Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences

Journal article


Rowland, Richard. (2013). Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences. Utilitas. 25(3), pp. 405 - 416. https://doi.org/10.1017/s095382081300006X
AuthorsRowland, Richard
Abstract

In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of reasons for pro-attitudes are reasons that would not still be reasons for pro-attitudes if it were not for the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.

Year2013
JournalUtilitas
Journal citation25 (3), pp. 405 - 416
ISSN0953-8208
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1017/s095382081300006X
Page range405 - 416
Research GroupInstitute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Publisher's version
File Access Level
Controlled
Permalink -

https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8v467/wrong-kind-of-reasons-and-consequences

Restricted files

Publisher's version

  • 56
    total views
  • 0
    total downloads
  • 3
    views this month
  • 0
    downloads this month
These values are for the period from 19th October 2020, when this repository was created.

Export as

Related outputs

The normative and the evaluative : The buck-passing account of value
Rowland, Richard. (2019). The normative and the evaluative : The buck-passing account of value Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833611.001.0001
The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment
Rowland, Richard. (2018). The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment. Analysis. 78(2), pp. 266 - 275. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx140
The significance of significant fundamental moral disagreement
Rowland, Richard. (2017). The significance of significant fundamental moral disagreement. Nous. 51(4), pp. 802 - 831. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12170
Reasons or fittingness first?
Rowland, Richard. (2017). Reasons or fittingness first? Ethics: an international journal of social, political, and legal philosophy. 128(1), pp. 212 - 229. https://doi.org/10.1086/692949
Our intuitions about the experience machine
Rowland, Richard. (2017). Our intuitions about the experience machine. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy: online peer-reviewed journal of moral, political and legal philosophy. 12(1), pp. 110 - 117. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i1.216
The epistemology of moral disagreement
Rowland, Richard. (2017). The epistemology of moral disagreement. Philosophy Compass. 12(2), pp. 1 - 16. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12398
Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments
Rowland, Richard. (2016). Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments. The Philosophical Quarterly. 66(262), pp. 161 - 171. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv070
In defence of good simpliciter
Rowland, Richard. (2016). In defence of good simpliciter. Philosophical Studies. 173(5), pp. 1371 - 1391. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0551-9
Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
Rowland, Richard. (2015). Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Philosophical Studies. 172(6), pp. 1455 - 1474. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0359-z
Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness
Rowland, Richard. (2015). Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12057
Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons
Rowland, Richard. (2013). Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons. Journal of ethics and social philosophy. 7(1), pp. 1 - 24.
Why Pass Every Buck? On Skorupski's Buck-Passing Account of Normativity
Rowland, Richard. (2011). Why Pass Every Buck? On Skorupski's Buck-Passing Account of Normativity. Ratio: an international journal of analytic philosophy. 24(3), pp. 340 - 348. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00504.x