DORAN’S THE TRINITY IN HISTORY:
THE GIRARDIAN CONNECTION

Neil Ormerod
Australian Catholic University

Robert Doran’s *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Mission*, volume 1, *Missions and Processions*, marks the culmination of over two decades of writing on the question of the nature of systematic theology, the notion of a theology of history, and the significance of what has become called “the four-point hypothesis,” which relates the four Trinitarian relations to various created participations in the divine nature. Drawing on Lonergan’s notions of the scale of values, of dialectics at the personal, cultural, and social level, together with the four-point hypothesis, Doran is providing a framework for a systematic theology for the next millennium. Just as Aquinas developed his remarkable synthesis on the basis of the grace-nature distinction and the visible and invisible missions of the Son and the Spirit, Doran deploys the scale of values, as an unpacking of the grace-nature distinction, and the four-point hypothesis as an enrichment of the missions of Son and Spirit, to project a Trinitarian theology of history.¹ Nonetheless the final achievement of a theology at the level of our time can never be the work of a single person, or even perhaps a single generation of scholars:

In the last analysis, such a theology must be a collaborative enterprise, the work of a community of persons building on common or complementary foundations, employing common or complementary methods, and sharing common or complementary presuppositions as to what systematic theology is and what is needed to move it forward.²

I have written elsewhere on the issue of the four-point hypothesis, which I believe to be the most significant advance, together with the scale of values, in systematic theology since Aquinas. Indeed I argue that the seeds of the four-point hypothesis can be found in Augustine and Aquinas, who had the basics within their grasp, but simply did not join the dots. In this way Lonergan’s work is an element in a genetic sequence of systematic theologies going back at least to the fifth century, and to which Doran’s work further contributes. He does so by taking the four-point hypothesis as his starting point, bringing into a single perspective both immanent (God in Godself) and economic (God for us) concerns, unified by a new and “supernatural” version of the psychological analogy for the Trinity.

In this article, however, I would like to engage Doran’s ongoing dialogue with the work of René Girard, as someone with “complementary” foundations and methods, in helping clarify Doran’s notion of “autonomous spiritual processions.” This notion is an essential element in his attempt to use the four-point hypothesis to develop a supernatural psychological analogy which parallels the “natural” analogy developed by Augustine and refined by Aquinas and Lonergan. My concern here lies not so much with Doran’s own contribution but with the question of Girard’s suitability in providing a proper complementarity to the project.

The article consists of three sections. The first considers Doran’s proposed nexus between the four-point hypothesis and the psychological analogy, and how this nexus might evoke Girard as a potential dialogue partner on the question of mimesis. The second section provides a summary of Girard’s position on the question of mimesis for those less familiar with his work. In the third section I focus in particular on Girard’s notions of internal and external mediation of desire, arguing that this account is simply descriptive rather than explanatory, and as such fails to properly identify the real nature of the distinction involved.

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4 “A trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas and Lonergan: Contingent Predication and the Trinity” (forthcoming).
The basic structure of the four-point hypothesis arises from an analogy Lonergan adopts from his discussion of contingent predication, that is, the question of how contingent realities can be predicated of God. His answer to this is in terms of the category of relation. To predicate some created reality to God designates a real relation in the created reality, but only a logical relation in God, so that God is not really changed in Godself. For example, to call God creator designates a reality in the created order but not a new reality in God, who remains the same whether God creates or does not create. The question we need to then ask is whether this same logic of relations can extend not just to God, but to the individual persons of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Spirit. Given these persons are defined by their mutual relationships, can we use the inner-Trinitarian relations to predicate created realities to the persons individually? The created reality that would then occur would in some sense participate in or imitate the divine relations, just as creatures generally participate in or imitate the divine reality by their very existence. This is spelt out clearly in Lonergan’s earlier writings on grace where he notes:

Now since every finite substance is something absolute, it seems appropriate to say it imitates the divine essence considered as absolute. But since these four eminent graces are intimately connected with the divine life, it seems appropriate to say that they imitate the divine essence considered as really identical with one or other real trinitarian relation. Thus the grace of union imitates and participates in a finite way the divine paternity, the light of glory divine filiation, sanctifying grace active spiration, and the virtue of charity passive spiration.  

Augustine gives some hint of this possibility in Book 5 of De Trinitate where he notes: “But as for the things each of the three in this triad is called that are proper or peculiar to himself, such things are never said with reference to the self but only with reference to each other or to creation, and therefore it is clear that they are said by way of relationship and not by way of substance.” Augustine, The Trinity, ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1991), 197. De Trinitate 5.12 (emphasis added). Significantly the translator dismisses this suggestion as confusion on Augustine’s part. I would argue rather that it marks the beginning of the elements needed for the four-point hypothesis.  

While this is not the final form the hypothesis takes, it does state clearly the ways in which the analogy operates, taking its stance on the analogy between creature and creator and extending it to the individual persons through the category of relation. In this way the created participations in the divine nature are an extension of the act of creation itself, drawing the creature into a more intimate sharing in the Trinitarian life of God.

Through his further reflections on the incarnation, Lonergan will tinker with the above structure slightly as he adopts a disputed position within Aquinas on what is called the “secondary act of existence” found in the incarnate Word. This position is then taken up in his final expression on the four-point hypothesis in *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica*:

First, there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.

This is the form utilized in Doran’s discussions. It takes the twofold communication of the divine nature through the two processions manifest in salvation as the divine missions and generalizes it to the four trinitarian relations to provide four created participations of the divine nature in human history.

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The question is, how does this relate to a possible supernatural psychological analogy? The development that Doran is seeking to achieve is that of a supernatural analogy based on these created participations in the divine nature which would in some sense parallel the natural analogy based on cognitional and volitional operations in the human subject. While the natural analogy provides a natural *imago Dei*, present in us all, saints and sinners, the supernatural analogy is to be found where grace abides, as the indwelling of the Trinity within the saints. I shall focus attention on only one aspect of this, largely because it is the one I have a best handle on, and take it as illustrative of the other aspects.

Let us then consider the natural analogy for the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son as found in Augustine and Aquinas. The analogy involved is that whereby a judgment of value gives rise to a loving decision to love that which is judged of value. This loving decision is “because of” the intelligent and reasonable grasp of the goodness of the thing loved. It is not automatic or spontaneous, but deliberate, an act (of love) from act (of judgment). In metaphysical terms it is a *processio operati*, for which Lonergan uses the term “intelligible emanation.” Here intelligible means both intelligible and intelligent, that is, under the control of intellectual process. Hence it is not just “caused,” but “because of” an intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation of goodness.

Doran then asks us to consider an analogous situation in relation to sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. These are related to one another as active and passive spiration are related to one another in the Trinity, the two relations simply being the single procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, viewed from the two possible vantage points. The argument is that these created supernatural realities in us thus provide a supernatural analogy for the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son within graced human consciousness. Acts born of the habit of charity flow from the sanctifying grace in a manner analogous to the way the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. How then shall we characterize this “flow”?

\[9\] I think Augustine attempts something like this in the final books of *De Trinitate*, but in the end he admits defeat: “You cannot do it, I know. I am telling the truth, I am telling it to myself, I know what I cannot do” (Book 15.50). See Neil Ormerod, “Augustine’s *De Trinitate* and Lonergan’s Realms of Meaning,” *Theological Studies* 64 (2003): 773-94, for an account of how the final books of that work are best understood as operation in the realm of transcendence, where God is known and loved.
At this stage Doran draws the analogy Lonergan developed in his later writings that take their starting point not in cognition but in love:

The psychological analogy, then, has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments of value are carried out in the decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho theos, who is identified with agape (I John 4:8,16). Such love expresses itself in its word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.10

As above, the question is how can we characterize the movement from the dynamic state of being in love manifest in judgments of value and decision as an act of loving?11 Rather than the term “intelligible emanation,” Doran proposes the term “autonomous spiritual procession.” This captures the reality of a spiritual act arising from and “because of and in proportion to” a prior spiritual act (so that it is “act from act”), where the term autonomous evokes the notion of personal agency or responsibility for the second act.12 It is a personal process, not spontaneous or automatic, but autonomous and hence something for which I am responsible. Doran uses this notion of autonomous spiritual procession to capture the “flow” from sanctifying grace to acts born of the habit of charity. If I am reading this correctly, what we have here is the classical distinction between grace as operative and as cooperative, cast in the language of interiority. According to this schema, sanctifying grace is operative, whereby God takes out the heart of stone and replaces it with the heart of flesh; the habit of charity is cooperative, dependent upon the work of sanctifying grace but also our “cooperative” autonomous spiritual procession of a decision to love. I am

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11 One could interpose here Doran’s discussion of the three modes of election in the Ignatian exercises as three modes of coming to a judgment of value. This would make a complex discussion even more complex. However I would note that each such mode involves a procession of “act from act.”
12 Doran, Missions and Processions, 176-95.
not sure this aligns with the position of Aquinas, who sees both sanctifying grace and the habit of charity as operative and cooperative, so there may be some more work to do here.\footnote{I have a preliminary suggestion here, but it will need development in a fuller piece.}

Doran then brings this notion of autonomous spiritual procession into dialogue with the work of Girard. As Doran notes, Girard tends to collapse the notions of spontaneity and autonomy, relegating them to mythic constructs that mask the mediated nature of human desire. For Girard, as we show below, our desires are mediated to us; they are mimetic. Far from being a spontaneous expression of “who I am,” my desiring self is socially mediated through the desires of others. A further complication here is that the way in which the four-point hypothesis has been stated by Lonergan, each of the four created participations in the divine nature is the result of an exemplary causality. The four graces participate in and “imitate” the four inner-Trinitarian relationships. While this imitation is used in a metaphysical sense, it does raise the question of how this metaphysical notion of imitation may be transposed into the language of interiority and how such a transposition may draw insight from Girard’s account of mimesis.

**Girard on Mimesis and Desire**

Girard’s work is difficult to classify. It has points of contact with psychoanalysis, literary theory, cultural studies, and theology. Certainly his work has fruitfully been taken up by various theologians, particularly in the area of the theological understanding of original sin and soteriology.\footnote{See, for example, James Alison, *The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin through Easter Eyes* (New York: Crossroad, 1998); Raymund Schwager, *Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption* (New York: Crossroad, 1999); Robert J. Daly, *Sacrifice Unveiled: The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice* (London: T & T Clark, 2009); Neil Ormerod, “The Dual Language of Sacrifice,” *Pacifica* 17 (2004): 159-69.} Perhaps the central feature of Girard’s thought is his analysis of desire, or more specifically the mimetic nature of desire. For Girard, our desires are mimetic, or imitative. Such a stance is a major critique of the notion of autonomous subjectivity prevalent in the Enlightenment, the self-directing, self-creating subject, who autonomously creates a personal world of meaning and value. If indeed our desires are mimetic then our desires in fact reflect the desires of those around us, and so are shaped and even manipulated by our social and cultural environment (a fact used, of course, by advertisers).
Girard’s analysis of the mimetic nature of desire can be confirmed in the common experience of parents whose children begin to fight over a toy. The fact that one child desires the toy immediately makes the toy more desirable for the other child. More generally, “we learn to desire by copying the desires of others. Our desires are rooted not in their objects nor in ourselves, but in a third party, the model or mediator.” Thus the “ground of desire resides, not in any one subject, but between subjects.”¹⁵ Desire is thus interpersonal. In this process of mediation, Girard distinguishes two categories, external and internal mediation, where the distinction is one of the symbolic or psychological distance between the subject and the mediator. External mediation allows for some distance or objectification of the process, so that one may be “proud to be the discipline of so worthy a model,” while in internal mediation one “carefully hides [one’s] efforts to imitate the model.” In such internal mediation the mediator then becomes a mimetic rival, with whom one is in competition. “The mediator becomes a shrewd and diabolical enemy who tries to rob the subject of his or her most prized possessions.”¹⁶

This mimetic rivalry lies at the heart of the phenomenon of scapegoating which Girard has analyzed in various works.¹⁷ This phenomenon works through five distinct stages: “1. Mimetic desire; 2. Mimetic doubling; 3. Mimetic crisis; 4. The Single-Victim-Mechanism; 5. Theogony and the genesis of culture.”¹⁸ The crisis engendered through mimetic doubling and rivalry threatens to destroy the society and is resolved through a focusing of violence on a single victim, the scapegoat. The sacrifice of the scapegoat restores social harmony, transforming the victim into a “divine” source of social healing and reconciliation. The efforts of the society to hide from itself this originating violence give rise to culture and religion, whose purpose is to perpetuate the lie of violence at the heart of the society.


What does mimesis reveal to us about the human subject? As Doran puts the matter:

Imitative desire, wherever it occurs, is always a desire to be Another because of a profound sense of the radical insufficiency of one’s own very being. To covet what the other desires is to covet the other’s essence . . . the subject really wants not only what the mediator wants or perhaps has, but even what the mediator is . . . They must be painfully conscious of their own emptiness to crave so desperately the fullness of being that supposedly lies in others.19

Girard refers to this desire as metaphysical desire, a “wish to absorb, or to be absorbed into, the substance of the Other,” a desire coupled with “an insuperable revulsion for one’s own substance.” Metaphysical desire is “a will to self destruction as one becomes something or someone other than what one is.”20 This reveals a “radical ontological sickness at the core of mimetic desire” for which the “only triumph possible is the complete renunciation of mimetic desire and of the ontological malady that accompanies it.”21

**Critique of Girard**

I have published a more substantial engagement with Girard elsewhere, in which I focused on his failure to distinguish between natural and elicited desire and hence his oversight of the natural desire to know God, which according to Lonergan is not elicited but constituted by our unrestricted desire to know. This has implications in particular for Girard’s account of the origins of culture where he fails to attend to what Doran, following Voegelin, calls the anthropological pole of the cultural dialectic.22 In this essay, I want to focus on one element of Girard’s account of mimesis, that is, his distinction between internal and external mediation of desire. This distinction is defined in terms of the “distance,” largely psychological and symbolic, between the subject and the one who mediates the desire.

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19Doran, “Imitating the Divine Relations,” 176.
20Doran, “Imitating the Divine Relations,” 177.
21Doran, “Imitating the Divine Relations,” 178.
While Girard groups mediated desires into these two fundamental categories, he allows that within this division there “can be an infinite number of secondary distinctions.” There is external mediation of the desire when the distance between the subject and the model is “sufficient to eliminate any contact between the two spheres of possibilities of which the mediator and the subject occupy the respective centers.” There is internal mediation when this distance “is sufficiently reduced to allow these two spheres to penetrate each other more of less profoundly.”

What is of interest is the language deployed here – distance, spheres of possibilities, contact – language which is decidedly descriptive and metaphorical, but also not clearly explanatory. The basic distinction between external and internal mediation sounds like an either/or, but then is further expressed in terms of relativity, more or less. And it is difficult to grasp just what constitutes “distance” and how it is measured, and how much “distance” is required to move from one category to the other.

How then might we reframe this language? As an alternative I would like to suggest that the distinction Girard is seeking to express would be better stated in the more explanatory language of “conscious but not objectified” and “conscious and objectified.” Lonergan adopts the language of “conscious but not objectified” to speak of the world of affectivity to the extent that we fail to attend to it, leading to a growing conflict between the self as conscious and the self as objectified. This is a genuinely either/or distinction, while still lending itself to a “more or less,” through the more or less successful objectification of the conscious affects involved. It seems to me that most of the mechanism that Girard identifies as scapegoating operates precisely because of the non-objectified nature of the conscious states involved. Hence salvation for Girard involves the objectification of the mechanism, historically made possible through the life and death of Jesus which exposes mimesis and the scapegoat mechanism for what they are.

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23Doran, Missions and Processions, 205.
25It strikes me that there is a certain gnostic feel to Girard’s work, that is, salvation is through having the right knowledge, in this case knowledge of the scapegoat mechanism.
We can push this further by reflecting on the nature of internal mediation. Doran places this as operating within the “first way of being conscious” which is psychic rather than intentional, and so its origins are to be found in neural demands emerging into consciousness. In this regard Girardians have been excited by the discovery of what are called “mirror neurons,” neurons which seem to trigger in one subject when they see another performing a particular task, a reaction first identified in monkeys.26 These neurons seem to mirror the neural activities of the model. In evolutionary terms this would be quite adaptive as it facilitates the development of adaptive behaviors in the young which are necessary for survival. If verified this would suggest the deep biological origins of internal mimesis. In some ways it might even be the primary mechanism for what Lonergan refers to as spontaneous intersubjectivity, which he refers to as the “primordial basis” for community.27 If so, this would place internal and external mediation as two very different realities. Here I would like to draw a parallel between spontaneous intersubjectivity and interpersonal relationships on the one hand, and internal and external mediation on the other. Spontaneous intersubjectivity should not be confused with the intelligent, reasonable, responsible and loving formation of interpersonal relationships, however much such spontaneity might be its initial spark. Similarly I think it is a confusion to identify internal and external mediation of desire as two aspects of one thing. Rather, they are two distinct things altogether. The spontaneous emergence of desire though internal mediation should not be confused with the objectification of and responsible negotiation of such spontaneity leading to authentic decision making.

Of course there are many ways in which such objectification and decision making can go wrong, as we are all too familiar. However, such failures hinge on our failure to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in relation to our experience of mimesis. This observation is important, I believe, because there is a tendency within Girardians to think “internal

26 There is a vast and controverted literature on the question of mirror neurons and their significance, but it is an idea which Girardians have taken up with great interest. See, for example, Vittorio Gallese, “The Two Sides of Mimesis: Girard’s Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation, and Social Identification,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 16, no. 4 (2009): 21-44.

mediation = bad” and “external mediation = good.” But on the reading above, as Doran notes, the mechanism of mimesis is neutral; the problem is not the type of mimesis per se, but a failure to conform oneself to the transcendental precepts. What Girard has done in his account of mimesis is, I think, to identify some of the ways in which the process of objectification of mimetic desire can be derailed, leading to irresponsible decision making (for example, scapegoating), much as Lonergan’s account of the biases does in relation to the pure desire to know.

Furthermore, this process of objectification and decision making arises from our non-mimetic (that is, unelicited) and natural desire for meaning, truth, and goodness which is at its heart a natural desire to see God. This desire is unrestricted in scope, natural to the human condition, and is a natural created participation in the divine nature as the source of all truth and goodness. There is a certain sense in which we could call this participation imitative, but not in either of the senses of internal or external mediation that Girard is speaking about. It is conscious, often unobjectified, but not mimetic in the usual Girardian sense of the term. It is, as Lonergan would say, natural, not elicited. This is significant because Doran wants to make connections between the supernatural created participations in and imitations of the divine nature that form the four-point hypothesis and Girard’s notion of mimesis. If grace completes and perfects nature, and if the natural and non-mimetic desire to see God is fundamentally elevated through the experience of divine love that “dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on [to set] up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing,” then it is not clear to me that this

28 As I have said elsewhere, this is one of the reasons I find Girard’s position more Protestant than Catholic because there is a strong tendency to see human nature as inherently corrupt. See Ormerod, “Desire and the Origins of Culture.”

29 Doran, Missions and Processions, 212.


31 Method in Theology, 106. Technically I think one would say that grace does not supply human nature with a new end (which is God), but rather a new relation to that end. That “new relation” is then specified in terms of the various created participations in the divine nature, the foundation of which is sanctifying grace.
operative grace is mimetic in the senses in which Girard uses the term.\textsuperscript{32} If I am correct, then I think there would be ramifications for chapter 8 in Doran’s book. I think Girard’s work requires a significant re-orientation and transposition before it can be successfully appropriated into a theological project of the type Doran is developing.

**Conclusion**

What cannot be doubted throughout this discussion are the creative insights that Doran is bringing to bear on the theology of the Trinity. In previous works and in the current one under consideration, Doran speaks of a genetic sequence of systematic theologies, each building upon what has gone before, fleshing out potentialities in the previous stage, not neglecting previous achievements, but placing then into a new and enriching context.\textsuperscript{33} It seems to me that this is what Doran has himself done in relation to Lonergan’s contribution. It is unclear to me that Lonergan fully appreciated what he had achieved in the four-point hypothesis. It is spelt out in his *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica* and not further developed. Doran has helped us see the riches it holds, unpacking its potentialities and placing the deep heritage going back to Augustine in a new and enriching context.

\textsuperscript{32}I am open, however, to the suggestion that the cooperative aspects of grace may have a mimetic component.

\textsuperscript{33}See, for example, Robert M. Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 89.