sophistication to deal with imperceptible and theoretical objects. Recall that we had to place Jones in the Pre-History of the Manifest Image, when first approaching the goal of a synthesis between the two timelines, to account for the rich resources needed from his language to make the Anthropomorphic Age possible. The trouble was if we try to bring Jones’ Ryleans’ timeline and the Anthropomorphic Age together in a straightforward synthesis it creates a clash. In a merged timeline the Scientific Image will start before the history of the Manifest Image. If we appropriate the refutation of empiricism in the timeline of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* to the epistemic conditions of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, we reverse the order of development in the latter of the two. The reason why this occurs is that the capability and presence of what distinguishes the Scientific Image, i.e. the development of resources for and the presence of theoretical and imperceptible objects will already be present in Pre-History with Jones in an amalgamated timeline.
The contradiction arises from an incongruence between the timeline of Wilfrid Sellars’ Socio-linguistics and his Process Anthropology. In the Socio-Linguistics of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* the ability to talk about publicly observable objects and their properties develops before the projective ‘affective’ behavioural vocabulary that the arrival of Jones makes possible. The language of objects precedes the language of personhood.

In *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* Sellars’ ‘Process Anthropology’ begins with (what we would call after reading Gleeson), a Gleesonian vocabulary of ‘affect’ and ‘expressivity’ that can describe the wind as cheeky and personify nature. Within Sellars’ Process Anthropology the ability to talk about publicly observable objects, as merely objects, that is, nature as the domain of truncated persons, develops only after the Anthropomorphic Age and the purging of an ‘affective’ vocabulary. Here personhood and its language come first, then the Object Language develops.

Sellars writes in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*:

Nature became the locus of 'truncated persons'; that which things could be expected to do, its habits; that which exhibits no order, its impulses. Inanimate things no longer 'did' things in the sense in which persons do them—not, however, because a new category

---

of impersonal things and impersonal processes has been achieved, but because the category of person is now applied to these things in a pruned or truncated form\textsuperscript{351}.

However, Sellars’ Socio-Linguistic Theory is different to the Process Anthropology of \textit{Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man}. Where the Process Anthropology of \textit{Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man} begins is in the middle of an Anthropomorphic Age. \textit{Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind}, on the otherhand, starts with an Object Language which develops into what will become a Jonesian ‘Paleo-Behaviourist’ language with the arrival of Jones. Jones’ Language is first learnt and taught as an Object Language about humans. The Age of Jones is out of sync with the Age of Anthropomorphism because Sellars’ ‘Process Anthropology’ starts with a rich ‘affective’ behavioural language embedded in an Anthropomorphic stage, and then develops into an Object Language only after the ‘affective’ vocabulary is purged through Empiricism.

To put it bluntly in one of Wilfrid Sellars’ accounts the stages of ‘affective’ vocabulary happen with the arrival of Jones, while in the other the ‘affective’ behavioural language is already present at the dawn of time, and only after a given time does the possibility for an Object Language happen, and only

then when the categories of personhood are purged by the philosophies of empiricism.

A moment’s reflection should reveal there is only one way out of this dilemma without a contradiction. Since the authority of social factors pertaining to the practices of the linguistic community determine the acceptance of standard conditions for fact stating roles and their transition in descriptive vocabularies of Observational Languages, and the way these become accepted in Report Languages is by social assent through a space of discourse, then development of scientific discourse must rely on the socio-linguistic conditions that allow science, or any de-personified Object Language to progress as a group enterprise. The language of thinghood can grow independently of the language of personhood so long as there is a space of reasons. Einstein, for instance, derived the data for his theories from the work of Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell. Maxwell and Faraday in turn relied on earlier discourse themselves that was handed down through the linguistic practices of the scientific community in books, literature and educational practices by people like Henry Cavendish and Georg Ohm. However, in this process, at no stage do they need an affective account of the mind or behaviour in order to describe their electro-magnetic research into energy and mass. At no stage do Faraday and Maxwell need to empirically truncate a lesser god of resistance we might imagine named Volter, or what we may imagine as his feminine counterpart, the goddess Capacitor, who together make up two halves of a Galvometric Godhead. When one picks up
Faraday or Maxwell, one finds the development of an Object Language, not a theory about other humans and their behaviours projected onto the universe. An Object Language can function and be communicable without a highly complex anthropomorphic language of emotion, motive or affectivity.

I therefore argue the socio-linguistic practices of the community have foundational priority in epistemic claims built on language practices, but these language practices do not need ongoing anthropomorphic theories or explanations about those language practices in order to work. Maxwell and Faraday never read Wilfrid Sellars nor based their studies into electromagnetic fields on studies of the behaviour and emotions of other humans studying electro-magnetic fields. What can be drawn from a lack of emotional, affective or Paleo-Behavioural analysis of motivations in the research and work of Maxwell's experiments is that the Object Language does not need a Jonesian language in order to build Observational and Report Languages about objects and their properties. The Object Language is capable of progressing without any ‘affective’ or ‘expressive’ concepts of a Post-Jones age. Object Languages can feed on themselves in different stages and domains either factually or figuratively to produce Observation and Report Languages. Indeed they can become highly developed Object Languages, but they do not need the personification and truncation of an Anthropomorphic Age to develop. Positing such is superfluous.

I think that this is the reason behind the structure of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. Sellars develops the language of human thought and
action specifically separate for the Object Languages and leaves them until the end of the paper. They are not necessary or foundational to the development of the Object Languages for the thesis of that paper, although they bring with them a revelation in retrospect about the nature of theoretical entities. If we apply this insight back to the developmental stages of the Manifest and Scientific Images we can see that the ‘Empirical Age’ of truncated persons is superfluous. In my reworked Neo-Sellarsian framework, I side with *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, and argue that Object Languages do not need either affective vocabularies, nor Gross-Body-Language stages, nor Jonesian Behavioural languages to develop but are primal in linguistic communities and can develop without Post-Jonesian Affective Vocabularies. Moreover, the thesis that the clash between the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image arises as a distinct stage from some newfound ability a linguistic community acquires to comprehend theoretical objects, can also be seen as a redundant claim with the modification I am suggesting. Sellars argues in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* that what divorces the Manifest Image from and the Scientific Image is that the language of a linguistic community suddenly develops the ability to posit theoretical entities and unobservable objects in the Post-Empirical Age. According to *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* this only occurs after the purging of the personifications of nature that society has

---

developed. The purging of various personifications of nature, Sellars argues, occurs at the end of the Anthropomorphic Ages\textsuperscript{353} and signals the start of the Empirical Age.

I disagree with Sellars on this point. I maintain that the same capacity for positing non-humanized theoretical entities and speculating on unobservable objects, that Sellars thinks the Scientific Image gains, are there also in much earlier stages of development and discourse. I maintain that the same features of natural language like simile, metaphor, analogy, the orders and latitudes of similitude, semblances and descriptive borrowing from other categories of enquiry, also exist in the practices of natural language. I suggest that the explanatory theoretical entities that are only supposed to appear with the Scientific Image in \textit{Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man} occur and reoccur through out written history in accounts of Stoic-fire, atoms and the void, Thales’ theory of hydro-semiina, and ancient accounts of Hebrew mana. In Hinduism and Buddhism we have accounts of matter that involve abstract concepts like Ksura and Aksura, Prakti and Purusa. There are Taoist essences as well as Major and Minor Trigrams of Yin and Yang and their manifestation in the Taoist forces that shape mountains and lakes, and primal elements of existence like wind, fire and water.

\textsuperscript{353} What I am calling the ‘Anthropomorphic Age’ is what Sellars calls ‘the Original Image’. The ‘Original Image’ is truncated, creating the ‘Empirical Image’. The Original and Empirical Images make up the Manifest Image. Sellars in \textit{Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man} thinks the Scientific Image emerges from the Manifest Image at the point in which that society develops the capacity to deal with theoretical entities.
That is, I argue, the ability to deal with abstract entities, either theoretical or unobservable, through developing Observation Languages which are made possible by withholding assent, and the ability to employ metaphors, similes and structural abstractions are all there and evident in earlier periods of discourse. Indeed we find them occurring throughout natural language practices. I disagree with the Neo-Carnapian Sellarsian idea that science is a simple one stage process which suddenly appears with the emergence of a society’s capacity to talk about theoretical entities. Science is an ongoing practice and an endeavour to develop newer and better Object Languages.

The language of thinghood needs no concepts borrowed from the affective vocabularies that arise after an age of Jones. That is to say that science as an Object Language can develop high levels of complexity without psychology, psychiatry or the cognitive disciplines and research fields. However, the Neo-Sellarsian model I am presenting in this thesis suggests that the Gross-Body-Language at the observational stage of development does need a language of thinghood in order to have metaphorical and figurative vocabularies to borrow from.

Indeed, prior to internalization, the Paleo-Behaviourist vocabulary behaves like an Object Language in the observational stage of development. When Jones first creates his language, people are treated as curious publicly observable objects with publicly observable properties, such as actions, movements, and gestures, that can be pointed out and terms taught. This same
process of learning vocabularies continues in the initial stages of learning a standard Object Language right up to the point of internalization. Prior to internalization the meaning of emotional words is often taken from publicly observable behaviour. According to the speculative history of the Rylean linguistic community this thesis is selling, anger, to someone learning the tribal argot of the Rylean community, is learnt, initially, by certain types of publicly observable behaviour in others like yelling, ranting, certain gestures and violent actions. However, after internalization and when someone has fully developed the capacity to express themselves in a language, they can describe their own feelings as types of anger while exhibiting none of the publicly observable properties of anger. I will deal with this in more depth in the coming sections.

What is of most concern now is how best to capture Sellars’ insight in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* without causing a contradiction in the sequence of developmental stages in the timelines between the two papers. Sellars has seized upon an important insight into two fundamental ways of seeing humans in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. What we want to do is capture that. So how exactly do we capture Sellars’ insight of two radically frameworks, made up of the Manifest and Scientific Image, from the latter position of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, without falling back into a Compte-Positivist esque Quasi-Carnap position?
The solution? Rejecting Sellars Neo-Carnapian framework in favour of his ‘Process Epistemology’.

I propose that the above problem of merging Sellars’ insight in *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, with the story about Socio-Lingusitics in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, disappears, if one forgets the metaphor of ‘images’ and instead sees the Scientific and Manifest as specific types of linguistic structure. If instead of two ‘images’ one sees the ‘scientific’ and ‘manifest’ as arising from two fundamentally different ways of using the affective and object vocabularies, one can then see that the scientific and manifest are actually making fundamentally different types of claims.

If we begin to look at the Medical-Psychiatric Object Languages and Behavioural Paleo-Psychological Languages like Jones’ descendants create, as two different types of language structure which arise from different ways of talking about humans within a linguistic community where the majority of members have undergone internalization, then we can deal with the different Images of ‘Man’ as arising from different types of ‘access’ these language structures have to the epistemic values of the Object Languages in that community. What I have in mind for this ‘access’ separating the Two Images are the types of statement Sellars unravels in what he calls ‘looks-talk’ and the pseudo-subjunctive conditional structures of assent-withholding that Sellars reveals underlies figurative and literal uses of fact stating roles in Report and
Observation Languages. This, I think is the correct way to understand the
difference between the Two Images once we resolve the contradictory timelines
in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* and *Philosophy and the Scientific
Image of Man*. This picture I am presenting is one where fundamentally
different language ‘access’ to figurative and fact stating modes of expression in
other fields of research and discovery, particularly the developed hard sciences
like chemistry, anatomy, microbiology, and so on, is what separates the Images.
The view I am presenting is supported by the clearly observable fact that the
same sorts of descriptive features of language i.e. metaphors, appropriated
models, similes and analogies also appear in other bits of natural language like
poetry, folk tale myths and symbolic forms of artistic expression. These features
of language do not suddenly appear in a Carnapian ‘scientific age’ in which
empiricism abruptly develops the sophistication to attach theoretical entities on
to observational frameworks. Rather they are simply natural features of
language that reoccur with the same sorts of pseudo-subjunctive conditional
features Sellars identifies in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*.

---

354 By ‘access’ I mean specifically the figurative and literal forms of language that characterize
tendencies in psychological and psychiatric explanations. Psychology has a limiting tendency to only
access bodies of knowledge with metaphors, similies, aphorisms, allegories, myths and other
figurative modes of expression. Psychiatry tends to access and use both figurative and literal modes
of expression, but more importantly than figurative and metaphorical uses of language, it has a
deeply embedded explanatory tendency to use literal statements of fact drawn from the developed
sciences of anatomy, chemistry, physics, microbiology and so on. Psychiatry tends to inherit literal
fact stating ‘access’ to the vocabulary and discoveries of these developed scientific linguistic
communities because psychiatrists receive training in the medical sciences.
What I argue brings about the clash Sellars saw between a Scientific and Manifest Image are different ways of using language. It is language use, and not the ability for humans to suddenly develop the ability to deal with theoretical objects, that creates two vastly different views of the human-in-the-world. That, I think, is an oversight on Sellars’ behalf which originated from grappling with Carnap’s Logical-Positivism. It is an oversight I think that arose because Sellars was still too deeply engaged with working out what was wrong in Carnap’s empirico-nominalistic framework. Carnap was an empiricist who maintained an ontological distinction between observable and theoretical entities. The empiricism that *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* is refuting, most assuredly, is Carnap’s, as evidenced by the papers on Carnap, that Sellars wrote and published around the time period of those two works. In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* Sellars replaces Carnap’s ontological difference between empirical and theoretical beings, with a methodological difference between Observation and Report Languages. Unlike Carnap’s ontological distinction, Sellars methodological one can change over time. People can come to interpret the world through the Observation Language and learn to see ‘theoretical beings’ as observable facts. However, Sellars does not go back and re-write the Anthropology of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*.

The oversight arises because he changes his position slightly when he refutes Carnap in the papers that appear between *Empiricism and the*
Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, and most directly when he wrote The Language of Theories355.

I argue we can maintain his latter position in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind by abandoning the need for 1) a primal Psychological Behavioural Language (foundational and present at the dawn of time) to deify nature and thus give us the resources for 2), an Anthropological Age. Such an Anthropological Age is necessary under his old theory, in order to give us the foundations for an Object Language which can only happen when Empiricism purges the gods of the Anthropomorphic Age. The result of abandoning 1), and 2), is there is no longer any need for 3); an Empirical Age which begets an Atheistic Post-Anthropomorphic Age in which nature is now the domain of truncated persons and primed to create the Object Languages.

Thus, instead of 1), 2) and 3), we simply reject outright the idea that science requires roots in an Anthropomorphic Age. On this view religion might be viewed as a mere historical contingency of the human race, or a socio-historical process for collectivising groups of people together for survival and gathering resources, but not as a strict necessity of either underlying, or ongoing linguistic-epistemic processes. Evidently, we need not posit disposable gods for science or scientific processes to flourish356. Nor have we needed to for quite some time.

356 What will emerge from seeing Object and Psychological Behavioural languages as fundamentally different types of language is the view that Psychology is limited to accessing the Object Language in metaphorical and descriptive terms of an Observational Language. Psychiatry and the psychiatric sciences are not limited to merely Observational stage figurative uses of Object Languages, but also
There is no Galvatronic Godhead of Volter and Capacitor in the development of Electro-Magnetic Theory. Science does not need anthropomorphic deification of Jonesian mentalistic terms to progress its advances in its Object Languages.

On this view the Object Language comes first, and then the Jonesian Language grows out of the Object Language as a special type of Object Language about observing humans. What makes The Jonesian Language fundamentally different to other Object Languages arrives with the stage I refer to as ‘internalization’. Here the language Jones created eventually deviates from the path of other Object Languages and develops special Affective- Behavioural properties. My suggestion is that the Affective Behavioural Language is a special type of language different to of the others. It has the capacity, following internalization, to develop Analogical Constructs. However there are praeter-linguistic components that give the language these special properties. The praeter-linguistic components allow one to access the final stages of language acquisition and learn what terms mean. What is important to this account is Sellars’ insight that there is a clash between different ‘Images of Man’. Rather than developing the ability to deal with ‘theoretical entities’, I argue that what

__________________________
utilize fact stating roles of an Object Language in an account of the mind. Objects languages like chemistry and physics can feature in psychiatric accounts of the mind. What is missing from the body of the text and puzzling is an account of religion and what Sellars calls ‘the perennial philosophy’. While explicit description in the body of the text is, perhaps, not appropriate, a description of where it fits into this model is provided here. Religion is an Object Language that can make use of Fact Stating roles in the Behavioural Language, while Superstition is another Object Language that can make use of Observational Statements drawn from the Psychological Behavioural language.
brings about the clash between the Scientific Image of Man and the Manifest Image is the development of a Psychiatric Science that is able to connect the Affective Behavioural Language Jones creates with the Fact Stating Roles in the Object Languages in literal, as well as figurative ways of drawing on scientific developments to offer explanations of the mind. Psychiatry contains literal as well as figurative ways of accessing and employing the Object Languages in its explanations, while Psychology is characterized by merely figurative use of the Object and Scientific Languages in its explanations.

If we see that the Affective Behavioural Language that develops from Jones will become a fundamentally different type of language from the rest of the Object Languages the tribe develops then we can see that different relationships between these two languages based on the Observational and Report Stages of those languages produces different types of epistemic claim. The clash between the Manifest and Scientific Image in this new model (unlike the one presented by Sellars in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man), is no longer merely characterized by the ability to handle sophisticated based on theoretical and unobservable entities. Such entities, if Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is correct become visible over time. The scientist, of course, learns to see Mumesons in the Wilson Cloud Chamber. Rather what characterizes the difference between the Scientific and Manifest Image, I think,

---

Where I use capitals, I am referring to the Psychiatric and Psychological Images as so defined under the Figurato-Litero Model suggested by this paper.
is the different type of access they have to pure Object Languages. The Manifest Image of Man only has metaphorical and figurative uses of the Object Languages and Sciences. However, the Scientific Image can use the Object Languages and Sciences in factual descriptions that feature in its explanations of the human being.

‘Psychology’ in this specific sense is the development of Jones’ Affective Behavioural Language within both stages of the Observational and Report Languages but is limited to the subjunctive-conditional structure of fact withholding assent in its use of the Object Languages. ‘Psychology’ in this sense borrows descriptions from the Object Languages, but the descriptions are limited to forms of similitude, along with metaphorical and figurative uses. A Psychologist might describe a certain interesting human traits as being like ‘hot’ or ‘cold’, and may call their theory ‘Hot and Cold Cognition’ but no scientific theory of heat, molecular expansion or thermodynamics features as an actual and factual part of their theory. The theory does not use ‘hot and cold’ in a literal sense that is continuous with the Object Languages of the tribe. The terms ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ are merely figurative as they are in a standard Observation Language which borrows from the domain of another Report Language and uses the terms descriptively.

---

Psychiatry is a development of Jones’ Language, but it has the ability to correlate the terms of Jones’ Language with the Object Language in Fact Stating Roles\(^{359}\) as well as figurative, metaphorical and types of descriptive similitude. This is why Psychiatry is able to employ advanced knowledge about physics, chemistry, bio-chemistry and bio-electrical information as literal features in the account of the mind psychiatrists offer. A psychiatrist might explain that the reason why a person acts a certain way is because they lack a certain key neurotransmitter like dopamine, or some sort of structural brain-tissue damage, or may refer to the blood-alcohol levels, or a type of hallucinogenic neurotoxin in their system, which they can describe factually in the Object Languages of Organic Chemistry and Human Anatomy.

While this distinction in the real world of psychiatric and psychological research may not exemplify every single nook and cranny of research, de lege ferenda, I argue that these methodological tendencies distinguishing the two fields can be used as a model, which can be encorporated into Sellars’ work to solve the conflict between the time lines of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, and *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*. I call this model the Fírgurato-Litero Model. I encourage the reader to read the literature of both fields with the above distinction in mind and note the way the language being used bears out. Psychology tends towards the language of metaphor and

\(^{359}\) These are Sellars terms so I have put them in capitals for transparency.
figurative use when it borrows or engages the hard sciences. Psychology de
Figurato is limited by this tendency. Psychiatry tends towards factual use of
medicine, anatomy and the hard sciences in its descriptions and explanations as
well as figurative uses common among Observation Languages in their research
phase. The epistemic authority for scientific knowledge and factual statements
that feature in psychiatric accounts of the mind, of course, are inherited from
psychiatric training which features the same medical and scientific background
as nurses and doctors as part of the Western Scientific Medico-Industrial
Complex. However, there are also deeper language threads which also arise
between the two branches.

The difference underlying the Manifest and Scientific Image on this view
proposed by the Neo-Sellarsian Figurato-Litero Model I am suggesting, is that
one type of Image, Psychiatry, which here represents the Scientific Image, is a
combination of an Object Language and Jones’ Language to create a new
Observational Language. Psychiatry can use both scientific factual statements
that can feature in its models at the Observational stage, as well as
metaphorical uses of the Object Language.

The other image, here represented by Psychology, and what we might
characterize as the Manifest Image is merely the development of Jones’ Anthro-
Affective Language with figurative use of the Object Languages. The
Psychologist cannot build up Fact Stating roles linking Jones’ Anthro-
Affectivism and the Object Language because The Psychologist lacks the ability
to use the Object Languages factually at the Paleo-Behaviourist stage when formulating what will become a Gross-Body Language. Any use the Psychologist makes of the Object Language is descriptively figurative and metaphorical because the type of access it has is limited to denial of the fact stating role in the subjunctive conditional structure of looks-talk.

The Psychiatrist is not limited in the same way. The Psychiatrist is able to develop a body of knowledge which correlates both Factual Statements of the Object Language, and metaphorical, descriptive uses with Jones’ Language in the Observational Stage of a Psychiatric Jonesian Language. This is why the Psychiatrist can use pharmacology and the advanced Object Languages of chemistry in his or her treatment of a subject. The Psychologist, however, can only use flowery and metaphorical descriptions that borrow from the Object Languages.

Thus the way forward, and avoiding the incongruence in the time line of the two accounts Sellars offers of the relationship between the Object Language and Jones’ Language which occurs between *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, and *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, is to abandon the ‘Process Anthropology’ of *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* which included the claim that a language based account of thought and the mind would be replaced by a neuroscientific view once the Scientific Image developed the ability to deal with Imperceptible Objects and Theoretical Entities. Instead, I argue that what Sellars recognized as a clash between the Scientific Image and
Manifest Image of Man should be understood to be based on a difference between general Observation-Report Languages that deal with objects and publicly perceptible qualities and a special type of Observation-Report Language that Jones develops which allows people to describe each other's behaviour. This special type of Observational Language which Jones develops has properties that will become clear in the next move of the thesis when I deal with what happens when Chalmers' phenomenal zombie tries to learn how to use Jones' Language. What will be brought into view there is the special property that Jonesian Behavioural Languages have once they pass through Internalization and become an Endo-Affective Language. This results in a different type of claim. This type of claim is what lies underneath the normative power of the phenomenological argument. The normative power of phenomenology actually arises from an autobiographical element in how we come to ascribe meaning to some terms when we learn them.

Moreover, it is this autobiographical element, when spelled out, which is actually part of the reason why Chalmers' zombie twin is unable to undergo all of the stages necessary for learning a language within Sellars' model of a Rylean community. There is a stage that I will call 'internalization' which arises from the special property that sets Jones' Language apart from the other Object Languages employed by the Tribe. This process of 'internalization' once fully spelled out results in the refutation of the claim Chalmers made that he and his
phenomenal zombie twin have the same corresponding Judgements. This is the refutation which I promised earlier in the thesis.\footnote{See Chapter IV Chalmerian Zombies and the Flash-bang in this thesis.}

What is important to the overall argument being presented is that Psychology, as explained above, and Psychiatry have the same language between them. This is Jones’ Language of human behaviour which I have been describing as an ‘affective’ language when fully developed and a Paleo-Behaviourist language while in its observation stage, borrowing the term from Gleeson’s insight to avoid the reader becoming lost in different uses of ‘psychological behaviourism’. However the languages of the Psychiatric Image can go beyond the limited metaphors and figurative languages of Psychology. So even though the two languages might begin with Jones’ ‘Paleo-Behaviourism’ and an Ur-Language, Psychiatry also has access to the factual knowledge of the tribe’s Object Language when formulating an Observational Language. This hybrid language is built into how a Psychiatrist sees patients, when the language of Psychiatry has sufficiently developed, and he or she arrives at a fact stating ‘Report Language’. That is a fully developed Psychiatric Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism can attempt to do things like attribute behavioural descriptions of fidgeting with reports of ‘painful agitation while trying to concentrate’ to an insufficiency of neurotransmitter in the pre-frontal cortex. Here Psychiatry draws on the Object Languages of medicine as well as the
epistemic authority real world psychiatrists receive in their training as medical doctors to form an explanation.

If we think about this in relation to Sellars’ original theory and the authority that upholds a fact stating report within the linguistic community, we can see that Psychiatrists originally gained this authority from their medical training, which contains extensive knowledge of chemistry and the effects of the chemistry of the body as well as developing branches of physics like Nuclear Medicine and scientific knowledge about the electro-magnetic wave spectrum used in diagnostic equipment like X-Rays. Western Medicine, of course, inherited the authority for using science on the human body from its historical connection to science and doctors who incorporated scientific knowledge from newly developed fields into their treatment. A Psychiatrist inherits access to this body of knowledge and the authority these Object Languages contain when they do their medical training.

Psychology inherits methodological tendencies that limit it to the metaphors, similes, appropriated models and descriptive vocabularies of the Object Language because psychologists do not have the medical and scientific training of the medical establishment, which psychiatrists receive. They do not have the recognized epistemic authority to prescribe pharmacology to correct chemical imbalances nor do they receive advanced knowledge of brain chemistry, anatomy, nor do standardized medical observations like blood sample analysis, heart rate and blood pressure generally feature in their diagnosis or
explanations\textsuperscript{361}. When we place the types of industry-based explanations psychologists have a tendency to give in to Sellars’ framework with the types of explanations that psychiatrists have a tendency to give, with an eye towards the model I have suggested, we can indeed begin to see the type of clash between two different ‘Images of Man’ that Wilfrid Sellars spoke about.

A Neo-Sellarsian Psychologist might describe ‘stress’ by metaphors to tension in bits of wood or metal and correlate this with an ‘affective’ vocabulary of the person’s behaviour and actions. The Neo-Sellarsian Psychiatrist however, unlike the Psychologist, might take blood pressure readings, register pulse and gather an account of certain hormones in a blood sample detected by the medically diagnostic use of organic chemistry which feature \textit{factually} in their account along with the metaphorical and affective vocabularies.

According to this view I am arguing for, the medical and scientific tendencies inherited by Psychiatry’s access to Object Languages in the Observation Stage of development produces a \textit{fundamentally} different type of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{361} Here, for instance if one tired of Jung, Freud, Fredrickson, Seligman, and other examples provided through this paper, one might look also to Zerka Toeman Monero’s seminal article and concept of ‘doubling’ and ‘role reversal’ for the ‘cosmic man’ applied in group therapy. See Zerka Toeman Monero, ‘The Significance of Doubling and Role Reversal for Cosmic Man. \textit{Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama, A Quarterly Journal.} No 28. (1975): 55-59. While one is in group therapy, one might venture in Irvin Yalom’s laterization and fictionalization and extensive use of metaphorical structures in Irvin D. Yalom, Ben Yalom. \textit{The Yalom Reader.} New York. Perseus Books. 1998. Likewise one might venture into Eric Bernie’s adult, child and parent metaphors in \textit{Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy.} California. Snowballpublishing. 1960. One might, here, go on and I invite the reader to do so.}
claim to base an argument on than the Psychological Source. This difference occurs even though both Psychology and Psychiatry start off with Jones’ Affective Behaviourism. Both sources use Jones’ Language, both sources might draw on metaphors and similes in the Observational stage, but the Psychiatrist’s use is not limited to metaphorical and figurative uses of the Object Languages, rather he or she can feature the Object Language as factual statements in the body of knowledge built up when constructing a Psychiatric Jonesian Language.

Thus, to conclude this section I have argued that Sellars was fundamentally right about the clash between a ‘Manifest Image’ and a ‘Scientific Image’ in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man was one of being a clash between fundamentally different frameworks. He was also right about the pseudo subjunctive conditional structure of the propositional statements in the Observational Stage in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Where the explanation on offer in this paper differs from Sellars’ own account is that the Figurato-Litero Model of Psychology and Psychiatry maintains the view that it is not the ability to handle theoretical objects which separates the Manifest and Scientific Images. No. Rather the Scientific Image that Psychiatry offers arises from the use of Object Languages in Fact Stating Roles in the descriptive and research phases of a Psychiatric Observational Language. Psychology, on this view, is limited to metaphorical uses of the Object Languages in formulating its Observational Languages. The clash is a clash over types of language access disciplines have. It is a clash about the types of language in use. The
Neuroscientific view is thus a genuine rival to the Ordinary Language Account of the Mind. Indeed, the Image emerging from Psychiatry, because of the factual access to the Object Languages of medicine and science that discipline inherits, presents itself as a genuine rival to the Manifest Image of Man presented by Psychology. Instead of a clash over the ability for human knowledge to handle abstract entities and theoretical frameworks, I propose it is a clash of the ways in which languages are used in formulating theories and explanations. Can Psychology ever leave the metaphorical and figurative and descriptive stage? This paper argues that it cannot. To the Psychologist talk about human beings is but a vocabulary of metaphor and simile, and merely the manifestation of a figurative device.
Chapter Seventeen:

Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Language.

I

Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of Mind

‘Psychology’ has become a terrible and confused word in use today. What is perhaps most unfortunate about the word ‘psychology’ is that it looks like the word ‘psychiatry’ to a layman not educated in the fineline meanings of prefixes, affixes and suffixes. So much so that people often cannot tell the difference and will sometimes go to a psychologist with a psychiatric problem. They might, on account of the confusion caused by the similarities between the two words, visit a psychologist with, for instance ‘Manic Depression’ which we now understand to be caused by an underlying chemical imbalance that is related to the brain’s inability to regulate a serotonin and dopamine reward cycle. Instead of a

pharmacological treatment like a bottle of pills to treat the imbalance, our Manic
Depressive layman, who has confused the two professions, receives a theory
about the ID, neurosis and the relationship between his mother and his anus.

The confusion between psychology and psychiatry is no incidental
matter, but has a very long history behind it. Both words have their origins in
the Greek word Psyche\(^{363}\) which at various stages of philosophy meant different
things\(^{364}\). Plato, from which Freud, the Father of Psychology is no doubt drawing
the word\(^{365}\), thought that the Psycho housed the tripartite elements of the soul;
nous, eros and thumous\(^{366}\). Aristotle after Plato thought that Psyche was the
animating element which separated life from inert matter. On his view plants,
animals and man have different psyches\(^{367}\). What distinguishes man here is the
rational element of the human psyche which Aristotle thought contained an
active doing and a passive knowing component; the will and the intellect. It is
uncertain whether Aristotle thought the rational human psyche survived
death\(^{368}\), however Aquinas who came after him certainly did. So even the prefix

\(363\) Katona, G. ‘The Evolution of the Concept of Psyche from Homer to Aristotle.’ *Journal of

\(364\) Katona, G. ‘The Evolution of the Concept of Psyche from Homer to Aristotle.’ *Journal of

\(365\) See the seminal Tournay, Ganfield. ‘Freud and the Greeks: A study of the Influence of Classical
Greek Mythology and Philosophy upon the Development of Freudian Thought.’ *Journal of the


100-113.

\(368\) Chroust, Anton-Hermann. ‘Eudemus or on the Soul: A Lost Dialogue of Aristotle on the
Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations’, *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*
for psychology and psychiatry contains referential confusions and vagueries that derive from rival philosophical theories and different periods of meaning. The use of the Greek prefix raises questions as to the sense in which we are we to take the ‘psych’ part of the word. We might here posit a beginning to separating the two terms by supposing that Psychology refers to Plato and Psychiatry draws its origins from Aristotle in keeping with the respective theories of matter and form in order to ground this distinction in the mystique and philosophical ardor of Greek linguistic origins.

However, I suggest that this confusion is much better remedied with a Pro-Sellarsian clarification that by ‘Psychiatry’ at a first approximation I mean that admirable profession in which someone trained in medicine, pharmacology, and anatomy like a doctor, who has access to the Object Languages of the scientific-medico tribe including physics and chemistry, then goes on to studies of the brain. The historical origins of psychiatry are perhaps, less clear, and confused by the origins of the history of psychology where we have discredited neurologists developing a ‘talking cure’ while becoming addicted through self-prescription to cocaine\(^\text{369}\) and fathering a rival discipline to psychiatry. However, where the real world falls short, here we refer to an ideal Psychiatry in the description I have given according to the Figurato-Litero Model drawn from my treatment of Wilfrid Sellars and his Philosophy of Mind.


‘Psychology’ is perhaps even less clear. Unlike Psychiatry which relies heavily and draws upon training in, and the using of evidence and research from the medical sciences, psychologists are divided about what approach they should be taking. In the real world upon visiting actual psychologists one will find that no two psychologists agree on the methodologies, ethics, types of research, what constitutes research, domains and the theories or body of propositional knowledge that Psychology as a discipline should entail. As such let us temporarily set aside the questionable findings of a survey into the ‘practice’ of psychology and turn to the model presented in this paper.

‘Gross-Body Language Psychology’ as defined by this paper is the pre-internalized behaviourally descriptive language of Jones that develops into a ‘Psychological’ account of the mind in the sense of this paper. This language may borrow from the Object Languages of Science, but it can only use these ‘borrowings’ in metaphors, similes, appropriated models, and other language constructs that are only possible on the basis of the underlying pseudo-subjunctive conditional structure Sellars reveals operating within different types of ‘looks-talk’. Such psychological talk is descriptive and figurative and limited to being so since it relies on denial of the fact stating role when it uses the Object Language in qualitative descriptions. This is the key to any formal difference from ‘Gros-Body-Language-Psychiatry’ as described in this paper which has access to the Fact Stating role of the Object Report Language and thus Factual Statements drawn from the Object Language can feature in explanations and
descriptions by the Psychiatrist when developing his or her Jonesian language. The Psychologist can say that changes in a person’s behaviour are like changes in the behaviour of a cluster of molecules but does not have the authority to make statements drawn from science or medicine. The Psychiatrist can say that, but they can also say changes in the person’s behaviour are due to changes in the chemical composition in the brain.

Jones’ Paleo-Behavioural Ur-Language, however, can evolve into any one of the Endo-Affective languages including Psychiatry, which borrows from the Object Languages and uses such borrowings factually. The language of an Endo-Affective Language is learnt as a Gross-Body-Language by members of the tribe, prior to being internalized\textsuperscript{370}. A Gross-Body-Language is descriptive of behavioural actions. For instance, it might at the Gross-Behavioural level link ‘crying’ with being ‘upset’. It can operate either as an Observation Language or a Report Language at the Gross-Behavioral level from the third person. However, while it is used as a Gross-Behavioral-Body-Language from the third personal point of view, people cannot Self Report with it. They may imitate the Self Reports of others, but they do not have the competency in the language for the semantics to know what such words mean in their own Self-Reports. They are

\textsuperscript{370} This is perhaps confusing at first because the same term in a language may be learned and used as a Gross-Behavioural Language term by one person, and to Self Report by another. This is because, internalization, it will be revealed, happens individually. It is a process each member of a tribe goes through to master a language and Self Report.
like parrots or answering machines which can mimic sounds, but do not know the semantic content of the sounds as words.

**Where do Ryle and Gleeson’s Critiques fit into The Neo-Sellarsian Psychiatric and Psychological Model?**

Ryle’s understanding and criticism of historically situated ‘Psychological Behaviourism’ in *The Concept of Mind* can be classified as a sub-species of this Figurato-Litero Model I am proposing.

Ryle’s negative view of the historically situated Psychological Behaviourism of his day which he expresses in *The Concept of Mind* was that it had a methodological flaw. The flaw Ryle identified was that it used scientific causation as an appropriated model that it imports from physics. This made the Psychological Behaviorism of his day problematic. Like various other species of categorical mistake Ryle identified, for instance the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ and the ‘Volitional Account’ of Saint Augustine, he saw the Psychological Behaviourism of his age as suffering from the same error of imposing concepts from the specialized domains of research on to what should be intuitive and common language understandings of a domain people should have intimate knowledge of. Ryle thinks that people already know how to have, think in and speak with the vocabularies of the mind by virtue of having one. For Ryle, to
understand the mind, all one need do, is examine the use of these commonly used vocabularies possessed by the competent ordinary language speaker.

The metaphorical, figurative, appropriated and borrowed languages of motion and causality that Ryle finds in the historically situated Psychological Behaviourism of thinkers like Watson, Thorndike and Skinner, and that Ryle thinks characterize their programme, is essentially what the ‘earlier’ Ryle of The Concept of Mind sees as a continuation of the Bogey of Mechanism into the Historico-Behavioural Psychology of his age. He thinks the Behaviourists are trying to impose concepts of motion and mechanism on to the human mind.

By using the Figurato-Litero model these types of Historico-Behavioural Psychologies are now classifiable as forms of discourse under the Neo-Sellarsian ‘Psychological Image of Man’ I propose, because they can borrow metaphorically and symbolically from the Object Languages of scientific causation but do not engage in any factual Report Language imported in literal fact stating explanations from the Object Sciences in their explanations. In Beyond Human Freedom and Dignity371 Skinner is not using blood sample analyse or blood pressure or looking at organic chemistry and the brain. These things do not feature in his accounts as explanations. Skinner’s use of ‘scientific causation’ in his explanation of Operant Conditioning is couched within ‘affective life’

---

concepts like pain, compliance, dignity, pleasure, fear and so on, which he uses to describe the reinforcement and extinction of human reactions.

While Ryle was not specific in *The Concept of Mind* about the type of methodological objections he has to the Historical ‘Psychological Behaviourists’ of his age beyond their recourse to scientific causation leading to a view of thinking as merely the twitching of limbs and a type of ‘Hobbism’, I take it he is talking about a ‘general recourse to scientific causation’ of which Skinner’s study and use of operant conditioning is an example. Here, of course, Skinner proposed that positive and negative re-enforcement conditions responses in subjects and went on to study and prove this with studies of various types of conditioning and observations of response. Underlying this, of course, is the paradigm of a linear ‘efficient causation’ model that reoccurs in many areas of scientific research.

The model of efficient causation, historically in the sciences became most tenable, of course, as a quantifiable research project through the development and use of Cartesian co-ordinates on the x-y-axis to map equations based on measurements of phenomena that could be perceived as being connected. The development of efficient causation into a system of equations for plotting ordinates onto Cartesian grids resulted in the development of areas in physics like Snell’s laws which can explain refraction, or Ohms Law (I = V/R) which, of
course, describes current and resistance using equations and algebraic transposition\textsuperscript{372}.

Here we would be able to classify Skinnerian Behaviourism, Pavlovian Behaviourism and some models of Cognitive-Behaviourism as being part of the ‘Hobbist’ species via the critique Gilbert Ryle proposes. Specific strains of Historical Psychological Behaviourism like Pavlov, Watson, Skinner and Thorndike of course use different types of causation to model behaviour. Where Watson uses a Stimulus-Response Behaviourism, Skinner’s Operant Conditioning\textsuperscript{373} emphasizes the role of past responses and effects in shaping present and future behaviour, leading to Skinner’s theory for Behavioural Modification as a therapy. Skinner attempts to justify this approach with what he calls Methodical Behaviourism. Methodical Behaviourism is perhaps most similar to Putnam’s rationale for the general project of Functionalism where we cannot access internal states and must rely on antecedents and in-puts to determine what a subject will do. Skinner, like the early Putnam, thinks we must resort to behaviour when researching the mind. Analytic Functionalism of the type advocated by Lewis and Braddon-Mitchel also relies on causal structures to define mental states\textsuperscript{374}. So too does Ned Block who argues ‘that it is a matter of scientific fact that mental states are functional states with functional

\textsuperscript{373} John Cooper, Timothy Heron, William Heward. \textit{Applied Behaviour Analysis}. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2014. Pp 22-30
properties’ and models his Psycho-Functionalism on causal relations to in-puts, other mental states and outputs\textsuperscript{375}. We might place all of these types of Behaviour-Functionalism under the label of Causal Behaviourism by observing that Ryle would object to these systems as examples of theories of mind which had fallen into what Ryle described as ‘the Bogey of Mechanism’.

Andrew Gleeson’s critique is different. Gleeson notices that many of the input/output methods for analysing and attributing mentality depend upon environmental effects. Gleeson thinks that such analysis is mistaken because it can attribute mentality to what could otherwise be random or mindless effects in the environment. For instance, attributing the banging of a tree against a house to the deliberate and agitated bloodthirsty thumping of an imagined homicidal killer with his axe could be one such way to think about the problem of false attribution. Another was the problem of attributing and thereby diagnosing AD(H)D to the computer program which takes the psychometric test as discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.

A taxon of Causal Behaviourism drawn from Ryle’s earlier critique of Historically Situated Behaviourism, for this thesis, thus gives us a system of classification under which different strands of theory can be classified depending on what the theorist is proposing in relation to the causal model and sub-

structures. The majority of these forms of Causal Behaviourism differ from Jones’ Behaviourism because unlike Jones’ Behaviourism they attempt to study behaviour as a fixed, static methodology in itself removed from the processes of the speculative developmental stages in a proposed linguistic community. To begin to see the difference clearly, we must see Jones’ Behaviourism as a developmental stage and not a complete theory in and of itself. Jones is a hypothetical linguistic progenitor, while his Language of Paleo-Behaviourism according to the Sellarsian view, emerges at a specific “historical” stage in the Socio-Linguistic Development of the tribe.

For Sellars and a Sellarsian view, Post-Empiricism and the Philosophy Mind, Jones as a developmental stage is necessary for gaining the ability for tribal members to be able to talk about each other as emergent anthropic beings. While Sellars never quite says as much, and claiming he did would be an anarchronism, in my reconstruction of Jones’ age I see the language of Jones as a vague Paleo-behaviouristic ancestor to the folk terminology which Andrew Gleeson argues is not co-extensive with the scientific environmental effects of Analytic Functionalism, and by implication many types of Causal Behaviourism for the same reason. The reason, of course, is that when Jones’ Language develops it will not be co-extensive with environmental effect out-put analysis, and I argue so for reasons Gleeson makes clear. Jones Behaviourism will have concepts like sensibility, intentionality, emotional affect, and telelogically oriented actions i.e. motives.
It is important, within the terminology of this paper, not to confuse (1) ‘Causal Behaviourism’ and different types of ‘Psychological Behaviourism’ with another term I am using, which is (2) ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’. Linguistic Behaviourism can be distinguished from (3) ‘Logical Behaviourism’ with the implicit theory of meaning proposed by Dummett. Linguistic Behaviourism is different from Logical Behaviourism in that it rejects the Analytic Doctrine of the Primacy of the Proposition. Instead, Linguistic Behaviourism embraces Dummett’s point about implicit language theorists. Linguistic Behaviourism also uses Ryle’s comparative frameworks and extra-sentential relationships which we might talk about as groups, families or classes.376.

Specifically, Linguistic Behaviourism emerges from (4) Ryle’s focus on the way words behave rather than complete propositions and is a rejection of the uniform function model that Weitz suggested. Linguistic Behaviourism rejects earlier Logical Behaviourist readings of Ryle that utilized simplified complete propositional models with a uniform function, which, of course, Ryle himself rejects, and favours the actual comparative matrix of useages that Ryle makes use of when establishing his Dispositional and Episodic frameworks. Rather than looking for logical uniform functions, Ryle looked for differences in pieces of

376 I have chosen the informal term ‘families’ when talking about the way that Ryle classifies dispositional and episodic verbs with adverbs and adverbial clauses, because firstly Ryle himself uses it, and secondly the groups of verbs, adverbs and nouns Ryle identifies have relationships not unlike a family resemblance.
natural language. For instance, Ryle argued that dispositions ‘behave\(^{377}\) differently to episodic verbs. Moreover, he argued that various and different types of dispositional verb will behave differently to each other. Ryle maintains that relationships between some of those dispositional verbs can be found by certain types of adverb they share in common, like, for instance, the class of dispositional verb that can be identified by the adverb of manner ‘carefully’. The verbs and participle nouns that can be qualified by the adverb of manner ‘carefully’, of course, form a set of dispositional verbs Ryle identified as Capacity verbs. Linguistic Behaviourism takes special and careful note of these relationship and does not try to reduce them to uniform functions or propositional models like Weitz did.

Causal Behaviorism and different types of Psychological Behaviourism are not equivalent terms, salve vertate, with Linguistic Behaviourism. Nor is Linguistic Behaviourism equivalent to Logical Behaviourism. Nor is Logical Behaviourism synonymous with Psychological and Causal strains of Behaviourism. Just because the terms I am using feature the word ‘behaviourism’ in them, does not make them equivalent or identical, or even variations on a theme. Linguistic Behaviourism as a term refers to analysis of grammatical and linguistic useages and conventions. Causal Behaviorism refers to a critique of Behaviourism where theorists of mind apply antecedent

\(^{377}\) Ryle’s term for what the language is doing inside of the framework of his configurational analyses.
models derived from mechanical theories of causation to the human mind. Such theories as those classifiable as a type of Causal Behaviourism are in the lines of sight of a Gleesonian criticism about lacking co-extension with an environmental effect vocabulary if they employ affective terminology, or a Rylean charge they suffer from positing bogeys of mechanism to account for human action.

What is important for the Paleo-behavioural stages of a language are the types of access it has to explanations about the mind and figurative uses of the Object Language within the Figurato-Litero Model. The different types of access characterized by descriptive fact-withholding assent, and ‘Fact Stating Roles’, of course, results in the Psychological and Psychiatric distinction this paper offers in the Neo-Sellarsian Figurato-Litero model.

I shall now spell out the historical connection between these terms and how Logical Behaviourism became associated with Functional Behaviourism as identified by Gleeson, General Functionalism as identified by Putnam, and Psycho-Functionalism like that identified by Putnam. Recall now that the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ earlier in this thesis was drawn from Ryle’s own description of his method. Ryle described his methodology of *The Concept of Mind* as analysing the ‘behaviour’ of the words. Earlier in the thesis the account I offered of a specific type of argument used by Ryle, his “Linguistic Behavioural Argumentative Method”, was set against a rejection of the propositional model of ‘Logical Behaviourism’. ‘Logical Behaviourism originally seemed like a good idea to philosophers like Weitz because they could use what had already been
discovered about the way propositions work to model the thought processes of the mind using dispositions with a uniform function. While the people who read Ryle, this way, were what Dummett clarified in his terms as an explicit language theorist and subscribed to the Primacy of the Proposition, I argued, and provided evidence that this reading of Ryle (as an explicit Logical Behaviourist) was erroneous\textsuperscript{378}. This misappropriated version of Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourism by Weitz, and philosophers who came after him, then became a forerunner for the movement known as ‘Psychological Functionalism’ which we looked at with David Chalmers’ history and have examined in relation to Causal Behaviourism. The problem with Logical Behaviourism is that it reintroduces the complex raft of issues related to the Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference since truth values require correspondence between propositions and states of affairs. This makes Logical Behaviourism a species of Psycho-Realism and suffers from all of the problems associated therewith. Why? Because the propositional content has truth value and suffers from a referential dilemma when dealing with propositions representing thoughts or mental entities. To be truthful propositional models they must picture the facts about the mind they model. This makes them liable to a charge of referential indeterminacy. Here, with Logical Behaviourism we have the problem of whose words and meanings do we use when looking at the truth values for the

\textsuperscript{378} See Morris Weitz in Chapter One.
propositional content of a theory? Does Dr Fred’s theory about anger and guilt model what Sue means when she uses the word anger? Or what Jane means when she uses the word anger? How do we know they mean the same thing? Do they mean the same thing? Dr Fred’s theory about Fredricksonian analysis drawn from the propositional model of Sue’s verbalized thoughts may not be applicable to Jane. The same Fredricksonian theory may contain propositions and produce what some might call molecular sentences\(^{379}\). Such sentences are either true or false based on how they model states of affairs. The truth and falsity of those sentences will have an effect on a theory’s truth or falsity when put together. The trouble with this type of situation is that one sentence given in a psychological theory about the mind, regarding, for instance, how anger and jealousy effect cognition, might picture a true state of affairs by Sue’s meaning for the terms she uses, but be utterly false by the terms used by Jane.

\(^{379}\) Here, of course, I am alluding to the vocabulary of the early Logical Atomists from whence the problem of truth and reference comes. There are historical reasons for doing this, though the problem need not be strictly understood this way. See Barry Gross. *Analytic Philosophy*. New York, Pegasus Press, 1970. In particular Chapter Four, Meaning and Reference. The problem put in a naïve sense is how do we assure the truth of sentences claiming facts about the mind when we have no assurance that the meaning for words used in those sentences, for instance ‘anger’, ‘sadness’, ‘shame’, or ‘melancholy’, does not vary between people to whom the theory might be applied. In the early Logical Atomst theories of the Twentieth Century, it was argued that truth arose as a type of correspondence between pictures sentences constructed and states of affairs in the world. If the meaning of the words used in psychology and its fields of research varies between subjects, then any given sentence might be true for one subject, but false for another. A theory, thus, might be true and false. If this were to occur, then such a theory breaks fundamental laws of meaning, identity and logic. The discovery of this state of affairs is good grounds for rejecting such a theory. For a deeper analysis of Logical Atomistic theories, see Peter Carruthers, *Tractarian Semantics*. Oxford. Basil Blackwell Inc. 1989. This book is deeply insightful and I do not think it has received its full due. See also C. W. Kilmister. *Russell*. Kent, The Harvester Press, 1984. This work deals at length with Russell’s logical atomist phase in the context of his wider philosophy.
Were we to be pedantic we might go through and label every sub-form of Causal-Behaviourism, and subclassify these in relation to the earlier Ryle, and later Ryle’s critique. However what concerns us more is what becomes of the developmental stages of Jones’ Paleo-Behavioural language either in its Psychiatric Endo-Affective form, or its Psychological Endo-Affective form, down the track when the normative sources of the Psychological and Psychiatric Images clash in our Neo-Sellarsian model. This story becomes fruitful in the Hetrophenomenological and Autophenomenological Distinction and redefining the conflict in terms of the Psychologism and Anti-psychologistic debate.

This brings us to another unfortunate fact about the word ‘psychology’. The problem is that it sounds like ‘psychologism’ and this may, perhaps lead to a confusion that Jones’ developing roots for a ‘behavioural psychological language’ is a form of ‘psychologism’. This is not strictly true. What I argue is that a Post-Jones Endo-Affective language has a special property that derives from an internalization process when the language moves from an Observational Language to a Report Language and flourishes into a fully developed Neo-Sellarsian tribal argot shared by the Ryleans. Jones’ Behavioural Ur-Language eventually develops into an Endo-Affective Language when it passes through the final stages of internalization and members of the tribe can begin to self-report\textsuperscript{380}. That internalization process, when unpacked, provides grounds for the

\textsuperscript{380} See Endo-Affective Languages in Chapter Eighteen, in this paper.
source of the authority for a psychologistic claim because it is based on phenomenal properties that cannot be re-covered in a ‘sola-lingua’ language-based account of the mind. The reason is that our use of language and the meaning we bestow on it depends upon processes of discovery that arise from phenomeno-affective facts we can only ascertain from experience of our own mental lives. The proof is that the phenomenal zombie which lacks the capacity for these non-linguistic experiences cannot learn to fully master all of the language uses of the tribe and has a genuine problem with the semantics of flash-bangs.

‘Psychologism’ is of course contrasted with an attempt at producing an exclusively language-based account of the mind. The attempt to argue that language and a theory of meaning are foundational in explanations of mind characterizes ‘Anti-Psychologism’. What is most interesting in Ryle, of course, is that he is an exponent of the argument that all of the facts relevant to the domain covered by a theory of mind can be covered by an account of language and we can see his project in *The Concept of Mind* as both an attempt to dismantle classical theories of mind, as well as the attempt to cover the facts such classical theories of mind attempted to cover with a purely language based account.
II

Endo-Affective Languages

Endo-Affective Languages are the end products of Behavioural Ur-Languages. Behavioural Ur-Languages are Jonesian Paleo-Behavioural Languages which develop in the early stages of a Neo-Sellarsian Rylean tribe. Endo-affective Languages have the capacity, once a member of the tribe learns them, to allow that member to make self-authoritative Reports about their own emotional state. However, when Jonesian Behavioural Ur-Languages become Endo-Affective Languages, they may develop into either Figurato-Litero Psychiatric or Litero Psychological Languages based on the explanatory tendencies in the third person drawn from the type of access the research theorist has to the Object Languages. That type of access will depend, in large part, upon the type of linguistic community that trained him or her, and the types of authority and fact stating or figurative language roles they have acquired. However, even at this stage the language is just a Neo-Sellarsian argot until it develops the special properties that can only be acquired once a language user goes through all of the stages required in the acquiring of that language. These stages make a language Endo-Affective. Prior to becoming fully developed and Endo-Affective the languages are merely Anthro-Affective. The user might use the terms to identify
behaviours in others, but can not use them to self-identify, or understand those behaviours.

However, developed the language of a community might become, there is still a further developmental stage it must constantly undergo by each member of that community, privately, when they learn that language and there are special properties that arise from that process. One of the special properties that distinguishes Anthro-Affective Languages that develop into fully developed Endo-Affective Neo-Sellarsian post-argots of the Rylean community is the process of internalization. After internalization languages can undergo even further development with their users which makes them capable of complex prosopopeia, with special properties of insight into others built from analogical structures that project personalized learning experiences on to new ways of seeing others.

These learning experiences are important for individual members of the tribe to undergo as they learn a language. They allow the later stages of Endo-Affective languages to occur. They are necessary for the member to develop the full capacity for building and using Analogical Constructs. Analogical Constructs are important because they provide the grounds, in the argument I am offering, for answering the Guess Work Objection\textsuperscript{381}.

\textsuperscript{381} See Ordinary Language Arguments and the Project of Anti-Psychologism in the Philosophy of Mind in the Introduction to this thesis.
Internalization, and the learning process that allows people to create Analogical Constructs from internalization, are what separates these fully developed Endo-Affective Tribal Argots from a) merely Observational Languages of the lower developmental stages, and b) Object Languages of any developmental stage that can describe publicly observable properties and objects. The ‘internalization’ process I propose involves phenomenal properties and a theory about their relationship to language. However, I argue that internalization occurs twice. The language must become capable of internalization which I propose happens (i) during the Socio-Developmental stages of a language once it passes from a Jonesian Paleo-Behavioural Ur-Language to an Endo-Affective Language capable of complex prosopopeia. (ii) It happens autobiographically when the learner of the language moves from Gross-Body-Language Behaviorism during learning a language to being able to Self-Report with that language even in the absence of body language or other social cues and contexts. The second, Autobiographical Internalization, is what allows a member of the Rylean tribal community to be able to use insight from Self-Reporting to then be able to make competent statements about the life of another and understand what those words mean in terms of one’s own experiences and the vocabulary one attaches to it. Prosopopeia is of course one of the most complex anthropo-linguistic Analogical Constructs, but the foundation for it is internalization. Without it, one cannot speak the words for another with one’s own meaning.
For the purposes of the argument I am propounding, I propose that when a language is missing the Socio-Developmental stages of internalization, and thus lacks the Report Language Stage in its development, then the first time that a member of the Rylean tribe learns Jones’ Behavioural Ur-Language, which can describe the actions of others, and begins to self-report with it, thereby internalizing it, the language develops the capacity for self-report, and thus the resources for a Report Language. However, note, within the framework of my argument, I am not saying that other members of the tribe automatically inherit the ability to use these languages to self report. They too must learn the earlier stages and then internalize the language, to be able to achieve higher competency in the use of the language, including various Analogical Constructs that are foundationally essential for prosopopeia.

So which language is a member of the tribe using when they use a term that other members of the tribe, (who have undergone internalization, and either been trained to Self-Report, or have developed Analogical Constructs for understanding others), are using when they themselves have not undergone such stages but merely use the word? We would call such a common language term an Autobiographical Pre-Internalized Observational Behavioural Term. In such a language, a term can only be learnt for one’s own behaviour and is the first stage of connecting private experiences with behaviour that will later allow the person to Self Report, or used for observing another. Such a term is used as part of a Gross-Body-Language. One cannot make a report about oneself, or about
another in terms of oneself with such a term, since one does not have the competence or the authority to use it prior to internalization. Since it cannot be used to report formally, the term can be neither Psychological or Psychiatric in terms of the Neo-Sellarsian Figurato-Litero Model this paper describes. This point is important because I describe use of an Autobiographical Pre-Internalized Observational Term as (B1) when I look into Wittgenstein’s crypto-theory of phenomenal language acquisition. (B1) is the stage where one learns Jones’ Language and begins to be able to apply that language in observations of others. We will look at (B1) more in-depth in the next part of the paper.

These Autobiographical Pre-Internalized Observational Behavioural Terms are the common vocabularies making up the Gross-Body-Language-Behavioural descriptions available to people learning a language, but have not yet been internalized by that person learning the language. As such a person using one of these terms has not yet gained the ability to make Reports about themselves or others in that language. But such words have what I describe as ‘Analogical Semblances’³⁸², which means if a subject used these terms, then other members of the tribe attribute meaning to the term based on that other member’s own understanding of what the words mean from their own learning experiences and drawing on the Analogical Constructs they have built up, even

³⁸² See also the supplementary paper at the end of this thesis The Telephone Theory of Language, where I spell out Gleeson’s argument about parasitic language forms.
if the subject using the term does not know what the word means. Affective Semblances ascribed to a subject are parasitic on the emotional learning and emotive understanding of others. Imagine, for instance, a man who dressed as a woman and then went on to describe having period pain in a group of women. The man himself has never experienced the pains associated with menstruation, however, women upon hearing of this man complain about his menstrual pain, will immediately commiserate and attribute their own meaning to his words. Such is an Affective Semblance and certain words that have a common language affective meaning to people who have learned them and undergone internalization, can be used to evoke these experiences, by people, beings or things that have not had those experiences but have simply learned to parrot the language.

The being parroting the language has not internalized the language and achieved a level of competency whereby they can report their own feelings and emotional experiences and be authoritative about it. They do not know what the words mean, even though the people around them do. They cannot recognize and describe their own emotional and personal experiences, if they have any, and truthfully make meaningful statements about them.

This ‘internalization process’ is the key to understanding the link between the phenomenal zombie, (as well as the Anti-psychologistic attempt at producing a language-based account of the mind) and the Occult Phenomenological Strain of arguments in Ryle. Phenomenological arguments
are, of course, made up of composites of phenomenal properties which require comparing them in various ways to make claims about the mind. One must compare different experiences to see the point of these arguments. The phenomenal zombie would not understand these arguments and so would have no insight into the language distinctions that rest on the comparison of these phenomenal properties. Once this point is grasped, with a little reflection, the pieces of the central argument of the thesis should begin to fit together.

Since I argue (1) emotional language is to a significant degree guesswork about an unobservable realm of experience, and (2) each sense of a word to be learned must derive from or be informed by the conditions under which the user learned to use the word competently, there needs to be an account of how (1) and (2) are either connected, or at least compatible. These of course are the two objections which Tim Crane lays out in his reading of Dummett and McDowell, and their rejection of Psychologism. I endorse both propositions not as objections, but as pillars of my argument on how people actually arrive at the meaning for the words they use, and build my theory of Psychologism on them. What is missing from the Psychologist’s position is an explanation of the process whereby the conditions under which a member of the Rylean tribe learns a word, and an account of how this learning has an autobiographical effect on the meaning of that word, which the member of the tribe uses to talk about a private realm of experience. By ‘private realm of experience’ I take the meaning to be one that depends upon an experience that cannot be observed by other
members of the community such, as what a ‘flash of anger’ feels like to the
person experiencing it.

The explanation of this process that connects (1) and (2) together, the
Crane-Dummett-McDowell conditions for Psychologism, will also reveal why the
Indeterminacy of Reference Problem emerges in theories and research on the
mind. The key to grasping the process is the developmental stages that involve
the public and private conditions under which someone learns an emotional
language and then comes to self report in that language. Object languages can
be deceptive because what we take to be ‘detecting’ like Price’s thermostat can
fool us into thinking something has phenomenal experiences of properties when
in fact, all we are doing is applying our own insight in Analogical Constructs,
and in effect producing prosopopeia. This occurs where we talk for another
person or being, using the words we have attached our own meanings to, which
we acquire autobiographically and which are more like guesses for an
unobservable realm of structures and experiences we call ‘another person’. Such
is evidence of our own consciousness, but not that of the beings we project we
project our vocabulary of affective concepts on to.

David Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie can not do this. Chalmers zombie
is able to detect publicly observable phenomena and make factual statements
about them in the Object Language, like a thermostat, without the phenomenal
qualities of the experiences. I argue that such is so. The phenomenal zombie, for
instance, with an internal heat sensor keyed into Price’s Thermometer may
learn how to use the word ‘warm’ correctly, at the accepted temperature according to the practices of the community, to be able to detect a ‘glow of warmth’ and make a seemingly convincing statement without being able to ‘feel’ the glow of warmth. However, the argument I am building up to is that firstly, this ability to detect ‘warmth’ by temperature alone is parasitic on the experiences of beings who do have qualitative phenomenal experiences; and more to the point, the phenomenal zombie cannot do the same thing for the content of a ‘flash-bang’ and this inability is an important difference which leads to him being unable to form the same Judgements as his real world twin. This is because a ‘flash of anger’ is not publicly observable but it only appears so because certain emotive words trigger Analogical Semblances in the audience to the statement when they hear them. However, there is one more stage we need to complete before that argument can be made in its entirety.
Chapter Eighteen

Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars and the argument for Private Access

I

The Beetle in the Box Argument and the Chalmerian phenomenal zombie.

Part of what is so puzzling about language is that certain expressions of language, for instance Ryle’s Reader/Witness argument, or the sentence ‘try to imagine lighting so bright it hurts your eyes’ contain within them phenomenological insights that can only be grasped once you try the exercise. However, getting to that point and conveying that insight requires using language. The Reader/Witness argument, for instance, must be laid out in steps and written down, or spoken aloud in order to transmit the material the person needs to think about to have the insight on offer unless, of course, you are the one who discovered it. I argue that this problem has plagued philosophers and muddled the debate about whether people do their thinking in words. For how is one able to convey an insight to another except by words? If one argues that
language is insufficient to ground a theory of mind, his or her opponent can simply point to the medium of transmission being used. Books on philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, thinking and the mind are all written in words.

Hence the first step of the paper was to restrict Ryle’s ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ to his grammatical descriptions of the behaviour of collections, fragments, useages and expressions of language and distinguish between ways of reading the distinctions Ryle uses in his arguments. Doing this permits a number of moves that by careful strategic analysis of his arguments bring out the ‘Occult Strain of Phenomenology’ hidden in Ryle’s work. This is like the two sides of the ‘Remember When/ Remember How’ argument. One way we can interpret that argument is to think about skills we have learnt and see if we remember how to do them, and compare that experience with instances of remembering when a particular event occurred in order to understand the difference between them. Another way of reading the ‘Remember When/Remember How’ distinction is to observe the linguistic patterns and relationships in statements about ‘remembering when’ and ‘remembering how’, and try to restrict the distinction between ‘remembering how’ and ‘remembering when’ to the level of descriptions of the grammatical behaviour of the words. In this case the grammatical description arises from the dispositional and episodic verbs that occur in the different types of statements someone makes.

Using this type of meta-analysis of Ryle’s arguments in *The Concept of Mind*, allows us to see that there are certain arguments that Ryle makes which
exceed the bounds of Linguistic Behaviourism because there are no grammatical
descriptions on offer. This analysis was able to show that there are ‘experiences’
and ‘phenomenal exercises\textsuperscript{383}’ in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account of the Mind
that put into jeopardy his position as an implicit language theorist and to a
larger extent, if Dummett is right about explicit language theorists being
mistaken in their approach, and an implicit theory really is the correct
approach, and Ryle is the strongest implicit Ordinary Language Philosopher,
then the critique of Ryle in this paper is a threat to the general project of Anti-
Psychologism.

I think that the strongest of these surreptitiously hidden
phenomenological claims that put Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account and the
project of Anti-Psychologism in jeopardy is the flash-bang strain because without
a way of distinguishing between ‘flashes of anger, envy, pain’ on a linguistic
basis there’s recourse to Psychology and the need for a theory of consciousness
to give us an account of the semantics of such language choices that allow one to
tell them apart. This places a theory of mind in explanatory priority to a theory
of language, since the user of the language relies upon phenomenological insight
in order to know what their words mean, and any account of mind based on
language that tries to cover ‘flash-bangs’ would need to go beyond language and
into the domain of qualitative consciousness. I have yet to reveal, in full, the

analogical mechanism that allows a language learner to attach their emotions to the words they use, or to use that insight in understanding the visible behaviour and the language usage of another except to say it fulfils the autobiographical criticism in the Dummett-McDowell claim that Psychologism is a theory where the means of acquiring a concept from a language and what it means to hold this concept in a language are hopelessly ravelled together.

So far, we have looked at and adopted Wilfrid Sellars’ developmental theory of ‘Socio-Linguistics’ as espoused in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, with a number of caveats. These caveats were drawn from; (a) Fodor’s Muller-Lyre criticism, which required us to go deeply into the pseudo-subjunctive conditional structures behind looks-talk that makes various non-literal, fact-withholding and figurative forms of language possible. (b) We took very seriously Andrew Gleeson’s criticism of Functionalism; and (c) inconsistencies between the developmental stages of a language community as proposed in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, and *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*, most notably when the languages of personhood, which utilize Gleesonian vocabularies, occur in relation to the ‘Object Languages’ of

---

384 These vocabularies, of course, are affective, sensitive, animate motion, motive and various emotive terms including some terms that utilize intentionality. These Gleesonian vocabularies separate our concepts of animal and human motion from mere environmental effect. Gleeson’s critique, of course, is that these languages were not co-extensive with environmental effect vocabularies. These languages the paper designates as languages of personhood. In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* these languages develop only at the end of the paper once the tribe has developed a language to talk about objects. In *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man* these languages exist at the dawn of the civilization which describes the wind as ‘cheeky’ or lightning as ‘angry’. This, of course, led to the Figurato-Litero Model this paper suggests, which re-organizes...
the tribe. The question that arises is whether such languages occur before or after the Object Languages of the Tribe? This paper argued they occur after the Object Languages and in favour of the Jonesian developmental stage, which this paper referred to as the Paleo-linguistic era\textsuperscript{385}.

Sellars’ language theory, in order to explain private episodes, posited the development of a language capable of picking out publicly observable objects and properties. We might call this (L1). (L1) contains a special type of subjunctive conditional using which the person may construct theoretical models, use metaphors and similes and borrow models and descriptive phrases from other parts of the language in order to develop new vocabularies for talking about things. This becomes possible because of the subjunctive conditional structure which allows the user to withhold fact stating assent but still make descriptive statements. Where (L1) does this it creates an Observational Language (OL). It is possible and common practice that L1 has multiple developing Observational Languages for different fields (O1), (O2), (O3) and (O\&c). An Observational Language moves from the domain of merely qualitative and descriptive statements when statements of the Observational Language (O1) are accepted into the standard language and does so when reasons for accepting these languages are given and accepted by the community. When this happens (O1)

\textsuperscript{385} See Chapter Five: Gilbert Ryle, Wilfrid Sellars and science, in this thesis.
becomes a Report Language (R1) capable of giving fact stating roles accepted by
the norms of the linguistic community. Most Observational Languages are
classifiable as Object Languages (EL). However as already explained a very
special type of Observational Language is created by the Messianic Behaviourist
Jones (B1) that allows people to use resources of an Observational Language to
talk about other people’s actions. I urge that it is questionable at this stage
whether the phenomenal zombie is able to learn the Observational Language
because of the subjunctive conditional structure that allows the user to withhold
assent to the descriptive content. It is questionable whether a phenomenal
zombie can feel doubt. I should argue that it cannot. But let us temporarily and
conditionally give the zombie the benefit of our doubt and do so for the purposes
of the argument. We may suppose the zombie either learns the language and
treats it like Price’s thermostat, or he is out of the village, and arrives back on
the day (B1) becomes used as a third person report language.

Now I take it as non-controversial that the zombie can make statements
in (B1) about the publicly observable behaviour of others. I see this as a non-
controversial statement because high level security companies now have
‘character recognition technology’ where surveillance equipment is able to
construct models using points on the human body that can identify movement
with body language; for instance they can combine the way a suspect or culprit
walks, in conjunction with facial recognition technology to positively identify
recurring trouble makers in some security premises. We might suppose the
zombie has this particular feature or a sophistication of it. To be clear the zombie would have no phenomenal experience of other people’s body language. Threatening and aggressive body language would make the zombie neither feel angry nor afraid. The zombie would not be ‘aroused’ at the sexy and alluring body language of a Rylean tribe member who wished to court the zombie. The zombie would lack the phenomenal experience to feel the various ‘sensations’ and physical and emotional ‘feels’ one has when one is aroused. But it would be able to ‘detect’ the body language and react accordingly.

But while the phenomenal zombie may be able to ‘detect’ the body language of other members of the tribe there is a question about whether it would be able to understand its own behaviour and language in terms of Jones’ Language. Now one might venture so far as to argue that the zombie can be fitted with some sort of device which is similar to the identity recognition software in advanced surveillance systems which can register the zombie’s body language and give the zombie the vocabulary to describe his actions and behaviours. Call this Solution One, (S1). Solution One will interpret the body language of the zombie and feed the zombie the words that correspond to the zombie’s actions. It is debatable as to whether the zombie has learnt to describe itself in Jones terms. Specifically, the zombie would not be able to articulate how it is feeling, except when it displays body language. This will be important when we reach my refutation of Chalmers, because my claim is that Chalmers’ zombie can not tell us how it is feeling when it is not displaying body language, but
Chalmers can. However, the more important question for the moment, given all of these considerations; is this enough to allow the zombie to internalize Jones’ Language and make ‘Judgements’ about the way it ‘feels’ in terms of Jones vocabulary and transition to (B2)? (B2) occurs when someone has both learned Jones’ Language and used it for describing others and begins using the terms to talk about themselves. The transition from (B1) to (B2) is the point where an Anthro-Affective Language begins to become an Endo-Affective Language and the person can describe how they are feeling, even when they are not displaying the body language. The zombie cannot do this. The zombie cannot describe how it is feeling in cases where it is not demonstrating the body language because the only means it has for knowing how it is feeling when it can’t feel because it is phenomenally mute, is when the equipment we’ve given it, reads the zombie’s body language and informs it.

Finally we might posit that even if the zombie has an identical neurology to its twin, and that we fitted neuroscanning equipment onto the zombie that could inform it how it should be feeling according to its brain chemistry, even though it can not actually feel anything because it is a phenomenological zombie, this still would not suffice, for as we saw with the case for disgust and mistrust and activity in the Insula Cortex in the Introduction, a patient may exhibit identical behaviour in the brain on neuro-imaging equipment on two separate occasions, and yet report entirely different phenomenal experiences associated with this activity. The zombie would still not be able to accurately tell us how it
is feeling. The zombie’s language would be indeterminate and suffer the same indeterminacy that plagues neuroscience. It would be indeterminate because the same neuro-activity can be reported by patients as different types of emotion, flash-bang or sensation. Because the phenomenal zombie does not have the phenomenal experiences to tell us whether an experience in one part of the brain is anger or jealousy, it is as indeterminate as the neurological machine. The zombie does not have caveat authority to correct the machine. The zombie does not know if activity in its insula cortex is anger or disgust. The zombie does not have the authority the first-person subject has to determine between cases of the same brain pattern activity. The zombie’s reports lack the determination and authority of a first-person subject who can tell us whether he or she is experiencing disgust or distrust. Since the zombie lacks the authority for a self report it can not move from an Observation Language to a Report Language. This point will become important when we look at the question, what is required to move between (B1) and (B2) in the next part of the thesis.

Before we can answer this question, we need to ask how normal people learn and come to apply (B2) to themselves. Because in addition to applying (B2) to others in fact stating roles once the language of (B1) is accepted and transitions from an Observational Language to a Report Language, people also learn how to apply (B2) to themselves and are able to internalize Jones’ Language and report their own feelings, and see themselves and others (in a non-optical sense) in the idiom of Jones’ terminology.
Unlike publicly observable objects and properties the emotional content of a ‘flash-bang’ is rather like ‘a beetle in a box’. It is fundamentally different to body language, behaviour, or the properties of a publicly observable Object Language.

Wittgenstein describes this scenario

(293) Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is by only looking at his beetle386.

The phenomenal zombie, unlike everyone else, does not have a beetle in his box. The beetle in this model represents the content of a ‘flash-bang’. We might refer to the content of the flash-bang as a sensation.

A very good question to ask at this stage is the affiliation that develops between words like ‘anger, pain, envy, pride’ and the sensations we associate with them.

J. J. C. Smart writes

How could descriptions of experiences, if these are genuine reports, get a foothold in language? For any rule of language must have public criteria for its correct application\textsuperscript{387}.

So what accounts are there?

Wittgenstein thinks the rules that govern language systems\textsuperscript{388} are what is most important in his account of the beetle in the box problem. Wittgenstein thinks we can ignore the content of the box, as long as we know the rules governing discourse on the box. There is a very good reason for rejecting Wittgenstein’s Rule Based Account of Language Games which I introduce from Sellars below and explain in the next chapter. Wittgenstein’s Rules-Based account for the use of expressions leads to an infinite regress of rules governing the application of words, and rules for those rules.

However, before reaching that point it is best to consider J. J. C. Smart’s point because it relates directly to the zombie, and its acquisition of languages. What accounts does Wittgenstein actually give in \textit{The Investigations} for how descriptions of experiences get, as J. J. C, puts it, “a foothold in language?”

\textsuperscript{387} Smart, J. J. C. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ \textit{Philosophical Review} 141, no. 56 (1959).
\textsuperscript{388} Ting, Fu-Ning. ‘Wittgenstein’s Descriptive Method’ Doctroial Dissertation, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1989. I use the word system here for reasons that Ting gives over in his paper. See Pg 48 for Fu-Ning Ting’s discussion of the bricklayer example and pp 45 – 46 for his illuminating discussion of systems, facts and language games.
II

The Incompleteness of the Philosophical Investigations

One of the problems with the *Philosophical Investigations* is how disjointed the comments are. Part of this has to do with the way the papers were constructed from different drafts\(^{389}\).

We find various drafts of the same propositions in *The Zettel*\(^{390}\), and the *Philosophical Grammar*\(^{391}\) with similar propositions to *The Investigations* appearing in different orders and even some of the same content rearranged in different ways\(^{392}\). The order of the propositions in *The Philosophical Investigations* becomes hard to follow at a certain point. Kripke complains of this\(^{393}\). Kripke openly admits that he abandons following the order of the propositions and arguments after Tractate 243 because of what he describes as ‘exegetical puzzles’.

---


There has been interesting shadowy research and ethereal scholarship on this point with different philosophers coming together to work out what exactly went wrong with the ‘Private Language Argument’ in *The Philosophical Investigations*. John Cook is perhaps the most forthright on this point. He claims the Private Language Argument section of *The Philosophical Investigations* is ‘irremediably confused’. The confusion, Cook argues, arises between the sense in which one can know they are in pain in the first person, and knowing someone is in pain in the second or third person. The muddle, for Cook, starts with the conditions for knowing J. is in pain, for instance, which involve knowing who J. is and that he is in pain, and this being confused with the sensation of pain one experiences one’s self. From there Cook argues that the confusion works its way in to deeper complexity\(^{394}\).

Alan Donagan lends himself to the view that the ‘Sensations and Pain’ sections of the Private Language Argument seem confused because they are incomplete\(^{395}\). Donagan has the insightful and thought-provoking argument that the thread on Pain and Private Language reaches final resolution through the Vorstellung and Bild distinction if carried out to its natural conclusion\(^{396}\).


While Bild is a pictorial display like that of a teapot used in the original example, a vorstellung is an imaginative representation. Whereas the question ‘what is in the bild of the teapot’ does not make sense, because a bild is a mere pictorial image of a teacup, the vorstellung has an imaginative life and it makes sense for us to imagine tea in the teapot boiling. The confusion in Wittgenstein’s argument, Donagan thinks, is a confusion between the bild and the vorstellung of pain. Whereas a
Dale Jacquette has a different view. He thinks there are missing stages of clarity and exposition that explain the language game being played between knowledge and doubt. Jacquette argues that a missing explanation of the polarity between knowledge and doubt is what is at the centre of the confusion in the Pain and Sensation thread. He thinks what is missing is a thread of arguments that proposes doubt must first be possible in order to have knowledge. This line of argument maintains that since one cannot doubt they are in pain it does not make sense to speak in the polarized sense of knowing one is in pain. He thinks the language game of knowledge, once fully understood, requires a polarity of doubt as a possibility. I think this also is an important insight into the jagged threads of *The Investigation* and points to the possibility that *On Certainty* may have started out at some point as the missing propositions Jacquette is looking for with his Knowledge-Doubt Polarity Thread Hypothosis.

Stern, with impressive scholarship and insight, argues that any confusion and contention between philosophers over the Private Language and Sensation thread originates in older layers of Wittgenstein’s Self Criticism of the
Tractatus buried in the notes making up the *Philosophical Investigations*. Stern argues that in the move between Logical Atomism and Meaning Holism Wittgenstein passes through three phases of self criticism and that the evident confusion philosophers find in the work arises between these three threads which appear, largely rough and unresolved in *The Philosophical Investigations* as we have it. The reason why there is so much contention, on this view, is that philosophers reading Wittgenstein are picking up on individual and often conflicting threads from these stages of his self criticism. Likewise Fu-Ning Ting is another philosopher who has picked up on different layers of self criticism running through Wittgenstein’s work.

Briefly I shall lay these out, because I am in favour of Stern and Fu-Ning Ting’s Three Stages of Self Criticism Hypothesis. I think they go some of the way towards explaining the disjointedness of the arguments and their views are complementary. The first phase is rejection of the Aprioristic focus of *The Tractatus*. Fu-Ning Ting agrees on this point with Stern, but he also goes further. Ting has an interesting view. He argues that in *The Investigations* Wittgenstein is conceptually inverting the normative force of appeal in ordinary language from the aprioricity of the *Tractatus* to an aposteriori investigation of the conditions for language. Ting thinks Wittgenstein’s goal is a total

---

inversion of his earlier philosophy from an apriori investigation of language to an aposteriori investigation of the types of games and conventions that we actually find in natural languages\textsuperscript{403}.

The second phase of the Stern and Fu-Ning Ting Three Stages of Self Criticism Hypothesis is what Fu-Ning Ting describes as the ‘Tendency for the Craving of Generality’\textsuperscript{404}. Fu-Ning Ting thinks Wittgenstein is constantly struggling against his own tendency to generalize from specific examples to

---

\textsuperscript{403} Ting, \textit{Wittgenstein's Descriptive Method}, 1989. The central thesis of Ting’s Doctorial Dissertation is impressive in its insight and stark simplicity. Ting argues that the purpose of \textit{The Investigations} is to invert the authority of an investigation into the force of normative rule following in the use of a language from an apriori source to an aposteriori investigation into the conditions for use of a language to develop. According to Ting’s fascinating dissertation for the earlier Wittgenstein, the original normative source of correct language use was the apriori atomistic structure we are familiar with from the Tractatus. Ting argues that the Later Wittgenstein inverts this and wants to establish what the conditions are under which a language develops alongside the history of man as a form of life, what Ting refers to as ‘the natural history of man’. The inversion, according to Ting, comes from the argument that language games have priority over facts (and/or propositions depending, of course, on your translation of German) which were the source for the Logical Atomist apriori normativity in following rules semantics. The priority of language games is asserted, according to Ting’s reading, by the argument that language games must pre-exist facts because facts themselves are a type of language game. This means that games have priority since even the facts of these games, and what a fact is, are governed by the games themselves. The language game of facts must establish what type of thing a fact is before a language game can have any.

Ting points out that Games may vary from simple to complex, but this does not mean the simple games are incomplete. So primal language games which exist before facts are not incomplete, nor do they need a linguistic concept of what facts are for the game of facts and propositions to be played. Therefore, the language game must precede the atomist’s investigation into the apriority of structures between facts. Hence Ting concludes \textit{The Investigations} are essentially a product of this insight, and an inversion of the \textit{Tractatus}.,

However. I want to avoid a confusion of Ting’s conception of Ordinary Language in relation to normativity, the apriori and the aposteriori sources and conditions for the normativity in language. So I refrain from using ‘language game’ and “use system”.

I think Ting is right on this point and admire his insight. He has found something very interesting in Wittgenstein. Suffice to say a full explanation of Ting’s final position, in comparison with that offered by this thesis is the subject content of an entirely different paper. There I would argue, with many caveats, that there is a relationship between implicit language theorists like Ryle’s analysis of the type of language as we find it used in everyday conversation, and the types of Linguistic Behavioural Argument Ryle gives us, with the aposteriori inversion of the normative rule following force in Wittgenstein’s analysis of ordinary language. That is to say Ryle’s arguments are consistent with the aposteriori conditions for an enquiry into the use of language, if we follow Ting’s reading of Wittgenstein about the inversion of the normative force in ordinary language.

underlying truths about language and this fractures the sequence of the arguments and the unity of his argumentative method. I argue that Fu-Ning is right on this point. When we examine *The Philosophical Investigations* we find patterns where Wittgenstein is clearly wavering between particular instances and an almost compulsive need to universalize these. He then finds other instances drawn from language use that contradict these universalizations.

The third phase is the ‘Pneumatisch phase’ where Wittgenstein rejects the idea that a calculus of symbols can get its meaning through a private inner mental process that illuminates signs, and instead goes forth with the thesis that meaning can be grasped publicly through use. This is the Anti-Psychologistic thread in Wittgenstein’s work. My answer to this thread is that while meaning in some aspects of language may begin publicly, with what Sellars would describe as ‘standard conditions’ and a class of observable symptoms like ‘pain behaviour’, it is part of the process of learning a language that people are later able to internalize words which they learn with their behaviour to be able to describe a stimulus in a realm of private experience.

Following from the Fu-Ning Ting and Stern Scholarly Hypothesis about the stages of Wittgenstein’s self criticism there is an inconsistency between (1) the first stage which involves Wittgenstein’s rejection of his earlier Aprioristic analysis of language and the ways Wittgenstein thinks people learn to use language, and (2) the final stage of Wittgenstein’s self-criticism, the ‘Pneumatisch phase’ where Wittgenstein rejects the idea, left over from his
earlier philosophical work, (and still evident in the rejection and inversion of an Aprioristic analysis of language), that a calculus of signs can be illuminated by some private inner experience. The conflict between the two self critical threads can be seen most clearly in an inconsistency that runs between some of the ways Wittgenstein thinks people learn a language. One way to approach this inconsistency is to look at Wittgenstein’s account of rules and language acquisition because this is where the two threads become most disjointed.

The best way to bring out this inconsistency is through Sellars because there is an important infinite regress Sellars finds in Wittgenstein, that it is essential to avoid, in order not to fall into the same inconsistency. I will discuss this infinite regress in the next chapter.
III

Wittgenstein’s Account of Language Acquisition for Phenomenal Experiences in the Philosophical Investigations

With the above scholarly concerns reviewed, Wittgenstein does have one passage about the way experiences get a foothold in language\textsuperscript{405}.

He writes

244. How do words \textit{refer} to sensations? – There doesn't seem to be any problem here: don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? – of the word ‘pain’ for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural expression of the sensation used in their place. A child hurts himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later,

\textsuperscript{405} This is J.J.C. Smart’s term. See Smart, J. J. C. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ \textit{Philosophical Review} 141, no. 56 (1959).
sentences. . . The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.\textsuperscript{406}

This suggestion involves two stages.

1. The child hurts itself and displays natural pain behaviour that is dispositional to children by their nature. The claim made here is that either all, or a large enough majority of human children cry in the presence of pain to make stage 2 possible.

2. Adults then teach the child the appropriate exclamations, terms, words, sentences and moves in the language game which have the same role as crying and can substitute for it.

What is important in this model is that the moves in the language game become the expression for the pain, not descriptions of it. What also is important here is that the pain pre-exists the linguistic expression in the form of a sensation that finds expression in a ‘natural behaviour’. This allows the child to replace the ‘natural behavioural expression’ of pain with a term endorsed by the linguistic community. Where might such terms for behavioural patterns originate? Here

we might fill the gap in the Wittgensteinian account with a Gleeson-Sellarsian backstory about a Messianic Jones as thus far, posited in this paper.

But at what point does the child learn to see his sensations as ‘pain’ and report it? How is he able, if we take this account, to ‘internalize’ pain, and thus connect the public word in use by the linguistic community with his private feeling of pain? Wittgenstein here has given us a clue, but Sellars’ ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory’ is helpful to unravel the stages involved.

At the Observation Stage Jones’ Language (B1) is an Autobiographical Pre-Internalized Behavioural Term. It is one of the Gross-Body-Language Behavioural Terms available to someone learning a language, which means it has the capacity for either Analogical Semblances, or Analogical Constructs in a Gleesonian vocabulary of affect or sensitivity when fully developed, and if, and only the learner is capable of learning it to the nth stage. It describes the visible publicly observable actions of the Rylean tribe’s people. Crying is pain behaviour. Crying is what somebody who is in pain does. Likewise, when Reg hits Rod, he is displaying publicly observable anger-behaviour. At the level of the descriptive vocabulary of B1 this is what anger is. Jones’ Language while in B1 is descriptive of actions. It has not yet developed, in its infancy, the ability to deal with private episodes beyond the possibility of perhaps a crude premature theoretical intuition.

Both Reg and the child learn the words associated with their behaviour. Reg learns the Rylean ancestral tribal argot for hitting someone in a rage, let us
say ‘calid’ drawing on the descriptive resources of other parts of the language, and the child, likewise, learns the same for crying.

Reg feels some sort of emotional content when expressing the behaviour of which he learns Jones’ word ‘calid’. Hitting Rod is the natural expression of Reg’s emotion like crying is the natural expression of Wittgenstein’s child. The members of the tribe see only the behaviour, not the sensation Reg has access to when he attacks Rod.

When Jones teaches the language of (B1) to his fellow tribesmen something interesting occurs. They begin to see Reg hitting Rod in association with Jones’ new word ‘calid’. They begin to see ‘calid-behaviour’ everywhere in the angry and aggressive behaviour of their fellow tribes’ people. However, something extra happens to Reg when he learns the word ‘calid’. Reg learns the feeling that went with the behaviour. When Reg transitions to (B2) not only does he have the behavioural concept for ‘calid’, he also has the emotional association, an association between the word and the feeling of the ‘flash bang’.

The distinction is like this. From Reg’s perspective, when taught the word for his behaviour he can associate whatever he is feeling while displaying the behaviour with the word. For the rest of the tribe they can only associate the word with the behaviour.

As I pointed out earlier the move from Observational Languages which contain theoretical objects, postulates, similes and ‘looks’ statements such as ‘x looks y’ to Report Languages, in Sellars, is the shift to fact stating roles. The
molecular theorist comes to see the effects of the molecules as the molecules when he shifts from an Observation Language to a Report Language. But this is different in the case of flash-bangs because only each of us has access to our own emotions and phenomenal experiences. It does not make sense to talk about seeing or feeling someone else’s ‘flash of anger’ from the third person perspective. Flash-bangs only occur in the first person or when an omniscient narrator explains what someone is feeling in the first person, from the third person. For instance, ‘he felt a sudden flash of rage’ and ‘I felt a sudden flash of rage’ but never ‘I felt Reg’s sudden flash of rage’.

However, we can observe body language, and we can be taught words for types of body language and attribute our own experiences of emotions to other people’s body language. I can also feel emotions while being taught the word for the publicly observable behaviour. I call this process ‘internalization’. Internalization happens when a person exhibits a publicly observable behaviour, is given the word for that behaviour, and associates a sensation with the word for the behaviour.

The stage that Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie is missing is being able to link the word for its behaviour with the emotional content of its ‘flash-bang’ because it does not have any. The phenomenal zombie cannot link its behaviour and its emotional experience because it is missing the phenomenal content of the content bearing cognitive state. The person who learns the word for the behaviour and internalizes it by associating the word with the way they ‘feel’
while exhibiting the behaviour can do something important that a phenomenal zombie cannot do, and that is, they can use the word when they feel that emotion, but they are not exhibiting the behaviour.

This is one key and very important difference between David Chalmers and his twin phenomenal zombie. For David Chalmers can report the presence of a sensation he has previously learned to associate with a word while exhibiting a behaviour, in the absence of that behaviour. Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie can only use the word while he is exhibiting the behaviour. In a case where Chalmers experiences a sensation, but does not exhibit any behaviour, he would be able to form a Belief407 with a Judgement408 about the identity of that

---


408 Ibid. ‘Judgements’ are a term from his terminology. I have adopted his term, but there are Sellarian reasons why I reject Chalmers’ ‘Three Orders of Judgement’ related to Sellars’ account of the ‘residue’ of descriptive content in fact-stating roles and the pseudo-subjunctive-conditional structure Sellars identifies in fact-stating accounts. See my discussion of Konstatierung statements in Observation and Report Languages in Chapter Sixteen of this thesis. In this case, I should argue, that the zombie would not be able to search its feelings in order to form a ‘Second Order Judgement’ and, thus could not make a statement about whether the flash-bang feels like a flash of remorse, a flash of disgust, or a flash of anger because it does not have feelings to search. This is like the case of a person who has congenital insensitivity to pain trying to describe what it feels like when you kick them in the shin. They do not know the difference between sharp stabbing pains, dull aches, itches, pings, pin pricks, prickling sensations or vague discomfort. They lack both the capacity to develop language competence to describe their feelings, and also, the feelings themselves, (i.e. in the case of someone, for instance, who had language competency but for some reason then lost the ability to feel pain. They may have developed the ability to tell aches and throbs from prickling sensations, but they could not describe what was happening to their shins being kicked, behind a screen, because they can not search the sensation and use the vocabulary and language competence they have already developed in order to make Second Order Judgements about the sensation they are having. Why? Because they are not having one. They can not feel the pain, even though they have developed language competency prior to losing the ability, i.e. they could not tell a stab of pain, from a dull aching pain, from a prickling pain even if they knew what those things felt like for them, because they could no longer feel them or have pain experiences in order to classify the pain, with their already developed linguistic competency. This would be like asking a man who has gone blind to tell you what colour sheet of paper you are holding up in front of him.) The phenomenal zombie, and a person turned into a phenomenal zombie (but who had developed prior language competence to
sensation which a corresponding phenomenal zombie twin would not be able to formulate because the zombie does not have that phenomenal experience. The zombie can not search its feelings and tell us what it is feeling. It cannot identify its emotional experience. The zombie can not examine its feelings and tell us whether it feels a flash of anger, a flash of remorse, a flash grief, or a flash of disgust. The zombie can form no Judgement about the identity of the emotion it is feeling, because as a phenomenal zombie, it can feel nothing. This is an instance where Chalmers and his phenomenal twin zombie would not have the same Judgement as him. This, of course, is the refutation of Chalmers’ assertion that both he and his twin phenomenal zombie could form the same corresponding Judgements, which I promised earlier in the paper.\footnote{See Chalmers, \textit{Judgements and Phenomenal Zombies} in Chapter Seven of this thesis.}

\footnote{Though their feelings and describe them) would (likewise) not be able to form ‘Second Order Judgements’ about flash-bangs. Ergo, Chalmers and his zombie twin cannot have a one-to-one correspondence between Judgements about the identity of an emotional flash-bang they are feeling, nor could the zombie develop the capacity to develop the linguistic competence to deliver verbal reports like his, nor even if it had prior language competence (like a man turned into a zombie), could it deliver verbal reports like Chalmers because it can no longer have flashes of fear, anger, disgust or remorse to apply its language competency to. What is of direct importance to the overall argument of this paper for a return to Pre-Fregeian Psychologism is that without the foundational experiences the phenomenal zombie needs to develop competency in flash-bang emotional descriptions of its feelings, it cannot progress to higher stages of language development.
Chapter Nineteen

Wilfrid Sellars’ Re-formulation of Wittgenstein’s Language Rules

Regress

So, the model suggested by Wittgenstein as one explanation, which we’ve
analysed within Sellars’ framework, allows for internalization so long as people
share sufficient similarities underlying the patterns of behaviour which they can
learn words for, and then associate the words they learn for their behaviour with
the emotion they’re feeling while they exhibit the behaviour. Later this allows
the person learning the language to express when they are feeling a sensation
like a flash of anger, without exhibiting the publicly observable behaviour. This
allows the person to develop an ‘Internalized Report Language’ that they can use
to talk about the phenomenal experiences of their non-publicly-observable
emotions.

Furthermore, this model is flexible enough to allow for an ego-centric
view and an inverted spectrum possiblity. So long as the behaviour is the same,
the person may learn the word everyone uses, but the emotional experience
might be different. All that is necessary for words to get a ‘foothold’ in language,
as J.J. C. Smart puts it, is that patterns of behaviour be sufficiently similar that
they can be publicly identified with the vocabulary learnt in (B1), and that the
person then learns to associate what they are feeling while exhibiting this behaviour with the word they learn for it, such that they come to internalize it and can come to express it later with a report.

There is a case with two related clusters of problems someone might use to attack this model.

Firstly, since the model relies on patterns of identifiable behaviour there arises a question about what happens when this is not the case. What about cases in which the person exhibits strange or uncommon behaviours that have no underlying vocabulary that can be used for third-person ascriptions in the community? Secondly what about the rules governing the use of any terms one might borrow, invent or draw figurative comparisons for this sensation? How does one employ the new term with consistency? There are no shared or common patterns of behaviour with which it is associated that could govern the use of that term.

Herein lies the importance of the Heterophenomenological and Autophenomenological distinction made earlier in this paper. One can doubt that another is in pain, but one cannot doubt that they themselves are in pain. The reason for this is that the pain of another person is exhibited in behaviour and languages which are publicly observable, but the pain itself, the 'beetle' in the box is, not.

Wittgenstein writes
It cannot be said of me at all (except as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps I am in pain. . . . The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain: but not to say it about myself.\(^{410}\)

I take Wittgenstein here to be claiming that there is a difference between knowing someone is in pain and being in pain. The person who is in pain cannot doubt that they are in pain. However, knowing someone else is in pain is different. This allows room for doubting they are in pain.

If we labour at Wittgenstein’s comment, we can make it a little bit less cryptic with the following suggestion. We might say that people can shown how to interpret the symptoms of pain in others using manuals of body language, perhaps written by Jones, and learning the language the person who is in pain knows and the moves in the games of that language which express the pain, but they themselves do not experience the pain. Someone might learn these moves in the language game and simulate them. There is room here to doubt that the person is in pain, which the person with the pain cannot doubt. Likewise, people can be taught to read body language cues to detect underlying emotions like

conceit, anger, disdain, deception, envy, but they do not have access to that person’s feelings for those emotions.

We can bring Wittgenstein and Sellars insight together in a table like this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation Language</th>
<th>First Person</th>
<th>Third Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural reactions like crying which are replaced with expressions and words in a language game a child learns. By connecting the emotion I have with the behaviour I am exhibiting when I am taught the word, I will later be able to report the emotion or sensation when I am not exhibiting a publicly observable behaviour with a</td>
<td>Jones creates an Observation Language to describe people’s behaviour. Learning this language allows tribe members to posit theoretical entities like ‘thoughts’ for sensations and emotions in others which they lack access to. This system of language is the system of expressions the child will eventually learn.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Language</td>
<td>I come to report my own experiences only I have access to within a language-game and see my own experiences in terms of the language I use.</td>
<td>Tribe members learn to see and ‘know’ other member’s emotions and behaviours and report their behaviour even though they do not have access to those emotions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One important distinguishing feature is that I am able to report on an emotional stimulus when I am not exhibiting the publicly observable behaviour.</td>
<td>When Reg sees that Rod is in pain he can know Rod is in pain and report it, but he cannot have access to that pain without the behaviour or Rod reporting it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The objection one might further raise to this use of Wittgenstein’s model is, of course, to raise the following question. Are people naturally disposed to understand certain reactions in others like crying, which do not require an Observation Language and it is the case that understanding these reactions comes easily and can be replaced with a language? Or do people need to be specifically taught a language to interpret the behaviour of others which they find naturally vexing and indecipherable? Both views relate to the first stage of Wittgenstein’s model, the natural pain-behaviour of the child. Where this becomes important is in the Private Language argument, which relies on a sensation that has no known word in a language. To try and get at the root of this problem Wittgenstein considers the case of a community which displays no outward body language. Here the child is forced to create his own word because the medium of similar patterns of body language is absent.

Wittgenstein writes

What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘tooth-ache’.

‘Well, let’s assume the child is a genius and invents a name
for the sensation!” – But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he used the word\textsuperscript{411}.

We might further clarify, since it underlies our suggested model that people have to have similar patterns of behaviours which they can learn the name for, and then when they move to an ‘Internalized Report Language’ that they associate with what they feel in their behaviour at the time they learn it\textsuperscript{412}. This latter is the autobiographical element I laid out with Tim Crane’s work on Dummett and McDowell in the introduction and will become the first part of my reply to the Guess Work Objection.

What is missing for Wittgenstein in the example of a community without body language is the middle part necessary for learning a language and internalizing it. The behaviour-pattern is the medium for connecting word-behaviour-emotion together when learning the language of the tribe. The middle part is missing here in Wittgenstein’s example. The child cannot learn the word of the tribe that replaces the behaviour because the tribe is ‘body-language’ deaf.

So, what are we to make of the person who exhibits a sensation-behaviour which is not common, but is different and perhaps unknown to the rest of the tribe? Here too the behaviour-access point for learning Jones’ word is


\textsuperscript{412} Where might the terms for these patterns of behaviour come from? Here we would point back towards Jones and his Paleo-Behavioural Ur Languages.
blocked. We can imagine a case very much like this if we take the example of a child with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder in a classroom. The child, when suffering from Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder, will squirm in his or her seat, will fidget, will find ways of distracting the class. This is pain-behaviour, perhaps, unknown to the teacher who is ‘deaf’ to the student’s body language and outward expressions.

The child may even invent a word for what produces these outward signs and blurt it out. However, the teacher does not know how to interpret this word, because the teacher does not suffer from Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder. The teacher is like the person who does not understand the body-language of others and needs to be taught a specific language to understand it but they are also deprived of the experiences that such a word might relate to. The teacher is in the position of one of the members of Jones’ tribe and needs a way to understand what is happening to the student but has no internal access to what the student is undergoing.

Wittgenstein writes

So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate
sound. – But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game\textsuperscript{413}.

Suppose the student’s sound is ‘Irrattention’ which is an example of a word that does not belong, yet, to a language game and which he associates with the painful state of trying to concentrate in a difficult environment. The teacher does not understand this condition. This is the closest sound the student with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder can arrive at to what he is experiencing. The teacher might learn to apply this word to the student whenever the student manifests the symptoms of his condition, and that is what “irrattention” means for the teacher. But the teacher does not know or understand the internal ‘pain’ state the student is in and that is central to what the child means by the word.

Here we have a publicly accessible point for understanding the student’s mental state – this is what students who have ‘irrattention’ do. This is the behaviour they manifest. But the teacher has no access or ability to understand the pain the student has. He cannot repeat the word for himself or for others in the context of ‘irrattention’ because he does not know the rules that allow him to apply the term except in the case of specific behaviours.

This is a problem. What Wittgenstein refers to as a language game has certain rules. One of those rules means being able to repeat the use of the word within the context appropriate for that word. Sellars describes this rules-based approach when he critiques Wittgenstein’s thesis on the rules of a language game. This leads Sellars to reject it because it leads to an infinite regress\(^{414}\).

Wilfrid Sellars writes

*Thesis.* Learning to use a language (L) is learning to obey the rules of L. But, a rule enjoins the doing of an action (A) in a sentence (E) in a language, which contains an expression for A.

Hence, a rule which enjoins the using of a linguistic expression (E) is a sentence in a language which contains an expression for E – in other words, a sentence in a metalanguage.

Consequently, learning to obey the rules for L presupposes the ability to use metalanguage (ML) in which the rules for L are formulated.

So that learning to use a language (L) presupposes having learned to use a metalanguage (ML). And by the

\(^{414}\) See Lu, Jiayi. ‘Sellars’ Paradox and Language Games’ *Res Cogitans* 6, no. 1 (2015)., for formal formulations of the regress leading to this paradox.
same token, having learned to use ML presupposes having learned to use a meta-metalanguage (MML) and so on.

But this is impossible (a vicious regress).

Therefore, the thesis is absurd and must be rejected415.

In the same paper Sellars goes on to develop the notions of ‘language entry transitions’ and ‘language departure transitions’ which are part of the background for the development of his solution to Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. These of course are his ‘observation’ and ‘report’ languages. Observation Languages contain a number of natural language traits, as has been discussed at length through the paper. An Observation Language might use metaphors or similes in structures Sellars identifies such as ‘x looks like y’, and avoids formal Fact Stating Roles which carry the full epistemic endorsement of a community and ‘standard conditions’ like Report Languages employ. Such an Observation Language may describe new and novel experiences of an observation in terms of models and descriptive content borrowed from other Report Languages. Indeed, such languages have a tendency to use descriptive language in place of Fact Stating Language and, as we saw, this derives from the pseudo-subjunctive conditional structure which allows the user of the language to withhold assent to literal factual statements. We also saw from

Sellars’ treatment of Carnap, that Observation Languages are also characterized by theoretical objects and postulates which later come to be factually stated as part of Report Languages. Whereas Carnap saw the difference between observables and theoreticals as fixed and ontological, Sellars rejects Carnap’s sophisticated brand of Logical Positivist Empiricism. Sellars thinks the difference between observables and theoreticals is fluid, not fixed and methodological.

If asked what the word ‘irattention’ meant the student might draw on the resources which we find are characteristic of Object Languages, and explain the pain of trying to concentrate with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder like this:

Each time someone speaks, moves a chair, taps a pencil or a bird flies past the window I lose my train of thought. It is like a gust of fierce hot wind blows leaves everywhere in my mind and each leaf is a lost thought from that chain. The more I try to concentrate when that happens the more painful it becomes holding on to that train of thought until the pain is too much to take.

So that while the term ‘fierce hot wind’ does not mean a literal ‘hot’ ‘windy’ type of ‘thought’ in a language the teacher and student share together (in the strict
rule governed sense in which Wittgenstein thinks language ought to work in *The Philosophical Investigations*), we can see that the language the student is using has some of the traits familiar to Sellars’ Observation Languages. That is, the student is constructing an Observation Language for his private experiences. He is presenting the same sorts of Observation Languages as Wilfrid Sellars discusses in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, The Language of Theories* and *Some Reflections on Language Games*.

The teacher might here be able to grasp the simile between leaves being blown away and the student losing their train of thought. Working on the student’s definition the teacher might be able to apply ideas of headaches and anguish and other types of mental pain to the student’s descriptions of ‘painful distraction’ and in this way incorporate models into his or her understanding. While the teacher may have no direct private experience of Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder, the flexibility found in the sorts of language games and systems that Sellars talks about, allows the teacher and the student to build an Observation Language together. When the Observation Language passes to a Report Language the descriptions lose their subjective character and the student will be able to offer Reports about being in ‘irrattention’, and the teacher will know what that means in terms of the teacher’s own experience which he has assembled by analogical reference to terms he has attached his own knowledge of his private affect, to model the descriptions of his student. This is an ‘Analogical Construct’. The teacher may never be in ‘irrattention’ like the
student. The teacher may however come sufficiently to grasp what is happening to the student. The knowledge shared between the teacher and the student with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder about ‘irrattention’ is an indirect knowledge sitting between what I will refer to in the next part of the paper as the third and first personal view. This knowledge is shared by building up analogical structures between the two personal views in which assumptions in the descriptive features of an Observational Language can pass via an indirect domain. This ‘indirect knowledge’ creates the illusion of the intersubjectivity of language that Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments are caught up in. It is to this we now turn.
Chapter Twenty

Insights into Dispositional Terms from the Age of Anti-Metaphysicians

To arrive at the final insight on offer in this thesis, it is necessary to see where Robert Wolff’s criticism of Gilbert Ryle comes from. Philosophers of Ryle’s era, in the early to mid part of the Nineteen Hundreds, can often be characterized by either a self-conscious embarrassment at, or a fear of, being caught out at engaging in ‘metaphysics’. A large number of the schools of thought of the era (and a legacy of Logical-Positivism) were strands of philosophy that were involved in critiques and rebuttals of classical metaphysics. What seems curious to us now is that many of these philosophers found ingenious ways of levelling charges against one another that their rival had returned to the classic domain of metaphysical problems and metaphysical doctrines. To do such was perceived, in the wisdom of the day as a most grievous sin.

To philosophers of this era, proving that your opponent had metaphysical leanings was seen as a felling criticism of that philosopher and a good reason to be dubious about the leanings of their philosophy. To our modern eyes this pejorative use of the term ‘metaphysician’ and various pejorative uses
of terms like ‘realist’, ‘anti-nominalist’ and ‘trans-substantialist’, is perhaps a curious and quaint way to talk. According to the wisdom of that age one need only to find some means of justifiably calling one’s opponent a metaphysician in order to dismiss their views as ‘claptrap’ and ‘hogswobble’\textsuperscript{416}. Nevertheless, this is the place and the time that the final insight for this thesis comes from.

I believe that it is important when doing philosophy, to keep, display and share a historical awareness of these shifts in philosophy in order to be able to pan for any gold an argument may offer\textsuperscript{417}. The era of the Wolff paper is, of course, the era before Saul Kripke and David Lewis came to redefine metaphysics and its problems with new types of transfinite mathematics and modal logic. With Lewis and Kripke metaphysics gained a new prestige, and today the title of ‘metaphysician’ is most coveted. The swing towards metaphysics comes to us primarily, of course, out of Quine, Kripke and Lewis in the second part of the twentieth century. The status of the modern ‘metaphysician’ is augmented by new applications for metaphysics in fields of discrete mathematics, and digital data mathematics with the development of ‘online ontologies’ and new types of programming structures which often find their ways into highly profitable fields of the information industry.


\textsuperscript{417} Such are the lessons of Edward ‘Ted’ Sadler, one of my undergraduate lecturers, who taught me to value rigour, exactitude and above all else historical awareness of the changing tides of philosophy in my scholarship.
Such being so, we must put this late Twentieth Century and Millenial knowledge aside, and begin in a historical time-capsule with Ryle’s own denouncement of metaphysics and Robert Wolff’s claim of Ryle’s hypocrisy in relation to metaphysics. This will allow us to examine Ryle’s likely reply to Wolff and finally this will open-up the last and penultimate insight on offer in this thesis.

Robert Wolff, in a very short and obscure paper\textsuperscript{418}, attacks Ryle’s dispositional account as a piece of speculative metaphysics. Robert Wolff accuses Ryle of metaphysical postulation and hypostatization and an almost Empedoclean Fidoism. One might almost say that Wolff’s criticism, rather amusingly, paints Ryle, himself, as a Fidoist.

Fidoism is a term used by Carnap’s\textsuperscript{419} for Ryle’s criticisms of an Anti-Nominalist Realist position\textsuperscript{420}. Carnap derives it from Ryle’s argument that a Neo-Platonic Pro-Realist hypothesizes the existence of an entity for any expression that loosely resembles a noun. Thus, according to Ryle’s argument, if one has a pet called Fido, the Anti-Nominalist would assert in the name of Realism that there are in fact two entities. These two entities are Fido-the-dog and Fido-the-name-of-the-dog. According to Ryle this creates problems between

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
identity statements, the properties of the name as an entity, as well as the dog as a separate entity. For instance, when one calls out the word ‘Fido’ it is unclear whether one is referring to the dog or the name of the dog. This tendency to attribute entities to expressions and terms is at the foundation of Ryle’s rejection of metaphysics.

Indeed, one could almost posit the debate between Ryle and Wolff in the shape of a satisfyingly philosophical Ouroboros, with each biting the tail of the other, over who is the Empedoclean Fidoist.

Wolff writes

The attempt to explain law like statements about the physical world has often led to the postulation of some sort of ‘substance’ or ‘stuff’ which endured through the many alterations of the world and hence accounted for the continuity and order of those alterations. In the same way, a dispositional account of mental concepts runs the risk of hypostatizing the patterns of behaviour either as ‘Faculties’ and ‘Ideas’ or as Dispositions.\textsuperscript{421}

\textsuperscript{421} Wolff, \textit{Professor Ryle’s Discussion of Agitations}, 1954.
Here, of course, Wolff is accusing Ryle of creating ontological distinctions on the basis of ordinary language foundations. As Wolff points out even though Ryle ‘commits this error. Ryle would undoubtedly repudiate it if confronted with it explicitly\(^4\). And indeed, Ryle, would passionately object to such an attribution. Ryle is purportedly Anti-Fidoist and claims to eschew metaphysics of this type, altogether, from his philosophy. Wolff’s charge is one of hypocrisy. The charge of hypocrisy arises because of Ryle’s Anti-Fidoist Ordinary Language critique of Platonism. In *Systematically Misleading Expressions*\(^5\) Ryle points out that sentences which have as their subjects non-existent entities, or as their predicates the claim that the subject does not exist, present a paradoxical problem for the philosophy of language. Ryle argues that if the subject of a sentence with a propositional claim is a non-existent, or the predicate denies the existence of the subject, then it raises the two part question; what is the predication of an entity referring to and what is the sentence actually about?\(^6\)

Ryle’s argument and underlying concern is that ‘terms couched in grammatical or syntactical terms’ which are perfectly useable and understood in

---


everyday ordinary language use by the natural language speaker, become ‘monsters’ when philosophers begin to take them too seriously and subject them to logical and semantical analysis. Ryle thinks that their ‘syntactic elements’ make expressions of Ordinary Language into monsters inhabiting what we would today describe as a Meniong swampland when philosophers apply truth conditions, referential theories of meaning, types of modal realist calculi, counterfactual truth values, or search among common expressions for ontological hints into the nature of reality. Ryle thinks the trouble with this sort of approach is that such philosophers begin to analyse idioms, argots and bits taken out of common language and its dialects in ways in which the terms were never meant to be used425.

Officially, Ryle thinks that all quasi-ontological statements are systematically misleading and end in a sort of layman’s inspired Platonism. For instance Ryle argues that taking a bit of natural language like ‘honesty compels me’ to mean that there is a Platonic force called “honesty” that literally compels someone who uses that expression to tell the truth, and this ‘veracious force’ can be treated as an actual entity, is to fall into the illusion created from the Ordinary Language expression and be misled by it.

In a moment we will see that Ryle commits a similar error in his analysis, as he criticizes other philosophers of doing in Misleading Expressions,

425Ryle, Systematically Misleading Expressions, 2009. See Pg 44.
with his analysis of dispositions and that there is some meat to Wolff’s criticism. However, my analysis of Wolff’s criticism will show that what arises from Ryle’s analysis of dispositions is not a Platonic force, but rather a confusion between first and third person perspectives.

Wolff writes

One of the most interesting examples of this hypostatisation is the discussion of agitations in the chapter entitled the Emotions. An analysis of the argument will illustrate the way in which the error is committed and the care which must be exercised to avoid objectifying dispositions, tendencies and other pseudo-substantives. . .

Motives are simply the dispositions and inclinations which he has previously analysed; pride, vanity, avarice, patriotism, laziness and so forth. ‘Feelings are the sorts of things people often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs’. . . Quite different to these are agitations or commotions\textsuperscript{426}.

\textsuperscript{426} Wolff, \textit{Professor Ryle’s Discussion of Agitations}, 1954. Pg 240.
Wolff makes the following argument

As soon as we speak of two motives or inclinations as opposing and interfering with one another, we get into trouble. For ‘patriotic’ and ‘cowardly’ are descriptions of the man’s behaviour and therefore the description of what he would do when confronted by conflicting interests must necessarily be a part of that self-same pattern.\textsuperscript{427}

Wolff contends thus

Part of saying that this particular man is patriotic is saying that when offered a chance to serve his country, he does so unless there is danger involved. Likewise, to describe him as cowardly is to say that he shies away from danger,\textit{although on occasion he will risk danger for the sake of his country}.\textsuperscript{428}

\textsuperscript{427} Wolff, \textit{Professor Ryle’s Discussion of Agitations}, 1954. Pg 240 Italics are his
\textsuperscript{428} Wolff, \textit{Professor Ryle’s Discussion of Agitations}, 1954. Ibid.
Wolff’s criticism of Ryle’s notion of dispositions, in its essence, is simply that they are far too narrowly formulated, and that the way dispositions behave when they go together in ordinary language usage by the natural language speaker, Wolff thinks, is to form a general holistic description of a person’s characteristic nature.

And indeed, that sounds about right. I side with Wolff and argue that this is indeed how people use dispositions in holistic accounts of people, not in descriptions of hidden and specific forces compelling people towards different behaviours.

But, given that, surely Ryle is also onto something. Surely there are cases like the following which we can relate to.

Plato, as Socrates, writes

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his
eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.\footnote{Plato. The Republic. Translated by Desmond Lee. Victoria: Penguin, 2003. Pp 147-148.}

I think everyone can relate to this type of turmoil and self conflict. If not in that specific context, then the more general agitation one feels when one wants to do one thing and feels an inhibition not to or a compulsion to do something else.

Notice the space we have at last moved into. In the course of formatting an Ordinary Language argument in terms of a Linguistic Behavioural analysis we have arrived in the space between a holistic descriptive analysis of dispositions as Wolff argues for in natural language usage, and a narrowed interpretation of dispositions as Ryle argues for and to which we can find our own sympathy. That is we’ve moved into a direct conflict between introspective scrutiny and ordinary language usage in a piece of Ordinary Language Philosophy. On the one side we have the Plato-Leontis-Ryle position, that is, a direct appeal made to the first personal perspective about what it is like to have competing impulses. This direct appeal to the first personal perspective carries over into an indirect appeal to the third personal perspective via an assumption that the Ryle-Plato argument makes on behalf of ordinary language when we think someone else is
agitated. These assumptions make up the third person indirect. Similarly we have a direct third person appeal in the Wolffian form of a linguistic behaviourist analysis about the holistic behaviour of dispositions expressed as descriptions as exemplified by the cowardly but patriotic man who ‘shies away from danger, although on occasion he will risk danger for the sake of his country’. This incorporates an implicit indirect appeal to the first person domain of language enabling Wolff’s rejection of Ryle’s own position for that is in fact how such descriptions work.

The two indirect appeals, the indirect first personal appeal, and the indirect third personal appeal taken together with the direct appeal might constitute an inchoate normative source for the claimed authority of the linguistic understanding of the natural language speaker. From these one might ground an Ordinary Language claim like that which I gave in the earlier example of Ryle’s critical censure of Augustine and the Stoics use of the concept of ‘volitions’. Ryle advances the claim that nobody actually uses ‘volitions’ in natural language descriptions and so concludes against them. He effectively uses this domain as a normative body to advance his own arguments and refute others. In the present case, however, Wolff out-Ryles Ryle. Wolff derails Ryle’s attempt at developing an ‘Agitational Calculus’ based on an occult appeal to a first person perspective. Wolff does this, firstly, by pointing out that dispositions, Inclinations and Motives in the third person work holistically as descriptions in Ordinary Language use. Secondly, Wolff has revealed that Ryle’s ‘Agitational
Calculus’ is actually based on an occult appeal to a first personal perspective. The allegedly occult first personal perspective is what I have called the direct first personal perspective understood phenomenologically. The argument works by sympathy. We see someone behave in a certain way, and we introspect and apply our own recollections or memories of a prior consciousness when we found ourselves in a similar agitational state. We might see the same domain involved in the form of an appeal for the difference between, for example, a glow of warmth or pride where we cannot locate a Linguistic Behavioural distinction for such an analysis. This, of course, is the sphere from which I’ve distinguished phenomenological arguments as an occult subset of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments.

The problem concerns how we understand dispositions. We have introspective motives on the one side and descriptions attributing them subjects on the other. The introspective source, the phenomenologically reflective act, is entirely opposed to the bit of natural language analysis as Wolff’s holistic Linguistic Behavioural argument about ordinary language motive talk shows. The two direct sources say different things, and the indirect sources that they ground, consequently, say correspondingly different things. The Linguistic Behavioural analysis invites us to go one way and maps the ordinary language claim at the source in that direction. The direct third personal perspective in turn invites an indirect first personal perspective view of dispositions as holistic entities. The introspective scrutiny that arises from a conscious reflective act,
however, which has our sympathies in the form of a direct first personal perspective, such as the case I quoted from Plato’s *Republic*, invites us to go in another direction and this in turn maps the indirect third person assumption that dispositions can conflict with each other, i.e. a man cannot be both patriotic and cowardly or he’ll suffer from an ‘Agitation’. We sympathize with this agitation from the first personal direct point of view which gives force to the indirect third person positional perspective and ends with ascribing conflicting motives to another.

It seems that there is a direct contradiction in what a disposition is as understood in Ordinary Language. From the directly first personal point of view motives can conflict with each other and with various impulses. From first personal insight when we reflect on our own experiences of conflicting motives, impulses and inclinations we find ourselves agreeing with Ryle and Plato. Anyone forced between going to a big game, or concert, and commitments to family or work will recall the mixture of emotions and motivating forces within them. We each have our own experiences of self conflict. So, from the first-personal point of view competing inclinations and motives can make us conflicted, but from the directly third-personal point of view they cannot. When we examine the way we talk about our friends and people we know, we find that dispositions behave exactly as Robert Wolff says they do. They work as holistic descriptions of what people are *like*. 
Having now arrived at this point, I want to take it back in a certain sense. That is, though so called ‘Ordinary Language Arguments’ concerning motives as dispositions lead us to contradictory positions about them, I wish to diagnose the contradiction. The cost, however, will be to undermine the authority of Ordinary Language Arguments, by revealing two underlying sources of analyses which can rival one another and in the case in point, produce contradictory claims. The contradiction between these claims seems inevitable until we realize what is going on in the phenomenology of the interospective act of reflection that we make implicitly and in the Linguistic Behavioural analysis that Wolff offers about the holistic way that dispositional descriptions fit together. If the data of the direct first personal perspective is irreducible to the data of the direct third personal perspective, then that suggests we should expect the possibility for inconsistency between some claims which purportedly make their claim to authority by appeal to a shared common source and that shared common source is the normative force of ordinary language usage. Ryle seems to get away with it because of an inconsistency connected to his claim that consciousness does not exist which diverts the reader’s attention away from what is happening when they read some of his arguments. Ryle uses unacknowledged phenomenological arguments that rely on introspective scrutiny, but he pretends that he doesn’t. This is Ryle’s surreptitious play. Hence the clash between the normative authority in Linguistic Behavioural Arguments and phenomenology is not obvious. Indeed this is the fault line
running through *The Concept of Mind*, that I pointed out at the start of this paper in the Introduction.

What we have identified is a contradiction between a source disclosing the normative force of a phenomenological claim based on the introspective scrutiny of performing the examination of conscious recollections, and another based on analysis of a bit of natural language. The source of the tension is readily identified. Each notion of dispositional motives maps a rival source of normativity. This complicates a straightforward division of perspectives into the first and third person point of view. The contradiction is made serious by the assumption they both are aspects of the domain of knowledge possessed by the ordinary language user and this is where both claims are drawing their normative force from. The Linguistic Behaviourist analysis lodged by Wolff makes an appeal to the behaviour of language based on the direct knowledge of the third personal use of language. Likewise, the appeal to our own introspective scrutiny, in the form of a conscious act of sympathy, of recalling a moment of self conflict is also a direct appeal. The problem of the contradiction persists for as long as we think of ‘ordinary language’ as one unified source. This problem is solved even if the contradiction is not dissolved once we recognise that indirect knowledge of the third person perspective is reducible to direct knowledge of the first person perspective. Indirect experience of the first person perspective is reducible to direct experience of the third person perspective. Neither direct knowledge of the first person, nor direct knowledge of the third person, is
reducible to the other. If we insist that they are then we do so on pain of admitting a contradiction. That is to say, if we insist things are reducible by the way Ryle treats them, then Ordinary Language Arguments are bad arguments because they produce contradictions. Saying that they are not removes the contradiction, but destroys the unity of ‘Ordinary Language’ as a unifying normative force of discourse on the mind.

The domain which the two threads of rival analysis, that is Ryle’s Occult Phenomenology and his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments would have shared is indirect. That is, the indirect domain poses any number of assumptions carried over from bits of analysis, as the domain we used to map onto the area of knowledge possessed by the natural language user, as a normative source. This domain, under scrutiny, has now disappeared into the first and third-person direct views. These are simply rival perspectives from which to approach the nature of mind.

The impact of the argument should now become apparent. Ordinary Language usage can’t be a normative source for mapping arguments on pain of admitting a contradiction from distinct sources, such as a Linguistic Behavioural analysis, or from introspective scrutiny in the form of phenomenological arguments. In short order, the domain of knowledge marked out by the ‘ordinary language user’ is no good as a source for justifying arguments concerning the nature of mind. Such a domain can admit contradictory claims about the mind because it conceals two direct points of view, not a single intersubjective point of
view. The illusion of a single intersubjective source arises from analogical structures which allow assumptions to pass between the direct views into indirect views. These are the Analogical Constructs I have spoken of throughout the paper, and are provided as an answer to the Guess Work Objection. We experience these Analogical Constructs, for instance when we see a man behaving in a way we might ourselves report in the first person as agitated.

When we see his behaviour and we use the word, we allow our own private experiences of what agitation feels like, which we learnt as a behavioural term and internalized, to pass through the analogical structures between the direct third and first person via the indirect domain. We project our own experiences of agitation on to that person’s behaviour.

The phenomenal zombie cannot do this since it has no experience of agitation. It thus would not be able to become a competent language user and would be restricted to a behavioural vocabulary, not a fully developed language with Analogical Constructs that allow it to project its understanding of sensations on to the behaviour of others. The zombie would not be able to learn to ‘see’ its emotions in other people. What it has developed is a quasi-language and not a real one. Such a quasi-language is not capable of explaining all of the facts germane to an Anti-Psychologistic theory of mind, since a fortiori it cannot explain all the facts of language. Thus have we reached the refutation of Anti-Psychologism.
Since the development of a language theory capable of explaining all of the facts of mind, depends upon a non-linguistic domain of introspection and consciousness from which sensations and feelings must be encoded by the speaker, passed through the medium of language, and decoded by the listener, by Dummett’s own light the project of Anti-Psychologism is untenable. Mind has priority to language in an explanatory theory about the facts both theories share in their domains because the meaning of the encoded language depends upon the non-linguistic domain the words are encoded from.

An Analytical Construct is a ‘post-internalized’ projection of our feelings and experiences on to the behaviour of another, and not merely the common language description of the behaviour in the language, associated with the word. Here, we apply by analogical construction, our own experiences onto another person when we hear them use the word to describe their own experiences, and in sophisticated circumstances when we analyse their behaviour. We sympathize, and empathize, and recall our own experiences. This makes language seem intersubjective, but really, all we are doing is a sophisticated

---

430 See Dummett, *What Do I Know When I Know a Language?*, 1993. Dummett writes ‘Philosophers before Frege assumed. . . that what a speaker knows is a kind of code. Concepts are coded into words and thoughts which are compounded out of concepts, into sentences, whose structure mirrors, by and large, the complexity of the thoughts. We need language, on this view, only because we happen to lack the faculty, that is, of the direct transmission of thoughts. Communication is, thus essentially like the use of a telephone: the speaker codes his thoughts in a transmissible medium, which is then decoded by the hearer. The whole analytical school of philosophy is founded on the rejection of this conception, first clearly repudiated by Frege. The conception of language as a code requires that we ascribe concepts and thoughts to people independently of their knowledge of language; and one strand of objection is that, for any but the simplest concepts, we cannot explain what it is to grasp them independently of the ability to express them in language.’
form of guessing and speculate on what they are feeling by applied personal experience. We are seeing the ‘agitated man’ in terms of our own experiences of agitation, which has an autobiographical history between when we learned the word, and what we take the word to mean.

The Rylean, unlike the zombie, learns his emotional language from being taught the word for his behaviour and associates that word with the sensation he experiences while exhibiting the behaviour. The word is a code for what he is feeling. When another tribal member listens to his words, the second Rylean tribal member decodes these words in terms of his own experiences. On this view I am presenting, pace Dummett, mentalistic language is actually rather like a telephone that encodes the private experiences of sensations into a language and then decodes language using analogical structures to relate the words back to private sensations which have been associated with the words via behaviour in the early stages of acquiring a language. This is how the means of acquiring a language and what it means to be competent in the terms of a language are connected to the meaning of the words in that language. Along with my answer to the Guess Work Hypothesis, this completes my explanation fulfilling the conditions for the tenability of the viability of Psychologism as a research approach in the Philosophy of Mind. With this last piece in place I complete my call for a return to a Pre-Fregeian theory of mind and conclude my account of the place of Ordinary Language Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind.
Conclusion and Afterword

What should emerge from this thesis is the treacherous crevasse between first person and third person positions in the use of language. Theories that fail to take into account of the fact that terms used in first-personal phenomenological descriptions, and those used in third-person discourse may mean different things, and thus fall victim to a range of treacherous illusions. The treachery is that assumptions hidden in Analogical Structures lead one to assume that terms used in the first and third person are thoroughly interchangeable, and that language is not personal or subjective, but rather merely communal and public. This thesis argues that such is not so.

In the introduction of the paper I revealed three suppositions in Ryle's philosophy, which Ryle took to unite the use of language between first and third position, and which I wanted to challenge\textsuperscript{431}. This thesis has argued that Ryle was mistaken on all three of these suppositions. The thesis argues against Ryle that there is something fundamentally different between the first and third

\textsuperscript{431} See Section II, Ordinary Language Arguments and the project of Anti-Psychologism in the Philosophy of Mind, in the Introduction. Also, see The Robert Wolff Paper and Autophenomenology in Chapter Fifteen. Midway Map of the Paper, in this thesis.
positions\textsuperscript{432}. We answer yes to the first condition against Ryle’s mistakes. The first person use and third person uses of language are fundamentally different. More importantly the choice of word we use depends upon a private experience that other people cannot have. What I call my ‘anger’ is my experience of my anger. At the mere level of language this is indicative of the stages of language development that one must go through to use a vocabulary for ‘flash-bangs’. We can say ‘I felt a flash of anger’ but never ‘I felt Tod’s flash of anger’. More importantly the choice of word we use depends upon a private experience that other people cannot access. The second premise in the three mistakes of Ryle is answered by the careful analysis of the Wolff paper. If there were no difference between the first and the third person position, then there would be no contradiction between Ryle and Wolff’s propositions about the way dispositions work. If there were no difference, then it would not matter whether we were using dispositions from the perspective of the first or the third person, because either use would be identical. However, there is. There is a difference in how we use dispositions in the first and third person position. The fact dispositions work holistically to describe characteristics in the third person, while exerting a phenomenal normative force when we think of them in the first person (as in the Plato example from the argument on the tripartite soul) means, not only that we are using language differently in those perspectives, but that we are thinking

\textsuperscript{432} See Section II, \textit{Ordinary Language Arguments and the project of Anti-Psychologism in the Philosophy of Mind}, in the Introduction.
differently when we articulate those perspectives because the ascriptive semantics and the phenomenal experiences associated with those words changes. Language has different properties that arise from the perspective it is used from. Some words will mean different things and exhibit different properties and behaviour when used in different personal perspectives. This creates questions, because we must ask the psychologist, the cognitive scientist and the philosopher in which sense is he or she using a word? This is the insight behind the metaphysical ‘force’ objection that Robert Wolff levels against Ryle’s account of dispositions.

When we forget that we are applying our own experiences to the language of others it can mislead us to see meaning in language as intersubjective and forget the autobiographical processes we, ourselves, underwent and continue to refine in the vocabulary we use to describe our private life. A twenty-one-year-old, a seven-year-old, and a fifty-one-year old will have different life experiences that contribute to different understandings of what the word ‘heartbreak’ means. To talk about all of their understandings as thought they were identical objects, from the third-personal perspective, I urge, is the underlying cause for the glacier of problems that has frozen over the sciences of mind, which I pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis.\textsuperscript{433} To speak of people’s emotional and

\textsuperscript{433} See \textit{The Three Tiers of Solving the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem in the Philosophy of Mind} in the \textit{Introduction} to this thesis where I introduced the ‘Silver Thaw’ metaphor for a common root problem underlying all of the research issues surfacing within the various disciplines of mind.
mental life under the assumption they are made up of identical and uniform objects, from the third personal perspective, is a treacherous assumption which leads to the sorts of problems that are manifested in attempts at building a science of the mind. Problems will appear like cracks in the glacier. The problems revealed by close examination of these cracks are the Inverted Spectrum Argument, the Beetle in the Box Problem, ‘Situational Responses’ and the failure of Context-Dependent Identity Claims. In one way or another, as this thawing paper has revealed, these are all symptoms of an underlying Indeterminacy of Reference that plagues psychological research, theories, data collection, cognitive science and domains that involve language about the mind.

This led us to answering the third premise in the three mistakes of Ryle. First person phenomenal experience is prior to third person language description. Firstly, the reason why first person phenomenal experience is prior to meaning in third person language descriptions is that we learn to associate with mentalistic words via body language in a linguistic community. But, prior to the body language or the word, is the phenomenal experience which we learn to eventually associate to the word. Secondly, first person phenomenal experience is prior to third person language descriptions because our private experiences, when we have mastered a language, are what we use to determine the words and descriptions we offer of our private emotional lives. This shows that a theory of mind is necessary for, and prior to a theory for the semantics of language since the semantics for the language depend upon private conscious
experience. To understand the word choice, we have to understand what determines the word choice. We can not understand the meaning of a ‘pang of regret’ and a ‘pang of sadness’ if we cannot understand the phenomenal ‘pang’ that determine the word choice.

This is why the phenomenological argument is so strong. First person insight drawn from analysis of phenomenal properties, like the difference between visualizing and witnessing an event, or the comparison of individual feelings to decide if the introspectable phenomenal experiences of an emotion one has is a ‘flash of anger’ or a ‘flash of guilt’, engages us on a personal conscious level.

Further proof of the priority of private phenomenal experience in emotional and mental vocabularies was found in the Rylean community’s developmental stages where we could say that David Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie was not able to learn the mature language of Sellar’s Rylean community. The Chalmerian zombie was not able to internalize the language to describe the feelings it felt while exhibiting the publicly observable behaviours for Jones’ Language because it had no feelings to determine and base word choice on. It could not examine its feelings to self-report, because, it was a phenomenal zombie. It had none. This meant it could not pass beyond the internalized reporting stage, and onto the final stage in which it learnt to apply its own experiences to the behaviours of others. The zombie lacked the necessary capacities to fully master language and use it meaningfully. Ergo something
prior to language determines meaning in language and is necessary to master language competency. If this were not so, the phenomenal zombie could learn to use the final stages of the language with full competence.

We gained insight into the final stages of language mastery and competency by applying Wittgenstein’s ‘Pain Argument’ to the teacher and the AD(H)D student. The student first exhibited pain-behaviour which the teacher did not understand. When in pain, the student fidgeted, disrupted the class, would get up and wander around. Eventually, drawing on metaphorical structures, similes and constructs made possible by the withholding of assent to the propositional content of the subjunctive conditional structure that ‘looks-talk’ adopts when it borrows from the vocabulary of the language, the student could make statements about his AD(H)D. The teacher and student were then able to build a language together that allowed the teacher to construct analogical structures from the teacher’s own experiences and come to a model of the AD(H)D student’s behaviour that the teacher could understand even though the teacher had no experiences like the student’s and possessed no common word and no common behaviour.

This offers an insight into why there is an indeterminacy of reference in the disciplines and sciences of the mind. Each person goes through a private autobiographical process, which may begin with the inherited behavioural Gross-Body-Language descriptions of a tribe, but which, to master the language, the person must first learn to internalize in order to describe and articulate
their own emotions, and then use those personal meanings to project as a sort of self-educated guesswork to understand others.

At no time does the teacher grasp the full meaning of ‘irrattention’. The teacher’s understanding of the student’s condition is analogical, not intersubjective. The teacher’s model refers to the student’s behaviour and language in a speculative way through analogues of his own experiences assembled by structures based on the student’s figurative, metaphorical, and similitudinal use of an Object Language. This is where we applied insight from Sellars’ to Wittgenstein’s account. What is important in this account we develop from Sellars and Wittgenstein in the example used is that the teacher’s experiences are not the same experiences as the student. The teacher does not have AD(H)D. The space between what the student says and the analogical understanding of what the teacher thinks those words mean, is entirely constructed in terms of the teacher’s own experiences and the semantics the teacher draws on when working at understanding the student’s experiences. We know that such is so because the teacher does not have AD(H)D, and thus cannot possibly have the same experiences as the student. Thus, the teacher’s understanding of the student, such as it is, must be analogical. This allowed us an insight into where the Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference arises.

Full mastery of a language requires internalization, which involves an autobiographical component where the process of acquiring a concept in a language, and what that word means, are hopelessly ravelled together. That
meaning is then projected onto others, like the two Rapunzels in their towers, staring at each other, and trying to build up a model of the inside of the other’s tower from her own experiences of hers. So to do we guess at the emotions of others. Thus, such completes the Dummett-McDowell-Crane conditions for an account of Psychologism.

What should also emerge from the thesis are notes for the death of classical theories of psychology. If this paper is right and the clash of Scientific and Manifest Images is based on different types of access to the Object Languages, then Psychology is, in a certain sense, doomed to speculations about the nature of mind but cannot arrive at intersubjective facts of the kind physics enjoys. The reason for this is that what one person means by the term ‘anger’ is applied to a non-public emotion they felt, which they learnt while exhibiting public behaviour associated with the word ‘anger’ that comes down to them from Jones’ descriptive vocabulary. The person then later is able to use this term when they are talking about prior instances or are not displaying public symptoms of anger but may be feeling it. This means that Psychology, de Figurato, is forever doomed to speculations about the identity claims of underlying emotions. Since it has no Object Languages it cannot refer to a Neural Correlate of Consciousness or a First Person Science to begin building up identity claims about the mind. The problem, when fully spelled out means that

\[\text{equation}\]

435 Recall that Chalmers can do this, but his phenomenal zombie cannot.
since Psychology lacks the Fact Stating Roles of an Object Language, a fortiori, the scope of the language of Psychology must remain foundationally speculative. Psychology cannot make factual statements because the language it uses is referentially indeterminate. It cannot express knowledge about the mind in the Object Languages of the Sciences, nor can it make identity claims about emotional states that transverse what any one person learns to associate with a feeling while displaying a behaviour to what another person has learned to associate with a word, without creating indeterminacy. The domain of Psychology is, in this way, endemically speculative.

Psychiatry can make factual statements about the body. It is not limited to metaphorical uses of the Object Language but can also feature these as part of its explanations. This introduces the possibility for a Neural Correlate of Consciousness in Psychiatry, since, unlike the Psychology of the Figurato-Litero Model, Psychiatry utilizes fact-stating language roles that draw on the hard medical sciences. Psychiatry is Litero, as well as de Figurato.

The idea of a Neural Correlate of Consciousness is David Chalmers’ concept and not my own. The chief difference here, is that I think the authority for an identity claim about whether two pieces of neurological data correspond to the same emotion depends on a first personal point of view. It is up to the person who is strapped to the machine to say whether neurological data 1 is disgust, and seemingly identical data 2 in the same subject is not disgust, but a different emotion, which the subject calls ‘mistrust’. The authority does not derive from
the data, nor the machine, but the subject’s own experience. This is the Caveat Authority implied by first person access to praeter-linguistic sources of phenomenal experience. How would one describe anger to someone who had never had it? Indeed, words fall short. One might mouth ‘anger’, but then what? How do you describe that sudden familiar flash of ire and irritation that washes through you to a phenomenal zombie who has never felt it? Such a thing is praeter-linguistic, beyond language, and yet, it is exactly these praeter-linguistic sources we rely upon, when we search our feelings and use them to determine what words we use to talk about how we feel. The people who listen to us, do not have our experiences of that particular instance of anger we are describing, but rather use their own experiences as an analogue to understand our words on how something made us feel.

A formal theory of consciousness should also be able to solve the problems researchers are having with context dependent claims, by introducing an explanation for why subjects respond to the same stimulus in different ways, and why identical neurological information can ‘feel’ different for the same subject by providing grounds for what can count towards a claim for correlating neural scientific information with a theory of consciousness from the perspective of the first person, as a first person science. Here the paper finds some common ground with David Chalmers. But where Chalmers advocates for an amphibious view between Functionalism and Consciousness with any clash over claims about the mind, favouring Functionalism. I, however, argue for a view that
favours consciousness as a First-Person Science, an Autophenomenology, but one supported by other Heterophenomenologies.

An analysis of behaviour and language as a research field, I think is possible. Where, perhaps, I differ is whether to call the investigation of language and behaviour ‘psychology’. The attribution, study of, and investigation into the relationship between language, behaviours and actions occurs in such a wide range of fields there are grounds to question whether a ‘psychology’ of ‘action’ or ‘behaviour’ could even be distinguished as a distinct field among them in any classical sense. Martial artists, skateboarders, sports commentators, sewing instructors, Master Masons and manuals on etiquette all have names, slang, terms and descriptions for behaviours, skills and actions. Naming human actions seems more like a feature common to natural languages than a specific psychological field of enquiry or research on the mind. What I have described as a Psychological Endo-Language and descended from a Jonesian Paleo-Behavioural Language, might equally be made to apply to any branch of human endeavour where humans develop names for their actions and eventually come to Self-Report and think in those terms. One might argue that Karate, Fencing, Rugby Union, The Cha-Cha and Table d'Hote all have their Jonesian Behavioural Messiahs.

This leads us to the final fate of Psychology. Since there is no way to know if the emotional experiences people attach to behaviours when they learn them are the same, the language of affect is endemically idiosyncratic,
autobiographical and indeterminable. It follows that if Psychology cannot
investigate the idiosyncratic and inaccessible realm of private emotional affect,
and also that the creation of names for human actions and behaviours is a
feature of natural language, and thus not a specific domain of enquiry into the
mind, there is no subject domain left for Psychology, per se, to investigate. What
we took to be classical Psychology was a confusion between the first and the
third person, which generated indeterminacy in the very terms theorists
attempted to build their theories from. The one true and best hope for a way out
of the indeterminacy problem was Ryle’s Ordinary Language Philosophy which
rested on the observation that people seem to know how to talk publicly about
their private emotional experiences. But we saw that Ryle’s philosophy was
hopelessly riddled with surrepetitiously disguised appeals to our private
experiences. Ryle’s Occult Phenomenological Strain of Arguments undid his
Ordinary Language claims, and what we found in them, was the same
possibility for indeterminacy to arise. This was most evident in the ‘flash-bang’
thread, where the person must search their own feelings to decide if a
phenomenal qualitative flash is one of anger or grief.

The prolegomena this thesis offers for any future philosophy of mind is
that research into the mind is fundamentally of two different types. Firstly,

\[\text{436} \text{ Like examining our memories of private studies for private twinges of studiousness, or the}
\text{qualitative phenomenal difference between seeing a light so bright it hurts our eyes, and trying to}
\text{visualize a light so bright it hurts our eyes.}\]
there is Heteropheneomenalogical research which is done from the third person, and covers behaviours, language, physiology and neurophysiology. Secondly there is Autophenomenology, which involves private experiences, introspections, phenomenological refutations, understanding of one’s own emotional experiences and exploration of consciousness through reflective introspective states.

In practice, if we relate this back to Francis’ subject it would seem, on first glance, that she would be able to correlate claims by a single patient with the Object Languages of Neuroscience. She might state that the patient knew what the terms meant in the semantics of their own developing autobiographical understanding of language, and talk about ‘negative internalizing emotion 1’ of ‘patient 1’ in a “speculative guesswork way” from her own autobiographical understanding of language. Where this becomes a problem is that the meanings the subject has for the words they use may not necessarily be the ones the researcher has. To avoid this problem, the practitioner of mind needs to become the subject in order to evade the problem of identity claims that differ between people. This is what this thesis argues for. This, of course, is Autophenomenology, and as you have read Ryle’s Occult Phenomenological Strain surreptitiously hidden in his other arguments, you too, reader have built up your own autobiographical understanding and private phenomenology for performing your own introspective analysis of the evidence in Ryle’s philosophy presented to your own private consciousness. With the Death of Psychology, there opens up a new and interesting area of first person research. Since
language is not intersubjective enough to allow for identity claims in a shared
domain of meaning, the psychiatrist or theorist of mind needs to strap
themselves into the (f)MIR, EEG or PET device and explore the identity of their
own emotional experiences to determine whether, for instance, ‘disgust’ and
‘mistrust’ are the same sorts of cognitive experiences even when the neurological
data tells them they are.

This paper has killed a myth, a very dangerous myth, that language is
entirely intersubjective, and that what both you and I mean by ‘anger’, as
members of the same linguistic community, is the same thing when we use it to
refer to our own private experiences. The problem of the possibility for
indeterminacy arises when we each use the same term to refer to other people’s
publicly observable behaviour, and again when we draw on analogical structures
to reflect on what someone displaying those publicly observable behaviours
might be feeling. This myth was dangerous because it lead us down research
paths that ended in muddles about what the identity conditions for words like
‘anger’, ‘fear’ and ‘envy’ were based on, or simply ignored the issue of whether
Sue and Rod meant the same thing as the theorist, when any one of the three used a term in a self-description or an observation. This dangerous myth
produced over a century of ‘speculative’ claims and produced rival and
contradictory schools of psychology that lacked a genuine foundation to make
identity claims about the mind beyond the mere speculations of what one person
feels and learns to associate with a word in conjunction with similar patterns of
publicly observable behaviour, to what another person has learned to associate with a word. Such cannot be done without creating indeterminacy. Any such reasonings are thus guesswork for an unobservable realm of experience in another and thus merely speculative, not determinate. The trouble, of course, is that the experience behind the words in common usage may not be the same type or even kind of experience between people using the same word. This is a problem given that words like “anger”, “oedipal jealousy”, “infatuation”, “shame”, “mistrust”, “disgust”, “distress”, “internalizing guilt” and “desire” are what psychological theories are typically made-out of. Even the descriptions of the phenomenological aspects for these emotions may be endemically subjective and thus incurably speculative when we turn them into theories and apply them to other people’s private lives. There is no guarantee that the feeling of the emotion I learn the word for while exhibiting certain types of behaviour, is the same type of experience you have when you learn the word for your behaviour.

All that is needed to create the illusion of intersubjectivity is similar patterns of behaviour a Jonesian Behaviourist can name at a developmental stage in language. The illusion of intersubjectivity arises because at certain developmental stages the language is learnt both from and for observable behaviours. While the words are at the observable behavioural stages of development (the Paleo-Behaviourist era) or the Gross-Body-Language learners’ stage, (i.e. someone learning the tribe’s established language) the words appear to have a gross behavioural uniformity because they refer to similar symptoms
of behaviour. However, once someone has internalized the language there is no way to know if the words they are using refer to the same emotions. This is because there is no way of knowing if the emotions and experiences related to the behaviours, which we ascribe words to (creating the illusion of uniformity) are the same emotions and experiences between different people. There is no guarantee that the autobiographical ascription of words to emotion and experience, in Self Reports, following the internalization of a word for a private experience, is in fact the same across different people. Thus, arises both the root and cause of the indeterminacy of language plaguing the disciplines of mind. Any theory constructed from these words, and applied to another person is speculative at best and suffers the problem that the theorist is using their own private autobiographical vocabulary of meanings. Freud’s schadenfreude might be Jung’s guilt, and what Jung is calling guilt could be Freud’s feelings of oedipal jealousy. They might not. We simply have no way of knowing and any attempt we make is speculative at best. However, accepting this frees us from the baggage of a century of blind alleys, shifting bedrock and discredited theories.

Some might read into my refutation of Michael Dummett’s implicit Anti-Psychologism as an argument for the end of Analytic Philosophy. I think this is a mistake. Dummett offers us one particular view of the mind favoured by a generation of Analytic Philosophers concerned with the Philosophy of Mind and its relationship with The Philosophy of Language.
I argue that Analytic Philosophy can survive a Phenomenological Turn and thrive. There has been a recent generation of Analytic Philosophers like Peter Jackson, Richard Menary, Kerry Sanders, Tim Crane, Mark Rowlands, Hector-Neri Castaneda, Michael Devitt, Stephan Darwall, John Waterman and David Chalmers who are interested in a re-examination of consciousness. This suggests to me that the Phenomenological Turn towards Psychologism may already be here in its earliest stages, particularly in Tim Crane and Mark Rowlands. Rather than an end of Analytic Philosophy, I argue that a Phenomenological Turn in Analytic Philosophy is simply a new stage in the development of a tradition of philosophy spanning the Twentieth Century. Analytic Philosophy on this view might be seen as not merely concerned with upholding a certain thesis about the priority of language in layer-cake explanations about the mind, but as an evolving systematic concern that involves methodological rigour, and a developing body of specific training for dealing with philosophical problems that is passed down from generation to generation.

END OF PAPER


Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1975.


Chalmers, David; Bayne, Tim. ‘What Is the Unity of Consciousness.’ In The
Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation edited by Chris
Frith Axel Cleeremans. Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012 @
.001.0001/acprof-9780198508571 downloaded 05/06/2012:: Oxford, 2003.

Cooper, John; Heron, Timothy; Heward, William. Applied Behaviour Analysis.

Chene, Dennis. Life Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. London:
Cornell University 2000.

Chroust, Anton-Hermann. ‘Eudemus or on the Soul: A Lost Dialogue of Aristotle

Clark, Andy; Chalmers, David, J. ‘The Extended Mind.’ In The Extended Mind,
edited by Richard Menary, Pp 27 - 41. Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press,
2010.


Marcia, James, Ruthellen Josselson ‘Eriksonian Personlaity Research and Its Implications for Psychotherapy.’ *Journal of Personality* 81, no. 6 (2013): Pp 617-626.


http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405110778_chunk_g97814051107788 [accessed 19/102011].


Monero, Zerka Toeman. ‘The Significance of Doubling and Role Reversal for Cosmic Man.’ Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama, A Quarterly

Murphy, Julien S. *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre*


______. ‘Some Reflections on Language Games.’ *Philosophy of Science* 1, no. 21 (1954).


http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405110778_chunk_g97814051107789 [accessed 19/10/2011].


Stern, Alexandra Minna. ‘Sterilized in the Name of Public Health: Race, Immigration, and Reproductive Control in Modern California.’ *American Journal of Public Health* 95, no. 7 (2005).


Velmans, Max. ‘Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology: A Dialogue with Dan Dennett. ‘Unpublished’, deposited at ‘


